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Abstract
This dissertation is the first full-length study to explore how the Canadian
government and military disposed of surplus munitions and supplies after the Second
World War. By investigating how the state planned and implemented its disposal
program from 1943 to 1948, this thesis places objects at the centre of attention and
demonstrates their profound political, social, and economic significance. By examining
the extended social lives of munitions and supplies in relationship to their postwar impact
on civilian life, this study offers a new and innovative perspective that links material
culture with postwar reconstruction, rehabilitation, and demobilization. What follows is a
history of how Canadians turned swords into plowshares that contributes to the fields of
military history, Canadian history, material culture, and disarmament studies.
Disposal was an important element of Canada’s exit strategy for the Second World
War because the objects accumulated to fight survived long after hostilities ended and
required diligent procedures to demobilize or destroy. In November 1943, the Canadian
government established the Crown Assets Allocation Committee (CAAC) and the War
Assets Corporation (WAC) to plan, control, and implement its disposal program. This
study elaborates on four critical themes: 1) the continuous and evolving nature of public
pressure for government action on disposal; 2) the role of the CAAC and WAC in
controlling disposal operations; 3) the way the objects of war require stewardship from
one use to the next; and 4) the process through which munitions and supplies were
reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new forms, functions, and intentions. This
thesis argues that through the CAAC and WAC surplus assets were disposed of to
support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although disposal was
not perfect and left behind some dangerous environmental legacies, the conversion of
surplus assets into peacetime purposes ensured that objects gained new uses and
meanings thereby mitigating their threatening nature to economic stability, political
authority, and public safety.
Keywords: Canadian history; military history; munitions disposal; material culture;
demobilization; disarmament; reconstruction; rehabilitation; peace.
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Introduction
The Disposal Problem
Inventories of war material must always be on tremendous scale, with the consequence
that at the termination of hostilities surpluses of munitions and supplies are enormous
even if every machine producing war goods ceased functioning as the guns ceased
firing.1
John Berry, President of the War Assets Corporation
On 11 February 1946, Corporal William Denniston and several other members of
his squad were hard at work moving stacks of bedframes at the 14th Central Ordnance
Depot in Petawawa, Ontario. With the end of the Second World War a few months
earlier, such anti-climactic work had become commonplace, though Denniston probably
welcomed the banality after six years’ service with the infantry. A Scottish-born
immigrant and an older soldier by comparison to his peers, Denniston had enlisted with
the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa in 1939 and survived the campaigns in Normandy
and Northwest Europe unscathed. On 10 April 1945, he was repatriated back to Canada
to deal with a pending divorce and because he volunteered for service in the Pacific
theatre.2 However, the war’s end in September forced him to reconsider his future plans.
Like many soldiers, he wanted to remain in the postwar Army but had to make himself
useful to a military facing significant postwar budget cuts. When he arrived in Petawawa
in December 1945, he must have seen the writing on the wall. Given that Petawawa was a
major supply base, he found his postwar plans piling up all around him. When hostilities
ended, the procurement and consumption of munitions and supplies dropped off
substantially from wartime peaks, yet the objects acquired by the government and
military did not just disappear. Denniston must have realized that the Army needed
custodians for all the leftover stuff, so he completed several courses on equipment storage
and took up a new posting in logistics.3

1

John Berry, “Functions of War Assets Corporation,” Quarterly Review of Commerce, Vol. 12 (1946), 32

2

Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG24, Vol. 25728, File: SC20954 Denniston, William
Ferguson, “Canadian Active Service Force Attestation Paper,” 6 September 1939; Ibid, “Record of
Service,” various dates; Ibid, “Personnel Selection Record,” 9 July 1945.
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Ibid, “Canadian Active Service Force Attestation Paper,” 6 September 1939; Ibid, “Record of Service,”
various dates; Ibid, “Personnel Selection Record,” 9 July 1945.
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The job of stacking bedframes is an innocuous example of a much wider problem
that confronted the Canadian military and government after the Second World War. It
was also a problem that Denniston and his squad were working at solving when disaster
struck sometime after lunch. Unfortunately for Denniston everything came to an abrupt
and painful end that day in February. While preparing to load a stack of bedframes into a
Chevrolet truck driven by Gunner C. Serat, a 24-year-old soldier with two years of
driving experience, Denniston suddenly “walked between the pile of bed springs and tail
gate of [the] truck” and “was crushed.”4 He was first rushed to the Petawawa Military
Camp hospital and later transferred to the Pembroke General Hospital, but his condition
never improved. After several hours of agony, Denniston succumbed to a traumatic
laceration of the liver and peritoneal hemorrhage on the morning of 12 February 1946. 5
Although commemorated by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission as a fatal
casualty of the Second World War, in reality Denniston was a casualty of the cleanup.
Certainly moving bedframes from Drill Hall No. 2 and stacking them in Drill Hall
No. 3 was not a job usually associated with the death of a war hero, but this was the
mundane reality of ending war: when the pace of fighting slackened, the pace of disposal
picked up. Once Canadian soldiers returned home as veterans, the government and
military were left with all the weaponry and equipment they had used to wage war. In
effect, victory precipitated a major logistical crisis in transport, storage, and disposal.
Assets of all types were piling up everywhere as the residues of factory production kept
arriving, while shipments overseas ended and disbanded military units returned kit to
storage depots. Against the backdrop of VE-Day celebrations, there remained a lot of
cleanup and inventory work on the horizon. The vast stocks of munitions and supplies
had to be collected, appraised, stored, and disposed of so that the war’s material legacies
would support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. An excruciating
amount of effort and attention was required to administrate, control, and untangle this
logistical quagmire. After all, bedframes do not stack themselves.

4

Ibid, “Report of Injuries Other than Wounds Received in Action,” 11 February 1946.

5

Ibid, “Ontario Provincial Police Report of Accident,” 12 February 1946; Ibid, “Report of Injuries Other
than Wounds Received in Action,” 11 February 1946. See also: LAC, RG24, Vol. 16,166, War Diary –
14th Central Ordnance Depot, Log Entries 11 and 12 February 1946.
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The banality of collecting and storing leftover munitions and supplies served an
important postwar purpose. Such actions allowed the military to manage the war’s
materiality, tabulate inventories, and determine postwar requirements. Whatever kit was
surplus – unneeded for future plans or operations – had to be discarded after hostilities
ended. From bedframes to bullets, all the objects of war transitioned into peacetime
through similar mundane routines. In doing so, however, they forged profound legacies
that continued in many different forms and functions long after the fighting stopped.
Even the bedframes that Denniston diligently stacked possessed a postwar legacy.
Although this legacy might not have made it to the front page of newspapers, surplus
bedframes ended up fulfilling a number of important functions in peacetime. Taken from
empty barracks, they were reused in hospitals caring for injured veterans or university
dormitories overwhelmed with new students. Some bedframes even ended up in the
bedrooms of new home owners in suburban communities throughout Canada and others
were scrapped by junk dealers or metal manufacturers who recycled the materials back
into the economy.
Whatever the case, objects impacted their surrounding social, spatial, and human
relationships in both profound and subtle ways. As Bruno Latour explained in
Reassembling the Social, objects connect the physical world with human actions and
experience because they ground the “incommensurability” of social relationships in a
physical setting.6 Objects provide stability to the human experience and have agency in
shaping its character and outcomes. In other words, a material world forms the structures
where human experiences transpire. Objects fill spaces, build homes, produce other
things, provision activities, improve living standards, and connect humans to each other.
Although their omnipresence can be taken for granted or render them invisible, their
collective presence remains constant over time.7 Eventually, though, like the bedframes
in Petawawa, an object’s utility and meaning gets used up or becomes surplus. The object
then enters a new phase of its existence when it transitions between old and new uses and
owners. In effect, this constitutes a disposal process. Broadly speaking, the term disposal
6

Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 63-86, especially 70-78.
7

Ibid, 78-86.
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defines a two-way process in which one party (in this case the government or military)
relinquishes something considered unneeded or used up, while another party acquires it
in order to fulfill a need.8 Tracing the patterns of utility and meaning embedded into the
disposal process is a worthwhile line of inquiry that this dissertation will follow in
relationship to the political, economic, and social significance of surplus munitions and
supplies.
As the full scope and extent of the disposal problem emerged across every category
of item and weapon, the fate of objects procured for war purposes coalesced in the minds
of politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, business leaders, community groups, and
average citizens. From about May 1943 onwards, they all began to realize the important
and challenging nature of disposal. A great deal of time, resources, and tax dollars had
been invested in procuring munitions and supplies, so what would happen to all these
assets now that the war was over? To varying extents, it was understood that the
liquidation of government assets had to be carefully planned and rationally implemented
to avoid a postwar economic and political disaster. The vast inventories acquired by the
government and military could not be wasted or thrown away haphazardly, particularly if
certain objects maintained residual value in peacetime. Moreover, the unfavourable optics
of having spent billions in public funds on suddenly worthless things would not appease
any future electorate. The threat of profligacy and waste motivated policymakers to find
as many productive outcomes for surplus assets as possible. Yet, at the same time, the
vast inventories of surpluses posed an economic threat as an unregulated fire sale of
second-hand goods would precipitate a deflationary economic cycle. If surplus assets
flooded markets they would lower prices for new goods, shrink corporate profits, and
decrease employment. Therefore, disposal had to walk a fine line between public
pressure, political will, and economic stability.
The question of what happens when wars end and when armies are disbanded is
incredibly complex. As many scholars have demonstrated, making provision for the
rehabilitation of veterans and establishing schemes for the postwar reconstruction of

8

LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Radio Speech on CBC by C. D. Howe, 23 October 1944, 5-6;
“Disposal,” (Accessed 20 November 2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disposal.
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social services, the political economy, and family life were essential for supporting this
transition between war and peace.9 However, there were many other plans and programs
that occupied policymakers and military officers at the close of hostilities, some of which
have received scant attention from academics. This is particularly the case in regards to
cleanup operations and the disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies. In fact, no study
– academic or otherwise – was found on the subject. Therefore, this dissertation
constitutes the first full-length history of the disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies.
To be sure, this dissertation is not the first study to identify disposal as a relevant or
important topic. In fact, the burgeoning field of peace and conflict studies has long
identified DDR or Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration as fundamental
principles and strategies involved with ending wars and making peace. In general,
however, these studies tend to focus on current events and contemporary conflicts (or at
least those occurring after the formation of the United Nations).10 While informative and
interesting, they are often underpinned with little archival research and tend to focus
overwhelmingly on the Third World and Global South, even though rich and developed
countries faced broadly similar challenges when exiting wars.11 Often far away from the
carnage and destruction, developed and industrialized societies must also reintegrate excombatants, demobilize war industries, disband military power, and dispose of surplus
materiel. This dissertation will explore some of these important subjects by examining

9

For examples, see: Peter Neary, On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the
Second World War (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011); Magda Fahrni,
Household Politics: Montreal Families and Postwar Reconstruction, (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005); David Slater, War Finance and Reconstruction: The Role of Canada’s Department of
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how the Canadian government and military disposed of surplus munitions and supplies
from 1943 to 1948.
A number of other studies focus on disposal or related subjects. In general, this
body of literature can be divided into three categories. First, there exists some scholarship
explicitly focused on disposal after the Second World War. However, the bulk of these
studies were produced in the 1940s and might now be better interpreted as primary
evidence indicative of the growing contemporary concerns for demobilization.
Additionally, most of these early studies focused on the United States and explored the
legislative and organizational responses to this gigantic and future problem. A. D. H.
Kaplan’s The Liquidation of War Production is perhaps the best example, as his book and
articles pointed out the potential dangers of inadequate disposal policies and outlined
various solutions.12 However, Kaplan’s book was published in 1944, well before disposal
operations got underway. Later publications from the 1940s, such as James Cook’s book
The Marketing of Surplus War Property or articles by P. C. Greenland and John Berry,
helped fill in some important gaps.13 Although disposal operations were still unfolding at
the time, these publications informed readers about their progress and development. In
particular, Greenland and Berry were well positioned to write their accounts as both men
were in charge of Australia’s and Canada’s postwar disposal programs, respectively. This
gave them a wide range of first-hand experience and access to documents and policies
that, at least in Canada’s case, have not survived.
A second group of studies consist of books and articles written mainly by collectors
and material culture specialists. These are some of the most informative and engaging
12
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studies, as they cover the full gambit of an object’s existence – from its creation, usage,
and destruction – and discuss how objects impacted their surroundings and owners.
However, these studies tend to get object-fixated and do not reveal much information
about the full scope of disposal across multiple categories of different goods. The book
Military Aircraft Boneyards exemplifies this trend as it only covers how the Americans
disposed of their massive fleet of surplus tactical and transport aircraft and offers little
comment on any other weapon system.14 Other studies, such as Nicolas Saunders’s work
on trench art, tend to focus heavily on the life histories and the significance of particular
armaments, war trophies, and memorials. Although incredibly fascinating, these studies
seek to understand the object’s cultural significance, meaning, and memory. Therefore,
they tend to focus on the items that were kept or preserved and not consumed or
otherwise discarded.15
The emerging field of modern conflict archaeology offers valuable insight into the
concept of “materiel culture” by situating objects within various wartime social and
cultural contexts. Gabriel Moshenska’s The Archaeology of the Second World War and
the edited volume Materiel Culture by John Schofield, William Gray Johnson, and
Colleen Beck are important works that help decipher the “cultural biographies” of objects
by examining their meaning, utility, memory, and heritage across time.16 However, as
Nicky Gregson, Mike Crang, and Helen Watkins pointed out in an article on salvaging
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souvenirs from derelict naval vessels, the need to understand how materiel culture exists
outside the military context and inside civilian life helps further understanding of the
“extended social lives of military things” and “their passage through value regimes to the
point of their destruction.”17 This dissertation will add a fresh historical perspective to
this growing field of inquiry by examining the postwar lives of Canada’s munitions and
supplies in relationship to their disposal and impact on civilian life.
The third group of studies mainly consist of book chapters and a small array of
articles that touch on related themes. However, these studies are not explicitly focused on
disposal and only cover the topic while in pursuit of other objectives and questions. For
instance, in books such as Harnessing Labour Confrontation by Peter McInnis or The
Other Cold War by Christopher Kilford, the disposal of surplus munitions, supplies, and
real estate received some attention. Yet, these studies were exploring labour relations in
the postwar period and Canada’s military assistance to developing countries during the
Cold War. Therefore they tied disposal into these subjects and did not cover it on its own
terms.18 The same observation can be made about the biographies of C. D. Howe, the
official histories of the Department of Munitions and Supply, and several other books and
articles focused on various elements of Canada’s reconstruction and rehabilitation
programs.19 In the US, some scholars have covered the disposal of military surpluses
after the Second World War. Jack Stokes Ballard discussed surplus disposal in a chapter
of his book on economic demobilization, The Shock of Peace; while Sam Lebovic
recently examined the fascinating origins of the Fulbright Scholarship program in an
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article on the sale of war junk and American cultural globalism.20 In effect, the history of
the disposal of munitions and supplies has only received passing interest from academics.
No study exists that places the disposal of munitions and supplies at the centre of the
narrative in order to explore the immense political, economic, and social legacies of the
Second World War.
Remarkably, Canadian military historians rarely address the subject of disposal.
Studies on the industrial front, the war economy, and defence procurement – a field
where one might reasonably expect such attention – are virtually silent on the subject.
Currently, there is no comprehensive study on the history of Canada’s wartime economy,
while the official histories of the Department of Munitions and Supply were written
without a strong evidentiary foundation.21 In fact, most studies on the industrial front and
defence procurement are exclusively focused on mobilization and production. While not
entirely unexpected or without valuable insights, these studies recount how munitions
were procured, thereby treating their manufacture and creation as an endpoint for
inquiry.22 Product lifecycles and disposal are hardly relevant, unless they demonstrate
how obsolescent weaponry requires replacement or justifies additional procurement
expenditures on research and development.23 Indeed, economic demobilization and the
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disposal of munitions and supplies are never treated on their own terms and remain,
arguably, the most understudied topics in Canadian military history.24
Most historians studying Canada’s Second World War focus overwhelmingly on
combat operations by recounting the war’s progress through military operations, tactical
deployments, and global strategy.25 In recent years, a growing social and cultural trend
within the military history community has prompted more research into the human
experience in conflict and post-conflict contexts. There is little doubt that this “new” type
of military history has its benefits. Studying how individuals and communities survive,
adapt, interpret, and recover from the traumatic experiences of war can yield many
rewarding insights. However, surprisingly few studies ask questions about the material
world underpinning the experience of war and peace. Instead, inquiry tends to favour the
objects, weaponry, equipment, and physical environments in relationship to their impact
and effect on combat operations, soldiers’ culture, and artifact collection.26 Yet the
battlefield conditions only constitute a portion of the object’s total existence. Barring
complete destruction or severe battle damage, the object’s “cultural biography” spanned a
much wider time frame than combat operations and, depending on the object in question,
contained many uses beyond killing.27 Studying the disposal of munitions and supplies
explores some of these biographies as well as the changes in utility and ownership
incumbent to an object’s transition from war to peace.
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In recent years, the surge of scholarship on the home front has filled important gaps
in the historiography of Canada’s Second World War. Jeffrey Keshen’s Saints, Sinners,
and Soldiers, Serge Durflinger’s Fighting From Home, Graham Broad’s A Small Price to
Pay, and Joy Parr’s Domestic Goods – to name just a few – have all furthered our
understanding of how the war impacted Canadians politically, socially, culturally, and
economically.28 Although pursuing other objectives and an array of different arguments,
these studies have demonstrated – both directly and indirectly – a great deal about how
the war effort and transition period were shaped by the presence or absence of objects.
Whether it was through rationing and regulation, shortages and substitutions, or
production and consumption, these themes tend to dominate the scholarship focused on
the home front. This dissertation expands on these themes by pushing inquiry beyond the
war’s traditional periodization. The state of war may have ended in 1945, but the tools of
war outlasted it by many years. In doing so, they survived in different forms and
functions and acquired new owners and meanings. In effect, this thesis is a history of how
and why the objects of war were discarded, reconstructed, or rehabilitated in peacetime.

Mobilizing the Industrial Front
The disposal of Canada’s wartime arsenals was an essential job given the material
abundance inherent in the nation’s war effort. Consequently, some discussion about
procurement and economic mobilization is essential to contextualize the issues involved
in the history of disposal. Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of Canada’s Second World
War was the manufacturing sector. The war unlocked an avalanche of public and private
investment that rejuvenated the national economy after a decade-long depression.
Between 1939 and 1943, the manufacturing sector’s output nearly doubled, as its net
value of production increased by 167 percent.29 Largely on the back of new
manufacturing capacities sponsored by the government, Canada’s GNP increased from
28
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$5.6 billion in 1939 to almost $12 billion in 1945, and the value of the country’s total
expenditures on all types of war goods (including munitions, supplies, defence
construction, and military pay) totalled roughly $28 billion or almost six times the GNP
in 1939.30
By 1945, Canadian factories had built some 9,000 ships (including over 800 naval
and cargo vessels), 50,000 armoured vehicles and tanks, 16,000 aircraft frames, 850,000
military-patterned vehicles, 1.5 million firearms, 72 million artillery and mortar shells of
various calibers, and 4.4 billion rounds of small arms ammunition – enough to shoot two
bullets at every human on the planet!31 Canada’s industrial effort also went well beyond
the production of weapons and ammunition. From airports and new office buildings, to
bedframes, uniforms, cafeteria equipment, radio sets, machine tools, ball bearings,
typewriters, and much more, the war effort required a seemingly infinite assortment of
goods, services, and resources – most of which the government acquired with public
funds spent through the Departments of Munitions and Supply (DMS) and National
Defence (DND).
Although dwarfed by the industrial might of Canada’s three largest Allies – the
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Soviet Union (USSR) – these numbers
were astonishing for several reasons. First, Canada’s smaller population (11.2 million
according to the 1941 census) and tax base meant that on a per capita basis the Canadian
economy performed extremely well. Aside from the automobile industry, the country was
an industrial backwater in 1939, rich in natural resources but poor in technical skill and
investment capital. Indeed, at the war’s outset the British government reluctantly placed
munitions orders with inexperienced Canadian manufacturers. That Canada eventually
supplied Britain with over half of all motor transportation after the fall of France in June
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1940 was no small miracle and a testament to the efficiency of the Dominion’s “prolific
automobile industry.”32 It was also a harbinger for the future of Canada’s disposal
program. In addition to everything else, there would be a lot of surplus vehicles leftover
in 1945.
A second reason why Canada’s industrial effort was so surprising had to do with
the initial war policies of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and his Liberal
Government. At first there was a general reluctance to mobilize and equip a large
expeditionary force for service overseas as memories of the horror and slaughter in
France and Flanders a generation earlier served as an example worth avoiding. In the fall
of 1939, and starkly contrasting the chaos of Sir Sam Hughes’s recruitment schemes in
1914, the prevailing policy pursued by the Liberals was a cautious and calculated one
later dubbed “limited liability” to describe its three main components: the British
Commonwealth Air Training Program (BCATP), limited overseas military commitments,
and comprehensive preparations for demobilization and veterans’ rehabilitation.33 The
irony of Canada’s mobilization for the Second World War was not hard to miss. As the
late C. P. Stacey, arguably Canada’s most important military historian, noted in his
landmark study of Canada’s war policies and administration, Arms, Men, and
Government: “a cynic might remark that in this war the government began planning for
demobilization even before it had made provision for a really effective war effort.”34
It was only after the fall of France, a full ten months into the war, that the federal
government finally started taking steps to expand and organize an efficient war economy.
In June 1940, the War Supply Board was replaced by the DMS, a new cabinet-level
portfolio backed by a hefty administrative apparatus and sweeping authority to “mobilize,
32
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control, restrict, or regulate” anything needed for war production.35 To head the new
department, Mackenzie King appointed as Minister, Clarence Decatur Howe, who then
proceeded to staff the DMS with highly capable bureaucrats, administrators, academics,
businessmen, and technicians. Many of those hired by Howe were loaned from the
private sector. At the time, newspaper accounts nicknamed them the “dollar-a-year-men”
because the government supposedly paid them a dollar for their services, while their
parent companies covered the rest of their incomes. However, research into civil service
records showed that the government paid some of these “dollar-a-year-men” far more
than a dollar per year for their services.36 Regardless of their salaries, the strategy was
nonetheless effective since the DMS assimilated a wealth of managerial, business, and
technical talent. This was especially critical given Howe’s proclivity for delegating
authority and relying on his subordinates to get the job done.37
To better acclimatize his new army of career business executives with little
experience in governmental procedures, Howe created an executive committee composed
of an inner circle of advisers whom he trusted implicitly.38 This executive committee
became its own type of “Ottawa Men” as personal relationships between career
bureaucrats and businessmen, plus the growing reliance on so-called “experts” with the
necessary training in the social and natural sciences, business administration, and labour
management were urgently required to expedite war production.39 Although Howe later
earned the nickname “Minister of Everything,” it was impossible for him to keep track of
35
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every aspect of the department’s business. As Robert Bothwell explained, some
contemporaries misleadingly described him as the “ringmaster” to a “thirty-ring circus”
but such analogies implied a micro-managing that did not exist.40 In reality, Howe was
master of the inner-most ring, with all the other rings linked to him through his executive
committee. In other words, Howe macro-managed his department, as Bothwell
continued: he built a “highly centralized structure of authority” that was based on a
“highly decentralized system of management and direction.”41 In making policies, Howe
was the arbitrator between competing plans and concerned himself only with the big
picture and let his advisers sweat the details. This pattern certainly held true in reference
to disposal operations after the war.42
A fifty-five-year-old American-born engineer with a penchant for pragmatism and
a booming budget of taxpayer dollars and foreign investment, Howe set about developing
Canada’s industrial potential through a myriad of investment strategies, initiatives, and
agencies. Under the terms of the War Measures Act (1939) and the Department of
Munitions and Supply Act (1940), the DMS gained a monopoly over all aspects of
munitions production, from the input of raw materials and labour to the output of finished
products. In practice, this monopoly was put in place through the creation of several
dozen production branches, resource controls, and Crown corporations. Production
branches (such as the Ammunition Production Branch, Automotive and Tank Production
Branch, or the Priorities Branch) were tasked with negotiating war contracts with private
businesses and overseeing the construction of war materials. 43 When private enterprise
could not or would not fill the needs of the war effort the DMS established more than
40
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twenty-five Crown companies to produce, purchase, or regulate essential materials and
equipment, such as synthetic rubber, explosives, and machine tools.44
Resource controls (such as the Aircraft Control, Metals Control, or Rubber Control)
were responsible for ensuring that priority access to resources and scarce materials was
first provided to those companies on war contracts. Controllers would ration, allocate,
stockpile, and set prices for the supplies and a Wartime Industries Control Board (WICB)
was established by PC2715 in June 1940 to provide controllers with a forum for reporting
on their activities and coordinating their efforts.45 The WICB was the sister organization
of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) which was established to control
inflation, prices, and all retail sales of commodities not related to war production.
Eventually, to attenuate conflicts of jurisdiction, a controller on the WICB was also
named the WPTB’s commodity administrator for the same resource or item.46 Together
these two organizations formed the nerve centre of Canada’s industrial war effort and
both organizations played an important role in the disposal of surplus assets after the war.
The creation of the DMS signalled an expanding federal involvement with
industrialization and a growing interest in subsidizing production. However, this
involvement departed from the prewar norm. In the 1930s, most munitions contracts in
Canada were funded by British taxpayers, and in the early stages of the war, the British
despatched several Admiralty Technical Missions to North America and established a
Supply Board in Ottawa. Through these organizations the British coordinated
procurement, ensured that production was calibrated exactly to design specifications, and
invested in Canadian industries converting over to war production. But with the creation
of the DMS and Cabinet’s decision to funnel all munitions orders (both foreign and
domestic) through Howe’s portfolio, the Dominion government increased its control over
production. By March 1943, it took over all financial aspects of the industrial effort
through a Lend-Lease style program called Mutual Aid. However, it is important to note
44
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that these changes would not have been possible without the nucleus provided by the
British expertise.47
Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley noted these developments in their official history
Studies in Overseas Supply, when they remarked that, “after the dissolution of the British
Supply Board at Ottawa, the [DMS] wielded a wholly sovereign control over war
production in Canada. It acted largely as agent for United Kingdom supply departments,
but it was an entirely free agent, accepting or rejecting British supply orders, placing
contracts, and manipulating priorities at its own discretion.”48 This increasing sovereignty
over the finance and direction of industrial production was an important policy shift, but
it also came with an increasing amount of political and economic baggage. The expansion
of controls and regulations over the economy meant that the DMS was manipulating
supply and demand to meet the needs of the war effort and also embedding public money
at the heart of economic activity. Extricating such widespread government influence from
the economy in order to allow the return of private enterprise – a key government priority
in 1945 – would not be easy, especially in light of all the assets the government and
military accumulated in order to prosecute the war effort. After all, the tools of war
would outlast the state of war by many years.
The war emergency following the miracle evacuation at Dunkirk in May 1940
provoked increasing federal regulation and expenditures. As Howe told the WICB in
mid-1940, the Dominion would have to produce more of everything and do so within its
borders.49 However, the initiatives commenced in 1940 did not yield instantaneous results
nor did they cause any immediate dislocation to civilian production. As Graham Broad
pointed out in his study on wartime consumerism, despite the carte blanche for munitions
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production, up until the end of 1941 Canadian businesses were meeting most war
contracts and production quotas by repurposing idle floor space in their Depressionravaged factories. Contrary to popular myths of scrimping, saving, and rationing on the
home front, the production of a whole host of non-war related items (including passenger
cars, washing machines, and toasters) continued well into the war’s second year with
little interruption and a steady flow of parts from the neutral United States.50
However, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 significantly
changed the landscape of Canada’s industrial mobilization. With their entry into the war,
the Americans initiated a massive rearmament program that took parts and resources
away from Canadian production lines. Coupled with the Hyde Park Declaration of April
1941, which alleviated the balance of payments crisis and further integrated the North
American economies, civilian production in almost all sectors was cut off. For example,
retail sales of passenger cars, trucks, and busses peaked at 130,552 in 1940 – the second
largest year of motor vehicle sales in Canadian history – but by 1943 retail sales across
the country had dropped to a paltry 4,798. The sharp decline was a product of a bevy of
wartime regulations from the DMS at the beginning of 1942 that, among many other
things, ended civilian car production and kicked war production into high gear.51
The war emergencies following Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor coincided with, if they
did not create, a period of unprecedented industrialization north of the 49th parallel.
Between September 1939 and August 1945, private and public funding for the
construction of buildings, the purchase of resources, and the import of machinery
equalled about $4.5 billion dollars, a whopping $3.5 billion of which went directly or
indirectly to the war effort (and a large portion of that total was spent between 1940 and
1943).52 Through organizations like the War Contracts Depreciation Board (WCDB)
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which began operations in August 1940, the DMS made the business of war profitable for
private firms. The WCDB was responsible for approving special depreciation for private
companies with war contracts that either had to purchase new war-related machinery with
“no reasonable post-war value” or expand production lines to meet contractual
obligations.53 Private industry also received other special tax benefits and allowances, in
addition to favourable financial terms in war contracts, so that operating expenses could
be written off more easily. This acted as a further catalyst for quickly turning over to war
production and it is estimated that these measures provoked about $514 million worth of
private investment on facilities and “about a similar amount for tooling costs.”54 In total,
the government corralled about $1 billion for war production from the private sector.
However, such investment was not enough to sustain the war effort since private
companies were unwilling to invest in manufacturing items wholly dependent on conflict.
Simply put, there was no profitable or sustainable future in the production of explosives
or the manufacture and filling of ammunition. As a result, the DMS created the War
Industrial Expansion Program to subsidize industrial production in many key areas (see
Appendix 1). The program invested about $700 million dollars (or roughly one-fifth of all
federal spending on the war economy) into two crucial areas: the purchase of machine
tools and other precision instruments needed for munitions production ($500 million) and
the construction of additional floor space ($200 million).55 From 1939 to 1945, the War
Industrial Expansion Program sponsored the construction of 33.5 million square feet of
new floor space at roughly 170 different locations across the country.56 It also paid for the
importation of the most specialized machine tools needed for munitions production.
Although these expenditures were a wartime necessity, when hostilities ended they left a
considerable amount of floor space and some of the most advanced production machinery
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in the government’s hands. Therefore, the disposal of this surplus floor space and
machinery became a central issue after 1945, as their inherent peace dividend provoked
widespread competition between public and private interest groups.
In the wake of such large-scale industrial expansion, war production peaked at
astonishing levels. The Great Depression and the “Dirty ’30s” seemed like distant
memories on bustling factory floors. Operating twenty-four hours a day, employing an
average of over 1.1 million war workers (peaking from April 1943 to June 1944), and
despite periodic shortages of key materials and machinery, Canada’s war economy turned
out mountains of munitions and supplies.57 By October 1943, the economy started hitting
record marks and the publicity of production ceremonies soon followed. In June 1943,
Howe was photographed with Minister of Defence James Ralston in Oshawa, Ontario,
where the 500,000th military vehicle (a battery charger lorry) rolled off the assembly
line.58 In September 1944, Howe was also photographed with Edna Poirier, a munitions
worker at the Defence Industries Limited (DIL) Cherrier plant in Quebec, who presented
him with the plant’s 100,000,000th projectile. As part of the nation-wide ceremonies
commemorating the 139th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1944,
Howe’s wife, Alice Worchester, christened the 1,000th ship built at Canadian
shipyards.59
There is little doubt that Canada’s staggering production totals were unleashed by
direct and indirect government expenditures and favourable economic policies. However,
Canada’s war production was also constrained by the Dominion’s position within the
Grand Alliance. In order to better coordinate logistics, the Allies created several
international organizations, known collectively as the Combined Boards, which were
dominated by the British and Americans. The most pertinent for the purposes of this
study was the Combined Resources and Production Board (CRPB) established in June
1942. The goal of the CRPB was to “combine the production programs of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, into a single integrated program, adjusted to the

57

Firestone, Locations and Effects of Wartime Industrial Expansion in Canada 1939-1944, 28.

58

Hennessy, “The Industrial Front,” 145.

59

Pritchard, A Bridge of Ships, preface.

20

strategic requirements of the war, as indicated to the Board by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, and to all relevant production factors.”60 In other words, the CRPB ensured that
each country produced the goods best suited to its capacities and coordinated the flow of
resources, parts, and technologies in order to maximize productivity. In practice, this
multiplied the growth of American branch plants and subsidiary companies in Canada
and reinforced, if not intensifying, Canada’s dependency on export markets. Moreover, it
also ensured the standardization of British-patterned weapons and kit which, despite
several attempts, greatly stunted the development of any trademarked Canadian-made
products and designs. The ripple effects of the CRPB limited the development of more
sophisticated industries, such as airplane engines. Canada’s entire aeronautical industry
did not produce a single engine during the war. Instead, Canada’s aircraft manufacturers
only produced airframes, parts, and electronics, and assembled aircraft once the engines
were shipped north from the US.61
Since neither the British nor Americans were willing to standardize their arms,
equipment, and ammunition, Canada became Britain’s preferred source of supply in
North America.

Apart from some common tank and aircraft models (such as the

Sherman tank and the Cornell aircraft), American factories were not ideally suited for
manufacturing British-patterned kit. Only the Lee Enfield .303-inch rifle was produced in
American factories, while in Canada British-patterned munitions were fixtures on
production lines: the .303-inch rifle, the 25-pounder field gun, the 3.7-inch anti-aircraft
gun, the 2-pounder anti-tank gun, the Bren light machine gun, the Boys anti-tank rifle, the
Universal Carrier, and the standard 3-ton and 15-cwt trucks.62 As a result, when
hostilities ended the munitions and supplies requiring disposal were generally all Britishpatterned. Given that the entire British Commonwealth was also facing disposal
problems, traditional export markets were not always available or willing to purchase
Canada’s surpluses. Thus, after 1945 Canada had tons of unneeded British-patterned kit
to liquidate, but faced the challenging prospects of a domestic market too small to absorb
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everything, while international markets were hotly contested and easily flooded with
similar goods.
However, since Mutual Aid accounted for roughly 70 percent of all war production
in Canada, the vast majority of industrial output went to the UK and not Canadian troops.
As Hall and Wrigley pointed out, the British were “the largest customer” of Canadianproduced items. They estimated that the UK received about 60 percent of all tanks, 67
percent of all artillery, 70 percent of all rifles, and 53 percent of all combat aircraft
produced in Canadian factories.63 Canada’s production programs therefore benefitted the
country’s allies ahead of its own armed forces, as the Canadian Army drew heavily from
British stores and supply channels to offset any shortages.64 This arrangement worked
satisfactorily during the war, but when hostilities ended the Canadian armed forces were
left in possession of large quantities of borrowed kit. Although this greatly truncated the
size and scope of Canada’s postwar disposal program, returning borrowed kit to the
British was not a simple process. Therefore, the disposal of surplus munitions and
supplies became entwined within broader political and economic questions related to the
settlement of war debts and the establishment of Canada’s postwar military requirements.
The expansion of industrial production coincided with the growth of other federal
departments, most especially the Department of National Defence. Throughout the war,
1.1 million Canadian men and women enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF),
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and Royal Canadian Army – about one out of every eleven
Canadians. Consequently, the DND had to acquire or construct the facilities and
equipment so its personnel could live, work, and train for combat operations. Thus,
despite the substantial amount of assets procured for the UK, the DND accumulated
sizable inventories of every conceivable item. Moreover, the needs of the war effort
dictated patterns in how the DND distributed its assets. This meant that financial
investments, infrastructure expansion, and the deployment of military forces occurred
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according to strategic and tactical objectives. Across Canada, new military bases,
airfields, coastal fortifications, and munitions factories were established. Sometimes these
wartime developments were extensive and all out of proportion to the local prewar
population and economy. In other cases, the war emergency forced the government to
rely on pre-existing industrial capacities and transportation networks, which were already
clustered in the urban centres and usually located in Central Canada.65 Whether in remote
areas or densely populated cities, the government spent money on acquiring the facilities
and assets it needed to prosecute the war effort. However, the future divestment of these
acquisitions posed a serious postwar challenge, particularly given their wide geographic
dispersion across Canada and the fact that a large portion was deployed overseas in
Europe.
Regardless of the amount of kit returned to the UK or how little Canadian factories
produced for Canadian troops, at the end of hostilities the military and government
possessed large inventories of munitions and supplies. Although postwar requirements
constantly changed, there were few illusions about the necessity of disposal. The postwar
military needed only a fraction of what its wartime predecessor had acquired. In 1945, the
Canadian military was poised for seismic reductions, as its total numerical strength was
rapidly reduced from wartime peaks to barely 40,000 by 1947.66 Such profound changes
and cut-backs generated many surpluses – even large quantities of new and high-tech
equipment would not be required. In the immediate postwar period, demobilization and
disposal were the dominant trends in military policies and procedures, not procurement.
Between 1945 and 1950, Canada disposed of more military assets than it acquired. More
tanks, planes, ships, trucks, buildings, ammunition, and uniforms (to name but a few
examples) were disposed of by the government than procured by it.

The Exit Strategy
Canada’s war effort fundamentally transformed the country in myriad ways and as
the defeat of Germany and Japan appeared more certain, the challenges of transitioning
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between war and peace became increasingly urgent. As Howe told the House of
Commons in April 1945 when presenting the White Paper on Employment and Income,
“the central task of reconstruction, in the interest of the armed services and civilians
alike, must be to accomplish a smooth, orderly transition from the economic conditions
of war to those of peace and to maintain a high and stable level of employment and
income. The Government adopts this as a primary object of policy.” 67 The White Paper
outlined the various issues expected to arise during the transition period and it also
elaborated on what the federal government was doing to fulfill its promises for a smooth
transition, high employment, and higher living standards.68 That this policy would be
accomplished best through the divestment of public ownership and economic policies
designed to reinvigorate private enterprise was a central element of the Liberals’
reconstruction efforts. As the White Paper explained “the Government does not believe it
to be either desirable or practicable to look to the expansion of government enterprise to
provide, to any large degree, the additional employment required. It follows that a major
and early task of reconstruction is to facilitate and encourage an expansion of private
industry, including primary with other industries.”69
A central postwar issue was the unprecedented expansion of the federal
government, its role in mobilizing war production, and the reconstruction of this new
political economy into a viable peacetime framework. Government ownership and
regulation was a wartime necessity, as Canada’s industrial mobilization did not happen
by happy accident. It occurred because the government had rationalized the normal flow
of business patterns, effectively suspending the laws of supply and demand for the
duration of the war.70 As Joy Parr explained in Domestic Goods, the wartime economy
stood normal business practices on their head. During the war, need trumped demand, so
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the normal channels through which goods and resources flowed were reorganized and
redirected to support the war effort and not patterns of civilian consumption – particularly
after 1941. More generally, this meant that federal authorities increasingly intervened to
regulate almost every aspect of economic activity and public investment was used as a
tool for redirecting production away from a free market system towards something
approaching a “command” economy with the federal government at its core.71
Successfully divesting this power and influence to support private enterprise
required an immense amount of preparations and diligence. As a result, plans for the
postwar period began very early in the Second World War and were prompted largely by
the interwar experience with veterans’ rehabilitation as well as the economic turmoil of
the Great Depression. As Peter Neary explained, for many contemporaries the 1920s and
1930s represented a postwar world that none wished to recreate. The hard lessons of the
interwar period loomed large in the minds of all policymakers and motivated them to
avoid another postwar disaster.72 The sentiment was widespread in government circles.
As a 28 November 1942 memo from the Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) stated “if
the government has not prepared a program in advance, the country will run grave risks
of facing mass unemployment, social unrest, and a chaotic industrial situation which no
ad hoc improvisations will be able to master.”73 Clearly, Canada needed an elaborate and
multi-faceted exit strategy.
Although it was impossible to predict the future, the major challenges of peace
were anticipated in one form or another. As a result, government officials worked hard
during the war to create plans and programs for postwar reconstruction, reconversion, and
rehabilitation. By 1944, the major elements of the government’s exit strategy were ready
for Parliamentary assent. Consequently, the 1944 legislative agenda became one of the
most important in Canadian history. That year legislation was tabled creating three new
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federal departments (Reconstruction, Veterans Affairs, and National Health and Welfare).
Legislation was also passed establishing family allowances that paid families to help with
the cost of raising children.74 A new version of the National Housing Act was introduced
that created the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to alleviate the
growing housing crisis by regulating the real estate market, guaranteeing mortgages, and
constructing homes through two crown companies.75 Furthermore, a whole series of acts
were passed to provide veterans with war service grants, gratuities, support services, and
educational benefits.76 Other legislation was passed to help farmers with loans for
equipment and farming implements, while businesses were aided by the creation of an
Industrial Development Bank that helped with financing peacetime industrial expansion.
Moreover, a whole host of laws were also aimed at re-establishing foreign trade by
loaning export credits for the purchase of Canadian products.77
It was within this larger context of postwar preparations that the plans for the
disposal of surplus munitions and supplies were formulated. Since the disposal problem
emanated from wartime procurement, it only emerged as a major concern once Canadian
industries started breaking production records. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, it was only in
mid-1943 that policymakers started realizing the future scope of the disposal problem.
After some extensive studies and discussions over the summer and fall of 1943, Cabinet
approved PC9108 on 29 November 1943. PC9108 was a critical order-in-council that
created the Crown Assets Allocation Committee (CAAC) and the War Assets
Corporation (WAC). The CAAC was an inter-departmental committee designed to act as
a hub for the paperwork associated with declaring surpluses and formulate general
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policies about disposal. The WAC handled the physical aspects of disposal by collecting,
maintaining, storing, selling, or destroying everything declared surplus by the
government. A few months later in July 1944, Parliament passed the Surplus Crown
Assets Act which formed a permanent legal, organizational, and administrative
framework for the disposal of surplus government property.
The formation of the CAAC and WAC is a starting point for understanding the
argument and direction of this dissertation. Over the course of seven chapters, this study
elaborates on four critical themes: 1) the continuous and evolving nature of public
pressure for government action on disposal; 2) the role of the CAAC and WAC in
administrating and controlling disposal operations; 3) the way the objects of war require
stewardship from one use to the next; and 4) the process through which munitions and
supplies are reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new forms, functions, and
intentions. Collectively these themes constitute the dissertation’s argument which is that
through the CAAC and WAC the government disposed of its surplus munitions and
supplies in order to support, and not hinder, postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation in
Canada. Although disposal was not perfect and left behind some questionable
environmental legacies, the conversion of surplus assets into peacetime purposes ensured
that objects gained new uses and meanings thereby mitigating their threatening nature to
economic stability, political authority, and public safety.
The creation of the CAAC and WAC straddles the line between the first and second
themes and demonstrates how the government responded to the political, social, and
economic pressures it faced from interest groups. As Chapter 1 explains, business
interests were initially the first to voice their apprehension about the future economic
impact of government surpluses, but they were quickly followed by local and provincial
governments and various other associations from across the country. Business interests
were most concerned about the deflationary economic conditions that might arise if an
uncontrolled flood of second-hand goods entered the marketplace. This was threatening
because it would force the postwar economy into competing with the vestiges of wartime
production and thereby lower prices for new goods of similar types, employment, and
profits. Businesses wanted the government to eliminate this threat and some trade
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associations even went as far as suggesting that all unneeded things be destroyed rather
than resold in domestic markets.
By contrast, political and social interest groups were less concerned about the
economic ramifications and tended to view the impending liquidation of government
property as a valuable opportunity to acquire cheap assets to assist with their
reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. Like businesses, they also favoured
increasing government regulation to control the flood of goods, but instead of
accommodating corporate greed, they wanted surpluses deployed to improve social
welfare programs wherever possible. Therefore, the disposal of munitions and supplies
became entwined within the larger postwar debates about the role of the state and social
security. It is worth noting that in regards to disposal, neither the right nor the left of the
political spectrum objected to increasing government regulations and controls, though
neither side agreed on the ultimate objectives for disposal or how the CAAC and WAC
should implement their new powers.
Pressure for government action also emerged within the bureaucracy itself. As
Chapters 1 and 2 explain, in line with the mounting public pressure, a collection of
bureaucrats and military officers came to grips with the disposal problem. The rapid
development of military technologies and the immense training facilities located in
Canada prompted an increasing need for disposal arrangements for production wastages,
worn-out equipment, and obsolescent weaponry. As a result, a group of people inside the
government and military were exposed to disposal early on and foresaw a future problem
when more than just worn-out and obsolete kit required disposal. As a result, they
pressured their superiors for action and later formed an important nucleus inside the
disposal administration created by PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act. Although
it proved difficult to keep some of these experts (many of whom were dollar-a-year-men)
employed in the WAC long term, they were instrumental in formulating early plans and
preparations. Later, once the flood of surpluses developed, their replacements adapted
and expanded the WAC’s operations to meet a new series of challenges and problems.
Chapter 2 elaborates more on the problems involved in managing disposal policies
and procedures to accommodate as many interests as possible. In effect, the government’s
28

attempt to control the disposal of its surpluses ended up becoming a battle against
diminishing returns. Not only was the value and utility of each asset depreciating over
time, but every policy and procedure created an inconvenient mix of productive and
deficient outcomes. In sum, an immense number of forms, receipts, and reports were
generated when tracking and controlling disposal operations in order to ensure that assets
were disposed of strategically. This, however, buried the Corporation and Committee in
paperwork that grew to unwieldly proportions when the tidal wave of surplus declarations
barrelled into the CAAC and WAC at the end of the 1945-1946 fiscal year. Processing
paperwork, appraising inventories, and negotiating sales took time and significant delays
and bottlenecks developed. These delays engendered a renewal of public pressure and
criticism that was exacerbated by several related postwar problems that disposal
operations were supposed to help remedy: severe material shortages, delays in industrial
reconversion, labour disputes, a growing accommodation crisis, and widespread
unemployment. Therefore, disposal operations were never perfect. Although they
achieved a great deal, policies developed along pragmatic lines that were not always
popular or without controversy. Having few precedents upon which to base such an
extensive program of divestiture, the operations of the CAAC and WAC evolved with
every trial and subsequent error.
The third and fourth themes shift the dissertation’s focus to the objects of war
themselves and the process through which they gained or lost utility in peacetime. When
the war ended, the munitions and supplies – whether new, used, or surplus – did not just
vanish on their own. Rather, they continued occupying a physical space, and until the
disposal process affected their forms and functions, they also remained entirely capable
of fulfilling their primary and intended purposes. This was quite problematic considering
the vast stocks of surplus weaponry and ammunition, but less so for supplies and nonlethal assets with a high degree of convertibility in peacetime. Whatever the case, objects
cannot change their forms and functions on their own. Instead, the implements of war
were ushered through the disposal process so that old uses, meanings, and owners were
discarded for new ones. Change was imposed on munitions and supplies after the war and
a concerted government program managed, controlled, and facilitated this transition.
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Chapter 3 discusses two of the most critical aspects in the stewardship of objects:
collection and storage. Following a major reorganization from August to October 1945,
the WAC moved quickly to collect and store the objects that were physically impeding
the return of peacetime operations on factory floors, the closing of military bases, and
civilian pastimes. The WAC’s clearance and warehousing operations allowed the
government to maintain custody of its surpluses, facilitate their repair or renovation, and
ensure that the government received a fair reimbursement for its property. In doing so,
the WAC formed a reservoir of assets – filling more than six million square feet of indoor
storage space at its peak – which supplied reconstruction and rehabilitation programs
throughout the country. The reservoir also acted as a shock absorber in that it allowed the
WAC to control the flow of goods entering the domestic market. However, clearance and
warehousing operations were not perfect. In general, the main difficulty surrounded the
management and handling of an inventory comprising over 200,000 different types of
items. Moreover, clearance and warehousing were also shaped by their high financial
costs, the geographic dispersion of surpluses, the abandonment of assets, the extent of
onsite pollution, and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
Stewarding objects through the disposal process only started with collection and
storage. In fact, hoarding assets was only a temporary measure and largely redundant if
the inventories amassed never left the WAC’s possession. As Chapter 4 explains, there
were only two ways to divest government property: either through sales or destruction.
Fears of economic ruin through a faulty disposal strategy were commonplace in the
1940s. Looking back at the experiences following the First World War, when sales of
surpluses were largely unregulated and speculators profited handsomely, policymakers
and politicians tacitly connected the onset of the Great Depression with the booming
supply of cheap government property in the 1920s. This prompted the WAC to heed the
advice and warnings of business interests and devise a selling strategy that explicitly
favoured big business. As a result, the WAC decided to limit the public’s access to
surplus stocks and only sell them through legitimate trade networks and businesses. In
effect, this strategy turned established businesses into middlemen who reconditioned and
resold the surpluses they bought from the WAC.
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As can be imagined the public despised these measures since they could not buy
direct from the WAC and had to pay higher prices for second-hand goods marked up by
dealers and distributors. Moreover, the public’s anger surged whenever reports of the
WAC’s destruction programs surfaced. The charges of waste and profligacy stemmed
from what was perceived as the wanton and indiscriminate destruction of public property.
To individual customers, the WAC’s selling and destruction policies were outrageous:
there were significant material shortages in postwar Canada and a ready demand for
cheap things, but instead of accommodating the marketplace the WAC refused to sell
direct to anyone without proper business credentials and destroyed the remainder.
Although this infuriated many desperate Canadians, few people understood the full scope
of the WAC’s situation and responsibilities. The Second World War was incredibly
wasteful and officials in the WAC faced the daunting challenge of mitigating the
continuing costs of depreciating assets.
Victory in 1945 produced vast quantities of leftover junk, while new goods quickly
deteriorated in value, utility, and condition. Derelict equipment, lethal weaponry, and
obsolete kit had limited value in civilian markets but their storage, maintenance, and
marketing continued soaking up public money. Every surplus item entering the WAC’s
possession cost it financially and over time these expenses far exceeded the profits from
any sale. If no business wanted to purchase the materials or if the assets were considered
dangerous to public safety, then the WAC had no recourse except to label them scrap and
have them destroyed. However, contrary to public opinion, the WAC’s destruction
program was a carefully conceived and rationally implemented process of reduction.
Even when destroying assets, the WAC sought to salvage value. For instance, scrapping a
weapon system meant breaking it down and separating out all the components from the
whole. Collectively, the objects had little value by WAC’s standards, but as individual
pieces their value and utility could change, particularly if they fulfilled new purposes or
joined new systems of objects. In effect, the WAC’s destruction program was the first
government-led initiative to “close the loop” on industrial production by reducing and
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redistributing war assets, often but not exclusively, through the manufacturers that had
originally produced them.78
The fourth theme follows logically from the third by exploring where Canada’s
materiel ended up and, whenever possible, how it was used or transformed in peacetime.
When wars end, the objects accumulated to fight are often the only things available for
reconstruction and rehabilitation. As Chapter 5 explains, given that severe material
shortages existed in postwar Canada and the fact that everyone required objects to fulfill
their own respective postwar plans and ambitions, government surpluses became highly
coveted starting points for peace. A material world underpinned every aspect of the
postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although the WAC could never satisfy the
ferocious demand, it provided a steady supply of goods and resources throughout the
economy that helped mitigate some shortages in several key areas. In doing so, the WAC
facilitated a process of material demobilization in which end users converted surplus
materiel into useful postwar purposes. The transition from war to peace occurred as
munitions and supplies were reduced, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new and
different forms, functions, and intentions.
Although many objects maintained residual value and utility in civilian hands, there
were many other items that could never be adapted or repurposed in peacetime. These
types of militaria were usually the lethal variety – automatic weapons, ammunition,
explosives, tanks, and tactical aircraft – which existed in profuse quantities across the
country and in Europe. Although valuable to collectors today, they provoked deep fears
and concerns amongst the nation’s contemporary political and social authorities.
However, since the WAC’s goal was to recoup as much of the original cost as possible,
funding destruction was not always advisable. Therefore, the WAC saw international
clients and allied governments as potential outlets for weapon systems and ammunition.
Chapter 6 covers the overseas disposal of munitions and supplies in more detail, as
Canada utilized the sale and exchange of surplus assets as a means of settling war debts,
supporting its allies, protecting domestic markets from the full flood of available
78
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surpluses, and saving the costs of repatriating materiel from Europe just to declare it
surplus in Canada.
It is important to understand that Canada never became a full-blown arms dealer. In
fact, for a variety of reasons, large quantities of its surplus weaponry, ammunition, and
explosives were never sold, but they continued occupying overcrowded stowage space,
particularly at the Bedford Ammunition Depot in Halifax, Nova Scotia, where a massive
explosion occurred in July 1945. In the end, whatever was not sold required complete
destruction. Chapter 7 explores this subject further in relationship to ammunition
destruction and ocean dumping. After the Second World War, hundreds of millions of
tons of conventional ammunition, explosives, and chemical weapons were thrown into
the oceans. Practically every belligerent nation used ocean dumping for destroying
surplus and captured arsenals. Ocean dumping became the preferred destruction method
for a variety of reasons that were generally linked to the numbers involved, storage
problems, financial costs, a lack of foreign markets, and public safety concerns. The
long-term effects of saltwater corrosion and the ecological impact of releasing large
amounts of chemicals, carcinogens, and poisons into marine environments were not
considered a priority. This has left a frightening environmental legacy that few historians
have ever researched.
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A Note on Sources
It would have been impossible to write this study without the records found in the
Crown Assets Disposal Corporation fonds available at the Library and Archives Canada
(LAC) in Ottawa. Formed in 1949, the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (CADC) was
the successor agency to the WAC and the records of both organizations were turned over
to LAC in 1985. They are now listed as RG101, a record group that gets very little
research traffic despite containing some interesting materials. However, while RG101
was an indispensable source for this dissertation, it was also the greatest weakness. To
put it bluntly: sometime between 1949 and 1985 large portions of the records of the
WAC were destroyed. Although I have little direct evidence to support this claim, it is
quite clear that something drastic happened to RG101 before it arrived at LAC.

1

The thoroughness and frequency of missing records is extensive. In total, the Head
Office and five Regional Branches of the WAC handled 306,014 separate sales orders
from 1944 to 1949. Every sale order required an immense amount of paperwork
emanating from Regional Branches to the Corporation’s General Manager in Montreal.
This created an extensive paper trail of records, which included: sales policies, inventory
reports, internal correspondence, briefing memoranda, correspondence with purchasers,
sales contracts, tracking receipts, appraisal reports, maintenance logs, theft and breakage
reports, financial records, advertisements, and many other useful documents. So where
did all this paperwork end up? Unfortunately, much of it is not available in RG101. Of
the 306,014 sales orders, documents associated with perhaps ten are available in the
fonds. Moreover, not a single set of records are available from any of the WAC’s
Regional Branches and the records generated by the General Manager’s office were
mostly created after the 1940s. It is no small irony that the bulk of records recounting
Canada’s postwar disposal program were themselves disposed of sometime after the
WAC ceased its operations.
The silence is deafening. In March 1946 alone, an astounding 96,481 inquiries
about surplus assets reached the WAC; most were hand-written letters from Canadian
1
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citizens and each required a response from the WAC. However, hardly any of these
inquiries or responses survives in RG101 (for March or any other month). Additionally,
the internal documents generated by the WAC’s staff to report on the impact or
ramifications of this surging interest for surpluses are similarly non-existent. Moving up
the chain of command, surviving records created by the Corporation’s senior executives
and directors are disproportionately small considering their heavy workloads. In fact, the
most important people in Canada’s disposal administration – John Berry, J. B. Carswell,
H. R. Malley, and E. R. Birchard – left no record collections behind for posterity. The
same can be said, though with less certainty, that few employees maintained extensive
record collections while working for the Corporation in the 1940s. Although the search
for private collections is still ongoing, the large gaps in the records of the WAC have
been the most surprising and frustrating research challenge.
However, all was not lost. Although RG101 lost much of its connective tissues, it
still contains a large and complex skeleton. The documents that are available in RG101
provide a general overview of how Canada’s disposal administration operated. They are
filled with a variety of files on policies, procedures, and several case studies that
predominantly span the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Several unpublished histories
and meeting minutes from the WAC and CAAC are probably the most valuable sources
available, as they provide a chronology of operations and document high-level policy
decisions and important events. RG101 also contains some interesting records about the
disposal of surplus government assets and property generated by the Centennial
celebrations, Expo ’67, and the two Olympic Games hosted by Canada in Montreal and
Calgary. Furthermore, since disposal crossed departmental boundaries, RG101 provided
several important research-leads when accessing other record groups, especially the DMS
(RG28) and DND (RG24). Most government departments kept tabs on the disposal of
their surpluses and the operations of the WAC. Some, like the DND, even went as far as
contacting purchasers to inquire about how their surpluses were being used. The
correspondence, reports, and other documents available in these record groups were
invaluable in augmenting the records of RG101.
Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the use of digital
technologies. Since RG101 possessed many holes and lacked the voices of those involved
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with disposal, the discovery of any evidence that filled in these gaps was especially
critical. In that regard, two bodies of evidence stand out. The first was the five annual
reports compiled by John Berry and the WAC’s Board of Directors. The information
contained in each annual report – summaries of events and problems, outlines of policies
and procedures, reports on departmental operations, statistics on shipping and handling,
and money recouped from sales – provided a solid narrative of the WAC’s operations that
greatly expanded on the available archival material. The prize piece of evidence was
located in an appendix attached to each annual report. Entitled “Sales of $5,000 or over”
and compiled for each fiscal year (April to March) this appendix provided a critical list of
selling information that included: year sold, dollar amount, a category description, a
detailed description, name of the purchaser, and the purchaser’s location (city, province,
and country). In total, the 6,631 sales listed in these appendices – a small fraction of the
306,014 total – accounted for over 80 percent of all revenue generated from surplus sales.
However, there was a problem with the sales lists: spread across 155 photocopied pages,
individual sales were not easily sorted and patterns could not be readily deciphered or
visualized. As a result, in January 2013, I created a “Sales Database” with the help of a
sheet-feed scanner, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software available in the
History Department’s Digital Research Lab, an Excel spreadsheet, Open Refine software,
and many days of elbow grease. This “Sales Database” quickly became a vital tool and
source of valuable statistical data, particularly for Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
The official testimonies before the House of Commons Special Committee on War
Expenditures and Economies (hereafter SCWEE) proved to be equally troublesome.
However, the application of some digital technologies allowed me to make use of this
other important body of evidence. The SCWEE was established in 1941 to monitor how
public funds were being spent on the war effort and by 1945 it performed the same
function for disposal. A whole host of government officials and bureaucrats (including
John Berry and most senior executives with the WAC), military officers, association
presidents, and even some outspoken critics testified before the SCWEE. It therefore
constitutes one of the most valuable sources of information on both war production and
disposal. However, without digital technologies, making use of this resource was
prohibitive. The SCWEE produced well over 2,500 pages of meeting minutes,
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testimonies, and reports that probably total about one million words. Finding relevant
information inside this opus was like trying to find the right needle in a stack of needles.
The sheer volume of information made the SCWEE records incredibly valuable, but also
useless unless digital methods could parse it into something more manageable. Luckily,
Western University’s library possesses a hard copy of the SCWEE meeting minutes
spread across three volumes. In late 2013, I used the book-scanning facilities at
Western’s Cultureplex Lab and OCR software to digitize all 2,500-plus pages and make
them keyword searchable.
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Chapter 1
Preparing for Peace: Creating the Crown Assets Allocation
Committee and War Assets Corporation
The progress of the war has resulted in the needs of the armed forces for weapons,
munitions, and equipment... Governmental machinery as a consequence has had to be
provided for the disposal of surplus assets… The establishment of this new machinery is a
constructive step toward meeting problems which are already facing the country and
which will grow in magnitude as time goes on. It should help to relieve the anxieties of
those who are apprehensive lest unneeded war materials, as at the end of the last war,
should be liquidated suddenly and without consideration of the effect generally on the
national economy and in particular on employment.1
William Lyon Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada

Introduction
Wartime measures, controls, and regulations did not simply disappear without
incident or recourse once Germany and Japan were defeated. Some controls were
discontinued completely, but even then their cancellation was planned; others remained
in full force long after victory was won. Certainly for Canadians living in the moment,
especially for those who served in uniform, there were clear distinctions between the
meanings of war and peace that developed organically and locally with the news of
victory. Yet behind the scenes some of those changes and distinctions experienced by
contemporaries were influenced, if not created, by the government’s immense postwar
preparations.2 During the Second World War peace was anticipated by government
officials who started planning an exit strategy long before the fighting stopped. Victory in
war did not yield an end to centralized government authority; rather, the coming of peace
required its expansion.

1
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This chapter addresses one aspect of the government’s postwar preparations: the
move towards creating the CAAC and the WAC. These two organizations formed the
federal government’s entire disposal administration as they were tasked with the
liquidation of all government assets and property that became surplus when the war
ended. Yet the creation of the CAAC and WAC was never a certainty. Rather, their
establishment stemmed from the reformation of an ongoing wartime relationship and
interdependency between the federal government, business interests, labour unions, and
all the various communal and public organizations that supported the war effort. With
war production hitting high gear in 1943 and with a growing confidence in eventual
Allied victory, some prescient individuals and associations realized that a comprehensive
disposal strategy was urgently required. As early as October 1942 anxious businessmen
and their associations drew attention to disposal issues by mailing letters and resolutions
to government officials requesting assistance and the formulation of policies designed to
protect their industries. They were followed by municipal and provincial governments, as
well as educational, agricultural, and veterans associations, which wrote to government
officials demanding an effective disposal strategy, priority access to surpluses, assurances
of postwar prosperity, and offers for cooperation with federal officials.
Throughout 1943 and 1944, these lobbying efforts provoked a changing attitude in
government circles about the necessity of a comprehensive disposal strategy. Beginning
around May 1943, officials in the DMS, DND, and Finance started contemplating the
creation of a single government-wide disposal apparatus to handle all future surpluses. A
single centralized administration was preferred over the disparate salvage arrangements
developed during the war (and confined mainly to departmental requirements) and fit
within the rationalized management structure that officials experimented with during the
war. Therefore, on 29 November 1943, the Privy Council approved PC9108 which
created the CAAC and the WAC.3 The CAAC was an interdepartmental organization that
determined the broad and strategic policies related to disposal. It was responsible for
receiving all surplus declarations from departments, facilitating inter-governmental
3
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transfers, and consigning surpluses to the WAC for final disposal. The WAC handled
physical disposal by maintaining, storing, selling, destroying, or otherwise dealing with
surplus assets. In line with other postwar initiatives and preparations, PC9108 was a
prime example of how policymakers anticipated the needs of peace as it was designed to
help ensure a smooth transition from the state of war to the state of peace. However, it
was not a perfect document and several revisions were made in the spring, just before
Parliament passed the Surplus Crown Assets Act on 12 July 1944.
Given that public money had funded their manufacture or purchase, Crown-owned
surpluses became entangled with wider political, economic, and social imperatives that
competed for their possession and use. Severe material shortages caused by cancelled war
contracts, labour disputes, and delays in the production of new goods added further
intensity to the demands for surplus munitions and supplies. These items were supposed
to fill the postwar vacuum in supply, especially since they were often the only materials
and finished products available for reconstruction and rehabilitation purposes. As this
chapter will demonstrate, many enterprising individuals, businesses, and organizations
lobbied bureaucrats and politicians for special considerations in 1944 and 1945, and in
doing so, helped shape the early history of the state’s disposal administration.
The Parliamentary debates about the Surplus Crown Assets Act can be viewed as a
microcosm as they came to encapsulate the broadest issues and implications of disposal.
The Conservative opposition complained bitterly about the centralization of power inside
the Privy Council and about a lack of public accountability on disposal operations, and
highlighted several loopholes in the Act itself. Yet no political party objected to the
creation of the CAAC or WAC and an uneasy alliance emerged across the entire political
spectrum, as everyone appeared to recognize the importance of disposal operations and
understood that the government would have to take the lead. When disagreements and
criticisms surfaced they usually centred on how the government should proceed: should it
divest all the assets it acquired or maintain them for future purposes? In effect, the
disposal of surplus assets became enmeshed within the early development of Canada’s
welfare state. After all, providing Canadians with social security required the retention of
big government as well as the assets and property that enabled to state to fulfill its
expanding obligations to its citizens and veterans.
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Growing Concerns
As the industrial effort reached its peak between 1942 and 1944, the issue of
disposal started concerning apprehensive manufacturers who recognized that Allied
victory would abruptly terminate lucrative war contacts and empty bustling factory
floors. Many felt that government action was required to mitigate any dislocation and its
potentially dangerous side effects, but at least initially, federal officials seemed less
concerned with disposal and more enthusiastic about expanding production. However,
over time concerted lobbying efforts from a variety of interests groups forced the
government’s hand as these groups mailed officials dozens of resolutions and messages
demanding action. In general, most resolutions from the business community voiced
concerns about postwar reconstruction and reconversion, demanded the curtailment of
certain war regulations, requested more information about the disposal of surplus assets
and future tax and export policies, suggested favourable policy alternatives, and offered
to send delegations to Ottawa for consultations.4
Some of the earliest overtures from the business community were sent to J. L.
Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, just before the war economy started hitting its peak. On
15 October 1942 the Executive Secretary and Treasurer of the Canadian Association of
Garment Manufacturers, Thos. W. Learie, contacted Ilsley about “a situation in the
clothing trade which is giving the manufacturers very great concern. It has to do with the
question of stocking materials for officers’ uniforms.”5 The problem related to the
accumulation of cloth used for fabricating officer uniforms, the substantial financial
investment this required, and the fact that the cloth was entirely dependent upon military
specifications and therefore would be “an asset of comparatively little value” when
hostilities ended. On behalf of Canadian garments manufacturers, Learie pressed the
government for “reasonable consideration” on the matter by either allowing clothiers to
set up allowances exempt from the Excess Profits Tax so they could cover potential
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losses in the future, or making some arrangements for the government to purchase all the
inventory at the end of hostilities.6
Ilsley passed the letter on to R. B. Bryce, Secretary of the EAC, who then
canvassed officials in the WPTB and the DMS for their opinions on the matter. By
January 1943, Bryce had heard back from Douglas Dewar, Chief of the Prices Division at
the WPTB, and C. D. Howe, both of whom found no reason for urgency on the matter.
Responding to Bryce on 6 November 1942, a few days after the Allied victory at El
Alamein and just before Operation Torch, Howe stated that if the government assumed
responsibility for the materials it would set a dangerous precedent and “invite
overstocking.” Although he suggested the possibility of some income tax adjustments for
inventories, his cautionary tone was unmistakeable. Drawing from his wartime
experience with businessmen, Howe advised Ilsley and Bryce that “the suggestion [by
Learie] is typical of the tendency of business to fall back hopelessly on the government
for an easy solution of a problem that industry should settle itself.”7
In early January, Dewar informed Bryce that the WPTB’s commodity administrator
for Fine Clothing was adamant about the urgency of the problem, but that he personally
felt that this case was exaggerated and that if action was needed in the future the
facilities, controls, and purchasing authorities already established for procurement could
be repurposed if necessary.8 Although both Dewar and Howe saw potential dangers
ahead and offered some advice, they gave only token appreciation for the potential losses
facing the garments industry. Howe’s dismissal of the matter is quite telling. At a time
when Allied armies were just recovering from earlier defeats, his priorities for
procurement were trumping his concerns for disposal. Moreover, his assertion that
industry “should settle itself” demonstrated a certain ideological reticence about the
future postwar economy. Even as Howe’s DMS created crown companies with haste and
largely funded wartime productivity with public funds, a certain ideological
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preconception about a future with substantially less government regulation still existed.
In early 1943, final victory was still an abstraction, much like the future shape of the
postwar economy. It would take some time and effort to curb priorities and convince
officials of the need for new government regulations.
On 11 January 1943, Ilsley informed Learie that “after investigation and
consideration” his lobbying efforts on behalf of garment manufacturers had failed. While
appreciating that “a special type of hazard” might exist in the future, the government
could not accept his suggestions. Ilsley then pointed out “that the manufacturers of
officers’ uniforms will have to be prepared to assume the usual trade risks in connection
with the materials which they stock.”9 However, almost as soon as Ilsley informed Learie
there would be no support for garment manufacturers it became apparent that the decision
contradicted other developments. While Ilsley, on the advice of senior bureaucrats,
rebuffed the notion of assistance, lower-level bureaucrats and commodity administrators
in the DMS and WPTB were forced into action.
Perhaps Dewar should have listened more closely to the urgent warnings from his
Fine Clothing administrator, because without guarantees for covering potential losses,
clothiers stopped carrying large and expensive stocks of inventory. The long-term risks
were just too prohibitive especially when in January 1943, the British Board of Trade
made changes to its export laws that limited shipments of wool to Canada, thereby
increasing prices.10 As a result, by the spring a shortage of both cloth and uniforms
materialized just as a surge in new officer commissions coincided with the deployments
of additional Army divisions to Europe and the invasions of Sicily (July) and Italy
(September).11 To mitigate the problem Melbourne Merchandising Company and the
Canadian Wool Board (crown companies established by the DMS and WPTB
respectively to purchase and distribute wool) started buying bulk supplies of cloth and
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wools in March. By October, the two organizations had approximately 445,000 yards
valued at $1.65 million. Moreover, officials also discovered that considerable savings
were accrued when the two government agencies stockpiled materials, set prices, and
distributed inventories according to necessity and contractual obligations.12
However, this was a somewhat belated discovery for officials involved in the
garments trade, as the practice of stockpiling inventories ahead of production was wellknown in other industries. For instance, the WICB’s Aircraft Control purchased special
parts, materials, and equipment to distribute to manufacturers two months in advance of
any future production.13 Perhaps, the largest stockpiles were built up by the motor car
companies on war contracts. As Howe told the House of Commons in November 1945,
car companies and the associated WICB Controls usually accumulated production
materials “five or six months ahead of final assembly” but once VJ-Day happened
“everything stopped” thereby creating the large surplus of parts, materials, and equipment
that businesses were dreading.14 Thus, the needs of the war effort forced the government
to invest more public money across an increasingly wider spectrum of industries and
stockpile more resources and parts.
The increasing scope of government expenditures prompted another letter from
Learie on 9 November 1943. However, this time it was accompanied by a “Resolution
Passed at a Conference Work Garment Industry.” This resolution was typical of many
received by the government because it stated the nature of the disposal problem in
relationship to “excess military supplies” and argued that “a serious accumulation of
wearing apparel for military purposes” would exist after victory. In a common refrain, the
resolution brought attention to “the most serious effect on the operation and development
of industry” should surpluses be dumped indiscriminately on Canadian markets. 15 In
other words, Learie’s November letter had a substantially different objective than his
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earlier one. Rather than asking for the government to purchase more supplies at the end
of hostilities, garment manufacturers were now worried about the state’s plans for
liquidating its inventories of clothing and uniforms accumulated during the war. To that
effect, the resolution offered some policy alternatives. It suggested that surplus clothing
be “used for the relief of sufferers in the war areas” and that if distribution happened in
Canada, it should be “done through the recognized and authentic channels” so the
industry was not destroyed by a flood of cheap, used clothing and fabrics.16
More generally, Learie’s efforts fit into a prevailing pattern of activism on the part
of businesses and provided an “indication of growing public interest” that deserved
further attention.17 Prompted largely by the DMS’s regulatory powers, stimulus for
industrialization, and mandate for all-out production, an increasing number of other
interest groups, commercial associations, companies, and eventually municipalities began
contacting the government with serious concerns about disposal issues. For example, on
16 June 1943 a resolution from the Board of Trade of the City of Ottawa arrived at
Ilsley’s office. It called on the government to give manufacturers preference and priority
for purchasing future surpluses to “prevent economic waste and not create undue
disturbance in domestic and export markets and the usual regular channels of business.”18
Later in October the North Bay Board of Trade issued a resolution that fully endorsed the
resolution from Ottawa’s Trade Board.19 Another example was J. F. McMullen, the
President of Marshall-Wells Canadian Companies Ltd., who wrote to Ilsley in August
with his suggestions and to inform the Minister that his company was willing to purchase
back most of what it produced, particularly if the items were still packaged and in good
condition.20
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The pattern of activism only intensified throughout the fall of 1943. In September
the Edmonton Ex-Service Men’s Rehabilitation Committee mailed the government a
resolution that was unanimously endorsed by practically every veteran association across
Canada.21 The resolution demanded that, at the end of hostilities, the Dominion “retain all
rights and title to all war material” until an Advisory Board was established and
composed of “a representative body of ex-servicemen and women” together with
government officials.22 In November the deluge of resolutions, inquiries, and
representations took off and did not let up. That month four important commercial
associations petitioned the government. On 5 November, the Radio Manufacturers
Association of Canada, contacted both Ilsley’s and Howe’s offices. This was followed by
a letter to Clifford Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, from Fred R. Smart, Secretary
Manager of the Stationers’ Guild of Canada. At the end of November, both the Canadian
Institute of Plumbing and Heating and the Canadian Builders Supply Association also
sent resolutions to Howe’s office and copies to Ilsley’s.23
These associations represented some of the most crucial manufacturers in Canada’s
war effort, as they furnished it with radio and telecommunications equipment, typewriters
and office supplies, furnaces and plumbing, and building materials of all shapes and
sizes. All four associations were very concerned that the items originally produced by
their members for war purposes could be recycled back into the domestic economy after
victory, thereby undercutting the production of new items and undermining their
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respective industries.24 Fred Smart and the Stationers’ Guild even went as far as to
suggest that “if surplus goods cannot be reasonably absorbed through regular channels,
that they be offered in foreign markets” and that “if no foreign market is found…that
such merchandise should either be frozen for an indefinite period or as a last resort
completely destroyed.”25 Destroying perfectly useable assets rather than allowing them to
enter a materially-starved marketplace was a completely self-serving and drastic
suggestion, yet the Stationers’ Guild was not alone in making that recommendation. In
fact several other commercial associations saw the destruction of all surpluses as the
preferable option rather than allowing their resale, as both the Automotive Chamber of
Commerce in January 1944 and the Allied Drug Council (representing the manufacturers
of pharmaceuticals, medicines, and medical supplies) in September 1944 informed the
government of this strategy’s viability.26
The situation in the garments trade was not unique. Rather, it reflected a common
situation facing almost every manufacturer at war’s end. The government’s expansion
and expenditures across all sectors – aircraft, motor vehicles, garments, and many more –
had created a major political and economic conundrum. The measures taken by the
Canadian Wool Board and Melbourne Merchandising might have mitigated severe
wartime shortages in officer uniforms, but they did not solve the overarching issue.
Through these agencies the government took on the financial risk of owning potentially
worthless assets, thereby relieving the civilian economy of absorbing the losses so it
could continue production without the final price tag overhanging its output. By
manipulating supply and demand the government was not only accumulating vast
inventories of assets (some of which would require disposal long before the war ended),
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but it was also blurring the mandates and accountability of its various departments and
agencies involved. Considering the plethora of militaria produced in record numbers,
federal interference in economic matters set a serious precedent and came with a
potentially large price tag that no department’s budget could absorb alone.
Absorbing financial losses became the bureaucracy’s proverbial hot potato.
Although the DMS and DND claimed the lion’s share of the war’s financial
responsibilities, this was not always the case. Subsequent correspondence throughout
early 1944 sought to iron out the accounting details relating to officer uniforms. On 22
November 1943, Donald Gordon, the Chairman of the WPTB, wrote to G. K. Sheils, the
Deputy Minister of the DMS, to ascertain his department’s views on the matter and
suggested that National Defence absorb any losses. Sheils wrote back in December
indicating that the DMS had no “status in the matter.” He also agreed that any losses
incurred in the procurement of officer uniforms should be carried on the accounts of the
end user: National Defence.27 By March, W. P. Walker, Vice-President of the Canadian
Wool Board, wrote Ilsley informing him that the RCAF had agreed to cover the losses
but required a special grant from the Treasury Board to purchase the necessary fabrics.28
This clever ploy to pass the buck back to Finance failed because Ilsley refused the
request. After considering the issue Ilsley felt that it gave the RCAF a chance to make
purchases “on an extravagant scale” while setting a precedent for the other services to
follow.29 The special grant would result in even larger inventories requiring disposal. In
the end, Ilsley’s decision meant that the Wool Board and WPTB were on the hook if
DND declined to cover the losses and had to prepare arrangements for this eventuality.
With similar situations bound to emerge in the future, officials started realizing the
necessity of coordination. Budgetary considerations and bureaucratic competition
threatened the development of a comprehensive and practical disposal strategy. However,
they also served as warning signs. From mid-1943 onwards, the disposal problem began
receiving more consideration from officials who were motivated to create a workable
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solution that would mitigate financial losses by recouping some of the original cost,
address the needs of businesses, help prevent another postwar depression, and solve any
inter-departmental conflicts or confusion. It was obvious to all involved that an interdepartmental committee was required, as this would centralize everything related to
disposal within a single administration. Moreover, forming a new inter-departmental task
force minimized duplication and conflicting policies, would allow a centralized group of
experts to consult with interest groups, and would ensure that policies were uniformly
implemented and monitored over time. But how exactly would this administration work?
And who would be in charge?

Disposal of Obsolete Stores before PC9108
Before November 1943 there were only three government agencies that handled all
disposal operations: the Treasury Board’s Chief Salvage Officer in the Department of
Finance, the Army Salvage and Disposal Board (ASDB) operated by the Canadian Army,
and the Scrap Disposal Branch established by the DMS. The experience of these three
smaller organizations was of inestimable value to the future disposal administration.
However, with the exception of the Salvage Officer, each one was formed for specific
departmental requirements and therefore they were not well suited for providing the
necessary inter-departmental administration. Instead, they provided a cadre of expertise
that was essential in the initial stages of preparations. That such experience existed before
the creation of the CAAC and WAC demonstrates that the problem of disposal was not
simply confined to postwar matters. Rather, the disposal of surpluses and obsolete stores
was also a wartime necessity.
Of the three, the Chief Salvage Officer had the widest mandate and was the only
one that predated the outbreak of war. J. C. Kelley, the Chief Salvage Officer, and his
staff of ten in Ottawa handled all of the government’s disposal needs, except for the DMS
and DND (Army).30 Once surpluses were declared by a department, Kelley’s role was to
either facilitate an inter-departmental transfer or sell the goods by public tender.
According to an article in the Ottawa Journal in October 1940, Kelley was in charge of
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“the biggest and strangest second-hand business in Canada” as he oversaw the sale of a
diverse amount of things: old typewriters, old bridges, an old lighthouse, real estate, used
auto tires, old cars, old bones, polar bear rugs, fur coats, and even “false teeth, ancient
style...a hangover from an old government supply of dental stores.”31 Over time Kelley
developed some talent for the sale of junk. He could find a buyer for practically anything,
even one for “a badly-battered car lying at the bottom of a 200-foot ravine in British
Columbia.”32 The article concluded that Kelley and his staff provided an important
service for the government by acting as “a clearing house and agent for all government
departments.” Its set-up was small and economical, something that ran contrary to all the
stories read by taxpayers about “Government extravagance.”33
Although both the RCAF and RCN relied on the Chief Salvage Officer for the
disposal of surpluses and obsolete kit, the Canadian Army established a procedure and
organization for managing its internal needs. On 25 June 1941, the Obsolete Stores
Committee and the ASDB were created.34 The Obsolete Stores Committee was
responsible for inspecting the condition of all kit and supplies and then recommending
whether they be disposed of to the ASDB or destroyed. The ASDB was placed under the
command of Lt-Col. W. G. B. Dailley, who was a senior executive with the T. Eaton
Company. in civilian life and had acquired extensive experience in both “salvage disposal
for the British Armies in the last War” and “the merchandizing of goods in Canada.”35
Dailley and the ASDB sold items by tender to the public or found other potential users
within the government or military. Eventually the DND created the Inter-Services
Committee for Interchange of Surplus Assets which relieved the ASDB of its latter task
and formalized the administration and exchange of surplus goods from one service to the
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other.36 Judging by the sales reports found in the ASDB’s war diary and records relating
to the exchange of assets within the DND, the military developed some workable
arrangements for transferring surpluses between the Services. These arrangements
worked efficiently since the ASDB did not handle many new or gently-worn assets.
Instead it mainly dealt with the derelict items unwanted by the Services, such as: a variety
of scrap metals and wood, derelict or worn out equipment, component parts, rags and old
socks, old uniforms and clothing fabrics, old boots, spent ammunition casings, used food
containers, and jerry cans.37
The Scrap Disposal Branch of the DMS was established around the same time as
the ASDB. Its job evolved out of the need to manage the waste caused by production.
Early in the war, the disposal of scrap metals and materials incurred through
manufacturing war goods was handled by the war contractor under special authority
granted in the terms of their contracts. However, as the official history of the DMS
pointed out, few contractors knew what to do with the waste and would dispose of it
haphazardly in dumps or in storage rooms on site, or they sold it to junk dealers (and kept
the profits).38 This situation changed as the demands of the war increased on industry and
with the development of resource conservation and streamlining programs designed to
ensure that production quotas created as little waste as possible.39 A survey
commissioned by the DMS in the summer of 1941 found that better controls over the fate
of refuse, trimmings, and used materials could help increase production, especially if the
scrap resources were recycled back to manufacturers or if the DMS controlled the
proceeds of their sale. On 15 October 1941, the Scrap Disposal Branch was formed and
W. B. Gordon, its first and only Director General, and his staff of nine subordinates
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handled the disposal of all scrap derived from war contracts, scrap derived from the
operations of crown corporations, and any materials that required disposal because of
design changes.40 These arrangements remained in place until PC9108 was issued and in
May 1944 the Scrap Disposal Branch was absorbed into the WAC.41
None of these organizations were capable of managing what lay ahead. Although
all three gained valuable experience in selling obsolete things, few new goods or large
quantities of expensive items ever became available during the war. Consequently, most
of what they sold was surplus because of obsolescence and not because the need had
terminated. Moreover, as the war progressed, the scale of disposal expanded beyond the
original capabilities of these organizations. By mid-1943 disposal had become an
increasingly larger wartime necessity and a source of great consternation for the DND.
Just before industrial production peaked in October, the war effort reached its watershed
in supply. At that point, several types of weapons systems and other assets employed
continuously from the outbreak of war started reaching the end of their lifecycles.
Moreover, technological innovation resulted in the development of newer and better
models that were starting to replace a wide variety of weaponry. J. B. Carswell, a
Director-General of the DMS stationed in Washington and later appointed President of
the WAC, summarized the situation that summer:
In the summer of 1943 the production of war munitions by the Allies had
reached a rate approximately four times that of the Axis. In all three
countries, U.S., U.K., and Canada, it was realized that at last we had reached
a stage where we had both time and elbow-room to weed out of our
respective programmes both obsolescent and surplus items. This movement
started about May ’43 and has been increasing in size and tempo ever since.42
The problem of obsolete weapons and equipment was particularly acute in the
RCAF. Almost from its outbreak, the war provoked rapid technological development in
aircraft design and engines that resulted in constant changes to the arsenals of Allied
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fighters and bombers. This wreaked havoc, not only on production lines plagued by
frequent alterations in aircraft design, but also in pilot and flight training as newer models
rendered the elementary training aircraft increasingly obsolete.43 With the establishment
of the BCATP in December 1939, Canada faced a serious deficit in training aircraft and
so the RCAF purchased Tiger Moth, Finch, and Anson airplanes while contracts were
issued to manufacture additional numbers.44 By 1941, however, the Tiger Moths and
Finches were, after some extensive negotiations, designated for replacement by the
Cornell and newer models of the Anson.
At the mid-point of 1943 the second generation of aircraft was becoming
increasingly obsolete and required disposal. Two reports were circulated to Cabinet in
April and May 1943 outlining what steps were being taken to “guillotine” aircraft (to
scrap planes for their component parts). The process of “guillotining” the obsolete Tiger
Moth and Finch models had commenced immediately when Cornells began replacing
them, but now the RCAF was seeking approval from Cabinet for an expanded “second
stage” that would take all Tiger Moths and Finches out of service over a two-year period,
systematically “guillotining” each one.45 Clearly, officials in the DND were grappling
with disposal problems, as the April report stated “it must be accepted that no aircraft
type, nor indeed any type of warlike equipment, can persist forever. This is a condition
that is forced upon us by enemy competition and which, with varying urgency, affects all
types of equipment from front line combat to elementary training.”46
The Canadian Army also had problems with obsolete kit. Issues involving disposal
and salvage overseas were dealt with by the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps and the
Salvage Collection Units of the Ordnance Corps, but at home special arrangements were
made. For example, the issue of storage space in training camps and ordnance depots
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(many hastily constructed or expanded after 1939) became a serious problem in late
1942. By that time, the Army had recruited, trained, and deployed several infantry and
armoured divisions’ worth of troops. To become effective soldiers, successive waves of
recruits required extensive practice at shooting and therefore millions of rounds of
ammunition were expended on firing ranges. However, every bullet or shell shot also
expended a cartridge casing, in addition to the wooden packaging crates used for storing
and transporting the ammunition in bulk. Standard procedure dictated that these empties
were picked up and stored on site. By December 1942 a crisis was developing since many
training camps and firing ranges were running out of storage space.47
“No one knew what to do” wrote the anonymous author of a January 1945
newspaper article in the Longue Pointer, the popular newspaper published at Longue
Pointe Ordnance Depot in Montreal. But a solution was in the offing. On 12 January
1943, the Ammunition Empties Group was formed at Longue Pointe under the command
of Major O. Rabatich, the Inspecting Ordnance Officer for Military District 4. Its purpose
and function was “to recondition and return to service all ammunition packages, boxes,
containers, fired cartridge cases, and other ammunition components” used by infantry and
artillery units in training operations in Eastern Canada.48 At the Depot’s Shed 47 (and in
conjunction with the ASDB), the Empties Group built up a system in which they received
shipments, inspected the serviceability of each item, and prepared them for future
disposal. Non-serviceable casings were turned over to the Depot’s Salvage Group which
sold them back to war contractors as scrap brass. Serviceable casings were stored until
orders came from the ammunition-filling plants working for the DMS. It was at the
ammunition filling plants that these serviceable casings were refurbished and refilled for
eventual reuse.49
In government circles, the summer of 1943 was a breaking point as the military’s
issues with obsolete kit mixed with the public’s growing interest in disposal matters. The
situation required action and thankfully there were several prescient officials in the
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government’s bureaucracy who were independently considering the disposal problem.
With all these issues swirling, suddenly superiors started listening and Carswell was one
of the first to speak up. Carswell understood that disposal operations would not just
involve the sale of obsolete junk since the armed forces and government would no longer
require their large stocks of arsenals and assets. Victory would necessitate the liquidation
of all inventories and many items would be state-of-the-art or in peak working condition,
while others might retain value for civilians in different forms and functions. Therefore,
the disposal of such assets needed special consideration well beyond the sale of war junk.
On 14 June, Carswell wrote Howe to outline the potential dangers and risks that lay
ahead. He stressed the applicability and usefulness of early and comprehensive disposal
arrangements “as a war measure” (emphasis original) since the “weeding-out” of obsolete
kit created surpluses that required immediate disposal. A month later, he submitted a
briefing note that suggested a course of action for dealing with war surpluses.50 Shortly
thereafter, Howe recalled Carswell from Washington and ordered him to implement his
suggestions. According to Carswell, this was followed by “several conferences with other
departments of the Government interested, culminating in a luncheon meeting in Ottawa
in October” when he sketched out his proposed ideas about the creation of a Committee
“to define surpluses” and a Corporation “to dispose of them.”51
Initially Carswell’s appointment might have surprised some colleagues in the DMS.
Stationed far away in Washington, he was an outsider to the Department’s Scrap Disposal
Branch. But Howe had an impeccable ability for picking the right men for the right posts
and Carswell’s appointment fits this pattern. Formally educated as an engineer, Carswell
arrived in Canada in 1910 from Paisley, Scotland, and found work in Montreal with the
company Ross & MacDonald. A few years later he was transferred to their Toronto office
where he worked on several major construction projects including, Union Station, the
Royal Bank Building, and the Central Technical School. During the First World War he
worked for the Imperial Munitions Board’s aviation department as chief engineer
overseeing the design and construction of all camps, airfields, and buildings in Canada. In
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1918, he started his own construction business and sold it ten years later to become the
managing director of Burlington Steel Company Ltd. 52 When war broke out again in
1939, Carswell was retired and living in New York but still volunteered his services to
the Canadian government. After receiving a stellar reference from J. C. Armer of
Dominion Forge & Stamping Co. Ltd., he was hired by Wallace Campbell, head of the
War Supply Board, in early 1940 and sent to Washington.53 With his combination of
business and engineering backgrounds, his experience during both world wars, and his
reputation and connections with the international community, Carswell was the ideal man
for the job of disposal.

PC9108: Creating the Committee and Corporation
Despite the wealth of experience with disposal, the Salvage Officer, the ASDB, and
the Scrap Disposal Branch were not initially consulted. Instead, when officials in the
DMS, DND, and Finance started seriously contemplating disposal issues they turned to
others. Independent of Carswell and prompted by the situation with garments
manufacturers, Gordon broached the subject with W. A. Bark, president of the crown
company Wartime Salvage Ltd., sometime in April or May 1943. On 5 August, Bark
submitted a two-page report in which he expressed some observations gained from
consultations and correspondence with several businesses that summer, including Willard
Storage Battery Company and Knowles Bailey Ltd. 54 Bark made several suggestions,
including selling assets by tender through “regular distribution channels” and creating a
catalogue of all surplus items. He also explained that forming a new disposal agency
might not be necessary if the existing controls and production branches were cleverly
reorganized to handle disposal. The plan would obviously benefit from the experience
and expertise gained throughout the war:

52

LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Newspaper Clipping, “Man of the Week – War Assets Boss,” The
Standard Montreal, 15 January 1944.
53

LAC, RG32, Vol. 42, File: 6-C-21, “Employment Carswell, J. B,” J. C. Armer to W. C. Campbell, 22
January 1940.
54

LAC, RG19, Vol. 387, File: 101-102-34, “Post-War Disposal of Equipment and Supplies,” by W. A.
Bark, 5 August 1943, 1-2; Ibid, N. H. Walker to W. A. Bark, 3 June 1943, 1-3; Ibid, K. Bailey to W. A.
Bark, 23 July 1943, 1-3. Bailey also sent his letter to Mackenzie King’s office.

56

By putting the present machinery in reverse and using various Controllers and
Administrators for the purpose of disposing of the particular supplies they,
themselves, created would seem to be a natural set-up. e. g. –
1- Aircraft Production Branch might become Aircraft Disposal Branch;
2- Automotive and Tank Production might become Automotive and
Tank Disposal;
3- Administrator of Heating and Plumbing would direct the disposal of
heating and plumbing fixtures;
4- Administrator of Fabricated Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals might
direct the disposal of all such materials.55
Although such a suggestion made sense in theory, it was not very practical. At that
time, war production was about to peak and each control and agency was wholly
absorbed in ensuring that production continued at its rapid pace. Burdening officials with
disposal – a problem as equally complex as procurement – was not ideal. Additionally,
such reorganization was limited to department-specific arrangements and therefore would
not be uniformly applied across the whole government. This would inevitably cause
serious duplication and internal competition, while also overwhelming existing
arrangements with more assets than their small staffs could handle. Moreover, in the case
of the Salvage Officer, the ASDB, and the Scrap Disposal Branch, they remitted the
profits from all sales back to the departments they serviced. Such arrangements
subsidized departmental budgets in some small measure, but with the expected volume of
surpluses in the future, this arrangement would profit only the departments bloated with
significant inventories while also preventing the government from collecting the proceeds
in a consolidated revenue fund to help pay off its substantial war debts. The need was
clear: a new inter-departmental agency that tied disposal operations into wider postwar
policy objectives had to supplant the disparate and existing arrangements.
A few days after receiving Bark’s report, Gordon passed it on to Clark with his own
opinions. Gordon stated that he had “from time to time” considered that “some definite
part of our post-war planning” should be “devoted to the question of salvage.”56 The
urgency of the issue had now crystalized in Gordon’s mind, not only because he was now
aware of Carswell’s proposals, but also because he felt that a “glorious state of
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confusion” would result if all departments did not coordinate their various Salvage
Committees before the end of hostilities. In an addendum to his letter Gordon reiterated
the importance of the issues at stake:
Already tremendous inventories of supplies are becoming available for
disposal. Various Crown Companies and Munitions companies whose
contracts...have been cancelled are anxious to wind up surplus inventories. I
should not be surprised if more than $50,000,000 of material is over-hanging
the market right now. If these companies are allowed to dump this on the
market, not only will there be a serious loss to the Treasury, but as well our
domestic markets may be demoralized.57
On 13 August, Clark sent Gordon’s memo to Bryce for consideration. Clark and Bryce
both agreed with some of Bark’s suggestions, especially about the creation of a catalogue
listing all supplies likely to become available at the cessation of hostilities. This would
allow for a quick compilation of most objects and “form the basis for further detailed
work.”58 Clark also felt that other Departments had to help compile the list, especially the
DND and the DMS, since they were directly concerned and possessed most of the objects
destined for disposal.
Clark and Bryce pointed out three additional big-picture considerations facing any
new disposal arrangements. The first related to gathering information on the potential
postwar uses of the supplies in relationship to civilian needs, government purposes,
postwar military requirements, commercial exports, and relief and rehabilitation purposes
(from both the war or some future natural disaster). Bryce also suggested that “as a minor
outlet for some of these supplies” they could be shipped up north or used “for new
colonization projects in pioneer areas in Canada.”59 Another consideration was the
channels and techniques of disposal in combination with determining what materials had
to be junked. Finally, Clark saw the need for international coordination, particularly with
the UK and US, so that property located in foreign countries and foreign property located
in Canada could be dealt with accordingly. However, he felt it was better to “leave this
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until we have explored our own problems to some degree, so that we will have certain
specific questions in mind in approaching those abroad.”60 Overall, Clark’s memo
highlighted the need for close inter-departmental collaboration between a variety of
government agencies and in many respects the business community. As he concluded,
“the collection of this information and the consideration of the potential demands and
possible techniques of disposition should get the various departments and agencies
concerned thinking along constructive lines themselves, in case the problem crystallizes
before we have had a chance to conclude the various studies.”61
A month later, the matter was brought to Cabinet and on the recommendation of the
War Committee a special ad hoc committee was established to consider the disposal
problem. At the 29 September meeting J. L. Ralston brought up the disposal problem
facing the Canadian armed forces for the third time. Earlier in April and again in May, he
had broached the subject on behalf of the RCAF, but nothing had resulted except deferred
decisions. This time, however, he received support from both Howe and Ilsley. As a
result, on 5 October, A. D. P. Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council, wrote to Watson
Sellar, the Auditor General of Canada, informing him that Cabinet had decided to form
“an interdepartmental committee, composed of representatives of the Departments of
Finance (who would act as convenor), Munitions and Supply, and National Defence” that
would “consider and make recommendations regarding suitable machinery to deal with
disposal.”62 The committee was comprised of Sellar (as chair), Colonel G. S. Currie from
National Defence, E. J. Brunning from Munitions and Supply, and Terence Sheard (Air
Member for Supply) was added later. Moreover, once the committee was in place, most
of the resolutions and paperwork received by the government were forwarded to Sellar
for consideration.
Seller’s report, submitted to Cabinet on 10 November, made recommendations for
the machinery of disposal. It started by outlining the scope of the problem. It estimated
that three billion dollars of assets “might be held by or for the Canadian Government” at
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the conclusion of hostilities and it identified several trouble spots in the form of “(a) lendlease materials of other allied governments, (b) developments and materials of the United
States government, mainly in the Northwest, (c) jointly-owned assets of the
Commonwealth Air Training Plan and of the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom
and Canada, and (d) various properties, moveable and immovable, of the United
Kingdom Government.”63 The report also

found that cancelled “production

commitments” and leases would release various types of supplies and goods requiring
disposal and that significant “external war investments” existed, particularly in
Newfoundland and Labrador.64
The report repeatedly suggested that due to the international dimensions of surplus
disposal, arrangements with Allied countries were necessary. An agreement with the US
was particularly urgent as the authors cited a pamphlet written Charles H. Lipsett and
published in the Daily Metal Reporter on 28 September 1943 estimating that the US
surplus inventories would be worth $75 billion.65 Given that future Canadian markets
would be overwhelmed with their own postwar surpluses, it was imperative that the US
be prevented from dumping surplus inventories in Canadian markets. The Sellar
committee recommended that the Dominion “seek understandings with other Allied
Governments” with the goal of establishing “an inter-governmental body analogous to
the Combined Production and Resources Board” in order to handle the monumental task
of disposal and to monitor the vaguely stated “principles to be followed in disposing of
surpluses.”66
The Sellar committee was most concerned about the form, function, and
administration of Canada’s disposal bodies, as Sellar’s report stated:
We foresee the probability of confusion delay and clashes of interests if
departments individually attempt to formulate plans and negotiate
liquidations of inventories and commitments. Further, we visualize
administrative risks if Ministers and officials alike are harassed by the
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importunities of speculators seeking a profit because the Government has
surplus stocks.67
Accordingly, it was crucial to establish legislation “to regulate the control, management,
and disposal of Crown property” and to create a “Disposal Board” and “Corporation”
under the Minister of Munitions and Supply, so that the full attention of the Board’s
Chairman and the Corporation’s President could be devoted to disposal matters.68 The
report then went on to outline some general terms of reference for the Board and
Corporation. The “Board” would operate under the jurisdiction of the Minister of
Munitions and Supplies and inform Cabinet directly on all matters pertaining to surplus
disposal. It would make recommendations on what to dispose of and how, and it would
be given the power “to co-opt technical assistance, to make inquiries and to demand
reports from departments and to authorize inter-departmental transfers.”69 The
“Corporation” had to have a name that distanced itself from the government, it had to be
run by a board of directors with shares in the company, and it had to be supplied with
enough funds to ensure it could store, manage, and administer the properties coming
under its jurisdiction.70 After deferring a decision on the matter, Cabinet requested that
Sellar’s committee submit a revised report on 19 November, since Deputy Minister of
Defence (Air), Charles “Chubby” Power, had offered some recommendations. On 26
November, Sellar’s report was finalized and Cabinet agreed on names for the two
organizations. The “Board” would be known as the Crown Assets Allocation Committee
and the “Corporation” would be called the War Assets Corporation.
Sellar’s report formed the basis of PC9108, passed by Cabinet three days later.
Emerging at a time when the government was preparing its enormous 1944 legislative
agenda, PC9108 was a significant development in the creation of a disposal policy.
PC9108 ordered each government department or agency to “survey and investigate all
lands, buildings, structures, plant, machinery equipment, articles, and things (including
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munitions of war and supplies defined in the Department of Munitions and Supply Act),
and any interest therein or parts thereof” that it administered “with a view to the
determination of the types and quantities of such assets” which were unneeded.71 Further,
the CAAC was established to monitor and coordinate these departmental investigations,
to receive all surplus declarations, to facilitate inter-governmental transfers, and to
formulate and recommend general disposal policies. Guidelines for policy formation
were also outlined in PC9108, as the CAAC was ordered to consider the needs of
provincial governments, municipalities, and public organizations when creating policies
as well as the potential benefits of deploying surpluses in “distressed areas.” For reasons
of public safety and economic stability, the CAAC was also ordered to establish policies
for things that “should not be offered for sale in Canada” or “should be converted back to
basic materials or should be withheld from the market for the time being.”72
PC9108 also created the WAC to act as the Crown’s agent in disposal operations.
Its shares were vested in a Board of the Directors (who, like the CAAC, were separately
appointed) and the Minister of Munitions and Supply. PC9108 instructed Howe to take
“all necessary steps” for organizing and incorporating the Corporation and the working
capital ($5 million) was provided by Parliament through the War Appropriation Acts.
The WAC was “charged with the duty of disposing of or otherwise dealing with surplus
assets” transferred and consigned to it by the Committee. In doing so it was empowered
to “hold, manage, operate, dispose of or deal in and with surplus Crown assets…in such a
manner as it may decide, subject only to the conditions and instructions stipulated” by the
CAAC upon consignment. The Company was granted some flexibility with policymaking
as well, as PC9108 stated the WAC could make “recommendations on matters of policy
and courses of action with respect to such surplus assets or which in the opinion of the
Company will promote the national well-being of Canada.”73
PC9108 also outlined the structure of the Committee and Corporation. The CAAC
was to have a full-time paid member acting as chairman and to consist of representatives
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designated by several government departments, the President of the WAC, and three
additional members representing the interests of labour, agriculture, and “the
householders of Canada.”74 On 14 December, PC9526 appointed the first two people to
the CAAC: its first secretary C. A. Geoffrion and its first chairman, J. P. Pettigrew. Three
days later PC9640 filled out the rest of the CAAC with representatives (mainly deputy
ministers) from the departments of National Defence, External Affairs, Public Works,
Finance (later in 1944 the Departments of Transport, Trade and Commerce, and Pensions
and National Health were added to the mix).75 Pettigrew was a key figure in the
Committee’s early stages. During the war he became one of Howe’s most competent
executive assistants and earned the CAAC appointment because of his familiarity with
the DMS’s production branches. However, in March 1944, Pettigrew resigned as
chairman so he could concentrate more fully on his role as an assistant deputy minister in
the DMS. However, he remained peripherally involved in disposal operations by helping
organize the termination of the Machine Tool War Service Committee in 1944-1945.76
Pettigrew’s replacement was John Berry, a rising star in the DMS. Berry was born
in Cheshire, England on 24 September 1898 and was educated in mathematics and
applied mechanics. Like most men serving in the DMS, he was a veteran of the First
World War, having served in the Royal Naval Air Service for several years. After the
Great War, he apprenticed as an engineer in the Liverpool shipbuilding industry and later
worked for Vauxhall Motors in Luton, England, and then General Motors’ Overseas
Operations in Detroit as a production manager. In August 1940 he was loaned by GM to
the DMS’s Automotive Production Branch as a technical advisor. Throughout his time in
the DMS Berry displayed a strong work ethic and developed a well-respected reputation
as an efficient manager. At the time of his appointment to the CAAC (as representative
for the DMS) in December 1943, he was Director-General of the Automotive Production
Branch, the WICB’s Motor Vehicles Controller, and the WPTB’s Administrator for
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Automobiles.77 However, Berry relinquished these other jobs shortly after replacing
Pettigrew. When Carswell resigned as President of the WAC in May 1945, Berry was the
natural choice to replace him. Thus, from 16 July 1945 onwards Berry occupied the two
most important positions in Canada’s disposal administration until 31 July 1949, when he
resigned to become President of Canadian Arsenals Limited (CAL).78
The Corporation’s Board of Directors was also selected around the same time as
the CAAC’s membership. On 28 December 1943, eleven men were sold shares in the
company and named to its Board of Directors, which first met in Montreal on 6 January
1944.

According

unpublished

history

to

an

of

the

WAC written in 1950, “the
directors

were

representatives

chosen
of

a

as

cross-

section of business, labour, and
agriculture and of the country
geographically.”79 In reality,
though, it was dominated by
businessmen
Photo 1 Board of Directors, WAC, January 1944. Sitting (L to
R): Hugh Lawson, John Knox, A. C. Guthrie, J. B. Carswell
(President), Jean Julien Perrault, J. B. Ward, and Wilfrid
Gagnon. Standing (L to R): Goodwin Gibson, F. O. Peterson
(Secretary-Treasurer), A. T. O’Leary, and R. D. Purdy. Source:
LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-8, War Assets Corporation –
Historical, Board of Directors.

who

became

associated with the WAC by
virtue of either their work as
“dollar-a-year-men” or because
of

their

backgrounds.

professional
The

business

experience of the WAC’s Directors encompassed mining and colliery agents, knitting and
clothing, beds and bedding, architecture, motor vehicles, merchandising, and real estate.
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Wilfred A. Gagnon, who became the WAC’s first Vice-President, is a typical example. In
the 1930s, he was Quebec’s Minister of Commerce and Industry in Adelard Godbout’s
government. His company, Aird & Son Ltd., specialized in footwear manufacturing and
therefore had a vested interest in disposal operations as his industry was particularly
susceptible to ruin, given the amount of footwear produced for the war effort. The
Canadian Encyclopedia noted that Gagnon used his business experience and wartime
connections to become one of the most successful industrialists in Canadian history.80
As important as PC9108 was in the development of the government’s disposal
policy, it was not perfect. Perhaps the biggest initial problem involved the ambiguities
and overlap between the two organizations. Under PC9108 both the CAAC and WAC
could formulate policies about specific surplus stores and make recommendations about
disposal to the Minister and so, presumably, there was an opportunity for duplication or
conflict. However, the authors of PC9108 dismissed this overlap and ambiguity. They did
so because they were aware that the officials, representatives, and staff of the two
organizations were being handpicked and therefore, despite the potential overlap on
paper, they had “full confidence that both the Committee and the Corporation would be
composed of, or headed up by, officers with sufficient common sense to ensure that no
narrow interpretation would be given” to PC9108 and “that no grasping for power and
authority at the expense of the other body concerned would take place.”81 In doing so,
they envisioned both organizations working together as teammates, a fact best
exemplified by the employees who occupied dual positions in both organizations. For
example, in October 1945 when the WAC was reorganized to form a new Procurement
Division, its manager, R. P. Saunders, was also named the CAAC’s executive secretary.
This overlap was necessary because the Procurement Division dealt exclusively with the
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consignments and transfers from the CAAC and having the same person in charge at both
ends helped streamline the process.82
The authors of PC9108 were intent on avoiding a power struggle. The Committee
and Corporation were envisioned as “two autonomous bodies operating on the same
plane” both reporting to the Minister and neither reporting to the other as subordinate.
The CAAC did not “instruct” the WAC nor did the Corporation “give orders” to the
Committee. Instead they worked cooperatively on a common problem, one that the
CAAC dealt with at an earlier stage.83 This cooperative and common-sense approach was
on full display at the CAAC’s first meeting on 5 January 1944, when confusion over roles
and responsibilities came up. However, Committee members felt that although “PC9108
was somewhat ambiguous” they would “at least try to iron out this question and get
underway” instead of requesting further clarification.84 The decision to establish a single
administration composed of two organizations working in tandem and not in direct
competition turned out to be a very sound idea, especially when compared to
developments in the United States.
In April 1945, Carswell was invited by the US Senate’s Special Committee to Study
and Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises to speak at a meeting of its
subcommittee on Surplus War Property. After outlining a brief on Canada’s disposal
agencies and the policies adopted for machine tools he answered several questions. Aside
from how prices and preferential sales were established for machine tools, the American
senators were interested in the centralization of authority and the division of
responsibility between the CAAC and WAC. They were particularly focused on how they
functioned together as Canada’s “sole disposal agency.” In clarifying the arrangements,
Carswell stated “we compare with your team of eight horses, I think it is, in the United
States. We only have one horse.” Having numerous agencies involved was causing
problems in the US, as major duplication, rivalries, and administrative delays hindered
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disposal operations. On this point one senator cynically remarked, in reference to the
CAAC’s American counterpart, “Our Surplus Property Board here has, itself, almost
been declared surplus.”85 Before thanking Carswell for his briefing, a Senator
complemented Canada on its administration, “I just wanted to observe that you seem to
me to have a very well worked out plan there, in your country. Ours should be as simple
as yours.” Another senator added, “It was apparently given a lot of thought.”86
Another limitation of PC9108 was not immediately apparent and only came to light
in early 1944 when Pettigrew and Carswell got to work. Although PC9108 did not cancel
any of the government’s other disposal arrangements it did supersede them, effectively
rendering them redundant. By its terms and legalities, government departments were now
required to vet their inventories and requirements, declare surplus the unneeded items and
property, and relinquish custody of them to the WAC (via the CAAC). This new set up
prevented any other salvage committee or organization from dealing with disposal since
it vested the powers to sell, destroy, or otherwise dispose of surplus assets with Howe and
through him, the WAC. Accordingly, PC9108 threatened the existence of the ASDB, the
Chief Salvage Officer, and the Scrap Disposal Branch. However, after some
investigation, Pettigrew and Carswell felt that eliminating these organizations would
cause catastrophic problems.87 In fact, an early January meeting with Brigadier W.
Mavor, the Master General of Ordnance (MGO), and Colonel Dailley had impressed
upon Pettigrew the importance of these organizations. He later reported to the Committee
that if these three operations were terminated or replaced by PC9108, “we would be
unable to get anywhere fast.”88
The key issue was the experience and type of surpluses handled by the ASDB,
Scrap Disposal Branch, and Chief Salvage Officer. These organizations primarily
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handled sales of smaller lots and less valuable items on a regular basis, but PC9108 was
drawn up mainly considering the bigger and newer items destined to be surplus at the end
of hostilities. If Howe cancelled these existing arrangements (as was his prerogative) the
CAAC “would be hopelessly bogged down as a committee through requiring everything,
no limit, to come forward to [it].”89 Furthermore, in their fact-finding meetings, Pettigrew
and Carswell found other problems with PC9108. All three disposal organizations used
special arrangements that greatly streamlined the paperwork associated with weeding out
obsolete assets. All three organizations required special approval for larger or out-of-theordinary sales, but for all regular transactions they were given a free hand. The Chief
Salvage Officer could sell anything below $10,000, but if the transaction surpassed that
threshold it required approval from the Treasury Board. The ASDB could sell anything
less than $5,000 without seeking approval, but anything over that and below $50,000
required approval from a Deputy Minister, and Ministerial approval was needed for
anything more expensive. The Scrap Disposal Branch operated under a blanket sales
authorization from Howe’s office, but every effort was made to recycle the materials
back into production.90 There were no such limitations built into PC9108: every sale, no
matter how big or small, required approval from the Privy Council.
Clearly some adjustments were necessary. In early 1944, the CAAC recommended
to Howe that anything declared surplus and valued under $15,000 would not need
approval from the Privy Council for disposal. The CAAC also suggested that the
chairman’s powers be increased so he could determine what could be classified as scrap
so he would not have to seek Council’s permission at every instance. A third
recommendation suggested that the WAC assimilate the three existing disposal agencies
into its operations.91 All three recommendations were approved by PC1342 and PC4013
and shortly thereafter the WAC integrated them into its operations as agents. Fortunately,
this happened right as the first waves of surplus stores (mainly from the RCAF) were
declared in early 1944. Although the ASDB and Scrap Disposal Branch were assimilated
rather seamlessly, the Chief Salvage Officer resisted. Kelley and his staff were not
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thrilled with the new regulations and felt that the proceeds of all sales should be remitted
back to the declaring department, not the Corporation or government’s consolidated
revenue fund. However, Kelley lacked support from Council and by May 1944 these
matters were settled and Kelley, his staff, and their experience were absorbed into the
new disposal administration.92

The Surplus Crown Assets Act
After issuing PC9108 Prime Minister Mackenzie King wanted to publicize it
widely, as Heeney told Howe in a letter requesting a press release: “Mr. King feels that
the Order deals with a matter of such widespread interest and importance that it should be
made public as from the Prime Minister by means of a press statement and possibly even
a press conference.”93 On 1 December 1943, King made the press release himself, while
Carswell hosted a major press conference in January. In his speech to reporters, King
informed Canadians about the creation of “an interim method” for disposal in the form of
the CAAC and the WAC and then outlined the various functions and responsibilities of
each. He also promised that PC9108 would be followed, in the next session of
Parliament, by new legislation “authorizing a permanent procedure” for disposal.94
More information and details about the government’s plans were released by
Carswell after the January Board of Directors meeting at the Dominion Square building
in Montreal. In the first detailed statements about government policies, Carswell stressed
a number of important points, particularly about the flow of goods and the overarching
purpose of the new disposal arrangements. King and Carswell were clearly attempting to
assuage growing anxiety about the future disposal of “inevitable surpluses.” Carswell
promised that there would be no “fire sale” of assets and that disposal operations would
be strictly controlled in order to stabilize the postwar economy and maintain high
employment. As he stated, “I look upon the new corporation as a symbol of partnership
between labor, industry and government in tackling one of our most serious post-war
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problems, the problem of keeping our economy going despite the existence of heavy war
surpluses.”95 Thus, creating the Corporation and Committee was a “constructive step by
the Government” that “should allay these fears, in a great measure.” He continued:
[WAC] has been designed and empowered to stand between these surpluses
and the going economy of the country; to impound these surpluses in one
great reservoir and to supply intelligent but firm control on the releasing gatevalves. Essentially the job of the corporation will be one of compromise,
recognizing that surpluses impounded too long cease to be assets and on the
other hand, that surpluses released too quickly could have the most disastrous
effect on industry and on employment.96
The publicity and attention generated by King and Carswell was met with a wide
and eager audience that, over the course of 1944, would grow to include more interest
groups than just apprehensive industrialists and their professional associations. With the
creation of a dedicated administration for handling all disposal matters, as well as the
added publicity, several other interest groups, municipalities, city councils, and
agricultural and educational associations started contacting the CAAC and WAC with
their own resolutions and demands. Therefore, while disposal policies were formulated
throughout 1944, both the CAAC and WAC faced mounting demands from private and
public interests alike. Although this pressure tapered off towards the end of 1944 (only to
revive after the war), it started peaking right as the first round of surpluses were declared
and as the Liberals drafted the Surplus Crown Assets Act.
When Howe stood in the House of Commons on 29 May to introduce the Surplus
Crown Assets Act and schedule its first reading, a mountain of resolutions had already
piled up. In late February Edward C. Fisher, President of the Alberta Pensioners’ Society,
mailed a resolution to the Prime Minister demanding a “National Plan” for the disposal of
military equipment and government property in order to relieve the housing situation and
homelessness. As the resolution stated “if a National Plan is adopted for the utilization of
this vast material, that tens of thousands of Canada’s needy and homeless would be
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helped, and the serious housing situation and slum conditions would be relieved.”97
Howe’s office received several other similar resolutions throughout the spring,
particularly from agricultural associations.
In one resolution, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture demanded that the
Dominion government allow farmers and farm organizations access to “used or new
equipment, plants and material either by direct sale by the Government or through the
War Assets Corporation.”98 Another resolution demanded that any surplus training
facilities constructed for the war effort and located “adjacent to agricultural colleges and
experimental farms” should be “made available as educational and recreational centres
for farm people.” Similarly, any hospitals or health centres associated with the training
facilities be repurposed as rural health services in line with Federation’s “Principles for
National Health Insurance.”99 Moreover, the Federation must have heard about the
DMS’s plan for declaring the sulphuric acid plant at Clark Island (near Valleyfield,
Quebec) surplus, as an additional resolution requested that the government “continue to
operate the synthetic nitrogen, and other government-owned or Government financed
fertilizer plants” or make them available to “farm organizations.”100 Finally, a resolution
from the United Farmers of Alberta stated that because “a large percentage of our farm
homes are without modern conveniences” and because “plumbing [and] suitable housing
[was] deemed essential for the wellbeing of the forces as well as for the prisoners of
war,” the government should adopt a needs-based method for distributing surplus
materials in Canada.101
Continuous public pressure was also levelled at the federal government from
educational associations, provincial authorities, and school boards. On 16 June 1944, J.
C. Dryden, Manitoba’s Minister of Education, wrote Howe indicating that his
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Department was “receiving a considerable number of inquiries regarding the eventual
disposal of surplus…machine tool equipment and technical apparatus” from school
boards eager to expand their course curriculums and acquire assets “suitable for school
instruction purposes at a very reduced figure.” Dryden felt that a plan could be easily
crafted “that would make available for educational purposes” government surpluses and
that it “would be heartily supported by departmental staffs in the provinces and also by
the public.”102
Other interests groups lobbied the government as well. On 28 July 1944, the
Ontario Parks Association wrote to the CAAC indicating that public bodies, such as
parks, deserved priority for purchasing surpluses “with particular reference to the
equipment used in construction and maintenance of airports and army camp; army
transportation, including jeeps, public address systems of the mobile type, or other
vehicles which could be put to parks use.”103 The letter also asked “that without
infringing on war production,” park and playground equipment receive a priority “since
after five years of war such equipment is almost at the wornout stage.” The Ontario Parks
Association justified the priority on the basis of future childhood development:
And since the physical welfare of the coming generation which must replace
that lost by war, must be based not alone on leadership...but upon equipment
and recreation grounds being available so that leadership can be utilized. And
such cannot much longer be maintained under present condition, with
wornout machinery, playground equipment which should be discarded and a
labor shortage which emphasizes the sad state of material equipment. All of
which means a considerable and growing lessening of physical endeavours.104
Municipal governments acted in a coordinated fashion. Over the course of a few
weeks in May 1944 at least twenty-five municipalities and city councils from across the
country mailed the government an identical resolution.105 The resolution stated that
because municipal and provincial governments had offered “every assistance and cooperation…to Dominion authorities” during the war and did so “frequently at
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considerable inconvenience and cost to the municipal taxpayers” and because municipal
employees, equipment, buildings, and property were used for the war effort “without any
remuneration,” municipalities deserved favourable consideration when selling surpluses.
The resolution also included a method for transferring assets between governments, one
that was definitely inspired by the wartime experience as it called for the acquisition to be
“on a lend-lease basis.” Most importantly, this resolution demanded that municipal and
provincial governments receive priority for purchasing assets “before such supplies and
equipment and buildings are sold to private individuals or corporations for resale to the
public.”106 Given their support for the war effort, municipal governments felt entitled to
preferential treatment for purchasing surplus war assets. Their lobbying efforts were not
only directed at gaining some favourable consideration from the federal government, but
were also clearly linked to growing concerns over how far the federal government would
cater to businesses.107
The intensity of interest in disposal matters was often tied to the regional disparities
of wartime investments. To many observers, central Canada seemed poised to profit most
from disposal since surpluses were most numerous there, leaving the Maritimes and the
Prairies at a disadvantage. Saskatchewan’s Premier, Tommy Douglas, pointed this out in
a letter to Prime Minister King on 12 October 1944, when he stated that a “serious
situation” was liable to “get out of hand.” As Douglas continued, “a great many airports
have been closed on the prairies. Most of these airports have excellent hospital
equipment, road machinery and some very fine buildings, also quantities of training
planes, army trucks and other mechanical equipment which are no longer required and
are being stored in various places across Western Canada.”108 Although the federal
government had established the CAAC and WAC, very little had been done to “acquaint
[the provincial governments and] agencies with what material is available.” Consequently
it was discovered that equipment was leaving the Prairies and being sold in Winnipeg and
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Vancouver.109 Douglas’s letter hinted at some resistance to and confusion about the
federal government’s disposal policies, but it mainly piggy-backed on wartime
complaints from provincial authorities about the encroachment of federal powers and the
realignment of Canadian business interests from a regional and provincial focus towards
the federal government and Central Canada.110
Regional interests in surpluses remained a real contentious issue. Gordon B. Isnor,
MP for Halifax and Chairman of the SCWEE, echoed Douglas’s concerns. In a letter to
Ilsley in January 1945, Isnor voiced concerns about the regional distribution of surpluses.
Isnor worried that some corporations were profiting more because of favourable
geography, as he stated the “large concerns, such as T. Eaton Company, Robert Simpson
Limited, Zellers, Woolworthe and Metropolitan and similar large firms have access
through their main office and thus make purchases at Toronto” while the merchants in
Nova Scotia were excluded and could not buy anything direct from WAC either in
Toronto or Halifax.111 After conferring with W. J. Bennett in the DMS, Ilsley reported
back to Isnor that his concerns were greatly exaggerated. The arrangements for disposal
were sound and worked out in consultation with business interests and according to
Bennett few merchants reported any problems. The key here was the fact that Central
Canada had profited dramatically from the war and that disposal operations would
solidify those gains.
In some respects, Douglas and Isnor were jumping the gun, as they raised their
concerns during a time when few assets had been declared surplus. It was not until the
fall of 1945 and winter of 1946 that surpluses started emerging across all parts of the
government, so they were pressing the government for action when few surpluses
actually existed. However, their letters reflected the widespread eagerness and
anticipation for surplus government assets. Everyone wanted to acquire objects to
improve their living standards and fulfill postwar ambitions, so ensuring that an equitable
distribution and access existed preoccupied many people, especially political leaders
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responding to their constituents. Although business interests wanted more restrictive
disposal policies, municipalities and other interests groups demanded priority access and
lower prices so they could make use of surpluses in their reconstruction and rehabilitation
programs. The letters from Douglas and Isnor hinted at the key issues and public
concerns involved in the disposal of surpluses. Divesting public property was certainly a
polarizing endeavour.
The Surplus Crown Assets Act encapsulated the polarizing nature of surplus
disposal. In June 1944 when it was debated in Parliament, all sides of the political
spectrum clashed over the purpose and responsibilities of the government for mobilizing
the transition to peace. For the left-wing social democrats and the C.C.F., Stanley
Knowles, MP for Winnipeg North Centre, voiced a common ideological starting point
when he argued that public enterprise had generated mass employment, booming
productivity, and victory during the war – so why not maintain it in peace? Knowles
continued by stating his view of the basic postwar issue: “is it to be the first concern of
the government to protect the kind of economic system we had before the war, one which
gave us the sad story of the 30s; or is the government going to realize that the demands of
peace are just as compelling as have been the needs of war.”112 Knowles feared that the
liquidation of such large inventories of public assets and property would not benefit
Canadians. Instead, he worried about handing the country’s economic fortunes back to
corporations and private interests that had left the nation in such turmoil after the last
war. Government was responsible for the social welfare of its citizens and the complete
liquidation of factory floor space, tools and equipment, office space, airports, hospitals,
and the vast array of other assets would greatly hinder its ability to provide the safety net
of social security.
Although conservatives conceded the necessity of public ownership in times of
war, they were adamant that public enterprise was not the key to a stable and prosperous
postwar system. In the House of Commons, J. H. Blackmore responded to Knowles by
stating that in war “the government must have design, and it must have special quality; it
must also have an exceedingly high degree of speed in the production of the items that
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are being brought into existence, and at the same time there has to be a high degree of
secrecy. All these things make it so that government ownership is probably the best
producer in this field in time of war.”113 However, government ownership was not
effective in the distribution of goods, was prone to wasteful spending, and had fostered
unsustainable economic growth in many areas of the country. In other words, public
ownership might produce a great deal, but that production had not taken into
consideration the spending power of export and domestic markets, consumer tastes and
preferences, and local conditions. To conservatives, private ownership would cater to
these aspects of supply and demand so a return to free-market capitalism was the only
viable option. Over-production was not the basis for continuing prosperity. Although
favouring the Act and the CAAC and WAC, Blackmore wanted those institutions to work
toward re-establishing private enterprise by reducing government assets, controls, and
liabilities: “I think that the time has come when the whole country must study the means
of the decentralization of industry, decentralization of credit control, and of responsibility
with respect to everything that pertains to our public wellbeing.”114
While arguments about Canada’s future were debated in Parliament, the Surplus
Crown Assets Act came under some harsh criticism and questions. Several Conservative
MPs took the Act as an opportunity to vent frustrations about how the King government
operated. During the Act’s second reading, R. B. Hanson went as far as to question the
necessity of the Act when PC9108 was already on the books. His questions were
prompted by John Diefenbaker’s continuing criticism of Cabinet’s excessive use of PC
Orders for running the war effort, but the question was probably an attempt to embarrass
the Liberals by getting Howe to admit that PC9108 was insufficient.115 However, the
point was moot. PC9108 was an adequate provision, but its permanency was in question.
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Each of the 58,402 PC Orders passed by the Privy Council (from 1 September 1939 to 28
September 1945) derived their binding authority from the sweeping powers gained under
the War Measures Act. In effect, the War Measures Act allowed Cabinet to govern by
decree and turned each PC Order into law just as though it was debated and passed by
Parliament. Given how heavily the government had relied on PC Orders, the war’s end
posed a legal problem: once the War Measures Act was repealed the PC Orders that were
not accompanied by Legislation (duly debated and passed by Parliament and the Senate)
would lose all legitimacy. In response to Hanson’s remarks, Howe explained to the
House of Commons that not only was surplus disposal a serious issue that required public
input and discussion, but it was “a continuing job” and “the powers of the government
under the War Measures Act will expire shortly after the war ends, but the work of
disposal will continue for a long period thereafter.”116
Several provisions in the Act received a great deal of attention from the
Conservative opposition. Hanson, J. R. MacNicol, and especially Diefenbaker were
outspoken in their criticism, particularly in reference to the authority, control, and
responsibilities of the Minister. In several sections of the Act the Minister’s powers were
absolute. The members on the Corporation’s Board of Directors and the Committee’s
representatives had to be approved by the Minister, their designated roles and
responsibilities were subject to the Minister’s instructions, the Corporation’s annual
reports had to be approved by the Minister, and all accounting records were to be
maintained in a “system satisfactory to the Minister.”117 Summing up his objections to the
Act, Hanson stated, “I find on reading the Bill that this Corporation and this Committee is
merely an instrument of the Minister himself, that he is a dictator under this Bill. There is
nothing that this Committee can do, or refrain from doing, there is nothing that this
corporation can do or refrain from doing, unless it has the imprimatur of the Minister.”118
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The big concern with such centralized authority was that Howe might cover up
failures or stop the Corporation from selling assets to particular people. The Opposition
wanted provisions written into the Act that guarded against the meddling influences of
the Minister or whoever received his delegated authority. On this matter, Diefenbaker
was relentless. Citing an American report written by Bernard Baruch that outlined several
principles and considerations for surplus disposal in the US, Diefenbaker called for better
transparency and oversight. As Baruch’s report stated, disposal had to happen in a “gold
fish bowl” where records and activities were always open for public inspection.
Accordingly, Diefenbaker felt that the Act had loopholes that could hide problems and
information. Despite the criticism, few changes were made. However, Diefenbaker did
manage to amend Section 18 of the Act to ensure that the Auditor General reviewed the
Corporation’s annual report which would contain “in reasonable detail particulars of
surplus Crown assets, sold or otherwise disposed of during the accounting period” before
the Minister tabled it in Parliament.119
After receiving assent in July 1944, the Surplus Crown Assets Act made some
changes to the administration established under PC9108. Most substantially, the Act
altered the relationship between the CAAC and the Minister. Under PC9109 the CAAC
was granted substantial independent duties and responsibilities for prosecuting its
functions and formulating policies, and in doing so, it advised the Privy Council directly.
However, under the Act, the CAAC’s role was redefined so that its primary function was
to advise the Minister on disposal policies. He would then advise the Privy Council as
needed. In other words, the Act delegated some authority to the Minister for accepting or
rejecting disposal policies before they were submitted to the Privy Council. 120 Moreover,
under PC9108 reports of surplus from each government department were made directly to
the CAAC and if an item or property was worth over $15,000 then a PC Order was
required for disposal. But, under the Act, surplus declarations were now addressed and
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sent to the Minister of Reconstruction, who then referred them to the CAAC for
appraisal. The Minister’s office became a middleman for all declarations.
Even though Howe always intended to delegate significant responsibility to Berry
and Carswell, disposal policies were firmly embedded under the purview of the
Department of Reconstruction, and by extension its parent department, Munitions and
Supply. That the Act was passed right after the creation of the Department of
Reconstruction in June 1944, and given Howe’s initial reluctance to become Minister of
Reconstruction, it appears that granting such wide authority for disposal was aimed at
further enticing Howe to accept the new portfolio and also to solidify the mandate and
responsibilities related to the new department. Thus, as much as these administrative
changes bolstered the legal and administrative powers of the government’s disposal
apparatus, the Act fits into the wider patterns of criticism and rivalry within the
government’s bureaucracy and Howe’s own attempts at empire building.121

Conclusion
In order to enact the administrative changes Section 19 of the Surplus Crown Assets
Act was drafted. In a confusing turn of events, Section 19 dissolved the CAAC and WAC
as established by PC9108 and then re-established them under the Act. All property,
assets, liabilities, and obligations in the custody or administration were transferred
between the old and new organizations, and aside from some personnel turnover, both
retained the same basic purposes, composition, and functions.122 On the same day that the
Act was passed the Privy Council approved PC5300 and PC5301 which ensured an
orderly transition by updating several PC Orders from earlier in 1944. 123 Thus, as W. E.
P. DeRoche, assistant counsel to the DMS, explained to the SCWEE, Howe had
delegated all the same functions and responsibilities to the new organizations, and so
despite the legal changes, “it is accordingly unnecessary in practice to distinguish
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between recommendations or actions of the original committee established by order in
council PC9108 and the new committee established by the Surplus Crown Assets Act.”124
With PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act the government had established its
response to the disposal problem. The government would rely on the CAAC and WAC to
handle all aspects of disposal, from policymaking through to sales and destruction. Their
creation emerged out of Canada’s immense wartime industrial productivity, the
increasing government controls and regulations over the economy, and the lobbying
efforts of private and public interests groups concerned about the challenges destined to
arise when victory was won. Everyone saw the creation of a disposal administration as a
necessary and logical step, which is certainly an achievement worthy of praise, even if
there was little consensus on how the liquidation of government assets would take place
moving forward. Perhaps the most important thing about the creation of the CAAC and
WAC was the timing. Both organizations were formed nearly two full years before
hostilities ended, ensuring that a significant amount of planning and preparations could
occur before the flood of surpluses arrived. Anticipating the needs of peace was
important because it gave the disposal administration a head start on its crucial task. The
following chapter will discuss exactly what was done with this head start and explore
how all the early plans and preparations both helped and hindered the disposal of
munitions and supplies.
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Chapter 2
From Flow to Flood: Managing Disposal Operations
In huge measure, the success with which we make the economic transition to peace will
depend on the quality of government administration in the process of industrial
demobilization. We shall need better organization for the transition to peace than we had
in mobilization for war if we are to avoid needless unemployment, loss of production, and
frustration of business enterprise.1
James H. McGraw Jr., President of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company

Introduction
On 23 October 1944, the Minister of Munitions and Supply made an important
announcement over the radio in which he explained the government’s plans for
addressing the disposal problem. The speech constituted the first public comments on the
issue since Carswell’s press conference in January and served to update an apprehensive
population. In the speech, Howe used the flow of water in a pipeline as an analogy to
explain the situation:
The flow of war materials from source in Canada to the fighting fronts
overseas may be likened to the flow of water through a pipe line. To maintain
a sufficient head of pressure at the receiving end, the pipe line must be kept
constantly filled. So it is with the flow of war materials. The valves
controlling the flow of these war materials are in Italy, France, and the British
Isles. Thus, when the flow is checked at any of these outlets, supplies back up
along the whole of the pipe line and surpluses become available in Canada.2
Not only had this “pipe line” of war materials resulted in some surpluses becoming
available during the war, but when hostilities ended the whole pipeline itself would be
surplus. Thus, the “valves” in Europe would be joined by many more in Canada, as the
materials, productive capacity, and vast stores of government-owned assets were no
longer needed. Victory would trigger a major commodity crisis since billions had been
invested in procurement and these items would not simply dematerialize into peacetime
without some effective disposal strategy.
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Howe’s analogy was incisive for another reason. The flow of water through a
pipeline was self-contained and took place in a controlled environment. This analogy
offered him a means to describe how the flow of munitions and supplies was regulated
and delivered to the soldiers at “the fighting fronts overseas.” This was significant
because Howe’s speech explained to the public how the government planned to maintain
control of that pipeline in order to avert a postwar disaster. The public need not worry
about disposal because the preparations of the CAAC and WAC ensured that the pipeline
of war materials would be successfully redeployed and liquidated to support postwar
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Howe was reassuring his audience: the government was
taking steps to prevent the flow of goods from becoming a flood. As he concluded:
War Assets Corporation with the consent and unqualified support of the
government, will endeavour through constant vigilance to protect Canadian
industry, Canadian labor, Canadian agriculture, Canadian merchants and the
Canadian public from the greed of the speculator, the cupidity of the profiteer
and to ensure that all our war surpluses shall be liquidated to the greatest
benefit of the greatest number of the citizens of Canada.3
Yet water rarely flows with controlled precision. Although Howe’s metaphor made
strong rhetorical sense, in practice controlling the flow of war goods – like that of water –
was very difficult.
The task facing the CAAC and WAC was enormous and it came with few
precedents and was replete with challenges that strained the capabilities of everyone
involved. Managing disposal operations was a constant battle against diminishing returns.
Every element of the disposal process – from defining and declaring surpluses to their
consignment and final disposition – required a significant investment of attention, effort,
ability, and money that did not always remain stable at every stage. Since it was up to
each department to review its inventories, establish postwar requirements, and declare the
remainder surplus, the work of the CAAC and WAC was contingent on the bureaucracy’s
speed and efficiency. Despite all the early preparations, government departments could
divert the flow of their surpluses on purpose or by accident. At times this left the WAC
and CAAC vulnerable to political and economic variables, competing bureaucratic
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procedures, and varying levels of interest and enthusiasm for disposal matters. From
narrowly defined departmental agendas, bureaucrats tended to view surpluses (and the
paperwork associated with them) as time-consuming nuisances. The kneejerk reaction
was to get rid of unwanted items quickly, but the new disposal administration cautiously
followed its agenda. Disposal was now an instrument of public policy that would require
more attention, effort, and cooperation to achieve. Therefore, the bureaucracy would have
to adjust accordingly.
To manage disposal operations efficiently, the CAAC and WAC had to overcome a
confluence of obstacles. The politics of establishing postwar requirements was a serious
issue within the federal bureaucracy, especially for the DND and DMS. Political and
military leaders clashed over the permanency of the military-industrial complex
developed during the war as well as the future size and shape of the armed forces.
Venturing into these debates was tricky business, as the creation of comprehensive
disposal arrangements was counter-intuitive to winning the war and legitimatizing the
military’s sizable postwar plans. Although the future necessity of disposal was obvious,
the exact details about the types, condition, and numbers of unneeded assets remained
difficult to ascertain before the war ended. The size of the military’s budget and material
requirements took time to settle, thus impeding the speed and willingness of the DND to
declare assets surplus. In regards to the DMS, postwar economic stability and the fate of
all the government-owned industrial floor space and machinery were central issues. This
led to the creation of competing agencies and sometimes diverted the flow of assets and
property away from the WAC.
Much of the early preparations for disposal focussed on creating workable and
comprehensive administrative procedures for the liquidation of all government surpluses.
In general, the early plans were designed to bring order and coherence to a large and
diverse problem that blurred departmental jurisdictions and involved many competing
political, economic, and social interests. During the spring of 1944, as the first waves of
surplus declarations arrived, the CAAC decided to institute a set of Standard Procedures
that all departments and foreign governments would use when declaring surpluses. This
administrative system sought to build consistency, coax out more information about the
assets being declared surplus, and allow the CAAC to strategically allocate surpluses
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according to political, economic, and social imperatives. The system for allocating
surpluses was known as the “priorities.” Establishing priorities created a hierarchy of
access to surpluses that accommodated inter-departmental transfers and privileged direct
sales to “priority holders.” Although they provisioned a great deal of local reconstruction
and rehabilitation programs, the priorities created significant administrative bottlenecks
that could delay final disposition, especially once the postwar rush commenced. However
other problems emerged almost immediately after the Standard Procedures took effect.
Over the summer of 1944, the CAAC and WAC started encountering complaints from
other departments and agencies. Since PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act carried
broad provisions about selling government property, conflicts emerged with existing
regulations. This prompted the CAAC to issue exemptions from the Act or make new
cooperative agreements instead of assimilating the other organizations altogether.
Although the early start on disposal preparations helped fix some of the pipeline’s
kinks, the establishment of administrative arrangements that were both workable and
comprehensive proved elusive. Each policy had diminishing returns since changing
circumstances, budgetary forecasts, and experience in dealing with departments forced
continuous modifications. It was fortunate that another early focus of the CAAC and
WAC was on populating both organizations with experienced people capable of finding
solutions through trial and error. However, keeping those individuals working for the
government was another constant challenge, as many of these “dollar-a-year-men” were
interested in returning to the private sector or worn out from their gruelling wartime
service with the DMS. Yet despite the personnel turnover and the short tenures of some
executives they still managed to achieve a great deal and deserve some credit for what the
CAAC and WAC accomplished after their departures.
By mid-1945, the plans and preparations for the disposal of surplus goods had been
developed and tested with a limited amount of surplus declarations. However, once the
war ended, officials discovered that despite their best efforts and early work, no plan – no
matter how well conceived – survives first contact. From May 1945 to October 1946,
roughly 35,000 separate surplus declarations were processed by the CAAC and WAC,
along with over 50,000 requests for “priority” allocation. The sheer volume and scale of
declarations and items consigned to the state’s disposal administration was overwhelming
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and greatly strained the capabilities of the Committee and Corporation. Internally and
externally, Canada’s disposal administration faced a new series of oversights and delays
that were magnified by the vast array of objects and associated paperwork. Luckily the
situation was not totally unforeseen, but the tidal wave that barrelled into the CAAC and
WAC belied Howe’s pipeline metaphor. After victory, the flow of surplus assets became
a flood.
To meet the new challenges the CAAC and WAC restructured their operations
from August to October 1945 by making two significant changes to their mandate and
operations. First, the WAC’s operational procedures were decentralized into five regions.
This alleviated the administrative burden and greatly facilitating the WAC’s increasingly
proactive role in collection, storage, and sales. Second, the WAC (and to a lesser extent
the CAAC) was restructured to reflect the new regional focus and also to eliminate as
many administrative bottlenecks and selling obstacles as possible. These organizational
and operational changes greatly reduced some of the problems and delays, but were
accompanied by a steep growth in employees, facilities, and operational expenses which
prompted another set of challenges and solutions. Managing disposal operations was an
imperfect business. Yet in making these organizational changes the foundation was set
for the WAC to become the largest merchandising company in Canadian history and, in
doing so, the WAC was better poised to fulfill its intended function as a “shock absorber”
during the country’s transition from war to peace

Laying the Groundwork: Early Plans and Preparations
After its creation, one of the CAAC’s first priorities was reconnaissance. In early
January 1944, Pettigrew started making inquiries with key government departments about
the state of their disposal preparations. This action not only drew attention to a future
problem of some importance, but it also helped Committee members familiarize
themselves with the scope of their new responsibilities. The logical starting point was the
largest consumer of munitions and supplies: the DND. After a Committee meeting on 12
January 1944, Pettigrew wrote to Howe requesting that the Minister inquire about the
military’s expected postwar requirements. In the letter Pettigrew stated that the CAAC
wanted the Cabinet War Committee to order the Defence Staff to start contemplating “the
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numerical strength of each of the Armed Services at the close of hostilities” and “that
such direction…would enable them to better declare...surplus[es] and would also enable
them to visualize the magnitude of the operations ahead.”4 On Howe’s initiative the
matter was referred to the War Committee and then to the Defence Council on 21 January
where it was discussed by the country’s top generals.
However, Pettigrew’s rather presumptuous request was dismissed three days later
when Colonel H. A. Dyde, Secretary to the Defence Council, informed him that it was
“impossible at the present time to furnish an accurate estimate of the numerical strength
of the Armed Forces at the close of hostilities.”5 There were good reasons for the Defence
Council’s reluctance to define postwar requirements. While the Defence Council was
sympathetic to the inevitable need for disposal procedures, the war effort showed no
signs of slacking. In January 1944, heavy fighting still raged in the air and at sea with
heavy losses on both sides. In Italy, Canadian soldiers took heavy casualties capturing
Ortona over Christmas, the landings at Anzio were just days away, and the Gustav Line
still blocked entry into Rome. Operation Overlord and the campaigns in Normandy and
Northwest Europe were six months away and just entering the final preparatory stages.
Although it was easy to be optimistic considering the serious Allied defeats in 1940,
1941, and 1942, victory was far from certain. At that point, nothing could be ruled out as
surplus yet except for small amounts of derelict equipment.
As the year progressed the Defence Council’s reluctance to define postwar
requirements became enmeshed within larger wartime issues and political wrangling that
surrounded the conscription crisis. Within a few months of Dyde’s response to Pettigrew,
rumours about manpower shortages in the Canadian Army became a reality as the
fighting in Normandy and Italy raged and casualties mounted at rates higher than
expected. Compounding this unsustainable situation was the inadequate number of
trained replacements for infantry units and the decreasing trends in voluntary enlistment
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at home.6 The battle lines over conscription materialized in mid-1944, much to
Mackenzie King’s alarm and dismay. Haunted by the riots and fallout from the
conscription crisis in 1917, Mackenzie King and most of Cabinet opposed compulsory
military service. However, J. L. Ralston and a small but powerful cadre of other ministers
holding important wartime portfolios (Howe, Ilsley, Angus MacDonald, and T. A.
Crerar) dissented. While recognizing Cabinet’s serious concerns about conscription, they
believed it was necessary to continue the war effort.7
Over the summer and fall of 1944, each side dug in and the manpower crisis
became an increasingly politicized and contentious issue. Mackenzie King, furious at
what he perceived to be the Army’s incompetent planning and use of manpower, grew
ever more apophenic, paranoid of conspiracies, and emotionally drained. 8 However, the
“conscriptionists” (as he labelled them in his diary) would not relent. After Ralston
toured the front in September and October, he returned to Ottawa more resolute than
ever. While overseas he learned that few Allied generals expected victory in 1944 and
speaking with wounded veterans in hospitals he discovered that many infantry battalions
were fighting at half-strength.9 Canada could not break faith with those at the front; the
nation’s Army needed more soldiers immediately. With the stress of long and divisive
Cabinet meetings, media coverage, and mounting pressure from the military, things hit a
breaking point in November. Although Mackenzie King tried everything possible to
manoeuvre away from conscription, even torpedoing Ralston’s political career by
accepting his letter of resignation written two years before, the beleaguered Prime
Minister could not avoid the issue and by the end of the month conscription for overseas
service was approved by cabinet.
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Decisions about the shape and size of Canada’s postwar armed forces developed on
the heels of the conscription crisis and were similarly contentious issues. As the war
came to an end in 1945, all three services put forward proposals outlining their future
shape, size, and budgets. Some of the proposals, like those from the Army, were
outlandish and contrived, as Granatstein remarked, without “one iota of political sense.”10
In June 1945, the Army proposed peacetime conscription in order to maintain a reserve
force of roughly 180,000 part-time soldiers and a professional force of over 55,000.
Cabinet, and especially Mackenzie King, balked at the idea and in August told the Army
to expect funding for a postwar force of 55,000 (reserves and professional forces
combined) and a total defence budget for the three services of roughly $172 million.11
The RCN and RCAF developed more flexible plans that, especially in the case of the
RCAF, accepted inevitable postwar budget cuts and attempted to make the most of
decreasing resources. The Navy’s plan called for $45 million in continuing expenses, $30
million in one-time payments, 18,000 reserves, and 10,000 professional sailors
maintaining twelve major war ships. The RCAF’s postwar plans required several
squadrons of fighter aircraft, bombers, and reconnaissance elements, 16,000 personnel,
and cost just under $60 million. Although gaining Cabinet approval, these plans proved
quite optimistic since all three armed services had trouble meeting even these reduced
recruitment figures.12
Given the postwar budget cuts and reductions in force establishments, the three
Services were primed to liquidate considerable assets and property. Yet for historians this
fact does not seem to loom as large as it did for contemporaries, as most histories of the
early postwar and Cold War periods tend to focus overwhelmingly on procuring new
weapon systems in an era of significant cutbacks and new alliance systems. 13 However,
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the downsizing caused by demobilization also made the disposal of existing arsenals a
primary consideration. This fact was not lost on those in charge, even if it was
accompanied by some foot-dragging. Even before the conscription crisis unfolded and
postwar establishments were set the Defence Council recognized that peace would
seriously change the composition and size of the armed forces. Back in January, when
Dyde replied to Pettigrew, he indicated this while acknowledging the need to prepare for
the eventuality of disposal. As a result, orders were issued by the Defence Council
instructing the services to beginning vetting their stores of weapons and equipment for
obsolete kit or items likely to become surplus in the future.14 Thus, while future
requirements and force establishments remained uncertain and a source of contention
between civilian and military leaders, there were no such illusions about disposal:
surpluses would inevitability exist after victory.
Although arrangements for the disposal of new and state-of-the-art weaponry
would await the end of the war, records from the Army’s Provisions Directorates in the
MGO Branch show that little time was wasted in revising disposal procedures for
obsolete kit. Recognizing that the ASDB would be assimilated into the WAC and that
new arrangements were required for handling surpluses, the Defence Council ordered the
creation of the Army Ordnance Surplus Assets Committee (AOSAC) on the same day it
discussed Pettigrew’s letter. The AOSAC convened just two days later and Colonel
Dailley was named its first chairman. The AOSAC became the Army’s central hub for
disposal connecting the MGO Branch, the Inter-Services Committee for Interchange of
Surplus Assets, the Obsolete Stores Committee, the ASDB, and the CAAC.15 From
January onwards, it investigated all assets and property handled by the MGO “with the
view to the determination of the types and quantities of such assets which are surplus to
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the needs of the Department of National Defence.”16 In practice, this meant that when
surpluses or obsolete stores were found within the Army’s various branches and
directorates, lists were sent to the AOSAC which would then distribute the paperwork to
the other committees listed above for investigation. Recommendations were then sent
back and if the goods could not be redistributed between the other services, were surplus
to all known requirements, or obsolete then the AOSAC forwarded the amended lists to
the Deputy Minister (Army) and through him they were declared to the CAAC.17
The Army was not alone in devising procedures for declaring surpluses. In response
to PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act varying methods – from large committees
to a single bureaucrat – were developed within the RCN, RCAF, and practically every
government department or agency. The creation of these arrangements highlights an
important starting point for the flow of surplus goods, as well as the relationship that
existed between the CAAC, WAC, and all the departments they serviced. The Committee
and Corporation were not responsible for examining the inventories of every federal
department, agency, or organization. Rather they depended on each one to inspect their
own assets and evaluate their own needs before declaring surpluses. Only once assets
were declared did the CAAC become involved and then, once the paperwork was
processed, were the assets sent to the WAC for final disposal.18 This was a key dynamic
to the flow of goods: the work of the CAAC and WAC was dependent upon other
departments and the military evaluating postwar budgets, expected requirements, and the
speed at which they declared surpluses.
In having the largest inventories, the DND and DMS became the key valves
controlling the flow of goods and disproportionately affected the character and tempo of
disposal operations. Therefore, shortly after being formed, the CAAC sought to forge
strong lines of communication and coordination with both. As part of its general
reconnaissance efforts and fact-finding missions, Committee members started liaising
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with particular individuals they could count on if problems or uncertainty arose. In
regards to the armed forces, this was especially critical since they would be working so
closely together. For declarations related to the Army, the CAAC relied on the two
Deputy Ministers serving as the DND’s representative on the Committee, first H.
Desrosier and then A. Ross. However, the practical experience of those lower down the
hierarchy of command (and actually in charge of handling the assets in question) was
needed, so the CAAC decided that Colonel Dailley was the best point of contact. For the
Navy and its disposal matters the CAAC dealt with L. C. Thompson and later Captain G.
L. Roome, who was appointed Director of the Navy’s Disposal Organization. For the
RCAF, Terence Sheard was initially approached but it was finally agreed that his boss,
Wing-Commander I. C. Cornblat, Director of Supply Administration, (and his successor
E. H. Mahoney) was the better contact.19 In regards to the DMS, the CAAC relied not
only on Berry’s connections but also on W. E. P. DeRoche, General Counsel and later the
Surplus Property Officer for the DMS.
Of course, the DMS and DND were not the only government departments that had
assets to dispose of after the war, so new disposal arrangements started popping up across
the entire bureaucracy. As a result, in early 1944 the first waves of surplus declarations
started arriving at the CAAC from all over the government. At that point, Committee
members were still familiarizing themselves with their new jobs and policies had only
been discussed in the broadest sense. So when the first declarations arrived from the
RCAF and the Department of Pensions and National Health, the CAAC received a
hodgepodge of lists declaring surplus several hundred obsolete aircraft and equipment as
well as unneeded firefighting and air raid precaution equipment. There was little
consistency in format or information provided other than type and quantity. 20 This lack of
consistency and detail prompted Berry to establish the Standard Procedures and require
every declaring agency to use them. This also helped solidify the administrative channels
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within the rapidly growing network of new departmental arrangements and officers
handling disposal matters.
In total there were ten different Standard Procedures issued from 1944 to 1948 with
several accompanying forms and receipts. Together they covered the basics of surplus
declarations and explained what was required of declaring agencies and how declarations
and assets were processed. The Standard Procedures were always referred to in short
form (“CAAC 1” “CAAC 2” etc.) while the accompanying forms were usually denoted
by a four digit number (“2231” “2232” “2241”). When revisions became necessary, the
short form was updated as “CAAC 2A” and “CAAC 2B.” Moreover, two other separate
sets of Standard Procedures were devised, one for declarations of surplus property owned
by foreign countries in Canada and the other for surplus declarations of American
property in Canada (see Appendix 2). CAAC 1 to 6 were drafted to explain how to report
surpluses properly, what kinds of information to provide in addition to type and quantity
(such as, original cost and location), the number of forms that were required (since
multiple copies were needed for all parties to keep track of items), the definition of scrap
and unusable goods, the types of codes and abbreviations to use when filling in forms,
and how to make priority claims for the transfer or allocation of goods.21 However,
experience in dealing with declaring departments prompted several changes. The
chronology of the trial and error process is evident in the dates on which procedures were
issued and subsequently revised, especially for CAAC 2 and 4 (the Standard Procedures
covering how to report surpluses and how transfers and allocations functioned).
Since PC9108 and the Surplus Crown Assets Act required that all surplus
government property be sold through the CAAC and WAC, some duplication and
conflict emerged with other departmental regulations when the Standard Procedures were
implemented. Over the course of 1944 several departments and agencies sought
clarifications for conflicting procedures. This proved to be an early challenge for the new
disposal administration, but these bureaucratic issues were resolved by allowing several
exemptions to the system. In most cases, exemptions were easily granted and added to a
master list that Berry started keeping over the summer of 1944. Most exemptions
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followed on the blanket one for perishable goods written into the Surplus Crown Assets
Act. Section 3 stated that no departments, except for the DND and DMS, were required
to declare surpluses in accordance with the Act if they were “agricultural or dairy
products or livestock or livestock products.”22 This spared the Committee and
Corporation from substantially interfering with the agricultural economy, its crop
surpluses, and its prices. Furthermore, in accordance with this provision the CAAC later
decided to extend Section 3 to include kitchen waste.23
Some exemptions were minor. In one case, the RCMP was provided one for selling
old uniforms to Indian and Northern Affairs. In other cases, the Department of External
Affairs was given permission to sell “small items abroad” when relocating embassies and
the Department of Mines and Resources received approval to “sell surplus in remote
areas under $100.00.”24 Other exemptions were larger. For instance, the National
Harbours Board and the Department of Transport were both permitted to sell surplus
lands they owned before the war in consultation with the WAC.25 Similarly the Soldiers
Settlement Board and the Veterans Land Act lobbied the CAAC over the summer and
were granted exemptions to sell or lease land and farming equipment to veterans seeking
a living in agriculture.26 Probably the largest and most important exemption granted to
any single department was given to the DND for destroying surplus ammunition. In May
and September 1944, the CAAC and WAC (which lacked the specialized storage
facilities needed for maintaining ammunition safely) allowed the military to destroy
unwanted ammunition and explosives without declaring them surplus. In response to the
growing tide of conflicts, the CAAC approved a blanket exemption in September 1944. It
authorized “Government Agencies which were either responsible for their own financing
or were an entity in themselves or having their own disposal Agency be excluded from
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the provisions of the Act.”27 Although the meaning of “own disposal agency” remains
unclear, it seems that this was a formal statement indicating that the CAAC and WAC
were finished assimilating other disposal agencies.
There are few – if any – indications that exemptions were abused. However, it was
entirely possible for a department to avoid using the disposal channels of the CAAC and
WAC. In theory, if the department maintained its own disposal agency, skirting the Act’s
provisions was just a matter of not declaring something surplus. Without a surplus
declaration the assets or property would never fall under the jurisdiction of the CAAC
and WAC. However enticing, it appears that this practice was not used frequently, and if
it was, it usually had the CAAC’s approval and was coordinated in some fashion with the
WAC. Therefore it seems that government departments adhered to the spirit of the
Surplus Crown Assets Act, although Howe and the DMS flirted with its boundaries and
took advantage of its loopholes. As DeRoche explained to the SCWEE in November
1945, “The Surplus Crown Assets Act gives power to sell to the Minister of
Reconstruction” rather than explicitly vesting that power solely in the CAAC or WAC.
So while these organizations became the primary and legal means for selling unneeded
government property, Howe’s mandate as Minister of Reconstruction enabled him to
delegate selling authority to other agencies and branches under his control.28 Indeed,
Diefenbaker’s sharp criticism of the Act had some merit.
Yet this particular loophole for delegating selling authority was necessary given
Howe’s wider mandate as Minister of Reconstruction and he keenly exploited it despite
some internal opposition. Towards the end of 1944, Howe formed the War Surplus
Branch inside the DMS and named Berry its Director-General. Records relating to the
War Surplus Branch are curiously missing from the DMS’s files and finding aids, but
testimonies to the SCWEE reveal that the War Surplus Branch negotiated sales of
complete factories and relied on the WAC to rubber stamp the transactions, thereby
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tacitly fulfilling the provisions of the Act.29 Records and meeting minutes from the
WAC’s Board of Directors show that it deeply opposed the creation of a competing
agency even though Berry was in charge. In January 1945, the Board wrote Howe a letter
that formally objected to the establishment of another selling agency. However, they also
offered some recommendations should this new agency remain in operation. Among
other things, it recommended that a clear definition of its mandate be publicized to avoid
confusion and that its mandate be exclusively linked to the sale of factories and industrial
machinery. A month later, Howe responded and while noting their objections he
indicated that the War Surplus Branch would not be terminated, but that the division of
responsibility would fall in line with their recommendations.30
From surviving evidence it is difficult to piece together how the War Surplus
Branch did its business, but it likely acted as a clearing house for the Industrial
Reconversion Branch, the most important and influential branch in the Department of
Reconstruction. Headed by H. J. Carmichael until December 1945, the Industrial
Reconversion Branch was responsible for establishing the nation’s postwar industrial
priorities and supporting the transition of industry from wartime to peacetime production.
In other words, the Branch’s consultants, economists, analysts, and statisticians
determined whether or not Canada could support a specific industry or if the expansion of
an industry was in the nation’s best economic interests.31 Carmichael’s Branch handled
the allocation of factory floor space and much of its associated machinery (especially the
most valuable and high-tech equipment). Therefore it required further powers to negotiate
their sale and disposition. In doing so, the Industrial Reconversion Branch administered
the department’s disposal arrangements and surplus declarations. However, it is also
quite evident that it could short-circuit the CAAC if it found a purchaser. In those
29
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situations it went directly to the WAC to close the sale, but if the Reconversion Branch
determined that a particular plant or parts thereof were surplus, it declared them through
regular channels.
Howe also delegated his selling authority to at least one other agency in his
department: the WICB and its resource Controllers. In regulating the flow of materials
and resources into the war economy, the WICB had to guard against shortages in supply.
As a result, Controllers established strategic stockpiles of resources either through
conservation and recycling campaigns or by purchasing materials in bulk with public
funds. The question of how to dispose of surplus stockpiles was eventually addressed by
Howe at a WICB meeting in September 1944. Both Berry and Carswell assumed that
entire resource stockpiles would be turned over to the WAC immediately upon becoming
surplus to the needs of Controllers and the war economy. Howe rejected that policy line,
reasoning that since stockpiles were created by acquiring the materials from the
marketplace they could be disposed of in a similar fashion and without an additional layer
of a bureaucratic involvement.32
Therefore, before the Control ceased operations, the Controller, employing his
knowledge and expertise in the trade, was instructed to sell as much of the stockpiles as
possible. If the Control did not liquidate everything before winding up its operations, the
remainder was declared to the CAAC and turned over to the WAC for disposal. On this
matter, Gordon concurred since the practice was already envisioned for the Canadian
Wool Board, which would continue selling its stocks until they were depleted. Moreover,
E. J. Brunning, the Coal Controller and formerly a member of the Sellar Committee, also
favoured this policy. He felt that it was “better to leave the stockpile surpluses with the
Controllers in the first place” since the WAC would inevitably depend on the expertise
and connections of the Controllers when marketing and selling the stockpiles.33
While exemptions certainly helped cut down on friction within the federal
bureaucracy, they were largely useless if capable people were not around to devise them
and help resolve problems. It was fortunate that an early emphasis was placed on hiring
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the most experienced and capable people for senior positions in Canada’s disposal
administration. Some mention has already been made of the company’s Board of
Directors and their wide-ranging business experience, but several other key employees
also demonstrate this pattern. In January 1944, F. O. Peterson, who was the SecretaryTreasurer for Citadel Merchandising, accepted the same job with the WAC and served in
numerous capacities until 31 December 1945 when he resigned.34
Hew Scott became the Corporation’s first General Manager in January 1944. A
Scottish-born engineer, Scott worked for the Allied War Supplies Corporation during the
war as their Director of Ammunition Filling.35 Scott resigned as General Manager in
February 1945 and, after completing a major tour and evaluation of markets in South
America, he officially left the Corporation in June. Peterson filled Scott’s vacancy until
October when A. E. McMaster took over. During the war, McMaster served as the
Executive Assistant for the Japanese Fishing Vessels Dispersals Committee and therefore
gained some dubious experience selling property and assets as the Dispersals Committee
sold the fleet of fishing vessels confiscated by the government after their rightful owners
were resettled.36 Several other employees were critical to the WAC’s operations. H. R.
Malley, who served six years in the Ammunition Production Branch of the DMS (two as
its Director-General), joined the WAC in August 1945 as VP in charge of the newly
created Supply Department and eventually succeeded Berry as President in July 1949.37
In November 1945, E. R. Birchard, who replaced Berry as Motor Vehicles Controller
after serving as his Deputy for most of the war, joined the WAC as VP in charge of the
Merchandising Department.
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These names and resumes demonstrate a key dynamic to the WAC’s business
model. As with its Board of Directors, the WAC’s employees represented a cross-section
of Canada’s industrial war effort. Whenever possible, previous experience with war
production was deliberately targeted so that it could be redeployed to demobilize the
wartime economy and disperse its materiality. This was crucial considering how the
Corporation was burdened by a large and diverse inventory of merchandise that it had not
produced but was forced to deal in. In other words, the WAC needed a wide set of
experienced employees because it did not specialize in any single niche market and was
forced to operate a conglomerate of many different and unrelated big businesses. As
Berry explained to the SCWEE:
We have one business which sells ships. We have a business which sells
automobiles. Another business sells aluminum, brass and copper. And then
we have another business sitting over here that sells something totally
different. And, off the record you are faced with the problem of having to
have senior executives who will run any one of these types of businesses, and
any one of these, again, is a big business in itself.38
Although finding key men was not difficult, retaining them proved to be a constant
challenge. Despite a small and capable nucleus that remained with the WAC throughout
the transition period, the Corporation experienced a high rate of personnel turnover at all
staffing levels.39 Among executives, the constant turnover was a product of several
factors emanating from the WAC’s chief mandate: selling surpluses. Many people saw
the Corporation’s existence as a “temporary” measure since it produced nothing and sold
only government property that, while vast in scope, was finite in supply over time. How
long the Corporation remained in operation depended completely on its performance. So
while no timetable existed for its termination, the quicker it sold its inventories the
quicker it became obsolete. As a result, the WAC did not offer much long-term job
security.
No stop-gap measures could remedy the turnover, even at the executive level. For
businessmen-turned-bureaucrats the lure of returning to the private sector remained
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powerful. In 1939-1940 the mobilization for war had attracted droves of “dollar-a-yearmen” and their private sector expertise into public service, but this brain gain evaporated
once hostilities ended. Although the government tried double-dipping into this talent
pool, few “dollar-a-year-men” obliged. After years of public service, many were eager to
return to their civilian careers or retire. Thus, “brain drain” became widespread and hit
the WAC repeatedly. The exodus of talent and experience (exemplified by the
resignations of Carswell, Scott, and Peterson in 1945 and Gagnon, Guthrie, and J. W.
Horsey in 1946) meant that a steep attrition rate developed right when a second wind of
ingenuity and expertise was needed most. As Berry explained to the SCWEE, “you can
say that quite specifically that Canada is short of key men, and that all of this type of man
are actively engaged by their own companies at the moment, with the reconstruction of
their own companies turning them back from war to peace.”40 In response to some
questions regarding the private sector loaning “key men” to the government during the
war, Berry clarified his point: “during the war period the government actually took over
some of the functions of officials, and as a result of that certain men could be spared from
those businesses and loaned to the government. Now, the situation is reversed.”41
Fortunately, replacements were usually found to plug vacancies as they developed,
but recruitment efforts were constantly handcuffed by the Corporation’s unique mandate
and overreliance on nepotism. To guard against wide-spread influence peddling and
abuse, proper character references from trusted sources were required. As Berry
explained, increasing salaries to compete with the private sector was not an ideal
solution: “I do not think we could attract people with money. The men whom we require
to do this job and do it honestly and properly are not the men whom you can go out in the
street and buy, not under the conditions under which we operate.”42 At all times, it was
best to draw from the small cadre of trusted individuals who had already contributed to
the war effort, were familiar with the bureaucracy and, ideally, had experience in the
production branches of the DMS. But even then enticing this cadre to stay could be
difficult. As Berry continued:
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Most men of the calibre required are already employed by commercial
enterprise or are snapped up by commercial companies when available. It
does not appear possible to borrow these men as was done during the war
period. I think I must say that the men remaining with the corporation and
those having joined the corporation since my own appointment are mainly
staying with the job from a sense of public duty and a desire to see the job
through.43
Coming on the heels of a grueling six-year war, few people were interested in another
round of demanding public service. During his only appearance before the SCWEE,
Howe explained that the job of disposal was a hard sell: “the difficulty is that we have a
very small staff for a very big problem. It is difficult to attract staff to this type of work. It
is not the type of work that commends itself to most people.” Right after Howe finished
his statement, Berry added that disposal “has been referred to as a self-liquidating job” –
meaning that it interested few people to begin with, those who started did not last long,
and if the job was done efficiently eventually it would be expendable.44
While cynical in nature, Berry’s remark was also quite incisive since it hinted at
another layer to the manpower issue. Trusted reputations were forged by service during
the war years, so the type of individuals desired most by the WAC were also the most
liable to be exhausted and worn out. The industrial front was a stressful and dangerous
place to work and by 1945 many “dollar-a-year-men” were burnt out or developing
serious health conditions. In October and November, Berry was bed-ridden with
pneumonia and relied on DeRoche or Peterson to present parts of his briefings to the
SCWEE.45 Several others were suffering serious health conditions or in desperate need of
a vacation. As Howe remarked, “I just got Mr. Berry out of a sick bed last week. I just
received word this morning that the second in command [Gagnon] is in hospital with
arthritis; and the man dealing with surplus plants [Malley] had a heart attack this morning
and would be in the hospital for at least three months.”46 Thus, the decision to take on
another daunting challenge immediately following the war meant that officials were often
risking further “liquidation” of their health and abilities.
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Despite the turnover, a remarkable amount was accomplished. In fact, brain drain
had some positive results since it added particular emphasis on developing solid
administrative procedures to ensure some form of institutional memory was maintained.
Officials put special effort into making workable administrative arrangements, because
they recognized that without them, the likelihood of problems and mistakes multiplied
exponentially, especially once new employees replaced those leaving. They also
recognized that imposing order on the disposal process gave them a foothold for dealing
with its various problems. However, since there were few precedents on which to rely,
trial and error was the only way to develop workable procedures. As a result, attempts at
imposing order were always accompanied by new or unforeseen complications. Trial and
error meant that administrative procedures remained in a constant state of flux and that
the batch of 3,267 surplus declarations from before March 1945 helped test the
established arrangements.
The serial insufficiency of the administrative procedures designed for declaring
surpluses stemmed from their purposes and goals. In general, the Standard Procedures
had four underlying principles. First, they had to be designed for efficiency so they could
handle the vast majority of all declarations and assets in an orderly and automatic
fashion. However, this meant that the administration had to be detail-oriented so items
could be tracked once consigned to the WAC. This multiplied the amount of paperwork
and was completely contingent on the willingness of officials to fill in the forms correctly
and with sufficient details. Second, the entire administration had to enforce strict
regulations that minimized widespread influence-peddling and abuse, but that in turn
eliminated pricing discounts and special treatment in the Standard Procedures – even if
assets were sold to provincial governments or public organizations involved in
reconstruction or rehabilitation.
Third, since the procedures were all drafted before the war ended, officials
understood that some flexibility was crucial to meet changing needs and assimilate new
experiences.47 However, this realization also lent itself to developing vaguely worded
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regulations and procedures that often resulted in new problems and delays, particularly at
the fringes of departmental jurisdictions or when filling in the requisite forms. In most
cases, when the Standard Procedures were revised it was usually to address the vagueness
of various provisions so that more details were coaxed out of declaring departments.
Finally, and most importantly, the administration had to have a set of special procedures
that allowed for the strategic allocation of assets. Such a system would protect the
economy from a glut of surplus second-hand property and also materially support the
needs of reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, the incumbent checks and balances
required to allocate goods and resources through a system of “priorities” were counterproductive to quick disposal and, once the volume of surpluses increased, the mountains
of paperwork bogged down the whole system as administrators had to match claims and
inventory lists by hand.
The system for strategically allocating surpluses, established through CAAC 4, was
a persistent issue that continually exposed the imperfections built into the administrative
preparations. Largely created because of the political and public pressure surrounding the
disposal of surpluses, the “priorities” system was a four-tiered scheme designed to create
a hierarchy of access and privilege in which other federal government departments
ranked first, provincial governments second, municipal governments third, and public
bodies (any school, hospital, relief organization, or publicly funded organization) fourth.
In this hierarchy, each level could submit a priority claim or request for any type of
surplus and if it became available in their region it could be purchased before it went out
on the open market and if none of the other priorities above laid claim.48 In this way
assets could be disposed of strategically and in the public’s best interests since the
property acquired by priority claim was often urgently needed for local reconstruction
and rehabilitation efforts.
At the first priority level, the CAAC facilitated inter-departmental transfers. A great
deal of assets changed hands this way and a significant amount originated from the
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inventories of the DND and DMS. In general terms, the CAAC facilitated the transfer of
numerous types of tools, clothing, bedding, medical supplies, buildings, real estate,
factory space, and many other types of assets from those departments to other ones. In
many cases, the property transferred went to the Departments of Labour or Indian and
Northern Affairs so each could continue supporting its various programs and policies,
such as the Canadian Vocational Training Program and the expansion of social services
in the North.49 After some discussion with the Treasury Board about the finances behind
the transactions, it was determined that no free departmental exchanges could take place.
So the CAAC became responsible for ensuring that transactions took place and that the
prices involved were equivalent to the market values as defined by the WAC. However,
once the CAAC matched surplus declarations with priority claims, the negotiations for
the exact price, transfer, custody, and transportation became the responsibility of the
departments involved.50 The CAAC played the role of matchmaker.
Probably the largest and most substantial inter-departmental transfer managed by
the CAAC was the airfields, facilities, and equipment of the British Commonwealth Air
Training Program (BCATP). The BCATP was arguably Canada’s largest contribution to
the Allied war effort. The program trained over a quarter of all Commonwealth aircrew
and pilots and prompted the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to remark that
the BCATP turned Canada into the “aerodrome of democracy.” The BCATP established
107 flight schools and 184 ancillary units located at 231 different sites across the country.
Many schools were located in rural or under-populated areas (such as Goderich, Ontario,
Penhold, Alberta, and Yorkton, Saskatchewan), so the postwar necessity of an airport was
questionable, but the interest of municipal and provincial governments remained high.51
Others, located in more populated regions, retained some practical value as civilian
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aerodromes and flying clubs or, inversely, as a source of building materials and housing
if demolished or renovated.52 In March and May 1944, Cabinet decided that the
Department of Transport would automatically receive “first opportunity of acquiring
control of all airfields and all or any of the buildings thereon” when declared surplus by
the RCAF and BCATP. However, if Transport did not require the property then it was
sent back through the normal disposal channels to the WAC. The Corporation then took
possession and determined the best course of action: either to sell the real estate,
buildings, and moveable assets or dismantle them and sell the materials piecemeal.53
By mid-1945, once several batches of surpluses had tested the channels of
communication, the tracking system, and the priorities scheme, the CAAC and WAC felt
they had developed a satisfactory system for managing disposal operations.54 However,
despite all these early preparations, once hostilities concluded and the rate of declarations
increased, some glaring problems and oversights quickly emerged. In fact, the small
sample size of surplus declarations around which the administrative procedures were
tested proved to be a critical weakness as the system was designed with too many checks
and balances that slowed disposal after the floodgates opened. However, despite their
shortcomings, the combination of early preparations and the assimilation of qualified
expertise did help mitigate a total disaster. Yet this did not happen without incident or
new rounds of mistakes, changes, and effort – especially on the part of the WAC.

The Best Laid Plans
On the eve of VE-Day, the typical path travelled by a surplus asset and its
associated paperwork went something like the following. Once a department or agency
defined its postwar plans and budgets, it knew what was surplus to its requirements.
Unneeded assets were reported to the CAAC using Standard Procedures CAAC 2 and 3
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and by correctly filling in the associated forms and receipts. The paperwork, having been
received by the CAAC at its offices in Ottawa, would then be added to a general tracking
schedule and staff processed the paperwork by comparing the declared surpluses to the
roughly 50,000-plus requests for priority allocation (as defined by CAAC 4) received
separately by the Committee.55 Copies of all paperwork were then sent to the WAC’s
Sales (later Supply) Department with the most recent tracking schedules. At every
Committee meeting these tracking schedules were approved for transfer and each entry
contained a specific recommendation that almost always related to a priority claim so the
WAC was apprised that it had to negotiate with a specific interest group. If no priority
requests were on file then specific recommendations were not generally provided.56
At no point in the process did the CAAC ever take physical possession of any
assets; it only handled paperwork. Everything declared surplus would be physically
handled by the WAC. Thus, the wisdom of forming both organizations on the same
plane, with neither subordinate to the other, was clearly evident. A division of
responsibilities existed, but there was a fundamental inter-dependency that a hierarchical
organization could never accommodate: duties shifted laterally, not from above or below.
All tracking schedules were received by the WAC’s Head Office in Montreal, which then
passed them on to its main operating department, the Sales Department. Until the WAC
was reorganized between August and October 1945, the Sales Department handled all
aspects of disposal.57 Although the arrangements were logical and straightforward they
would also prove to be quite cumbersome and prone to delays once hostilities ended.
From April 1944 to August 1945, the WAC centralized all its operations around
only sales. At its offices in Montreal, the Sales Department coordinated the
categorization, pricing, marketing, and selling of all surpluses consigned to it. However,
the centralization of all declarations, paperwork, and sales approval for the entire country
at one location and within one department created an administrative bottleneck. The
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Corporation’s various branches, located across the country, had very little autonomy and
were arranged mainly as places to pick up goods or make inquiries about purchases. This
resulted in “a decided time lag” since the WAC’s regional headquarters were reduced to
“distribution outlets only for that surplus referred to them” from the Head Office.58 The
postwar rush only exacerbated this bottleneck and compounded the inherent delays.
Further complicating this situation was the fact that during the early stages of planning
and preparations there were hardly any considerations made for warehousing needs.59
Instead, the WAC expected to rely heavily on declaring agencies to maintain custody of
their surpluses and also make deliveries to the purchaser according to instructions
received by the Head Office. The custodial arrangements may have saved the WAC the
cost of warehousing and shipping, but it did not expedite disposal.60
Before the WAC’s major reorganization, delays and problems started appearing as
the volume of declarations steadily increased. By April 1945 the AOSAC noticed that a
significant delay between the declaration of surpluses and their actual sale was
developing. On 18 April, the new MGO, Major-General James V. Young, submitted a
report to the Deputy Minister (Army) that he had commissioned “because of complaints
from several of my Directors” that surpluses declared to the CAAC were not being
disposed of by the WAC “within a reasonable length of time.” The report, written by
Dailley, was not very flattering to Canada’s disposal administration. Up until April the
four Directorates of the MGO Branch had made 218 surplus declarations but only 52
could be classified as completed. Moreover, the elapse time of the remaining declarations
was troubling: thirteen were older than nine months, 58 were between three and nine
months old, 33 were less than three months old, and the remaining 62 declarations were
unaccounted for in the report.61
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The report also uncovered that, of the sales completed, many were made piecemeal.
For instance, the AOSAC found that of the 2,500 butchers’ cleavers declared surplus and
“in the hands of W.A.C. for 5 months…only 34 have been sold to date” while $17,908.68
worth of “surplus tools and equipment” were “in the hands of W.A.C. for 7 months and
only $100.00” was sold.62 Although some sales were taking place, they were not in
significant quantities. Moreover, given the severe material shortages across the country
and that some of the surpluses declared by the MGO had useful civilian purposes the
delays were doubly concerning: how could the WAC not find any customers? Even
though many of the problems exposed by the AOSAC’s report were attributable to the
centralized operational practices of the Corporation, the report demonstrated that some
“legitimate criticism of the service being rendered by War Assets Corporation” existed.63
For the armed forces these delays in disposal were particularly troublesome because
of the custodial arrangements with the WAC. Downsizing force requirements and
declaring surpluses not only involved the disposal of unneeded kit, it also meant that each
armed service started consolidating the munitions, supplies, and real estate they planned
on keeping. This made any existing storage space and warehouses a premium resource
that could not be spared indefinitely for unneeded things. However, without storage
facilities of its own, the WAC was completely dependent on the armed services to
maintain custody of surpluses until it found a buyer. This took time and had serious
implications for the armed forces since assets declared surplus months before were still
occupying “badly needed storage space” on a seemingly indefinite basis.64 Once
demobilization hit full swing, the WAC started hampering the efforts of the armed forces
to both consolidate and liquidate their wartime inventories.
The custodial arrangements caused problems for the WAC. Because the
Corporation wanted declaring agencies to maintain custody of their surpluses, it
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effectively relinquished control over their treatment and fate before final disposal. This
was a major problem given the pressing storage concerns facing the military and most
federal departments. As a result, declaring agencies started viewing surpluses as a
nuisance – especially if they remained in their possession indefinitely – and were anxious
to dispose of them as quickly as possible. Viewing surpluses as expendable and worthless
could result in their premature destruction, particularly if the declaring agency only
considered the asset’s value within the narrow confines of departmental requirements. In
such cases, the declaring agency did not consider the object’s residual value in civilian
markets or in fulfilling other purposes. For the declaring agencies, the Corporation was
simply not getting rid of unwanted things quickly enough.
Perhaps, the most notorious example of the pitfalls of custodial arrangements was
the situation involving the WAC and RCAF at Penhold, Alberta. The incident started in
February 1945 when the WAC allowed the RCAF to destroy a laundry list of surplus
equipment, with a few noted exceptions clearly identified in the correspondence.65 RCAF
personnel, acting as the WAC’s custodians and technical advisors, began identifying and
destroying unneeded equipment and obsolete aircraft by scrapping or incineration.
However, RCAF personnel misunderstood the meaning of “surplus” and “obsolete” as
defined by the WAC. They assumed that since the aircraft and equipment in their custody
was obsolete by Air Force standards, they did not possess any residual value for other
purposes. In fact, the opposite was true, especially since weapon systems are the sum of
several thousand components, some of which – such as engine batteries or Plexiglas –
retain value in civilian markets. But the WAC, lacking direct supervision at Penhold,
could not intervene and the destruction continued until questions were raised by the
media and in Parliament. To many observers it was clear: waste and wanton destruction
had taken place and the WAC was held accountable, even though its custodial agent was
responsible for destroying the items in question.66 The long shadow of the Penhold fiasco
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caused significant changes to the WAC’s operational policies and also prompted it to
forbid the military from destroying anything except ammunition.
The other major problem that the WAC encountered was the propensity for the
declaring agencies to consolidate their surpluses in a single location before declaring
them to the CAAC. This was problematic for two reasons. First, it meant that additional
shipping costs had to be added to the purchase price and it further complicated the
logistics of sales for the Corporation. Second, it resulted in quite a bit of negative
publicity for the WAC. As Peterson explained to the SCWEE, “people see the surpluses;
they know they are there; they see them moved away; they don’t like it, and they assume
the War Assets moved them.”67 Inversely, the bad publicity and public dissatisfaction
could be aggravated if the surpluses, concentrated in a particular location by the declaring
agency, remained trapped by the WAC’s centralized practices and the CAAC’s
administrative bottleneck. This meant that the public could see large stocks of unused
supplies and materials sitting on seemingly abandoned property or behind barbed wire
fences, exposed to the elements, and further deteriorating in condition. The complaints of
the Calgary General Contractors Association in August 1945 provide a typical example:
We are informed that there is a quantity of building materials of all kinds in
storage at Currie Barracks and at No. 11 Equipment and Supply Depot here in
Calgary that is not being used in any way. As you are no doubt aware, we are
suffering from a serious shortage of supplies and we are at a loss to
understand why this material is not being released to the trade.68
Regardless of circumstances, the WAC was blamed even if the armed forces had yet to
declare the items surplus as was the case at Currie Barracks.69
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he indicated that the April report resulted in some improvements but that “a regular
procedure for hastening War Assets Corporation” should be adopted. McColm suggested
that each week the AOSAC prepare a list of overdue declarations and have the Deputy
Minister transmit it to the WAC’s newly formed Supply Department. The gentle
reminder would serve to “press the various Divisions of the Corporation for action.”70
That McColm noted improvements in the WAC’s performance in October was significant
given the increasing volume of materials declared surplus during that time and the fact
that the WAC was only selling a fraction of what it took in from the MGO per month.
According to the MGO’s monthly tabulations of declarations and sales (calculated in
dollar figures) the WAC disposed of $15,156,994.37 up to October 1945 out of a total of
$47,265,593.95 worth of surpluses. As an aggregate, the WAC sold about a third of all
the MGOs surpluses, an accomplishment worthy of some merit, particularly given the
discrepancy between the original value (calculated by the MGO based on what it paid to
acquire the assets) and the WAC’s depreciated selling price (based on the going market
rate and WPTB price ceilings).71
However, these figures do not indicate much about the rising volume of assets
entering the WAC’s inventory at war’s end. Subtracting the totals for September from
October, the WAC took in $6,169,081.00 worth of new surpluses from the MGO Branch
in October while disposing of $1,127,294.95. Subtracting the totals for August from
September revealed a similar disparity between input and output: $5,204,069.53 worth of
goods declared in September versus $1,551,158.71 worth of goods sold.72 A few
conclusions can be drawn from these statistics. First, by the fall of 1945, for every dollar
the WAC made in sales it was taking in between five and six dollars’ worth of goods
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from the MGO – a pattern that was surely replicated across all branches of the military.73
Second, the increasing amount of items consigned to the WAC caused a natural lag in
sales, so it is obvious that McColm adjusted the AOSAC’s expectations for immediate
disposal action. A backlog in sales was impossible to avoid given the increasing volume
of goods declared surplus, the administrative and operational procedures, the collection
and inspection of goods, marketing requirements, and sales negotiations. Although it is
conceivable that the WAC succeeded in selling $6 million worth of goods (originally
priced) for $1 million (selling price) in the same month, there are no indications that any
assets declared in September or October were actually sold in the same month.
Table 1: Declarations of Surplus Received by Month, 1944-48
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
January
1
430
2,472
805
256
February
9
416
2,483
723
266
March
46
559
2,862
749
365
April
45
984
2,737
615
May
59
1,216
2,486
652
June
165
1,692
2,001
502
July
194
1,330
1,784
719
August
175
1,593
1,325
529
September
180
1,767
1,016
370
October
242
1,064
1,014
443
November
469
1,520
996
352
December
277
1,487
668
293
Total
1,862
14,058
21,844
6,752
887
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report (April 1st, 1947 to March 31st, 1948), 7.

The situation with the MGO Branch was just the tip of the iceberg. When hostilities
ended, the floodgates opened. Despite the early preparations and planning, the flood of
surpluses was overwhelming and appears to have caught officials somewhat off guard.
Before May 1945, few surpluses (except mainly obsolete kit) existed since bureaucrats
were unsure about their future departmental needs and consequently they were loath to
declare too much surplus too quickly. This was especially the case with the Army as
relinquishing control and ownership of a significant quantity of assets was
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counterproductive, not only to winning the war, but also to legitimizing its sizeable and
demanding postwar requirements. This reluctance to declare anything surplus no doubt
played a major role in forming the massive waves of declarations towards the end of the
1945-1946 fiscal year.74 Once hostilities ended and postwar budgets were settled in basic
terms, most government departments and agencies (especially the Army) suddenly
switched gears, from cautiously guarding inventories to rapidly defining and declaring
surpluses to the CAAC.75 Table 1 shows the acute and swift growth in surplus
declarations from all departments (not just DND) from 1944 to 1948 – note the peak
period from May 1945 to October 1946 and the fact that the two biggest months (March
and April 1946) coincide with the end and start of the fiscal year.
A common refrain among CAAC and WAC officials, both in their records and their
testimonies before the SCWEE, was the unprecedented nature of the task now facing
them.76 Of course there were vague notions of past failures and sweeping indictments of
speculators following the First World War, but the liquidation of such a vast amount of
government property had never been attempted before. Over a two-year period, from
April 1945 to April 1947, more than 35,000 separate declarations were processed by the
CAAC and consigned to the WAC. Keeping in mind that each declaration could contain
as little as one item or, more likely, lists of hundreds if not thousands of items, the
magnitude of disposal operations becomes more apparent. As the WAC’s Third Annual
Report stated, “one report of surplus may well cover a complete plant involving
buildings, land, machine tools, etc., having an original cost of $10,000 while another will
cover one horse valued at $25.”77 Unfortunately, the exact dollar values of all
declarations are difficult to ascertain (given the discrepancy between the original and
actual values), but since these declarations constituted the bulk of everything tagged for
disposal, the total original cost was worth billions. Indeed, the flood of goods might be
described as a tidal wave.
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Since federal departments controlled the floodgates and opened them when they
pleased, some friction between the disposal administration and declaring agencies
resulted at the fringes of mandates and responsibilities. As a result, new problems started
popping up everywhere. Some were well beyond the control of the WAC and CAAC.
This was because departments were liable to renege on their surplus declarations if
circumstances and forecasted budgets changed. Although it remains unknown how
frequently this occurred, by January 1947 the CAAC had to address the issue at its
monthly meeting since “government Departments were, in many instances, requesting the
return of materials previously reported surplus” and doing so after the WAC had prepared
its inventory reports. Since the inventory reports were “accountable documents” and
subject to audit, the Committee determined that reporting Departments had to repurchase
the assets in question (if they were not already sold).78 In other instances where inventory
reports were not prepared then it was possible to transfer the objects back to the
Department but this entailed further correspondence and investigation.
One well-documented case involved the RCAF and its facilities at Debert, Nova
Scotia. In April 1947, the RCAF declared surplus over a dozen airfields and facilities, but
in doing so it also secured a special dispensation that froze final disposal indefinitely.
Two years later, in February 1949, the RCAF had clarified its postwar requirements and
released most of the property. However, it wanted to re-acquire some of the assets and
real estate at five locations: Bowden, Alberta, Debert, Nova Scotia, Edenvale, Ontario,
Jarvis, Ontario, and Souris, Manitoba.79 In the case of the sprawling military facilities at
Debert some serious postwar changes had occurred in the interim. Almost all of the
Army’s buildings at Debert (about 443 in total) were dismantled but the RCAF’s
buildings were spared and renovated by the WAC for use as a warehouse facility. 80 After
the inventories dwindled in Debert, the buildings and surrounding property were
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transferred to the Department of Transport in accordance with Cabinet’s directives for
BCATP airfields. Thus, in the spring and summer of 1949, the WAC had to reacquire the
property from Transport so it could transfer it back to the RCAF.81 This type of situation
illustrates the complexities and uncertainties of declaring surpluses. The postwar rush to
downsize caused a logjam of paperwork, and if circumstances or budgets changed then
sometimes departments wanted their stuff back. This meant forestalling final disposal so
that assets and paperwork could reverse course against the prevailing flow of bureaucratic
procedures.82
In other cases, the WAC and CAAC shared the blame for delays and problems with
the declaring departments. Perhaps, the biggest issue facing Canada’s disposal
administration resulted from insufficient details on surplus declarations and priority
claims. This was a product of both inadequate instructions in the Standard Procedures and
lackadaisical bureaucrats improperly filling out the paperwork. Quite often in the haste to
complete the maze of forms for ridding themselves of unneeded assets or making as
many priority claims as possible, officials did not fill in the paperwork correctly. It did
not take long for Berry and his staff to discover this problem and make changes to CAAC
2 and 4 in several futile attempts at curbing this behaviour by eliminating vagueness in
the instructions. However, because clarifications to the Standard Procedures only helped
as long as other agencies played ball, the problem persisted. In doing so, further delays
were caused when the CAAC was forced to track down and investigate the declaring
agency or priority holder to determine exactly what was being declared or requested.
After the tidal wave washed in this task became a real time-consuming impediment for
processing declarations.
To illustrate this problem consider a hypothetical example: say the DMS declared a
drill press surplus at the John Inglis Plant in Toronto and valued it at $1,000. At first
glance this “declaration” might seem sufficient, but how could the WAC market or sell
the drill press without more information describing it and its features? And how could it
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be differentiated from all the others, if one had to physically remove the drill without
knowing its serial number? The plague of vague descriptions crippled disposal
procedures at their very core. Without any information detailing the exact type of drill
press (whether it was a bench, pillar, or radial) or its condition of use (worn out or new)
or the exact size and capacity (whether it was hand-held, stationary, its features or
limitations) or its component parts (such as power sources or drill bits) the declaration
was virtually useless. Inversely, the vagueness of priority claims was equally
troublesome. To simply request “a drill” without any further detail provoked similar
questions: what type was required? How big and powerful? What parts were needed and
for what purposes would it be used?83 This type of information was critical because it
enabled the CAAC to match items from the WAC’s inventory with a priority request.
Keeping in mind this was long before computers and keyword searches, so each priority
claim was matched by hand against the mountains of declarations. Even if the forms were
filled in correctly, processing paperwork through the priorities took time and each vague
declaration or request only added further delays.
Other issues and delays resulted entirely from the CAAC’s and WAC’s operational
procedures since the tidal wave of declarations and priority claims turned the priorities
scheme into a dam rather than a filter for the flow of goods. As the previous section
explained, the priorities scheme called for negotiating sales directly with specific interests
groups but this slowed sales and the problem quickly snowballed when the postwar rush
brought in over 20,000 surplus declarations and 50,000 requests for priority allocation
from April 1945 to March 1946 alone. This compounded the WAC’s centralized
operational procedures and the “sieves” of the CAAC’s priority system. The sheer
volume stalled disposal to the detriment of priority holders. One example, brought up by
Peterson during his testimony before the SCWEE explained the situation quite succinctly.
A few months after VE-Day, 174 pieces of construction equipment were declared surplus
by the DND and brought back to Montreal from Goose Bay, Newfoundland. The WAC
received 1,500 inquiries about them from both priority and non-priority holders. The
equipment was second-hand and some of it was in “bad repair” but there was clearly an
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interested market as many potential customers and construction companies inspected the
gear. Yet in order to give priority claimants time to exercise their priority rights, sales to
the public were “held up for three weeks” but priority claims were exercised on only
twenty-two machines.84 Clearly, the priorities were preventing the WAC from
capitalizing quickly on sales of assets in high demand and left many customers frustrated.
The complaints that “you can’t buy from War Assets” started emerging out of a
confluence of factors and events loosely connected by the media. On the heels of the
Great Depression and war, severe material shortages continued throughout the transition
period, fueling an increased demand and eagerness for goods of all types. With new
goods especially scarce, the public expected second-hand government surpluses to be
profuse and available. Perhaps conditioned by extensive wartime propaganda that
glorified industrial productivity, there was a perception that somehow the WAC’s
inventory was vast, infinite, and available immediately for public consumption.85
However, this was at odds with reality. Moving assets through the CAAC priorities and
the selling branches of the WAC took time. Moreover, the WAC could only sell what
was consigned to it – a fact the public always seemed to misunderstand despite the
continuous publication of pamphlets and newspaper advertisements.86 Before the war
ended, few surpluses existed anywhere, so there was actually little to buy from the WAC.
It was only after VE- and VJ-Day that the WAC’s inventory grew substantially, but
selling restrictions limited who could make purchases. Moreover, there were also no
guarantees that the avalanche of declarations at war’s end contained things the public
wanted or in quantities that could satisfy demand. Indeed, the WAC may have taken in a
large amount of assets, but the most desired commodities represented only a small
fraction of the total.
The priorities also caused frustration. For example, over the summer of 1945 the
WAC and the Ontario Federation of Agriculture came to an agreement that allowed the
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Federation to facilitate the sale of military-patterned trucks and field artillery tractors
through a series of lottery-style auctions to bonafide farmers. Auctions took place across
Southwestern Ontario in the late summer and early fall and the one in Markham received
some media coverage. In late September, about 300 farmers gathered at the Markham
Fair grounds for the lottery draw. Names were thrown into a hat and the lucky winners
received the chance to purchase one of the available 125 military-patterned trucks and
twenty-five artillery tractors (each valued at $330 and $280 respectively).87 Sensing an
opportunity mechanics ventured to the Markham Fairgrounds but they were turned away
at the door by Federation officials who were stringently verifying the credentials of all
attendees. Only farmers were allowed to purchase the machinery, and since the WAC did
not waive the resale condition attached to all priority sales (this prevented the purchaser
from legally reselling what had been purchased for 90-days) mechanics were completely
cut out. “I can’t possibly see what use a tractor could be to a farmer” an exasperated
“garage man” told the Globe and Mail, “the machines run only about four miles to the
gallon. But they would be ideal for us for towing purposes.”88 Out of luck, the mechanics
could not buy directly from the WAC and instead had to wait to purchase vehicles and
equipment through established dealers and at prices closer to the WPTB’s price ceilings.
The hierarchy of access and privilege created by the priorities also resulted in
competition between and within each priority level. Those lower down the priority list
were at an inherent disadvantage and were often unable to purchase assets even if they
became available. For example, as Peterson explained to the SCWEE, by November
1945, “only seven buses in usable condition have been declared surplus” and since these
were sold to the federal and provincial governments on priority claims, “the school
boards throughout Canada who want buses must be given the unpopular and the
unexpected answer.”89 The school boards, being public bodies, were fourth in the priority
scheme and could only get access to goods not purchased by the priorities above, to say
little about the intense competition between school boards that would have resulted had
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the small number of busses become available. Managing the competition for goods
between organizations at all levels of the priority system became an additional burden of
some complexity. In one instance, the CAAC got out in front of a potential fiasco when it
negotiated an agreement between two international relief agencies that were requesting
the same types of materials. In April 1945, the CAAC, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Canadian United Allied Relief Fund
(CUARF) agreed to distribute supplies on a percentage basis: UNRRA received 7/10 and
CUARF 3/10.90 Thus, the CAAC was able to accommodate both the large and small
relief organizations and avoid additional public embarrassment.
The priorities scheme required more vigilance than originally expected. This was
because the scheme was open to abuse and exploitation. Abuse of the priority system
stemmed from the fact that some claimants made dozens of blanket requests at once or
claimed more than they actually needed so they could resell for a profit after the 90-day
resale restriction expired. In other instances, the abuses were less about volume and more
about particular individuals trying to beat the system for their own selfish gains. Over the
summer of 1945, staff in the WAC and the DMS started discovering large-scale abuses of
the priorities system. According to Howe, veterans who received a priority certificate
from the Motor Vehicle Controller were purchasing vehicles they did not require and
reselling the cars for a tidy profit. The cheating was “on a colossal scale” as the number
of priority certificates handed out by the DMS “exceeded available cars by some 60,000”
and further solidified the WAC’s refusal to create a veterans’ priority since the cheating
would inevitably spread to its inventory of vehicles and other commodities.91
In another incident the WAC discovered that members of the public could abuse
the priorities system through misrepresentation. In August 1945, Louis Richard, an Audit
Supervisor with the Auditor General of Canada (who later joined the WAC in 1947 as
Treasurer and became President in 1954), was informed of one such instance by the
Corporation’s then Comptroller, G. A. Cruickshank. According to Cruickshank, Montreal
Sales Order 0087 dated 23 May 1945 was issued to approve a sale to the Unemployment
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Insurance Commission in Moncton for a “Ford car” valued at $365.42. However, the car
was paid for by a personal cheque from Mr. McBeath, an employee of the
Unemployment Insurance Commission. On the surface everything looked normal, but the
odd discrepancy between the priority claim and the actual purchaser raised a red flag.
After looking into the matter, the WAC’s Priorities Division determined that Mr.
McBeath had “used the name of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in order to
obtain a priority which he could not obtain otherwise.”92 Upon discovering the scam, the
Priorities Division cancelled the sale and refunded Mr. McBeath his money while the
Moncton Branch repossessed the car.
Suffice to say, when the tidal wave of surpluses arrived, the priorities scheme
turned into a major headache that fuelled increasing delays, bad publicity, and
paperwork. Although officials were not overly concerned by the negative publicity, they
did start debating the merits of abolishing the priorities scheme altogether in November
1945.93 Clearly, things had hit a breaking point. A product of political pressure and a
desire for strategically managing disposal, the priority system was well intentioned and
worked best when there were fewer declarations and limited available surpluses.
However, the flood of paperwork and assets was overwhelming and prevented any
orderly liquidation. At a meeting with Howe several members of the Board of Directors
called for the elimination of the priorities system “because first, they lead to abuse of the
privileges, and second, they tend to bog down operations.”94
On the matter of abolishing priorities, Berry disagreed with his colleagues. Given
that the WAC sold surplus materials through established trade networks and not usually
by direct transactions with end users, he recognized the importance of ensuring that
public institutions and governments received some consideration in a system mainly
conceived with business interests and economic stability in mind. To Berry, the priorities
system had to continue, not only because their cancellation would cause unfavourable
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political fallout, but also because they reserved goods and assets for interest groups and
public programs assisting with postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation.95 Priorities
served an important function, but Berry also recognized that they were slowing sales to
the detriment of postwar prosperity. The solution, however, was not to eliminate the key
cog in the disposal administration but to streamline the whole system around it and
remove as many of the other bottlenecks as possible.
Overall, Berry felt that revisions to the priority system would become necessary in
the future, but that the timing was not ideal. Without his support the priorities scheme
was not abolished in 1945. However, over the following few years, Berry authorized
several modifications that streamlined processing and selling efficiency. One particularly
important change was the establishment of time limits for holding a priority request on
file. At first they were set at thirty days and then lowered to ten days in mid-1946.96 In
January 1947 the time limit was abolished completely when the CAAC “relieved” the
WAC “of the necessity of carrying requests on its records.”97 This almost entirely
eliminated the administrative bottleneck that had plagued the system from its inception.
From January onwards, the WAC still continued making direct sales to priority holders
but only if the materials requested were available in the Corporation’s inventories “at the
time the request [was] received.”98 There was now no responsibility for administering an
institutional memory for the priorities system. Over the spring and summer of 1947, it
was abolished completely in line with decreasing inventories and decreasing sales.

The Reorganization and Expansion of the WAC
The reason why Berry was reluctant to significantly change the priorities in
November 1945 had a lot to do with the WAC’s restructuring and reorganization over the
summer and early autumn. The changes were largely aimed at eliminating administrative
bottlenecks and improving the Corporation’s selling efficiency, so he wanted to give
them an opportunity to sort out the issues affecting disposal. At the time, making more
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modifications that would eliminate part of the disposal process, especially one that
fulfilled an important function, was not prudent. Besides, Berry shared some cautious
optimism that a by-product of the reorganization would attenuate the priorities quagmire:
The reorganization deemed necessary had barely commenced when V-J Day
brought an enormously increased volume of surpluses which had to be
handled concurrently with the loss of existing personnel and the introduction
of additional newly appointed personnel and substantial changes in
procedure. This reorganization has made good progress, but I would ask the
committee to keep in mind that while every effort will continue to be made to
complete it as quickly as possible, there is necessarily much still to be done.99
The first steps in the WAC’s restructuring took place back in February 1945 when
J. W. Horsey was hired as Executive-Vice President and added to the Board of Directors.
Horsey was only on the WAC’s payroll for less than twelve months, but his influence
over the future shape, structure, and mandate of the Company was profound. As President
of Dominion Stores, a very prominent supermarket chain founded in 1919, he had
extensive experience in merchandising and sales and the Board of Directors gave him a
free hand to review the Company’s operations. Horsey’s report was tabled in June and
some of his ideas on selling strategies were published in the Quarterly Review of
Commerce in January 1947.100 Above all, his recommendations were designed to increase
the selling efficiency, as he told Board members in March, “anything in the nature of a
barrier to sales must be broken down.”101
One of Horsey’s biggest organizational changes was the implementation of a new
regional focus. Over the summer and early autumn, the WAC (and CAAC) decentralized
operations by dividing the country into five selling regions: Western, Prairies, Ontario,
Quebec, and the Maritimes. Each region was controlled by a Branch Manager who
oversaw all merchandising and supply operations in their respective jurisdictions. The
five Branch Managers reported directly to the General Manager who remained
headquartered in Montreal at the Head Offices, now located at 4095 Catherine Street
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West in a building formerly used by Westmount Tool Works. The WAC’s centralized
organizational structure was similarly dispersed. Surplus declarations were still sent to
the CAAC in Ottawa and tracking schedules were still passed on to the WAC’s Head
Offices, but in Montreal the schedules were now sorted by region and mailed out to
Branch Managers. The priorities scheme was similarly decentralized and no longer totally
contingent on the Head Offices and CAAC in Montreal and Ottawa. Instead, priority
requests were mailed directly to the Regional Branches where they were assessed against
and accommodated by the region’s available inventories.102 If regional inventories could
not accommodate a request, it was forwarded to Montreal and matched against the
national inventory. The big advantage of this change was in dividing the size of
inventories

and

number

of

requests

across

the

priority
each

region thereby cutting the
administrative bottleneck
into

five

manageable

portions.
Photo 2 The WAC’s Head Offices (circa. late-1945) located at 4095
Catherine Street West, Montreal. The building was formerly used by a
DIL subsidiary, Westmount Tool Works. Source: LAC, RG101, R-11-9, History of War Assets Corporation Lt. and War Assets
Corporation.

Because

specific

areas within regions were
liable

to

have

high

concentrations of assets,

special branches were organized within the company’s five regions. For example, SubBranches were opened in the Pacific Northwest in Edmonton and Whitehorse that
handled and appraised all the American surpluses that accumulated along the Alaskan
Highway, Northwest Staging Route, and the Canol pipeline. Given the significant amount
of American surpluses located in Prince Rupert another Sub-Branch was opened there as
well. To deal with specific disposal challenges in Ontario and Quebec, District Supply
Managers were appointed to oversee the WAC’s activities in Ajax, Ontario and
Bouchard, Quebec. In Ajax, the Supply Manager handled the disposal of assets by
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coordinating the sale of property, tools, and other assets to the University of Toronto and
the CMHC. In Bouchard, the Supply Manager coordinated disposal operations between
the Canadian Army and the WAC. In February 1946, a special Supply Department
representative was also sent to Newfoundland as the Army, RCN, and RCAF were
liquidating large amounts of equipment and facilities in this strategic location. 103 Thus,
the WAC’s new regionalization made the Corporation more proactive in the cleanup of
wartime developments wherever they had occurred.
The regional decentralization required a corresponding change to the WAC’s
organizational structure. Therefore, Horsey rationalized the Corporation’s various
departments and divisions. Almost immediately after joining the WAC, he created a
temporary “Services Division” and tasked it with various responsibilities crucial to a
selling organization but virtually non-existent in the WAC: warehousing, shipping, and
security. To improve the efficiency of the Head Office, Dominion Stores lent their
secretary, A. A. Beevor, to help improve clerical practices.104 Furthermore, to oversee the
Corporation’s accounts, internal audits, and handle its finances, Horsey formed a new
Comptroller Department and appointed an accountant, L. A. Brooks, to manage it. An
Educational Director (Harry Low) and a Personnel Director (Clarence Fraser, loaned
from Bell Telephone Company of Canada) were hired for training new employees and
also to ensure that the Corporation continued to recruit the most qualified and
experienced personnel as possible. Harry Low was later given the additional task of
coordinating sales with the needs of educational associations. Horsey also took issue with
the Corporation’s lack of publicity and public engagement. He did not like “the
Corporation’s past policy of ‘Keeping Quiet’” and felt that “a series of constructive,
positive statements should be made regularly to the population at large, to Industry and to
employees…through news columns…and through convincing attractive advertising” in
order to fight back against any bad publicity. As a result, he gave Herbert Lash, the
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WAC’s Publicity Director, a more proactive mandate to monitor the press and publish
positive news stories relating to the WAC’s activities.105
The Sales Department, with which Horsey constantly tinkered, was eventually
disbanded and replaced by two separate Departments: Supply and Merchandising. H. R.
Malley was put in charge of Supply, which took over all procurement, categorization, and
warehousing responsibilities. The Supply Department was also subdivided into several
Divisions: Procurement, Clearance, Warehousing, Traffic, Security, Reclamation, and
Surplus Property. The Merchandising Department, headed by E. R. Birchard, took over
all duties relating to marketing, pricing, and sales. It was also subdivided into several
Divisions: Pricing and Distribution, Sales, Priority, Export, and Direct Sales.106 Several
other Departments were created by the end of the summer. The Organization and
Personnel Department (formed by merging the Educational and Personnel portfolios) was
responsible for human resources, payroll, administration, records management, and
investigations. The Lands and Buildings Department, headed by G. H. S. Dinsmore,
handled the immense task of real estate sales across the whole country. 107 Tying in with
the emphasis on regional decentralization, each Department and Division was divided by
region so representatives were stationed at every Branch.
The organizational changes coincided with the growth of the WAC’s operations in
the fall of 1945 and with the rapid expansion of the Corporation’s workforce. As the
Tables below demonstrate, the number of employees grew sharply immediately following
the war and as the mountains of surplus declarations and assets began overwhelming the
CAAC and WAC. However, it must be noted that the expanding labour force was never
conceived of as a permanent development. Everyone understood that the decentralization
and expansion was a short-term contingency, and that when the Corporation’s inventories
dwindled so too would its workforce. The WAC was redesigned to expand and contract
105

Quote from: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-8, “Report to the Board of Directors of War Assets
Corporation on Organization,” J. W. Horsey, 8 June 1945, 9; LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of
Directors, Meeting Minutes, 8 March 1945. See: CWM, Democracy at War, “War Assets Corporation
Would Appreciate a Correction,” Toronto Telegram, 16 July 1946. The request for a correction was not
very welcomed in this instance, as the reporter pointed out several things that the WAC “official” did not
request corrections on.
106

War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 12.

107

Ibid, 15-19.

124

with the flow of goods. The decentralization accommodated the steep postwar expansion
but as inventories depleted over time, the Corporation could close down its regional
operations and revert to its centralized practices. This is exactly what happened and it is
certainly evident in the precipitous drop in employment numbers as the WAC wound up
operations from 1948 to 1950.108
Reliable employment statistics are not available prior to June 1945, but the WAC’s
First Annual Report indicated that in March 1945 there were 571 employees working for
the Corporation, mostly in Montreal. This number is at odds with the Second Annual
Report as it appears to have only counted “administrative” employees and not those
working in the “field” (the Second Annual Report put the total figure at 1,557 in June
Table 2: Number of
Employees in the WAC in
March, 1945-1950
Year
Employees
1945
931
1946
6,074
1947
9,919
1948
3,527
1949
284
1950
120
Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File:
R-1-2-4, Organization of the
Crown Assets Disposal
Corporation; Ibid, File: R-1-1-9,
“History of War Assets
Corporation” 15 July 1950, 20.

1945 and an unpublished history put the total at 931
in March 1945).109 Aside from discrepancies in
tabulation and classification, there is one other major
limitation to the statistics. Unless otherwise noted,
the numbers are aggregate figures based on the last
month of the fiscal year and do not provide much
indication on the substantial monthly fluctuations
experienced by the Corporation. As the Second
Annual Report stated after noting the number of new
hires (4,790) and the number of “separations” (1,156)
between June 1945 and March 1946, any review of

the employment statistics should bear in mind “that they represent net increase and do not
give any indication of the large number of appointments necessary to offset the heavy
rate of staff turnover.”110
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Regardless of these discrepancies, the employment statistics indicate that from
June 1945 to June 1947 the WAC’s workforce expanded substantially from 1,557 to
8,501 – an increase of 545 percent. During that period the Corporation hired more than
15,000 new employees while about 8,000 were terminated. In January 1947, the
expansion peaked when 10,371 employees were on the payroll, an increase of 666
percent over June 1945.111 Moreover, the WAC was meticulous about employing
veterans. Not only was a veteran’s hiring preference the law, but it also helped offset the
fact that the WAC had not provided veterans with a special priority. When the SCWEE
grilled Berry and other officials about the lack of a veterans’ priority, they relied on
employment statistics to partially defend their policies while also demonstrating how the
Corporation supported veterans in other ways. As Table 3 illustrates, at the peak of the
WAC’s growth, and even
Table 3: Employment Trends in the WAC, 1945-1949
Percent of
Total Number of
Percent of
Veterans to
Employees
Year
Males to
Total Male
Total
Staff
Lowest Highest
Staff
1945-46
944
6,074
73
53
1946-47 6,074
10,371
71
71
1947-48 3,527
9,919
68
70
1948-49
294
3,527
57
70

as its workforce declined,

Source: War Assets Corporation Fifth Annual Report (April 1, 1948
to 31 March, 1949), 11.

Supply

Department.

Although

the

veterans accounted for 70
percent

of

all

male

employees and most were
hired

on

short-term

contracts to work in the

vast

majority of the WAC’s employees were temporary workers who were paid lower salaries,
had limited benefits, and no pensions, most employees accepted these provisos as they
saw the job as a temporary paycheque while they searched for permanent employment
elsewhere.112 To accommodate the substantial turnover of personnel the Corporation’s
Organization and Personnel Department “worked closely with the various employment
offices and agencies” and became “instrumental in placing an appreciable number in
positions of more permanency.”113
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While it is uncertain how many employees were former war workers or female
veterans, the hiring of veterans definitely allowed the Corporation to double up on the
experience and training of the country’s ex-soldiers, thereby improving the overall
quality of its workforce and, perhaps, lowering training costs in some cases. In other
words, hiring veterans (and war workers) meant that the WAC was gaining employees
who had some practical experience in the use, manufacture, components, and capabilities
of the objects entering its custody. Moreover, veterans also made excellent security
guards. In February 1945, the WAC entered into an agreement with the Canadian Corps
of Commissionaires to provide security, fire detection, and supervision of visitors at all
its facilities. Throughout the fiscal year of 1946-1947, the number of Commissionaires
working for the Supply Department nearly doubled from 661 to a peak of 1,116.114 Since
the Commissionaires were overwhelmingly composed of veterans, the WAC further
boosted its employment statistics and helped counter the backlash against its
unfavourable policies towards veterans.115
Decentralizing the organizational structure also helped increase sales. To
accommodate the new regional focus, Horsey had the regulations governing signing
authority on sales below $25,000 loosened. This allowed greater autonomy to the
Corporation’s salesmen and Branch Managers across the country, as it eliminated some
of the incumbent processing delays by removing the need to communicate with the Head
Offices. Before this change every sale – no matter how big or small – had to be approved
by the Board of Directors in Montreal. Furthermore, a new selling mantra was adopted:
“as is, where is” meaning that surpluses declared in a particular area were sold there so
that the Corporation could save on the cost of shipping and handling the surpluses. This
policy was ideal for making quick sales because it privileged local interests and it became
increasingly important as inventories expanded.
One of the biggest barriers to sales and a source of many bureaucratic problems had
been the WAC’s lack of storage space and custodial arrangements. In order to overcome
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these issues, Horsey enacted a significant change to the WAC’s mandate and purpose by
instituting a new supply and logistical apparatus. This was an essential element of all
merchandising businesses and it was clearly lacking in the early part of the WAC’s
history. In creating the Supply and Merchandising Departments, Horsey split the
logistical tasks from the selling, thereby instituting a significant operational shift by
adding the collection and storage of surpluses to the WAC’s mandate. The following
chapter will discuss this important change in more detail, but it is important to realize that
from October 1945 onwards the WAC largely abolished its custodial arrangements and
only used them when absolutely necessary, such as with ammunition storage. Until
inventories were depleted, the Supply Department’s two most important divisions,
Clearance and Warehousing, handled the tasks of collection and storage.
These organizational changes paved the way for a period of rapid expansion. Up to
October 1945, $40,133,166 worth of goods were sold by the WAC in 42,161 separate
transactions from its establishment in late 1943.116 With each passing month those
numbers increased significantly. In November 1945 the WAC hit the $10 million mark in
monthly sales and in January 1946 monthly sales topped $14 million. In March 1946, the
WAC hit its high water mark as monthly sales reached the astounding total of
$42,830,725.34, doubling the totals from January 1944 to October 1945 in just 31 days.
In April, the slow decline in sales began as the total dropped to just over $21 million and
by September 1946 sales dipped back below the $20 million mark.117 By the end of 1948,
the WAC had made over 306,014 separate transactions and recouped $427,246,250.81.118
During this postwar selling frenzy, the volume of sales was not the only thing
overwhelming Canada’s disposal administration. Word got out quickly that the WAC was
open for business and that the items and materials in short supply might be available in its
inventories. As a result, the Corporation was blindsided by a huge influx of inquiries
from the public that grew to such astounding proportions that the Corporation’s Central
Registry struggled to keep up. In October 1945, 28,113 letters reached the WAC, a
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staggering monthly total to say the least, yet it was dwarfed by the 96,481 letters received
in March 1946. That amounted to an average of 3,112 letters arriving at the WAC every
day that month.119 Clearly, the public was interested in acquiring surplus assets! Yet it
was also equally clear that the WAC’s organizational changes were working. Even under
the immense strain, the Corporation’s operations bent but they did not break. The delays,
administrative bottlenecks, and various other problems facing the WAC in 1945 might
have prompted critical media reports and questions from politicians, but the
reorganization and expansion had a positive effect. When confronted by the SCWEE
about delays and complaints, Berry used the sales data to defend his organizations.
Although he recognized that some delays and problems still plagued the system, he
usually attributed them to the priorities scheme.120
Berry may have downplayed some of these problems, as many new ones started
emerging as the flood of surpluses came in and the reorganization took effect. The two
most pressing problems facing the WAC after October 1945 were the increased
operational costs and decreasing sales revenue. The increasing size of the WAC’s
workforce and the number of warehouses in operation steadily increased expenses
beyond forecasted budgets. However, getting extra money from the DMS (and later the
DRS) was not a guarantee, so the WAC was constantly looking to save money and cut
costs. This fact overshadowed its expanding logistical operations and added an additional
limitation to how effectively it could adapt to its new custodial responsibilities. PC9108
granted the Corporation a $5 million start-up investment and Section 15 of the Surplus
Crown Assets Act allowed the WAC to keep a percentage of profits to cover operating
expenses. This percentage was originally set at three percent by Howe in December 1944
and required a Privy Council order to change. In April 1945, an increase to five percent
was authorized and this proved adequate once the postwar rush commenced since the
frequency and size of sales increased the actual dollar value of that five percent.
However, as the sale of big ticket items dwindled and the frequency of smaller and
less valuable sales picked up throughout 1947, the WAC’s operational costs ate away at
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profits. The problem was that the administrative and supply costs inherent to every sale
did not fluctuate dramatically, but the profits recouped per sale did. So as the big ticket
items were sold off, the WAC was left with less valuable assets and as a result the cost of
each sale increased as a percentage of the total profits earned. Furthermore, the higher
costs of sale on less valuable goods was compounded by other expenditures that the
WAC was required to pay out of its operational budget. In 1946-1947, the WAC funded
the completion of several war contracts for ships and other materials for the British and
placed with Wartime Shipbuilding Ltd. through Mutual Aid.121 Apparently, the
Corporation had little say in this arrangement but it cost the WAC an additional $3
million. As a result, a last-minute 2.5 percent increase was made in March 1947 and
approved by PC1115 and in April the percentage was adjusted to ten percent. However,
administrative expenses in 1947-1948 eclipsed the ten percent margin and additional
money had to be withdrawn from sales revenue.122
Keeping sales revenue high and operational costs low was a constant preoccupation
because every dollar earned was remitted on a yearly basis to the Receiver-General of
Canada to help pay down the country’s war debts. Quoting Carswell at his first press
conference in January 1944, the Toronto Star reported that, “every dollar will be turned
over to the receiver-general and every dollar turned in will mean a decrease in the war
debt of Canada and a lessening of the amount of taxes the government will have to
levy.”123 Utilizing the money in this manner was a policy choice that was widely
supported. However, in practice, Carswell’s promise was somewhat empty. Remitting
“every dollar” back to the government was not possible since the WAC had to cover
some of its operational costs with the proceeds of sales. Overall, operational expenses
accounted for an average of about 17½ cents of every dollar sold. In other words, that
meant 82½ cents on every dollar sold “was returned to the Canadian tax payer.”124
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Another problem developed out of the new selling mantra. Although the “as is
where is” policy generally cut overall operational costs, it could also have the opposite
effect. This was because the policy required greater measures for monitoring the amount
and distribution of surpluses in every region and resulted in the creation of the WAC’s
Pricing and Distribution Division inside the Merchandising Department. Monitoring the
distribution and price of goods was necessary given the regional disparities of wartime
investments and the fact that surpluses tended to be concentrated in Central Canada.
Therefore, “as is where is” put some regions at a disadvantage, either because other areas
had more materials available or, inversely, there were too many assets available so local
markets became saturated. As Berry stated rhetorically to the SCWEE in response to
some skepticism from an Alberta politician about the WAC’s redistribution efforts, “if
200,000 spark plugs were reported surplus in Ontario and that was the total surplus that
had been reported across the dominion, you would not suggest that all those spark plugs
should be sold in Ontario?” The answer was, of course, a resounding no. So Berry’s point
was clear: in order to mitigate some of the regional disparities a redistribution program
had to occur and did. Furthermore, redistribution also ensured that “as is where is” did
not result in a flood of similar goods overwhelming a local or regional economy and if
that danger existed then national distribution was required. 125 To follow Berry’s
hypothetical spark plug example, if the 200,000 plugs declared in Ontario saturated the
spark plug market and lowered prices in the province, than it was necessary to
redistribute them to prevent a collapse in Ontario’s spark plug economy.
Material shortages and limited declarations of items in high demand added further
complications to this new selling strategy, but the WAC made the effort to redistribute
goods from region to region as equitably as possible. Although its efforts never seemed to
impress political leaders from the Maritimes and Prairies, they did help ensure that some
of the items in high demand were available at practically every Branch. 126 Thus, the real
emphasis of the new selling policy was the “where is” rather than the “as is” since the
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Table 4: Distribution of Motor Vehicle Sales (all
types) by Province and Vehicle Registration 19441945
National
WAC
Province
Vehicles
Registration
Sales (%)
(%)
British
435
8.95
8.37
Columbia
Alberta
356
7.33
7.91
Saskatchewan
360
7.41
8.52
Manitoba
298
6.13
6.27
Ontario
2,133
43.90
47.26
Quebec
767
15.79
14.74
Nova Scotia
307
6.32
3.82
New
144
2.96
2.57
Brunswick
Prince Edward
59
1.21
0.54
Island

policy could create artificial

Source: SCWEE, 27 November 1945 (No. 3, Book 2), 67.
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that the WAC redistributed
and sold vehicles throughout the country according to the percentage of vehicle
registrations in each province and it appears that these efforts continued in later years. In
regards to other assets requiring redistribution, the WAC relied heavily on the 1941
census records.127

Conclusion
The early plans and preparations for the inevitable consequences of victory had
given the CAAC and WAC a head start on the disposal problem. By the time the war
ended, they had established and tested administrative systems for managing the flow of
goods and paperwork. They had also formed a priority system for strategically allocating
materials, made contact with particular individuals inside the whole bureaucracy, and
were able to find capable people for important positions in the CAAC and WAC despite
the heavy turnover in staffing. These arrangements certainly helped mitigate a postwar
disaster but they were devised well in advance of the war’s end. Thus, when the “valves”
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opened to release the flood of objects and paperwork, officials discovered just how
unprepared they actually were. With the tidal wave of 35,000 Surplus Declarations,
50,000-plus priority requests, and billions worth of assets descending on Canada’s
disposal administration from 1945 to 1947, just staying afloat during the flood was no
small achievement.
In light of past experience, the variety of problems and inefficiencies that surfaced,
and the need for adjusting procedures to deal with such tremendous inventories, the
CAAC and WAC (especially) revised and reformed their operational procedures,
mandate, and structure. To divide the workload and better accommodate the collection,
storage, and sale of surpluses, both organizations regionalized and decentralized
operations. The Corporation was redesigned to expand and contract with the flood of
assets and in doing so it took on a larger and more proactive role in the collection and
storage of surpluses. In order to cope with increasing responsibilities, the WAC also
underwent a period of significant expansion within its newly restructured organization.
The two areas that accounted for the majority of this expansion included the Supply
Department’s Clearance and Warehousing Divisions. This study now turns to the
operations and impact of these two important divisions.
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Chapter 3
Bursting at the Seams: Clearance and Warehousing
Operations
The job will be the biggest piece of merchandising ever attempted in Canada. How big,
may be illustrated by the fact that in one ordnance depot alone there are, at this moment,
military stores having an investment value larger than was our entire National debt in
1914.1
C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply and Reconstruction, 23 October 1944

Introduction
Under the crushing pressures of a surging inventory, expanding workforce, and
continuing public criticism, Canada’s disposal administration bent but did not break.
Instead, the CAAC and WAC adapted their operations to supply Canada’s political,
economic, and social reconstruction with the required materials. This adaptation was all
the more remarkable considering how the WAC implemented changes on the fly from
August to October 1945. In reorganizing operational practices the Corporation better
positioned itself to assist with the country’s postwar transition and effectuate the cleanup.
Two of the most significant changes were the formation and operation of the Clearance
and Warehousing Divisions inside the Supply Department. These divisions allowed the
WAC to physically control the flood of surpluses through onsite collection, shipping,
handling, storage, and maintenance. Although operations were far from perfect,
Clearance and Warehousing provided a critical bridge between war and peace since they
removed and relocated the assets and materials that were physically obstructing the return
of peacetime operations on factory floors, military bases, or anywhere else that surpluses
existed. This chapter examines the scope and scale of clearance and warehousing
operations, their contribution to reconversion and demobilization, the challenges
encountered, and the things that were abandoned.
Through the collection and storage of assets, the WAC positioned itself to absorb
the “shocks of transition” by gathering, managing, and facilitating an object’s transition
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into new and sometimes different peacetime applications.2 Therefore the WAC facilitated
a process of removal and renewal that was closely associated with the demobilization and
reconversion of Canada’s wartime political economy. In doing so, the Corporation
influenced how objects and resources were redeployed and reused in postwar Canada. In
fact, without the WAC’s collection and storage operations, the war’s materiel might
never have been reused or redistributed to the civilian economy on such a large scale or
without a coherent strategy in mind. As a result, the WAC’s clearance and storage
capacities helped preserve the residual value and utility of assets by maintaining custody
and regulating the supply. This process was the stewardship of objects and it boosted
marketability, stabilized prices, increased sales, and turned the WAC into the largest
merchandising company in Canadian history.
Yet the removal and renewal of assets did not always yield positive and useful
outcomes. Instead, the war’s materiel legacies also created less productive, dangerous,
and problematic situations that lingered long after hostilities ended. For every valuable
asset there were piles of obsolete and derelict items that required disposal. Therefore,
Clearance and Warehousing personnel were often occupied sifting through and sorting
out the gems from the junk. Moreover, since Canada’s vast tracts of under-populated
space were ideal for creating large training and testing grounds for Allied military
personnel and weapons systems, significant amounts of unexploded ordnance and surplus
kit littered areas across the country. Chemical residues from munitions factories polluted
surrounding landscapes and impregnated all the production equipment and buildings.
Large scale cleanup operations involving decontamination, garbage collection, and
environmental remediation were required but these efforts were severely limited by the
incumbent financial costs, the permanency and composition of military facilities, and
their remoteness and geographic dispersion. Faulty clearance operations and the
abandonment of assets created a materiel legacy that influenced the surrounding social
and spatial environments in uneven patterns of utility and danger.
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Clearance operations could never have existed without the expansion of storage
capacities. After all, the war’s materiel did not simply disappear once its primary utility
was usurped. Objects continued occupying a physical reality: when Clearance teams
removed something from one place, it required storage somewhere else before final
disposal was arranged. This is why the WAC’s Warehousing Division was so critical.
During a time of severe accommodation shortages and expensive rental costs, the WAC
rapidly expanded its warehousing operations to include fifty-one warehouses, totalling
over six million sq. ft. of indoor storage space at its peak. This significant amount of
stowage space allowed the WAC to build up its inventories that were later sold to support
economic and social reconstruction. In effect, the Corporation’s warehouses allowed it to
absorb the war’s materiel legacies and guard against any major economic dislocation
caused by government surpluses. However, just as with clearance operations,
warehousing came with some serious challenges. The huge volume of assets entering the
WAC’s custody caused major problems that related to cataloguing, screening, tracking,
processing, and sales. This resulted in an attrition rate through clerical errors, breakage,
and theft. Most troubling of all, assets could fall through the cracks by either entering or
exiting warehouses without any receipts or proper inspections.

The Cleanup Crew: Clearance and Materiel Legacies
The creation of the Clearance and Warehousing Divisions signalled a significant
organizational change designed to cope with the flood of surpluses after the war.
Predictably, the Supply Department’s workforce grew in proportion to its surging
workload. Over the fiscal year of 1946-1947, Malley’s Supply Department accounted for
the vast majority of the WAC’s payroll: roughly 74 percent of all employees worked in
Supply. In March 1947, the Department employed 7,314 of the 9,919 workers on the
WAC’s entire payroll, while the Clearance Division alone employed 1,899, down from
its peak of 1,970 in December 1946. By contrast, the entire Merchandising Department
employed 1,544 (or about 16 percent of the total workforce) and all other Departments
accounted for the remaining 1,061 workers (or 10 percent).3 These employment statistics
indicate much about the changing nature of the WAC’s operational practices, the
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quantities entering its possession, and the urgency of clearance and warehousing duties in
supporting the transition from war to peace.
Clearance was one of the WAC’s most important contributions to Canada’s postwar
reconstruction. On the government’s dime and time, almost every single facility or
factory that had produced or housed munitions and supplies was cleared by the WAC.
The Clearance teams (or private contractors hired in some cases) were also responsible
for collecting surplus assets from military installations, airfields, shipyards, or bases. By
March 1947, the WAC had received a total of 40,428 requests for clearance operations
across the company’s five regions and Newfoundland. This was an astounding figure that
could have easily crippled operations, yet the teams moved quickly. Of the 40,428
requests about 27,800 or 69 percent were completed by March 1947. A year later, the
total number of clearance requests reached 44,399 while 41,285 or 93 percent was
completed, leaving only 3,114 outstanding in March 1948.4 Indeed, operations progressed
so rapidly that by August 1947, Malley started pressing his deputy, C. E. Elliot, to get
Regional Supply Managers to cut staff as quickly as possible. Malley was concerned
about reining in salary and wages which accounted for “approximately 75% of our total
expenses” and this had to be “vigorously attacked in order that our overall expenses are
commensurate with the Corporation’s earnings” (which were decreasing from the
previous year due to the shrinking number of big-ticket items in the WAC’s inventories).5
The efficiency of Clearance teams depended on carefully controlling operations and
closely cooperating with other organizations and stakeholders. The Clearance teams
operated on strict “controlled lines” that allowed inspectors to triage assets quickly
according to several categories: capital assets (anything in saleable condition), tools and
gauges (production equipment and precision instruments), and aircraft. Everything that
did not fall into these categories, was worn out, or considered dangerous was categorized
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as scrap.6 Triaging assets depended on close collaboration between the Clearance teams
and declaring agencies. In regards to the armed forces, special sections were established
to process stores originating from each Service The formation of specific army, navy, and
air force sections greatly streamlined a large portion of the Clearance Division’s work, as
each section processed only clearance requests from the corresponding Service. This also
ensured that close liaison and familiarity developed between the WAC’s inspectors, the
various disposal officers from each Service, and those personnel stationed at the locations
where surpluses were declared.
Largely a product of necessity and experience, the close coordination between
clearance teams and declaring agencies was essential for the proper handling of all
surpluses and ensuring that only dangerous items without peacetime applications were
singled out for destruction. Clearance inspectors and service personnel relied on each
other to inspect and categorize items. For instance, Clearance teams and RCAF
maintenance personnel jointly inspected surplus aircraft and their component parts in
order to consider their “airworthiness” so that no dangerous or jerry-rigged items were
sold on civilian markets.7 Furthermore, the disposal of secret technologies and equipment
required special care, not only to ensure that the objects were mutilated to preserve their
secret nature, but also to limit the amount of personnel gaining familiarity with designs,
features, and purposes. In the case of ASDIC, the codename for the first generation of
SONAR, the Navy took the precaution of removing the equipment before declaring
vessels surplus.8
Clearance teams also cooperated closely with the DMS and war contractors when
entering their facilities and factories. In all cases, the Clearance teams were preceded by
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three different groups of inspectors and technicians. Employees from Canadian Arsenals
Ltd. (CAL), a new crown company established in September 1945 to maintain a postwar
government-run munitions industry, and personnel from the Plant Decontamination
Committee (PDC) inspected all facilities and factories in conjunction with the
contractor’s employees. Together they decided what was surplus to their needs, what
needed decontamination, and what was required for postwar munitions production. CAL
inspectors used a colour-coded tagging system to easily sort and separate the assets.
Green tags indicated that the item was surplus and in saleable or good condition. Yellow
or blue tags indicated that the equipment was government property required by CAL and
it would handle removal. Red tags meant that CAL inspectors considered the assets
surplus and scrap materials.9 However, to guard against the needless scrapping of items
with residual value, clearance inspectors did not simply rely on the declaring agency’s
classifications and tagging. Instead, they made their own judgments through onsite
inspections. To determine an item’s reusability, they appraised its salvageable materials
and component parts. Therefore, Clearance inspectors became the primary filters for
disposal, as they evaluated the condition of assets and whether they were suitable for sale,
storage, or destruction.10
Once the tagging process was finished, the PDC moved in to decontaminate the
facilities and equipment. The PDC was established by the DMS over the summer of 1945
to undertake extensive cleanup operations at munitions factories and proof ranges. At
many of these factories the volume of production, especially of explosive compounds,
had been so great that particles and residues had impregnated everything (the walls, roof,
floors, uniforms, machinery etc.) at facilities and even polluted the surrounding
landscapes.11 These sites required remediation because the public’s general safety was at
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risk. As Howe stated in a 9 October 1945 radio speech announcing the creation of the
PDC (which had been active since July), “following the First Great War a number of
accidents, some of which were fatal resulted from careless disposal of plants and
equipment used for making explosives and filling shells.”12 Under the supervision of a
variety of experts from the DMS’s ammunition, weapons, and explosives branches, the
PDC was assigned “the duty and responsibility” to investigate and decontaminate all
munitions plants “which have become dangerous by reason of impregnation with
explosives” and, in the cooperation with the contractor, render the facilities as safe as
possible so they could be dismantled or reconverted or sold. Eventually the PDC was
transferred into the WAC in August 1946.13
While the WAC’s Clearance teams had little to do with the actual desensitization or
decontamination work, its employees entered problem areas relatively quickly after the
PDC finished or even as the work was progressing. Dangers lurked everywhere,
especially at the larger chemical and explosive factories like the DIL plant in Nobel or
the various surplus proof ranges utilized by the DMS and DND to test weapons and
ammunition or train soldiers in their use. Despite proper safety precautions and
experienced workers, decontamination and clearance could be dangerous, not only
because explosive compounds and poisonous chemicals permeated everything in
munitions factories, but the job also required the movement of heavy machinery or the
dismantling of entire facilities. In late November 1945, one fatality occurred at the DIL
plant in de Salaberry when a worker fell off a ladder while dismantling part of the plant
for the PDC.14
Once the PDC finished its work, the WAC was informed and a Clearance team was
dispatched. At the facilities Clearance teams re-inspected and categorized everything in
conjunction with the declaring agency. However, they did not immediately remove assets
8 “Desensitizing Scarboro Plants,” ca. 1945; Ibid, Box 3, 2082-1-1-9 “Disposition of Records – Drawings
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from the factories. After making their initial assessments, inspectors had to file their
reports with the Warehousing Division in order to confirm if storage space was available
nearby. In the interim, the equipment was usually tucked away in an empty portion of the
contractor’s facility, unless a special request was made for immediate removal because
the facility was too small. When surpluses were removed inspectors issued receipts to
contractors. Quite often contractors, who had assisted with the surveys and
decontamination, wanted to purchase green-tagged items or other materials for use in
their factories. In these cases, the WAC’s Clearance teams noted the contractor’s requests
on the proper forms and representatives from the Merchandising Department followed up
to negotiate the sale.15
This practice was common and the WAC’s preferred “Plan A” method for clearing
plants. The “Plan A” scheme was configured specifically for either the objects already
considered surplus crown property or items not yet declared surplus but the government
was willing to sell them anyway. Under the procedures of “Plan A” contractors made an
inventory of all tools, products, and materials left over in their factories. This inventory
was then reviewed with the CAL, PDC, and WAC during their onsite inspections. After
determining ownership and what was surplus, a time-line for the physical removal of
assets was established based on the contractor’s requirements. At that point contractors
identified which assets they wanted to purchase from the government through the
WAC.16 Provided that there were no priority requirements, the WAC was happy to oblige
contractors with onsite sales since it saved the additional logistical and marketing costs
while also ensuring the most direct route for reuse.17
The “Plan B” method for plant clearance was slightly different. It was reserved for
situations in which the contractor wanted reimbursement for work (completed or
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incomplete) or if the assets and materials tagged as surplus were not already crown
property. “Plan B” took more time to resolve as the Contract Settlement Board became
involved and the inventory lists were heavily scrutinized since they were now entwined
with the formal settlement of cancelled war contracts.18 “Plan B” scenarios developed out
of situations where companies had taken advantage of accelerated depreciation (or the
other fiscal measures enacted for industrial mobilization) to make private purchases of,
for instance, single-purpose machine tools for ammunition production. These assets were
not required by private firms after the war but they were not crown property, so an
exchange of title and financial settlement had to take place before they were removed by
Clearance teams.19
The disposal of machine tools and equipment exemplifies the clearance process.
When Canada went to war in 1939, the previous decade of economic turmoil and idle
industry had left the country with a desperate shortage of machine tools. In 1939
Canadian industries possessed about $58 million worth of machines tools or roughly
30,000 individual units, two-thirds of which were estimated to be at least thirteen years
old.20 This shortage of machine tools was rectified by the DMS when it created a crown
company, Citadel Merchandising, in June 1940 to control, purchase, and distribute
machine tools for the war effort. In just four years, Citadel spent $160 million purchasing
tools in the United States and it authorized roughly $92 million in additional purchases by
war contractors through the War Industrial Expansion Program ($60 million) or from the
contractor’s own accounts ($32 million). This brought the total wartime expenditures on
machine tools to about $250 million for the purchase of approximately 45,000 new units.
Adding those figures to the existing totals and accounting for the scrapping of some
derelict machinery, by 1944 there were about 70,000 machine tools in the country worth
around $300 million.21
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The increasing involvement of the state in acquiring machine tools meant that by
1945 most of the most advanced and newest machinery was owned by the government.
Moreover, the DMS had also kept machine tools as mobile as possible during the war
since shortages of production machinery often followed the distribution of war contracts.
As a result, the DMS resorted to moving them from factory to factory so companies could
meet their contractual obligations. Naturally, businesses were apprehensive about the
government’s disposal plans and eager to acquire the tools for peacetime production
before it removed them. Even before the Allies had landed in Normandy on D-Day,
businessmen were anticipating peace and “thinking of their post-war situation and their
desire to get into peacetime production at the earliest.”22 As early as February 1944,
officials in the DMS and CAAC began forming a plan, but they discovered that – much
like with other commodities – the disposal of machine tools was fraught with difficulties.
Since the armed forces needed an industrial base for future defence procurement, it was
difficult to forecast how many tools would be surplus. Moreover, a third of all types
(about 82$ million worth) were single-purpose machines that “were chiefly for turning
out special war work such as shells and ammunition.”23 Aside from defence procurement
this machinery was worthless to the peacetime economy, while a large portion of multipurpose machines would be worn out from continuous operation.
Out of these developments and considerations emerged the disposal and clearance
strategy for machine tools. The CAAC and WAC worked with CAL, Citadel
Merchandising, and the Machine Tool War Service Committee to set prices, inspect
machines, and maintain custody of those tools needed for future munitions production.
The CAAC and WAC used “Plan A” and “Plan B” methods to meet their obligations for
disposal and clearance. In general, the two plans were very flexible and worked well in
almost all situations. In regards to machine tools specifically, both plans contained
special provisions that balanced the pressing need for strategically allocating surpluses to
educational institutions with the expediency of kick-starting postwar production at the
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contractor’s factory. Although priority holders were technically entitled to the machinery
before contractors, Canada’s disposal administration understood how important machine
tools were for all types of businesses, large or small. In particular, the CAAC recognized
that the “small machine shop operators” needed special assistance in acquiring modern
models to replace their old or worn out machines because “without new equipment they
would have difficulty in surviving financially in peace time.”24 Largely based on the
recommendations and input of individual businesses, the flexible approaches of “Plan A”
and “Plan B” helped cater clearance operations to the needs of industry and onsite sales
of machine tools were conveniently exempted from priority claims.25
As the graph below indicates, the bulk of machine tools declared surplus were sold
in the three fiscal years immediately following the war. According to the WAC’s annual
reports, sales were primarily concentrated in 1945 and 1946, and few were sold before
April 1945 or after March 1948. It is possible that sales took place before and after this
period since the annual reports only listed sales over $5,000 (so any sale under that
threshold was not recorded), but in these cases sales would have been for small quantities
of useable machines in good condition or for worn out machines at seriously depreciated
values and with limited remaining life spans.26 The postwar market for machine tools was
competitive. From April 1945 to March 1946, the total value of machine tool sales by the
WAC ($18,835,041.07) ranked third behind only ships ($31,970,437.42) and trucks
($21,453,787.64), but by the fall of 1946, the Merchandising Department’s Machine
Tools Direct Sales Section was discontinued while the volume of sales dropped off as the
number of available and useful machines shrank.27 For the following fiscal year the total
value of all machine tool sales dropped to $12,500,586.35, ranking as the sixth-highest
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commodity behind ships, vehicles, textiles and boots, complete plants with equipment,
and vehicle parts and equipment.28
Figure 1: Machine Tool and Equipment Sales (Over
$5,000), 1944-1949
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The war’s materiel (in this case, machine tools) could be a very useful starting point
for peace, so it is no coincidence that the bulk of machine tool purchases were made by
private companies immediately following the war. Public organizations, schools, and
government departments purchased machine tools for educational purposes, but the
volume of sales was dwarfed by private firms especially during the peak selling phase. 29
Machine tools were crucial to any postwar production and business interests eagerly
sought to acquire the most useful tools before they were relocated by Clearance teams. It
is worth noting that a similar pattern was also found in the sale of industrial floor space as
roughly 43 percent of war contractors that operated facilities owned by the government
purchased them after the war.30
The glut of machine tool sales, tightly focused around the timeline of plant
clearance operations, is not all that surprising. Given the substantial wartime investments,
subsidies, and contracts from the federal government, war contractors were facing a
unique situation when the war ended: they did not own much of the machinery (or even
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some of new plant extensions and production lines) they were operating. Moreover,
contractors had also faced heavy wartime taxes and regulations and as a result many
businesses lacked the necessary capital to reinvest in reconversion, plant clearance, and
product innovation. Thus, with the government funding clearance through the WAC, it
provided a valuable service to contractors by saving them the cost of clearing out
unneeded materials, machines, and unfinished or finished products cluttering the factory
floors and physically impeding the return of peacetime operations.31
Thus, the WAC’s Clearance teams played an important role in facilitating the
transfer of publicly-owned goods to private interests. Immediately following the war,
Clearance teams fanned out across the country and tabulated inventories, inspected items,
filled out paperwork, helped settle war contracts, and removed any remaining
government property to warehouses. In doing so, they protected government interests and
investments, while also accommodating private corporations as glorified repo men.
Fielding the clearance teams was a vital element of the state’s reconversion program. In
taking on the responsibility for clearing plants of the unneeded materials, the government
ensured that it maintained ownership of assets that were purchased or fabricated with
public money. While some contractors tried to swindle the government, it appears that
most assisted WAC inspectors and clearance teams in good faith.32 When coupled with
the WAC’s expanding warehousing capacity, this meant that the government was
reimbursed for all its property and ensured it maintained greater control over the
redeployment and reuse of the war’s materiel legacies.
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Cutting Losses: Abandoned Materiel Legacies
Given the volume of sites requiring clean up after the war many problems surfaced.
As much as clearance helped with reconversion, a variety of factors – geography, budget
cuts, public criticism, the volume of goods, and the extent of environmental damage –
affected cleanup operations. Despite Canada’s distance from the fighting fronts, the
Second World War left behind materiel legacies that were not always positive,
sustainable, or useful. Although the PDC and WAC did their best to remediate
problematic materiel legacies, the scope was beyond their resources. In order to keep up
with the workload they adopted some pragmatic and crude tactics often borrowed from
the DND. Upon entering former munitions plants or surveying proof ranges, inspectors
quickly realized that certain sites or buildings were beyond saving. In these cases,
explosive compounds were too deeply saturated in the building’s constituent materials
and production equipment, so they would never be safe for reuse. Moreover, at proof
ranges the amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) was plentiful and complicated by the
various depths at which shells were buried in the ground. This rendered many explosives
invisible or inaccessible to the technicians clearing ordnance. To keep pace with the
immense workload, sites were often quickly decontaminated or demolished by setting
fires, thereby completely destroying the dangerous substances and the materials they
permeated. At proof ranges, fires were set in the hope that the heat would ignite any
ordnance buried near the surface. It also appears that the PDC took other crude shortcuts
that usually involved dumping the contaminated equipment or materials into the nearest
body of water. This strategy was adopted by the military during the cleanup after the
Bedford Magazine Explosion in July 1945 and, in all likelihood, at the north end of Parry
Sound and Simmes Lake when the PDC dismantled the DIL plant in Nobel.33
Ironically, despite the fact that decontamination was designed to protect public
safety, the destruction of contaminated sites faced public opposition. To the media and
the public, who were not aware of the contamination’s extent, the demolition process
looked like a deliberate waste of public money. To outsiders it appeared as though
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valuable building materials – from door and window frames, to nails and lumber – were
literally going up in smoke, while the marketplace was clearly starved of those and other
desperately needed materials.34 In late September 1945, the Deputy Minister of the DMS,
G. K. Sheils, was informed by Lud Hawkins, a member of the Department’s Publicity
Branch, that “unless proper publicity steps” were taken, “misinformation concerning the
necessary destruction of buildings formerly used in the manufacture and handling of high
explosives will result in unsatisfactory reflection on the government’s action in this
regard.”35 Hawkins relayed a suggestion from Gordon Garbutt, DIL’s Publicity Director,
that would allow them to “invite local newspapermen to visit these plants and see for
themselves why it is necessary that these buildings should be destroyed.” 36 The reporters
would then be able to explain the necessity of the PDC’s demolition activities, since
“highly inflammable and explosive materials have permeated the wood and timber of
these buildings, with the result that they are of no further use, and in fact would be highly
dangerous if they were released to the general public.”37
Sheils liked the idea but believed that this publicity was better handled by the PDC.
As a result, the PDC’s chairman, Lt-Col. G. Ogilvie, was ordered to prepare publicity
materials that would fight off “any suspicion that we were unnecessarily destroying
valuable property” and a tour for reporters and interested government officials was
organized.38 On 10 October 1945, a bus was chartered from the DMS’s Montreal offices
to tour the Bouchard plant in Ste. Therese, Quebec. Reporters observed all the
decontamination and salvage efforts in action. Coming on the heels of Penhold and the
continuing public criticism about the willful destruction of government property, Howe
explained to Parliament that this tour was designed to “forestall charges that more war
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equipment was being destroyed instead of sold.”39 Unfortunately, these publicity efforts
did not provide a long-term solution to “forestall” the public’s criticism which continued
throughout the transition period.
Other problems surfaced when the financial costs of clearance operations were
excessive. This was especially the case if private contractors and permanent structures
were involved. After facilities were inspected and all government property removed,
sometimes the buildings required demolition not only because of contamination but also
because of wartime lease agreements. To meet the needs of mobilization, the federal
government and military had acquired considerable amounts of land during the war,
either through expropriation or leasing. For the land it leased, the government and
military were contractually obligated to return the property to its original state if there
was no interest in purchasing it. When the land was declared surplus, fulfilling these lease
conditions became the responsibility of the WAC. To keep its own costs down, the
Corporation contracted this job out to private firms that wanted to purchase and relocate
whatever was constructed on the land. In most cases, contractors purchased buildings for
component parts or raw materials. In other cases, the structures were kept intact and
moved to new places. If no contractor was found for this job, the WAC’s Clearance
teams did the demolition work.40
One relatively well-documented example involved Joseph Sasseville, a Montrealbased firm that purchased many buildings and installations at several former Canadian
military bases in Newfoundland. Having purchased well-over 100 different structures
from the WAC at Botwood, Philip’s Head, Wiseman’s Head, Cape Spear, and several
other places, the firm took over clearance and cleanup operations at those locations in
1946 and 1947. Given that the buildings were all constructed on land leased to the
Canadian government by Newfoundland, Sasseville was contractually obligated to
39
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demolish the buildings or remove them and restore the properties to their original states
as reasonably as possible.41 By 24 November 1947, Sasseville had finished its work and
the Newfoundland government released the WAC and the Canadian government “from
any further responsibility for the restoration of these areas.”42
At the time, however, there were some unresolved questions about the concrete gun
emplacements that remained at Cape Spear and Wiseman’s Head. Sasseville considered
the cost of removing the guns and their mountings prohibitive and the WAC (which was
also unwilling to spend the money) “granted permission to leave the guns and mounting”
in place.43 However, Newfoundland’s Department of Natural Resources could not
“ascertain definitively” if the WAC had the right to do this since the original leases were
not available, so it added a caveat to its communiqué and reserved the right to request
their removal at a later date.44 In the context of the postwar rush to clean up several
thousand sites and an inability to track down the terms of the original leases, all the
stakeholders involved were able to evade an expensive cleanup operation. As a result, the
concrete emplacements and 10-inch guns were simply abandoned and left to decay.
The situation remained unchanged for two years until inquiries began arriving at
DND in March 1949 about purchasing the guns as scrap. It was then that Ottawa took
action to address the oversight, as officials became aware that some of the guns were not
mutilated properly while others had simply disappeared. Moreover, the sites and
installations were deteriorating rapidly.45 At Cape Spear “the underground magazines,
control room and tunnels connecting the two positions were not filled and [were] now in
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a very dangerous condition” as the tunnels were collapsing and “constitute[d] a public
hazard.”46 Fortunately, only the lighthouse-keeper’s family lived in the immediate
vicinity and they were aware of the dangers but still allowed their livestock to graze in
the area. After making a reconnaissance tour of several installations in the summer, the
Army declared eight guns surplus: two each at Chain Rock, Cape Spear, Bell Island, and
Fort Amherst.47 Most were later disposed of as scrap by the WAC and the sites were
cleaned up by the end of 1950 thus resolving a lingering problem caused by financial
constraints. Today, a tourist can visit these and other locations and view the abandoned
materiel legacies firsthand as the concrete emplacements at Cape Spear were never
demolished and some of the mutilated guns are still there.48
The geographic dispersion of surpluses also complicated disposal and cleanup
operations. Because strategic imperatives dictated the when and where of wartime
expenditures and the movement of military resources, the war effort sometimes spawned
large-scale development in areas of Canada that would become uneconomical and
unsustainable after victory. In some places, new patterns of development resulted where
virtually none had existed before.49 Prince Rupert, a town on the northern British
Columbia coast, exemplifies this boom-bust nature of defence spending, since its shortterm importance to the war effort meant unparalleled expansion, funding, and
infrastructure development all out of proportion to the population size and local pre- and
postwar economy.50 A local newspaper, the Prince Rupert Daily, noted some of these
changes in the wake of VJ-Day celebrations:
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Carried along by the impetus of wars emergent requirements, Prince Rupert
during the past two or three years has had an era of activity that almost
overwhelmed the city and its facilities and capacity, bringing about what
some considered an unhealthy, artificial prosperity. We might as well admit
that things are going to be difficult soon. After having been carried along, we
are going to be on our own now.51
For much of the war, Prince Rupert was an important supply facility for the Pacific
Theatre. It was the closest port to the Aleutian Islands, a key stop on the supply run to
Alaska, and eventually a terminus for the Alaskan Highway. As a result, it became a
focus of American and Canadian funding and wartime development. According to a
Valuation Report of U.S. Army Facility, Prince Rupert and Port Edward, British
Columbia co-authored by American and Canadian appraisers in December 1945, Prince
Rupert had not enjoyed much prosperity until the Second World War when its population
nearly quadrupled in size. The town was incorporated in 1910, had a population of 6,555
in 1939, peaked in 1943 at 21,500 residents, and was expected to drop to 7,500-8,000 by
1947.52 During the war, there were so many people in Prince Rupert that all amenities
were strained under the immense demands for water, electricity, fuel, and alcohol. If
someone wanted a shower they had to go to the Exhibition Building, wait in line, and
pray for warm water and good pressure.53 This situation, however, would not persist. The
experienced appraisers writing the Valuation Report figured that the town’s isolation, the
lack of industrial or agricultural economies in the region, and the projected decreases in
population and defence spending after 1945 would doom the area. They also concluded
that Prince Rupert could not absorb all the facilities, equipment, and other materials built
on war contracts and destined to be declared surplus and sold.54
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After VJ-Day there were too many buildings left over and not enough people
remaining in Prince Rupert. During the war, the Canadian government had invested $1.8
million dollars in the city, while Wartime Housing Ltd. built at least 151 temporary
dwellings. A major hospital was also constructed but never used and it was eventually
turned over to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs for use as a tuberculosis
sanatorium. On the other hand, the Americans invested $17 million dollars to construct
new roads, a mess hall, several barracks, a hospital, four entertainment clubs, a theatre,
gym, library, chapel, and barber shop. They also built a 53,776 sq. ft. administration
facility for the Prince Rupert dockyards, which were also expanded. Down the road in
Port Edward, 180 temporary buildings were erected, the port facilities were improved, a
400,000 sq. ft. ammunition magazine was constructed, and in 1944 they completed work
on an underground storage tank that could hold over 93,000 barrels of fuel.55
However, without the threat of Japanese invasion there was simply no need for a
continuing military presence or such large-scale infrastructure in the postwar period.
Although some of the larger buildings with communal and social significance were
purchased by local interests, the conclusions of the Valuation Report proved accurate.
The sales of the military hospital wing at the Prince Rupert General Hospital, the U.S.
gymnasium building, and the YMCA war services building were straightforward, since
the Prince Rupert General Hospital Association, the City of Prince Rupert, and the Civic
Centre Association (respectively) purchased these properties.56 But finding other local
purchasers was difficult. As a result, assets were removed either by the withdrawing
Americans or by the WAC which redistributed them to more populated regions of the
country. Furthermore, many surplus facilities sold by the WAC as “buildings without
land” were purchased by southern interests from Vancouver, Victoria, Ottawa, Seattle,
Portland, and Tacoma.57 These types of purchases (especially to private companies) often
signified that the structures were valued for their materials and immediately demolished
or relocated elsewhere. Considering that most of the facilities in Prince Rupert had been
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hastily constructed without meeting the town’s building codes, demolition or complete
abandonment was a fate bestowed upon these wartime investments.58
The abandonment of assets and property was quite common across Canada
particularly if the structures were permanent or if moveable assets were located in remote
places (like the sub-arctic). So while the government took in a great deal of property after
the war, lots of items and objects were intentionally left behind. The abandonment of
assets was not just confined to Prince Rupert either. It happened frequently in the Pacific
Northwest along the Alaskan Highway and Canol Pipeline routes as the Americans left
behind a great deal of assets that remained too expensive to return home or too worn out
to keep. This practice had tacit approval from Washington, as one report to Congress
explained: “every effort has been and is being made by responsible officials on the spot
to segregate and return to the United States material worth returning, abandoning only
that not worth the cost of evacuation.”59 It was also a practice the Americans adopted in
other parts of the world, especially the Pacific where munitions and supplies were
stretched out across numerous tiny islands. In an effort to encourage local purchases of
American surpluses, the American Senate added an amendment to the Surplus Property
Act that provided “intangible benefits” for unsalable surpluses, such as funding an
educational exchange program named for the senator who wrote the amendment, J.
William Fulbright.60
Although the Canadian government avoided paying for much of this northern
wartime development, after the war it took possession of the Northwest Staging Route
and the other American construction initiatives as part of its obligations under the 33rd
Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD). The 33rd
Recommendation was the product of months of negotiations throughout 1943 and 1944
and formed the basis of the disposal agreements between Canada and the US. In practice
though, the 33rd Recommendation was preceded by a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that
Carswell and his American counterpart, Will Clayton, negotiated in early 1944. This type
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of informal accord was common to most international arrangements and helped build a
practical framework for the formal agreements that followed in March 1946. The
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” was a reciprocal promise made by both governments to “not
offer Government-owned surpluses” for sale in the other country.61 This meant that the
WAC could not sell Canadian surpluses in the US, but more importantly, the agreement
prevented the US from dumping their vast amounts of surpluses in Canada. Although
some exceptions were made for agents acting on behalf of either government and there
were limited controls on the cross-border resale by third parties, the agreement worked
well until it was replaced by the 33rd Recommendation, approved by Canada and the US
in September and November 1944
respectively.62
The 33rd Recommendation
was a very practical document.
Under its terms each country was
allowed to withdraw from the other
whatever moveable property it
owned and wished to keep within
one year of the termination of the
Photo 3 Abandoned Trucks on the Canol Heritage Trail,
near Mile 222. Source: Anthony DeLorenzo, 31 July 2012
Available at:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abandoned_truc
ks_on_the_Canol_Heritage_Trail.jpg

war. After that point, anything
remaining automatically exchanged
hands free of charge. Immovable
property was dealt with by a

separate provision that allowed the US to submit a list of all surplus property in Canada
for which it wanted financial reimbursement. The list was delivered in February 1945 and
joint valuation reports (such as the Valuation Report for Prince Rupert) were arranged so
the Americans received the going market rate according to the appraisers’ findings. The
WAC, acting as the Canadian government’s disposal agent, was heavily involved in
61
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almost every aspect of this disposal operation. This was not only because it hired the
Canadian appraiser for each valuation report, but also because the Recommendation
contained provisions requiring both countries to abide by the other’s laws governing
surplus disposal. The Canadian government had insisted upon this clause because of the
large volume of American surpluses in Canada. All American property not returned to the
US and not required by the Canadian government had to be sold through the CAAC and
WAC, while the proceeds of sales were turned over to American accounts.63
However, after hostilities ended, the Canadian government wanted to expedite the
financial settlement with a comprehensive agreement before the end of the fiscal year. On
30 March 1946, the two governments agreed on a set price for all remaining American
property in Canada and the Canadian government paid the United States $12 million for
the defence facilities, leftover equipment, and infrastructure that had originally cost about
$59 million USD (there were separate agreements for the Alaskan Highway and Canol
Pipeline). According to Stanley Dziuban, the deal was mutually beneficial to both sides
as Canada received airports and infrastructure while the US received cash in return.64
However, the usefulness and practicality of the remaining facilities and infrastructure was
questionable as a large portion of the leftover equipment was war junk not worth the cost
of repatriating back to the US and technological advances in aircraft designed rendered
the series of air bases obsolete. Indeed, a cynic might conclude that the Canadian
government paid the Americans to leave their garbage behind.
Such a situation was compounded by the attitude of Canadian political leaders
toward northern developments. In general, Ottawa was indifferent toward the Alaskan
Highway, Northwest Staging Route, and the Canol Pipeline from the beginning –
officials even called the highway “a most dubious egg” at one point.65 The government
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was even less enthused about having to maintain the new infrastructure coming under
federal jurisdiction and clean up all the war junk that remained in the surrounding areas.
Therefore, the remoteness of the area, the amount of territory requiring clean up, and the
continuing costs of maintenance were prohibitive. It was simply easier and more cost
effective to follow the American example and abandon what could not be salvaged,
relocated, or sold locally.
As a result, the Pacific Northwest became littered with abandoned relics from the
Second World War that were not worth the cost of disposal. These relics and materials
became entwined into the social and spatial identities of the region and have had a
residual impact on the local inhabitants and the tourist industry more generally.66 The
Canol pipeline is an example. It was crash-built by the Americans in the wake of the
Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands so that oil from Norman Wells in the Northwest
Territories could be transported to refineries in Whitehorse. Over the winter of 19431944 approximately 2,650 km of four and six inch piping was laid across the rugged
landscape, in addition to 1,600 km of telephone lines and a service road. Amazingly, the
first oil reached Whitehorse in April 1944 but the project was abandoned a year later
since it was incredibly expensive and impractical as oil production in Whitehorse was
four times the world price and the threat of further Japanese advances had passed.67
In 1944, the Americans arranged for the pipeline’s sale to Imperial Oil and the
company demolished large portions and removed whatever else it considered valuable.
However, there was little oversight and Imperial Oil left behind considerable amounts of
materials and worthless equipment. Whatever remained came under the WAC’s
jurisdiction in 1946 and some sales did occur in 1947, but everything else was abandoned
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once again.68 In the 1950s and 1960s renewed federal investment in the north improved
the road networks and spurred a mild increase in adventure tourism, but little was done to
clean up the Canol pipeline and the large amounts of remaining materials. In October
1996, the Canol Heritage Trail was officially opened at a plaque ceremony in Tulita and
according to a 2012 article by Maclean’s the 355km hiking trail ranks as the most
challenging in Canada.69
Aside from the rugged Canadian wilderness and breathtaking scenery, the other
tourist draw is the leftover materiel dotting the area. Against the backdrop of a northern
landscape, the derelict remains of
pumping stations, road camps, bridges,
trucks, and other rusting equipment are
strewn along the Canol trail. For
tourists

these

are

some

of

the

highlights of the hiking experience. As
Wendy Cecil, Chancellor of Victoria
University, described in a commercial
for Northwest Territories Tourism, the
Canol Trail was just like “a living
museum” because visitors can “see
remnants
Photo 4 Group of Inuit with housing made from
American military supplies, Fort Chimo, QU. 1948.
Source: S.J. Bailey/LAC/PA-167628

of

constructed…you

when
can

it
see

was
where

bridges got swept away; you can see

some of the old buildings; there’s still lots of the old trucks, all stripped of their rubber
tires and motors and everything but the shells…it’s a bit like walking through a ghost
town.”70 However, for the locals, the material legacies of abandoned military equipment
68
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were more than just parts of the landscape. In some cases, the leftover objects were
integrated into their lives to bring some meagre improvements to living conditions in the
north. As Photo 4 demonstrates, local populations often appropriated leftover military
supplies to improve their housing needs, as these Inuit did in Fort Chimo (present day
Kuujjuaq) along the northern tip of Quebec on the coast of the Ungava Bay.
Yet the leftover materiel is not always welcomed. Even today it poses some
challenges and dangers for both humans and wildlife. In July 2014, during the ninth
annual Canol Youth Hike, Norman Yakeleya, the now former MLA for the Northwest
Territories’ Sahtu region, discovered around mile 170 of the hike that the old
communication wires installed by the Americans were hanging dangerously low. The
group

found

moose

antlers

tangled up in the telephone wire
and as Yakeleya told the CBC,
“it really breaks your heart
when you see those antlers all
tangled up in those wires. The
poor animals suffocated in that
Photo 5 A set of moose antlers tangled in telephone wires
found at Mile 170 on the Canol Trail. Source: “WWII-era
Telephone Lines Snag N.W.T Moose, Caribou” CBC News, 8
July 2014 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/wwii-eratelephone-lines-snag-n-w-t-moose-caribou-1.2700166 Credit:
Norman Yakeleya.

state.”71 While the scars of the
Second World War are most
often associated with far off
battlefields,

destroyed

landscapes, and the immaculate cemeteries of the Commonwealth War Graves
Commission, other forms of materiel legacies and pollution still remain and require
continuing expenses and maintenance decades after its conclusion. In 2009, the federal
government paid to clean up the wire along the first 80km of the Canol trail and added
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the pipeline to its list of contaminated sites since roughly 20 percent of the oil it
transported never arrived in Whitehorse.72
The issue of UXO located around the country also continues to cost Canadians.
Since Canada’s vast expanse of land was perhaps its greatest contribution to the Allied
cause, the country was used extensively for training soldiers and testing weaponry during
the war. As a result, large numbers of sites became so contaminated with unexploded
ordnance, that an overworked and underfunded PDC and WAC could not possibly
remediate everything. Moreover, jurisdictional limitations also plagued their operations
since they were only responsible for clearing proof ranges operated by the DMS or those
declared surplus by the DND. Facing drastic budget cuts in 1945, the DND had little
incentive to clean up the testing and training ranges it planned on maintaining, while
postwar exercises only added more UXOs to these properties. Over time, however,
geological processes push shells closer to the surface, while Canada’s population growth
has put more land into development. This has resulted in more frequent encounters with
UXO. For instance, in 2005 the DND started collecting data on UXO locations and in
2013 officials speculated that there are more than 860 “legacy sites” across Canada and at
least another 1,100 sites off the Atlantic coast.73 Since 1927 unexploded ordnance has
killed 15 people and injured another 20 across the whole country. In Vernon, British
Columbia alone, between 1944 and 1973 at least nine people were killed in accidents,
including two Boy Scouts named Grant Morgan and Don Hope who died when a buried
mortar exploded in 1963. As of 2013, the last known injury was in Lethbridge, Alberta
when a farmer ran over a buried pyrotechnic device in 2007.74
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“A Solid Big Gob”: The Challenge of Managing Large Inventories
Despite lingering problems, cleaning up contaminated sites and clearing out surplus
property from military and industrial sites was a crucial element of the state’s disposal
efforts. This act made way for the return of peacetime operations and materially aided
postwar reconstruction and reconversion programs. However, it was only half of the
story. Without a place to store all the items, objects, and materials collected by the WAC,
clearance operations were impossible to sustain. Therefore, the Supply Department’s
Warehousing Division was an essential element of clearance operations. Once Clearance
teams did their work, the assets not purchased by the contractor on site and not required
by CAL or the armed forces were collected and transported to one of the WAC’s
warehouses to await final disposition.
The Warehousing Division allowed the WAC to control the flood of surpluses
entering the economy and testimony before the SCWEE explained this important
function, “Canada cannot absorb in a short period the huge stocks made surplus and
means must be found to properly warehouse them” so they would not flood markets and
depreciate prices for new goods.75 These comments were echoed by an unpublished
history of the WAC. Since private industry, the armed forces, and federal departments
relied on the Corporation to remove and dispose of surpluses as quickly as possible, it
was not feasible or advisable to “sell the surplus in time to meet the removal demands
without flooding the market.”76 The best option was “to remove such surplus to
warehouses” where they would be stored until sold or, if no sale could be arranged,
destroyed.77 However, the storage and maintenance of all merchandise reclaimed by the
government was no easy feat. The Warehousing Division faced some significant
challenges related to the volume of goods entering its custody and this section will
examine these problems in relation to the expansion of storage capacities and the
stewardship of objects.
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The toughest initial task was finding space for everything. In December 1945, just a
few months after being created, the Warehousing Division boasted eighteen warehouses
spread across the country: eight in Ontario, seven in Quebec, and one each in the
Maritimes, Prairies, and BC. The eighteen warehouses amounted to roughly 1.735
million sq. ft. (or 39.8 acres) of indoor storage space. To put this early amount of storage
space into perspective: it was almost twice the size of Parliament Hill which occupies
952,390 sq. ft. in downtown Ottawa. Yet this space was not nearly enough. In January
1946, the first month that Surplus Declarations topped 2,000, the fifteen warehouses in
Ontario and Quebec (totalling 1.435 million sq. ft. combined) were reaching full capacity,
as 65 percent of Ontario’s and 75 percent of Quebec’s warehouses were filled. Similar
issue occurred in other regions as well. In the Maritimes, 60 percent of the available
140,000 sq. ft. was occupied, while 35 percent of the 125,000 sq. ft. serving Manitoba
and Saskatchewan and 80 percent of 35,000 sq. ft. serving British Columbia and Alberta
was occupied.78 With the flood of surplus declarations and clearance requests increasing
each month, it was obvious that more warehouses were required, especially in the west
and east. As a result, the Warehousing Division expanded rapidly to operate a peak of 51
warehouses, totalling more than 6 million sq. ft. of indoor storage space by March 1947.
The expansion of the WAC’s storage capacity was a remarkable achievement
considering how expensive real estate and rental charges were in a country plagued by
severe accommodation shortages during and after the war. Acquiring new buildings or
facilities was very expensive and yet the WAC managed to find more than six million sq.
ft. of indoor space without going bankrupt. How did that happen? Malley’s Supply
Department came up with an ingenious and cost effective solution: the WAC would
repurpose the facilities already owned by the Crown and declared surplus through the
DMS or DND. Berry’s testimony before the SCWEE confirmed this policy which was
implemented wherever possible. However, he also indicated that as of December 1945,
the armed forces were still closely guarding their storage capacities, so the repurposing of
existing spaces was not a straightforward process: “I believe we possibly use [vacant
airport buildings or army buildings for storage], but in certain cases we have not been
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able to organize to the point where we can take over existing buildings which have
surpluses in them from the present custodians; namely, the air force, the army, and the
navy.”79
Since the WAC usually did not construct any warehouses, its storage facilities came
from two general sources. First, a portion of the warehouses taken over by the WAC were
formerly Crown-owned plants (or sections thereof) that were already closed down and
declared surplus. After some renovations, the Corporation gained plenty of space that was
often in the general vicinity of where assets were declared and already located near good
transportation networks since factories were constructed along rail lines wherever
possible.80 Rather than rushing to sell the real estate, the WAC reused it temporarily and
once the warehouse’s inventory was depleted, the building(s) were put on the market and
sold as the WAC reverted to its centralized operational procedures. 81 According to the
pamphlet Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown-Owned Plant Buildings, at its peak the
WAC warehouses occupied roughly 4-5 million sq. ft. of floor space at thirteen former
crown plants. But by 1948 the Corporation occupied only 1.1 million sq. ft. and there
were few indications that storage space would be required much longer.82
The second source of warehousing was the space commandeered at military bases
across the country. This cut down on expenses especially if the materiel was located on
the same base, as it only required transportation to the WAC’s buildings or the assets
could be left in place to avoid double handling. This policy was not always welcomed by
the military because it took up valuable space on bases at a time when the postwar
storage problem was most acute, but over time the WAC and military found ways to
cooperate. To supervise the storage, handling, and maintenance of assets on military
bases, the Supply Department assigned personnel and hired security guards. This
particular arrangement worked extremely well in several places, especially in Montreal at
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the Longue Pointe Ordnance Depot. The 210-acre depot was Canada’s “Valcartier” of the
Second World War. Crash-built on the outskirts of Montreal very early in the war, by
1944 it was the central logistical hub of Canada’s entire war effort. Practically all
munitions and supplies produced by Canadian industries were shipped overseas or
returned home through its sprawling facilities, railways, and dock yards. After the war,
the WAC used Longue Pointe as its central shipping hub for many international sales and
some local ones as well.83
The amount of outdoor storage space used by the Corporation was probably larger
than the indoor space, but it is harder to
quantify because the square footage was not
recorded and because it is more difficult to
define. For instance, assets could be stored
directly outside the doors of warehouses
permanently or temporarily. They could be
put in sheds without walls adjacent to
military bases or left in open-air depots
behind barbed wire fences. Additionally, the
remote

areas

where

surpluses

were

abandoned could be labelled as a form of
Photo 6: A rare picture of decommissioned
ships at the graveyard near Sorel. Source: LAC,
RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9 History of War
Assets Corporation Ltd. and War Assets
Corporation, Newspaper Clippings, The
Standard, 15 September 1945, 3.

outdoor storage space. Assembled aircraft
posed a special storage challenge due to
their size and numbers. As a result, they
were often left at RCAF bases or aircraft

factories until a sale or destruction could be arranged.84 If the planes were in saleable
condition but the logistics of storage proved too problematic or the space did not exist,
than the planes were “cocooned” (wrapped in plastic) and left outdoors. Cocooning
became a very common practice during the war. Just before its outbreak Dow Chemical
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invented a thin plastic wrap (it was green and smelled bad) that it called “Saran.”
Originally, Dow Chemical was unsure about its potential applications until munitions
shipments had to be packaged and protected from dust, moisture, salt water, air, and
damage.85
The largest outdoor storage space utilized by the WAC was a part of the St.
Lawrence River on the “leeward side of Isle de Grace” north of Sorel, Quebec. It was
here that the WAC established its largest ship graveyard for Canada’s surplus naval and
cargo vessels. The WAC paid about $100,000 to set up the site and under the joint
command of the WAC’s Fred Hamilton and the Navy’s disposal officer at Sorel, LtCmdr. J. Hodgkinson, a veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic and former commander of
the corvette HMCS Morden. Morden was one of roughly 100 corvettes sold from the
Sorel graveyard, which could hold up to 150 vessels at any given moment.86 Flower and
Castle-class corvettes were joined by several other types of vessels common to Canada’s
wartime navy, as fairmiles, frigates, destroyers, and the Fort and Park cargo vessels were
also moored at Sorel.87 The WAC also maintained two other ship graveyards in
cooperation with the Navy, one on either coast. The graveyard at Shelburne, Nova Scotia,
handled surplus ships on the Atlantic coast, storing primarily minesweepers, harbour
craft, and any overflow from Sorel. Surplus vessels on the Pacific coast were moored at
Bedwell Bay before final disposal.88
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Table 5: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1946-47
Total
Approx.
Approx.
Warehouses
Sales
Occupied
Total
Tonnage Tonnage
Region
Operating
Orders
Area
Personnel Received Shipped
March 1947
Handled
(Sq. Ft.)
1946-47
1946-47
Maritimes
6
614,381
304
10,852
8,192
8,657
Quebec
11
1,555,913
761
30,583
28,151
20,202
Ontario
12
2,338,964
873
27,625
32,026
19,649
Prairies
8
578,608
156
12,237
12,147
14,285
Western
14
1,163,699
417
25,960
19,386
14,167
Total
51
6,251,565
2,511
107,257
99,902
76,960
Source: War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, (April 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947), 11

As sales peaked over the 1946-1947 fiscal year, the number of items entering and
exiting the WAC’s warehouses grew to staggering proportions. As Table 5 indicates, the
WAC’s 51 warehouses shipped 99,902 and received 107,257 tons of materials that year.
The roughly even split between shipping and receiving occurred because the WAC
reached the peak of its clearance, warehousing, and selling operations: the volume it took
in started equaling what it shipped out. This allows us to interpret the WAC’s disposal
operations in three phases chronologically defined by the annual reports. The first period,
1945-1946, was dominated by the intake of surpluses into warehouses during which some
sales occurred (particularly onsite to contractors) but the tonnage entering warehouses
was much larger than what was leaving. Unfortunately, statistics for 1945-1946 are not
available, but they should mirror (in reverse) the trends in Table 6. The second or middle
period, 1946-1947, was characterized by roughly equal levels of shipping and receiving,
whereas the first and third phases were characterized by an imbalance in intake and
output. During the last phase, 1947-1948, the number of warehouses was drastically
reduced in line with the liquidation of inventories and this is reflected in the major
imbalance between the shipping and receiving and the higher rate of sales orders handled
over the previous years.89
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Table 6: Warehousing Operations of the War Assets Corporation, 1947-48
Total
Approx.
Approx.
Warehouses
Sales
Occupied
Total
Tonnage
Tonnage
Region
Operating
Orders
Area
Personnel Received
Shipped
March 1948
Handled
(Sq. Ft.)
1947-48
1947-48
Maritimes
2
456,505
82
9,097.81
12,524.01
11,860
Quebec
3
427,639
117
8,349.66
33,973.26
26,559
Ontario
2
993,262
217
8,688.19
59,577.88
26,278
Prairies
2
109,808
26
4,146.28
18,834.67
9,288
Western
3
391,714
106
14,587.28 26,353.26
18,740
Total
12
2,378,928
548
44,869.36 151,263.08 92,725
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, (April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 8

The volume of assets entering and exiting warehouses brought a whole host of new
problems. Perhaps the biggest challenge was keeping track of the ballooning inventory.
As Berry explained to the SCWEE, some of his divisions had seen significant increases
in their business after V-J Day. Referencing the sale of machine tools as an example of
the problems caused by the sudden surge, Berry stated that over the six-month period
following Germany’s surrender, sales of machine tools tripled from an average of
$300,000 per month to $1 million a month:
Up to that time we had a flow of X machines coming in per week or per
month. On V-J Day it was not a flow of machines of X per month, it was a
solid big gob of machines which descended on us. I cannot possibly have the
administrative machinery to catalogue all these machines; as to what they are,
where they are – we have to sell them openly. It may take me 12 months to
get all these machines sold properly. It may take me two years.90
That the WAC sold the “solid big gob” of machine tools roughly in accordance with
Berry’s two-year estimate was remarkable given the diversity and sheer volume of
everything else descending on the Corporation. After the war, the WAC received solid
big gobs of every imaginable category of goods!
Cataloguing such a large inventory was not easy or, as it turned out, even desirable.
As Ken Johnstone explained in the September issue of The Standard, “the country’s
largest department stores may stock up to ten thousand different items. War Assets
Corporation lists something like two hundred and fifty thousand items in its
90
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inventories.”91 Given the volume of declarations and the number of objects entering and
exiting the WAC’s warehouses every day, compiling a comprehensive inventory of
250,000 different categories was impractical since it would be immediately out-of-date
and too large for quick reference. As Berry explained in another description of the
inventory problem, “to catalogue the variety of goods and material disposed through the
sales forces of the Corporation would require a large [book]. For example, a breakdown
of material and components cleared through the Aircraft Section alone entails the
enumeration of approximately 20,000 items. The section devoted to Radar and Radio lists
5,000 separate classifications of items dealt with.”92 Moreover, the stock of items in each
category was constantly fluctuating, and since every change had to be done by hand and
without the help of microprocessors, inventory management software, or the internet, it
was administratively impossible to keep a running tab.93
In addition to the diversity and volume of items, creating a comprehensive
catalogue was further complicated by the wide geographic dispersion of surpluses, the
difficulty of combining into one master list all the various regional inventories, and the
freight charges for mailing what was a heavy stack of paper to all interested customers.
For these reasons the WAC was never able to circulate lists or catalogues of its entire
inventory, much to the dissatisfaction of its customers and inquiring politicians. As
DeRoche stated to the SCWEE in response to a question about why air raid precaution
equipment was not included on the catalogue submitted as evidence, “this inventory is
just one month. The total thing stands about that high (indicating) off the floor.” 94 In this
case, the air raid equipment had not been declared surplus that month and as a result was
still in the Director of Civilian Defence’s possession and therefore not included in
DeRoche’s briefing.
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The procedures and practices for tracking inventories within the WAC were
imperfect and overwhelmed by goods and paperwork. This made the Auditor General’s
job more difficult. Because of Diefenbaker’s vocal criticism and questions in the House
of Commons when the Surplus Crown Assets Act was debated, an amendment was added
that required the Auditor General of Canada to investigate the WAC’s operations and
accounts. As a result, dozens of auditors and supervisors fanned out across the country
each year in order to inspect the WAC’s Head Office, Regional Branches, and all its
warehouses. What they found raised eyebrows. Overall, most of the surviving auditor
reports indicate that the records management at warehouses were adequately organized
and maintained given the circumstances, although there were some systemic
discrepancies between the paperwork and actual stocks available in the inventory.95
As a result, the Auditor General continuously appended a caveat to its yearly
reviews. While sympathetic to “the tremendous amount of paper work required in this
company by the nature of its operations” as well as “the very great amount of clearance
work” that “took place in a relatively short time,” the Auditor General qualified its report
by stating that “the procedures and practices of the Corporation were not of such a nature
as to permit establishing by examination of records maintained that all assets received for
disposal had been fully accounted for.”96 The Auditor General’s remarks were a serious
charge against the WAC, especially considering all the organizational and administrative
preparations. Apparently, it had all been insufficient. Yet, remarkably, the comments did
not yield any significant changes for two reasons. First, it appears as though auditors
understood that clerical issues were impossible to avoid given the amount of assets and
paperwork at hand. They were therefore willing to work with the existing system by
limiting the discrepancies as much as possible. Second, Berry and his fellow executives
believed it was impossible to alter the WAC’s practices and procedures to better serve the
needs of auditors or create a detailed inventory. If this were to happen then operations
“both as regard to taking over surplus and the sale of surplus” had to be “stopped for a
95
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considerable period (estimated to be two months).”97 As the Second Annual Report stated
after the Auditor General’s critical remarks:
The Corporation feels that a stoppage of operations by the Corporation would
be entirely unjustified as the safeguards that have been instituted to protect
the Crown-owned property in its custody are of such a nature that only minor
losses of property are likely, and the necessity for accepting surplus so that
the original custodian departments may demobilize their personnel or,
alternatively, contractors may clear their plants and return to civilian
production are of paramount importance.98
The difficulty in tracking such large inventories with even more paperwork was a
product of many issues incumbent to the WAC’s operations and identified by auditors. It
all started with the fact that the CAAC and WAC used different procedures and forms.
The two separate administrative practices resulted in the provision of different file
numbers for each declaration. This resulted in misfiled paperwork, much to the dismay of
officials in the MGO Branch who discovered that some files were lost at the WAC’s
Head Office in April 1945.99 Operating two administrative systems simultaneously was
necessary given the different responsibilities of each organization. As Chapter 2
explained, the CAAC’s Standard Procedures were issued to ensure consistency in filling
out Surplus Declarations and also to ensure that a clear link was maintained between the
items, their condition, the declaring agency, and location. These details allowed the
CAAC to screen assets through the priorities and, when necessary, facilitate an interdepartmental transfer or recommend a direct sale on the tracking schedules.
However, once the assets entered the custody of the WAC a new set of
administrative procedures existed, designed specifically for the physical task of inventory
management. When Clearance teams acquired assets on site they were less concerned
about where the objects originated, what they had been used for, or their original cost.
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Instead, they were most interested in the object’s condition, dimensions, component
parts, weight, features, availability, quantities, location, and warehousing requirements.
The WAC therefore relied on a separate set of procedures and forms denoted by the
prefix “S.D.” to track assets and sales through the provision of receipts and forms for
contractors, declaring agencies, transfers between Departments or Divisions, and
eventually, customer sales.100
Internally, the Clearance and Warehousing Divisions used several imperfect
methods to help keep track of items and paperwork. The Clearance division maintained
an inventory of codes and abbreviations that helped them fill out forms for the
Warehousing Division and Merchandising Department. However, this catalogue was over
300 pages long, constantly changing as stocks were accrued or diminished, and largely
generic since little information about the quality and quantity of each item could not be
maintained.101 Inside warehouses, bin tags were used so personnel could easily navigate
aisles and locate objects. Staff kept tags up-to-date by editing them with markers as items
were removed. Warehouse supervisors kept track of stocks by inspecting availability
reports (issued when items entered warehouses), sales forms (issued when items left
warehouses), and discrepancy reports (issued when items went missing). However, as
auditors discovered, this could be a cumbersome system to navigate since there was no
general index for the forms, only stacks of paper that had to be cross-referenced by hand
at each warehouse office. 102
As a result of these practices, the identity of assets in relationship to the declaring
agency and the CAAC’s Standard Procedures was “naturally lost” once in the WAC’s
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custody.103 This was an inevitable consequence of the Corporation’s storage and handling
procedures, but frustrated auditors attempting to track the flow of specific goods from
intake to output. Due to the sheer volume of assets entering the WAC’s possession, it was
necessary to adopt storage and sorting practices that were as pragmatic as possible.
Maintaining the identity of an object in relationship to the original surplus declaration
was an impractical basis for arranging warehouses and processing sales. In other words, it
made no sense to store all radios declared surplus by the DND or the DMS in separate
places. Rather it was more convenient to store all radios in the same bins regardless of
origin and divided by condition, type, or
manufacturer.104
The identity problem is best
illustrated

by the

Reclamation

Depot

WAC’s

No.

located

1
in

Valleyfield, Quebec. The Reclamation
Depot handled the storage, processing,
and sale of all surplus clothing, textiles,
bedding, blankets, boots, and shoes.
Photo 7 John Brocklehurst checking a pile of khaki
uniforms at No. 1 Reclamation Depot, Valleyfield,
Quebec. This rare photo from inside a WAC
warehouse was taken from a badly deteriorating
issue of The Standard, 15 September 1945, 4.
Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9,
“History of War Assets Corporation Ltd. and War
Assets Corporation,” Newspaper Clippings.

Valleyfield became a very important
feature of the WAC’s support for
postwar relief and rehabilitation across
the world. Yet the flow of clothing and
textiles posed a problem for auditors
because it was impossible to track an

incoming shipment through its delivery, inspection, storage, processing, and sale. When a
shipment first arrived at Valleyfield it was measured by total weight (not by the quantities
of each item) and then transferred to another room (with all the other new shipments) for
inspection. Inspectors sifted through each shipment and removed insignias, sorted
contents by type, and folded articles for storage in the Depot’s 50-plus huts and buildings.
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Eventually, once a sale was made, the purchased items were all washed and dyed (to
meet military policies governing the sale of old uniforms) before leaving the Depot.105
Not only would the items look physically different, but it was impractical to sort and
store each type by their original shipments or owners. Rather, it was more feasible to
store all the pants, all the tunics, and all the blankets separately, regardless of where they
originated, and subdivide them by condition.106 As a result, it was impossible for an
auditor to determine if the 100 lbs. of pants sold on a Friday were all or part of Monday’s
100 lbs. clothing shipment from, say, the Department of Labour.
Given the intake of such large quantities, it was not uncommon for Clearance
inspectors to simply leave assets in warehouses with the intention of screening them later
but never getting the chance. This occurred often and was documented at Warehouse 55
by an auditor who discovered that a large amount of material and equipment had not been
screened by Clearance or Warehousing staff and simply left in open boxes on the
warehouse’s floor “for as long as ten months.”107 Moreover, warehouse staff also had to
deal with a steady stream of returned materials, either because the customer was unhappy
with the shipment or because the Corporation had over-shipped. This happened with
some regularity and increased workloads since goods had to be rescreened, new forms
had to be filled out, and the assets had to be physically returned to bins or, more often,
sent to the scrap heap because the items were unacceptable to the buyer. In one case,
Garsons Scrap Yard in Nova Scotia actually refused to purchase the scrap consigned to it
by the WAC as it was “useless scrap.”108
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Compounding this problem was the eagerness of Clearance inspectors to close files
quickly. During the peak of clearance operations, overworked inspectors hastily filled in
forms with insufficient information or, more problematically, they would close files
before warehousing receipts were included. This loop-hole was discovered first by the
WAC’s Comptroller Branch and confirmed later by reports to the Auditor General in
November 1947. As a result, by February 1948, steps were taken by “the internal audit
staff at Ottawa” to review “some 50,000 plant clearance files with the objective of
ascertaining whether or not materials intended to be taken over by War Assets
Corporation have actually been received and that materials received and no longer on
hand have been disposed of legitimately.”109 Although the Discrepancy Investigation
Committee never appears to have reviewed all 50,000 files (this would have entailed
reviewing every clearance request handled by the WAC) they did investigate some of the
larger discrepancies at several meetings in March and April. They concluded that in most
cases the Crown was partly or totally responsible for the discrepancies. This was either
because of “clerical errors on the part of the corporation” or long delays in the inspection
and repossession of inventories when contracts were terminated and the “desire of
contractors to obtain full use of their premises with minimum delay” which could result
in the materials being used illegitimately in peacetime production, resold by the
contractor, or scrapped before the government could collect them.110
Improper or delayed screening by clearance and warehousing staff was a fairly
serious problem since assets could fall through the cracks. Judging from surviving
evidence, this occurred with some regularity and, in the end, made for some
uncomfortable and even dangerous situations. In one case, a “serious accident” occurred
at Sorel when a hand grenade, left onboard HMCS Sherbrooke, exploded after the ship’s
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commanding officer signed the ship’s “explosive free certificate.”111 As a result, orders
were reissued to officers instructing them to make a “thorough search of the ship” after
de-ammunitioning took place and before the ships were transferred to the WAC.112
However, as George E. Irving later discovered, these inspections could be somewhat
porous. In November 1945, Irving, a retired captain from the Royal Canadian Naval
Volunteer Reserve, purchased Hodgkinson’s old ship HMCS Morden from the WAC and
had it transported from Sorel to Port Dalhousie, Ontario. Sales records indicate that
Irving may have misrepresented his intentions for purchasing the ship since the sale was
listed as a “corvette for scrap” and therefore came with a slightly cheaper price tag. But
Irving had other plans for the decommissioned vessel and started rebuilding it as a lake
freighter over the spring of 1946.113
On 29 April Irving made an unexpected discovery while removing ammunition
racks from inside the ship’s aft magazines. To his surprise, he found “a 4-inch Corvette
Shell Mk VIII No. 497, without nose cap” wedged behind the racks that the WAC’s staff
had missed when they were preparing the ship for sale.114 In what must have been a
nervous few moments, the retired sailor telephoned the RCMP’s Niagara Falls
Detachment around 1pm and Constable J. Brucker arrived shortly thereafter. Brucker
removed the shell to Queenston Quarries “pending further instructions as to the
disposal.”115 Final disposal took a few months to coordinate with officials from the
Department of Mines and Resources and the RCN, but the shell was eventually dumped
in Lake Ontario in June.116 Although the shell’s detonator (nose cap) was removed,
making it safe for handling, such a situation was an obvious symptom of how
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overwhelmed the WAC’s clearance and warehousing operations were after the war. The
explosive, hidden from plain sight, was missed when the boat was inspected by both its
former crew and WAC personnel. That Irving decided to retrofit the vessel proved
fortunate since scrapping ships requires ferociously hot liquid-oxygen torches and heavy
machinery for dismemberment. His decision probably prevented an oversight in Sorel
from turning into a devastating accident in Port Dalhousie.
Improper screening and inspections also resulted in defective tabulations. This
meant that, at any given moment, the WAC’s actual stocks could be much larger or
smaller than officially recorded. This resulted in over-shipments or under-shipments to
customers or in sales occurring for assets that had not officially entered the WAC’s
custody or in assets taking up storage space without anyone knowing they were there. A
field audit of Warehouse 48 in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, from 11 February until its
closure in July 1947 revealed several discrepancies in shipments from the warehouse. In
one instance, involving the shipment of canned food to the British Food Mission, “it was
found that a shortage occurred between the Warehouse and the purchaser’s
destination.”117 While theft at any point in the logistical arrangements was a distinct
possibility, it was also likely that warehousing records were inaccurate. The records may
have either over-estimated the amount of canned food actually available for sale or
packages containing a portion of the cans purchased were not located in the warehouse at
the time the order was filled.
The issuing of Discrepancy Reports to account for the difference between the
tabulations on paper and actual stocks of materials in the warehouse became a common
practice that varied in severity from warehouse to warehouse. At Warehouse 14, adjacent
to the Crown Industrial Building in Villeray, over 4,000 discrepancy reports were on file
when auditors reviewed the facilities in 1947. By contrast, Warehouse 48 and Warehouse
41 at Debert had very few discrepancy reports on file, allowing auditors to conclude these
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warehouses were well managed.118 Discrepancies between the paperwork and actual
stocks available in warehouses originated mainly from three sources. The improper or
delayed screening of incoming materials has already been mentioned, but this and
inaccuracies on the original Surplus Declarations to the CAAC or clearance receipts
accounted for a large portion of the problem. The other two sources involved breakage
and theft. Just like personnel from the Clearance Division were liable to abandon objects
and materials onsite by purpose or accident, a natural attrition rate developed inside the
warehousing facilities – either on purpose or by accident – that affected the availability of
assets. Many of the objects entering the WAC’s custody were already worn out, obsolete,
or otherwise unwanted, so breakage happened constantly in warehouses as assets were
damaged or destroyed when handling them. As a result, warehouse supervisors wrote off
assets in what amounted to a wastage rate.
The tight third-party security provided by the Commissionaires at warehouses made
it difficult to steal large quantities of assets without a sizable number of co-conspirators.
Although surviving evidence is silent on this issue, it does not appear that any large or
organized rackets developed inside the WAC. Yet small-scale thefts were a systemic
problem that occupied the Investigations Division of the Organization and Personnel
Department with several dozen cases each year. For instance, during the fiscal year of
1946-1947, the Investigations Division kept busy with 161 cases of which sixteen
resulted in prosecutions and convictions “involving 20 persons, mostly Corporation
employees, and 20 other cases which were completed by the dismissal of 31
employees.”119 In comparison to the Corporation’s total employment statistics over the
same period, these numbers are miniscule. However, this does not mean that thefts were
uncommon. In fact, it seems that only the most serious incidents were passed on to the
Investigations Division since warehouse supervisors were more likely to write off the
losses after conducting their own investigations. As an auditor noted in his review of
118

Discrepancy Reports were common at Warehouse 14 and there were even more at Warehouse 22. LAC,
RG58, Vol. 17, File: War Assets Corp. Working Papers Quebec Region 1947-1948, “War Assets
Corporation – #14 Warehouse,” no author, 22 September 1947, 1-2; Ibid, “Discrepancy Reports Raised in
Quebec Region,” 10 November 1947; LAC, RG58, Vol. 40, File: War Assets Corporation Ltd. Head Office
Year-end Test Audits 31 March 1948, “Audit of Warehouse No. 41, Debert N. S. for the period July 8,
1946 to June 23, 1947,” L. E. L. Harvey, 7 August 1947, 7.
119

War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 23.

177

Warehouse 14, there were thirty-seven Discrepancy Reports issued throughout the year
because of “pilfering” and only “about one half” were sent to the Investigations Division
while no records of the warehouse supervisor’s investigations were available and no
staffing changes happened because of the shortages.120
At Warehouse 14 thefts included the disappearance of some flashlights from a
storage bin and “three aircraft type, eight day clocks removed from the manufacturer’s
case and the cases refilled with pieces of scrap.”121 In another instance, a security guard
thwarted the theft of an electric motor found “behind the driver’s seat in the warehouse
truck outside the warehouse.”122 At Valleyfield, auditors discovered when checking the
discrepancy reports that the warehouse supervisor had simply written off a number of
thefts. Given the nature of Valleyfield’s inventory and the fact that it was during the dead
of winter (January and February) 1948, the missing items were understandable, as they
included: five pairs of leather women’s shoes, 61 satin brassieres, 58 small and medium
waistcoats, 10 pairs of woollen gloves, and five pairs of leather mitts.123
Although most were small in nature, some serious thefts were committed. For
instance, on 14 October 1946, the RCMP was notified by the WAC that a large
centrifugal water pump powered by a General Electric motor was stolen from its
warehouse at Watson Lake in the Yukon. The water pump was heavy and big (4m x 1.5m
x 1m) so a group of people and a vehicle were involved. Upon making their inspection,
constables found the locks on the warehouse doors were broken and tire tracks from a
truck equipped with “mud grip” tires in the immediate vicinity.124 WAC maintenance
personnel were interviewed but no one knew anything about the robbery so the unsolved
case remained opened until 25 February 1947 when it was cancelled. Since nothing was
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ever found in the region by police, it seems likely that the water pump was stolen by
someone heading south, perhaps enterprising American soldiers or civilian contractors
returning home with equipment that their government had declared surplus.125
Fraud was another type of crime associated with the WAC, especially given the
severe material shortages across Canada. As Warren Baldwin reported in the Globe and
Mail on 3 March 1946, WAC officials in Ottawa were confronted by “three very
indignant young men” who demanded the immediate delivery of the trucks they had
supposedly purchased from the Corporation.126 After calming down, they explained that
four months earlier an acquaintance had put them in touch with a man who had pull with
the WAC and could get them the trucks despite the priority restrictions. The men were
directed to “a business address, where business-like negotiations regarding type, size and
price were carried out, and where the men finally parted with their cash deposits.” 127 Of
course, this was not legitimate and the three men were swindled out of about $1,200.
When the case was turned over to the WAC’s Investigations Division, eighty-nine similar
scams involving “gullible purchasers” and motor vehicles were found and the RCMP was
brought in to conduct further criminal investigations.128
In another incident, a young man explained to his landlady that he was an official
with the WAC and could get her furniture “at bargain prices” and when she invested
$250 with him, he disappeared. “It was left to War Assets officials to explain to the
landlady that the young man wasn’t and never had been an employee of War Assets.” 129
Taking advantage of a materially-starved marketplace and a backlog of consumer
spending power, scammers and fraudsters capitalized on the public’s knowledge of the
WAC to misrepresent themselves and swindle money. As the newspaper article
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concluded, making special reference to the very popular and coveted Jeep, “one other
warning. If anyone tries to sell you a War Assets jeep, don’t bite. War Assets Corporation
hasn’t yet seen a jeep, and doesn’t expect to for a long time, if ever.” 130 Fraud would
remain a constant companion of the WAC’s operations, well into the postwar period. In
1973, a group of men misrepresenting themselves as salesmen for the WAC’s successor
agency, the Crown Assets Disposal Corporation (CADC), travelled around Kingston,
Napanee, and Brockville “offering jeeps at $100.00 cash, brand new, in crates” and when
they collected the money they advised the purchasers that the CADC would make the
delivery later. Of course this was not the case and, amazingly, “when apprehended they
had collected in excess of $28,000.00”131

Conclusion
While the WAC held little influence over how objects were used once in the hands
of new owners, its clearance and warehousing operations played an important role in
controlling the fate of an object’s transition into peacetime. For the most part, the WAC
controlled access to government surpluses as well as the types of objects made available
for redistribution in the civilian economy. This is why the clearance of both military and
industrial facilities was so important, not only to public safety, but to economic renewal
and reconversion. In clearing the 40,000-plus sites and collecting the surpluses located at
each, the government ensured that it would be reimbursed for its property and create a
large inventory of assets for redistribution. Moreover, in clearing unwanted objects from
factories, the government helped private industry make room for new machinery and
different peacetime operations. This was a prerequisite for any postwar development and
expansion since the assets cluttering factory floors, military bases, or office buildings
would no longer impede reconversion or postwar production. Clearance and warehousing
constituted an important mechanism for absorbing the shock of peace through a process
of stewardship.
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However, the shock absorbers did not always accomplish their objectives. Financial
and geographical obstacles, as well as the profuse quantities of objects involved,
frequently scuttled clearance and warehousing operations. If the clearance and
remediation of sites was too expensive or if the assets were located in remote areas, then
they were often abandoned or only partially cleaned up, thereby leaving a materiel legacy
for future generations. Furthermore, the sheer volume of assets entering and exiting
warehouses left personnel in a constant uphill battle to keep up and ensured that the
storage system broke down periodically. This resulted in assets slipping through the
cracks by either entering or exiting a warehouse without an associated paper trail or
without being properly inspected. These discrepancies resulted from numerous sources
and illuminate the operational conditions inside warehouses, the nature of the Auditor
General’s criticism, and the wider challenges faced by the Corporation while ushering
objects through the transition from war to peace.
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Chapter 4
“The Wonderland of War Assets”: Selling, Scrapping, and
Salvaging Value
In the operations of War Assets Corporation there arises the responsibility of protecting
the public against its own enthusiasms. No matter how much people may covet military
equipment, it may not always be suitable for civilian use. Therefore, much military
equipment may not be offered for sale at all.1
C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply and Reconstruction, 23 October 1944
First we must give away all the assets of the war:
Stores, trucks, equipment, goods of every kind,
And all the factories built with public money.
These must be channelled toward monopolies,
Who will most surely exploit them.
This we shall call restoring free enterprise.2
F. R. Scott, “Orderly Decontrol 1947”

Introduction
Although clearance and warehousing were very challenging aspects of disposal
operations, they were also effectively redundant if nothing left the WAC’s possession.
After all, the chief purpose of the WAC was not to hoard surpluses but to dispose of them
in the best interests of the national economy, employment, and the taxpayer. There were
only two avenues for accomplishing this divestment: selling or destroying. In general
terms, the selling option was preferred over destruction since it allowed the WAC to
recoup some of the asset’s original value. However, this did not mean that the
Corporation charged head-on into the postwar period by selling everything it could all at
once. Rather, it had to liquidate assets in a rational and stable fashion so that surpluses
would not precipitate an economic crisis by lowering prices for new goods and harming
employment. Therefore, in many cases – especially those involving lethal assets or items
without civilian applications – destruction was the preferable option. To help guide the
Corporation’s work, sometime in early 1944 the WAC’s Board of Directors, in
consultation with the CAAC and Howe, devised a selling strategy based on “nine cardinal
1
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points” that were outlined in the Corporation’s first few annual reports and
communicated to the public in Howe’s October 1944 speech on the CBC.3 The cardinal
points served as the basis of all the WAC’s operations (see page 189 for list).
One theme that connected all nine cardinal points related to the fears of reliving
another postwar depression. In the 1940s many people feared that another Great
Depression was unavoidable and would be worse than the economic collapse of 1929 and
its decade-long fallout. As Cyril James, a respected economist and President of McGill
University, stated to the House of Commons Committee on Reconstruction in August
1942 “there will inevitably be a post war depression, either immediately after the war or
after a brief period of prosperity.”4 James was not alone in raising the alarm, as his
comments reflected a broad sense of apprehension about a future postwar experience that
might replicate the prolonged turmoil following the Great War. Those planning disposal
operations shared some of James’s doom and gloom, though it also served as motivation
to get things right the second time around. The cardinal points were designed to regulate
the circumstances in which surpluses were sold and restrict the WAC’s clientele so they
would not upend the normal economy. In doing so, the points helped contain any
disruptive conditions arising from the influx of such large quantities of government assets
Above all else the nine cardinal points formed a disposal strategy that blatantly
favoured corporate interests. However, this strategy was rationally conceived and largely
based off the First World War experience when speculators – someone who purchases
goods for resale below market value but possessed no capacity for producing those goods
or any connection to the industries concerned – had been the government’s primary
customers. Instead of facilitating another deflationary economic cycle by flooding
markets with inexpensive goods, the government decided to bring business interests into
disposal operations. The WAC hired agents to help broker sales, commissioned
prominent businessmen to help direct policies and practices, and most importantly, it set
up its organization to sell surpluses only through established businesses and trade
networks. In other words, the WAC did not sell direct to the public. Instead, it only sold
3
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surpluses through manufacturers, wholesalers, and dealers who then resold to end users.
Thus, the WAC devised a selling strategy that expressly included a middleman, but
instead of some reckless speculator who cared little about long-term stability, that
middleman was established business.
Although the WAC devised a rational selling strategy, its policies and procedures
were criticized by the public, journalists, and politicians. By controlling prices and the
flow of goods through established businesses, the WAC was forcing end users to pay
more for surplus goods, as the costs of reconditioning, transportation, and commissions
were built into the final price. In the immediate postwar period Canadians faced severe
material shortages but expected to use second-hand government property to offset the
dearth of goods and materials in order to fulfill their postwar plans. Unfortunately, the
WAC’s policies did not always cooperate, leaving many frustrated. As one vocal critic
wrote in a scathing review of the WAC’s operations, “for the last year of my two and a
half years of exploration through the gloomy Wonderland of War Assets, I admit I had no
real hope of doing business with the Corporation. But I kept trying, partly from a sense of
frustrated amusement, partly because the more I saw of War Assets, the more bizarre its
business techniques seemed to be, and the more they seemed to call for enquiry.”5
The public’s frustration grew most acute whenever reports surfaced about the
WAC’s destruction programs. Contrary to the public’s assumptions, the WAC operated
an efficient destruction program that progressively reduced items to components or basic
materials before permanent elimination. Although it was not a flawless process, at each
stage the WAC repeatedly tried marketing the items or selling them piecemeal before
starting a new round of reductions and salesmanship. However, the public only saw
waste, negligence, and profligacy. The assets being destroyed had cost taxpayers billions
when they were acquired or manufactured during the war, but now the agency tasked
with recouping that investment was destroying perfectly useable items at a time of severe
shortages. To add insult to injury, the surpluses were only available through established
businesses and sold at the WPTB’s price ceilings. It did not seem to matter to anyone
outside the WAC that it possessed substantial stocks of things that required destruction,
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such as war junk that no one wanted or tactical assets without civilian utility. Instead,
people expected surpluses to be cheap, available in vast quantities, and be exactly what
they wanted. Of course, this was not always the case. War was incredibly wasteful.
Although the WAC did its best to sell everything it could, what was not sold had to
be destroyed to save on storage and labour costs. Unfortunately, this meant that the
arsenals, so revered by the glories of war and victory, would not survive in peacetime.
Instead, they became victims of financial and storage constraints, dubious civilian
applications, political and economic considerations, a lack of commercial interest,
depreciated

values,

obsolescence.

The

and

scrapheap

was an inglorious end for the
implements of war. Perhaps the
painting by a former navy
officer, Tony Law, encapsulated
the public’s mood about the
depressing fate bestowed upon
the

war’s

nostalgic

materiel.

The

veneration

of

corvettes, moored together in
Photo 8 These corvettes, docked at Sorel, Quebec, soon to be
sold for scrap, attest to the scale of postwar demobilization
and the sadness felt by many sailors at the decommissioning
of their ships. Painting by Tony Law, CWM, Artifact
Number: 19710261-4075.

gallant rows stretching far into
the horizon as if they were
marching into battle once again,

sharply contrasts the cold reality of their impending doom. The corvettes were stored at
Sorel where they awaited scrapping or conversion into other purposes. Ron Marsh, a
reporter for The Montreal Gazette, felt the same way. In July 1945, Marsh called Sorel “a
grim place” for “fighting ships.” “Not so long ago,” he wrote, Hollywood “produced an
exciting moving picture” about these “gallant little” vessels, but now they were “dead
ships” forgotten and tossed aside.6 Indeed, the dark colours and long shadows reflecting
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off the water in Law’s painting visualize Marsh’s remarks by communicating a deep
sadness and frustration at the ships’ unceremonious end.

Corporate Dividend: Established Businesses and Selling Restrictions
When the Second World War ended in May and September 1945 it capped off a
decade and a half of depression and war. The prevailing economic conditions – first
rampant unemployment and economic dislocation, followed by wartime restrictions on
the production of civilian goods – forced most Canadians to put off purchasing new
homes and durable goods. Although booming wartime production ushered in an era of
full employment and increased income, from 1941 onwards civilian goods were not
considered a priority for resources or manufacturing. Instead, Canadians continued
sacrificing and made do with the materials and household goods left over from the 1930s.
However, as Graham Broad has shown, Canadians found other ways to spend their new
earnings (on entertainment and movies, for instance) during the war, while they also
paradoxically accrued savings that they hoped to expend once the war was over.7
Most Canadians looked forward to the opportunities of peace, a time when they
could pursue their own postwar plans and increase their living standards. In 1945,
Canadians had more money to spend and a backlog of needs built up over the previous
fifteen years of scarcity. This fostered, as Doug Owram described, “a more unabashed
pride of ownership” amongst the generation that lived through the depression and war.8
However, as Joy Parr explained, the expectations for immediate relief and gratification
were thwarted by postwar developments, labour strife, delays in production, economic
policies, material and housing shortages, and wide-spread unemployment.9 As a result,
frustration and anger brewed in many quarters, particularly among returning veterans and
labour unions, since the government appeared indifferent and unresponsive to a serious
crisis threatening everyone’s postwar ambitions. In October 1945, one of the Army’s
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Rehabilitation Officers recounted the dissatisfaction in a report on a meeting with one of
Calgary’s local Rehabilitation Committees:
While the matter of violence is to be strongly deplored, experience shows
unfortunately that this is about the only method of obtaining quick and
decisive Government action even in a democratic country. Surely it is too
much to expect that the men who did not fail in their job are going to stand
placidly by when they find that the people have failed in their promises of
employment for all, houses for everyone, in fact a regular Garden of Eden...
These men are on the whole deep thinkers, they know what can be done under
emergency; there is an emergency right now. They are used to action and they
want some kind of definite action right now.10
However, government officials – many of them businessmen-turned-bureaucrats –
were not aloof or unsympathetic to the situation. In fact, many were keenly aware of the
dangers caused by the accumulation of consumer spending power mixing with a sudden
ferocity in demand for new products. Therefore, instead of working to facilitate the
surging demand and meet the public’s expectations for new goods, policymakers and
their corporate allies preached caution and restraint.11 As inconvenient and infuriating as
the postwar shortages were, perhaps they were serving a useful purpose in a broader
sense? After all, something had to be done to protect the public from its own
enthusiasms, lest that eager demand and increased spending power be wasted on the
promise of immediate gratification, impulse buying, and short-term prosperity instead of
long-term growth. In regards to the disposal of government surpluses, this was a
particularly pressing issue since everyone expected them to be available for purchase at
cheaper prices and in large quantities. To policymakers it was as if a perfect storm
brewed on the postwar horizon, where cheaper goods would mix with a ferocious demand
to usher in some long overdue prosperity but at the expense of sustainable growth.
This was a potent mix because the disposal of superfluous military and government
property was a double-edged sword. On one hand, used and second-hand goods were a
cheaper alternative to new ones and generated considerable interest from consumers,
businesses, and entrepreneurs. For consumers and the general public, cheaper prices
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meant saving money while purchasing items that would increase living standards after
years of shortages. For businesses, cheaper goods and raw materials meant lower
production costs and potentially higher profits from increased productivity, factory
expansion, and the resale of assets that had already been paid for during the war. For
entrepreneurs, cheaper goods and materials meant low-risk start-up costs and the
potential for cornering a market if one could purchase the entire stock of an item or
resource. On the surface, the influx of cheaper goods appeared to provide some tangible
opportunities that, at least over the short term, stood to benefit everyone.
On the other hand, a glut of cheap goods and resources was not that advantageous
or profitable. In fact, over the long term, the disposal of government surpluses was more
of a curse than a gift. For consumers, cheaper goods meant sacrificing quality since used
items usually have shorter shelf lives. Depending on how worn out they were by wartime
usage, surplus assets were more liable to break down frequently and increase repair costs
over time. Although policymakers did not ignore the shelf-life issue, their main concerns
were focused on the threat that surplus goods posed to employment and corporate profits
because the liquidation of surpluses had potentially catastrophic deflationary
consequences. Second-hand goods are usually less expensive than new ones and therefore
they threaten prices for new goods of similar types. This is particularly the case if the
costs of production (having already been paid during the war) are not reflected by the
selling price and if a flood of second-hand goods enters the marketplace all at once.
Moreover, some industrious customers were liable to buy surpluses from the government
on a speculative basis, meaning that their purchases were motivated by the opportunity
for resale at slightly higher prices but still well below market value. Therefore,
liquidating the vast stocks of government-owned property without any restrictions or
controls created informal economies that further undercut the prices of new products and
threatened employment, all while creating illegitimate sources of supply that
manufacturers might increasing rely upon to cut costs and increase profits. Over time this
situation would hit the primary and secondary industries especially hard. When
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speculators stepped into regular supply channels to sell their materials, they did so at
unsustainably low prices that in no way reflected the costs of extraction or manufacture.12
Experience after the First World War and the subsequent economic turmoil of the
Great Depression enlightened concerns in the 1940s. This experience strongly indicated
that the government had to enact a proper disposal strategy so that it would not sponsor
the creation of an economic bubble that could sabotage the principles of the White Paper
and the promises for high and stable employment.13 A proper disposal strategy was
embodied in the WAC’s nine cardinal points:
1. To sell all saleable surpluses at going market prices but within ceilings set
by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board;
2. To control the flow of surpluses so as to create the least possible
disturbance to the normal economy of the nation;
3. At all times to make every effort to control the price to the user and to
reach the user by the shortest feasible route;
4. To keep out of unfair competition with established business;
5. To see expert advice from industry on price levels and marketing methods
but not to act on such advice to the expense of public interest;
6. To distribute sales uniformly across Canada;
7. To sell abroad in harmony with other governments everything that
becomes available abroad and that can be sold there;
8. To keep out the speculator;
9. To recover for the taxpayers, the original investors in these goods, the
largest possible cash return.14
Thus, a proper disposal strategy controlled the flow of goods entering markets and
stabilized prices in line with market values. It sought input from established businesses
on policies and practices, while also adequately investigating potential clients. Above all,
the disposal strategy was intended to limit the deflationary conditions that occur when
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supplies and speculators are plentiful. In doing so, a proper disposal strategy guarded
against the economic conditions that might undermine future prosperity.
In regards to disposal, the chief concern was always the meddling speculator.
Following the First World War, Allied governments paid very little attention to their
customers and, in the case of the United States which waited six months after November
1918 to start selling surpluses, delays and ad hoc plans characterized most disposal
efforts.15 As one journalist wrote in the Financial Post in December 1943, after the First
World War surplus materials were “forced onto markets that were already full of these
materials” despite vigorous protests from American industry and labour.16 Instead,
military and government officials chose not to listen. Devoid of much experience in
business matters or appreciation for the postwar value of surplus assets, these mandarins
never thought to implement restrictions or controls, nor did they perform any
“investigations and background checks” on their clientele to see if they were “responsible
and acceptable buyers.”17 The article continued:
As a result, many fly-by-night firms sprang up [in the US] for the sole
purpose of operating in government surplus merchandise. Many of these
individuals and firms had unsavory business records and were undesirable
speculators...since many such transactions were surrounded with suspicion,
legitimate businessmen were reluctant to compete with such irresponsible
individuals.18
During the Second World War, a consensus emerged among Canadian bureaucrats
and politicians that blamed the pesky speculator and their fly-by-night companies for
contributing to, if not causing, the economic collapse in 1929. As they saw it, speculators
had purchased surpluses from governments dominated by non-business types interested
in a return to laissez-faire policies and then resold those inventories throughout the
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1920s. This created a booming supply of materials that fuelled mass production.
However, the speculator’s “unsavoury” practices lowered prices, which in turn killed
profits and employment, thereby initiating a deflationary cycle that eventually led to the
Great Depression. In Parliament, J. R. MacNicol spoke about this prevalent practice:
I remember clearly what happened after the last war, when the business with
which I was associated bought many steel boilers which were used in this
plant...and afterwards sold them at prices below those for which boilers of a
similar capacity could be purchased from the home manufacturers. That must
have had an effect on boiler production and naturally on employment in our
boiler plants.19
Whether or not this causal assumption was an accurate explanation of the Great
Depression’s origins is less relevant here than what policymakers believed to be true in
the 1940s. When looking back at 1918-1919 for lessons on how to dispose of surplus war
assets in 1945-1946, the lens of the 1930s shrouded everything in failure. The mistakes –
real or imagined – served as lessons for the future and provided justification for making
changes in the present. Indeed, on the issue of surplus disposal, both sides of the political
spectrum recognized the dangers, vilified the speculator, and agreed that government had
to do something, though they disagreed on what that “something” meant.
In Parliament, concerns about surplus sales and speculators were voiced by the
Conservative Opposition. In a speech debating the Surplus Crown Assets Act in June
1944, R. B. Hanson stated:
Above everything else I warn the minister [Howe]…against sales to
promoters or speculators. The minister will find the thrifty, the wide-awake
man who will care more about making money than winning the war, ready to
purchase these goods, and having in mind the scavengers in this country who
are always looking for this sort of thing, he will find the man who will be out
to buy these stocks on a speculative or promotion schemes.20
In private correspondence similar issues were raised by the left-wing social democrats. A
concerned Tommy Douglas, the newly elected Premier of Saskatchewan and leader of the
CCF, wrote Mackenzie King on 12 October 1944:
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I think you can understand that after the experience following the last war
most people are apprehensive lest these stocks of equipment and supplies for
which the Canadian people paid, should fall into the hands of speculators who
would sell them at a handsome profit...I am therefore, writing to you in the
hope that the whole situation can be clarified because I greatly fear that it
holds the possibility of dangerous repercussions unless attended to
immediately. I know that you are very busy, but I would urge that some
action be taken in this regard lest the situation get out of hand.21
If the interwar experience was to be avoided, preventing sales of government surpluses to
the pesky speculator became the rallying cry. As Berry told the SCWEE in November
1945, no doubt with the Great Depression in mind, “as regards to this slowing up [of
sales], I personally think that if we are to dispose of our domestic surplus to the best
advantage of the public, we must sell now while the market is starved, so that when
normal manufacturing gets under way, the sale of surplus will not compete with new
goods and so with employment.” The merits of this strategy were plainly obvious to
Berry, who concluded that it “will help to fill the vacuum in the supply situation and so
assist in preventing a false boom and its subsequent evils.”22
Avoiding sales to speculators – the WAC’s eighth cardinal point – was a sacrosanct
policy, but it could not exist on its own. The cardinal points were designed to work
together to prevent that “false boom and subsequent evils.” In order to limit the influence
of speculators on the normal economy, controls over the flow of goods and prices had to
be maintained (cardinal points 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7). Moreover, these controls also had to be
supported by business interests, so as to ensure that they were practical, helpful, and
fulfilled their intended purposes. As a result, the WAC immediately seized upon the
utility of pre-existing trade and distribution networks commonly maintained by
manufacturers and private companies (cardinal points 4 and 5). Therefore, in order to
ensure that the national economy was not heavily disrupted by a flood of surpluses or
meddling speculators, and also to “keep out of unfair competition with established
businesses” the WAC operated only through established business and trade networks. 23
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As the WAC’s Second Annual Report clearly stated: “wherever possible, the Corporation
places itself in the position of the manufacturer of goods which it has to dispose of and
routes them to the retail purchaser through the channels the manufacturer usually
employs in his commercial operations.”24
This policy had a sweeping impact on how the WAC sold its surpluses. Rather than
turning into a retail chain where the public could purchase government surpluses, the
WAC never sold directly to end users. Instead, the Corporation grafted it operations into
the pre-existing channels used by established manufacturers, dealers, and retailers for
marketing and distribution. This was done usually at the wholesale level, unless the item
needed reconditioning. Although there were a few exceptions to this rule, mainly in the
sale of ships or aircraft and when priority claims were exercised on goods that required
no repair or modifications, the WAC never deviated from this policy. Moreover, using
only reputable businesses and trade networks was further justified because WAC officials
considered it the safest and most efficient method for getting surplus assets onto the
market while shortages existed. Thus, the Corporation’s selling and marketing strategy
was expressly designed to include a middleman but that middleman had to be an
established stakeholder in the trade and not some speculator with fleeting interest in longterm stability.25
Buttressing established businesses by using them as middlemen was a natural
outgrowth of the Corporation’s mandate. Above all, this policy truncated the speculator’s
access to surpluses and controlled the flow of goods and prices so that legitimate
manufacturers and dealers did not have to compete against their own wartime production.
In fact, using the businesses that had established reputations in the field as a sanctioned
middleman for disposal operations was an ingenious method for reversing the supply
chain to create a “removal chain.”26 This quickly eliminated surplus assets from
government inventories while also redistributing them back to taxpayers through the
manufacturers that had originally produced them. In effect, the WAC’s disposal strategy
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“closed the loop” on wartime production and co-opted established businesses into
forming one of the first modern systems of “reverse logistics,” a term coined later in the
twentieth century to describe “the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the
efficient, cost effective flow of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and
related information from the point of consumption to the point of origin for the purpose
of recapturing value or proper disposal.”27 Using established businesses as middlemen to
help reverse the flow of supplies was the safest and most convenient option available. Yet
it was also a deliberately conservative initiative that was geared towards economic
stability and corporate profits, not end users. Clearly, in devising this disposal strategy
officials with the WAC were unwilling to liberalize the sale of surpluses out of fears of
upending the capitalist system and ushering in another Great Depression.
Although policymakers felt most comfortable hitching their economic fortunes onto
established businesses, they were also picky: the middlemen they used needed proven
track records of survival, reliability, profitability, and patronage. When contemporaries
used the term “established business” they envisioned major companies – such as Ford,
GM, and CIL – that had proven their worth on the industrial front during the war and,
perhaps most importantly, by surviving through the economic wasteland of the 1930s.
Those big businesses that possessed large research and development branches, staffed
with engineers, scientists, and marketers were particularly valued. There were many
precedents that directed officials towards this strategy. For instance, consider the origins
of Kotex, the first cheap and disposable sanitary pad for menstruation. During the First
World War the American military and its allies required bandages at alarming rates and
the paper company Kimberly-Clark won the contract to provide highly absorbent
bandages made from a new material, cellucotton (a highly absorbent cotton made from
wood cellulose). However, when the war ended abruptly in 1918, Kimberly-Clark lost its
major clients but it still possessed a massive inventory of cellucotton.28 The company
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needed to find a market for its materials quickly. Having heard rumours that nurses in
France had used the bandages as improvised pads for their menstrual needs, KimberlyClark’s scientists and marketers figured this was the outlet they desperately needed.
Disposable pads were not a new invention. They had been around since the late
nineteenth century, but the cost of production and materials made the selling price too
prohibitive for women accustomed to reusing old rags.29 However, for Kimberly-Clark,
the cost of the cellucotton had already been paid out during the war, so its disposable
sanitary pad could sell cheaply. In 1921, Kotex hit store shelves accompanied by an
immense advertising campaign that told readers about its origins. 30 A few years after
launching Kotex, with its stockpiles of surplus cellucotton still ample and new production
underway, Kimberly-Clark targeted the reusable handkerchief. In 1924 it débuted a new
“disposable kerchiefs” called Kleenex.31 Thus, two products that are so commonplace in
today’s society owe their origins to material demobilization following the First World
War. More specifically, though, they owed their existence to the marketing, research, and
development branches of a large and successful business. The development of new
products made from surplus materials had secured new markets for Kimberly-Clark,
allowing it to thrive throughout the Depression. It was this type of entrepreneurial spirit
that policymakers wanted to nurture and sustain with their disposal operations.
The use of established trade networks provided many other advantages, both to the
WAC and business interests. In getting the first chance to purchase back their products
(or even a competitor’s if they outbid them), manufacturers were given an opportunity to
control the quality of their goods that eventually re-entered the marketplace. This was
important since it helped maintain brand-name recognition and reputations with
customers, while it also ensured that assets built to military specifications would be
properly reformed to meet civilian laws and safety standards. Moreover, established
businesses were also better set up to handle any post-sale customer services as they
29
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operated repair facilities, offered warranties, and possessed a dependable supply of spare
parts. Relying on these pre-existing services saved the Corporation from provisioning
them. This was important given that the WAC manufactured nothing it sold, so its
inventories were constantly depleting over time. Despite the plethora of items it
possessed after the war, once the Corporation sold an entire category of goods there
would be no replacements forthcoming, so it was best to make customers use regular
channels, lest one day the source of spare parts dried up.32
In funnelling surpluses back through established trade networks rather than making
direct sales to end users, the WAC refrained from competing with manufacturers and
dealers across the 200,000-plus merchandising fields that made up its inventory.
Moreover, this policy also kept the WAC out of competing with established retail
businesses, which saved a tremendous amount on operational costs. If the Corporation
opened up its inventories to the public and allowed direct sales, then it had to open retail
outlets in every city and build up an extensive logistical infrastructure to ensure a fair
distribution. As Berry explained to the Veterans Affairs Committee on 29 March 1946:
Creating a chain of stores would be a further expense and require further
planning outside the scope of what [the WAC has] done already… In order to
do this [the Corporation] would have to hire 100,000 more employees – not to
mention that stores selling surplus would undermine other stores selling new
goods. This would also take jobs away from the retail sector in the short
term…Retail stores under the WAC would require buildings, this would mean
taking them from other stores and businesses – given the shortages of space,
this was not ideal. It would also be a temporary situation, so it was better to
give the space to some business that would be permanent.33
Selling directly to end users required the WAC to create its own network of governmentoperated retail stores across the country, pay more rental charges and worker salaries, and
then once surpluses were completely liquidated, tear down the whole enterprise and
relinquish any lasting responsibility for customer service. Such efforts seemed more futile
than the expediency of supporting established businesses and getting goods to the market
32
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as quickly as possible. After all, why double up on the pre-existing trade and distribution
networks? Or risk upending the flow of normal economic activity in order to solve a
temporary crisis? What was the point of competing with companies that “will continue
long after the WAC disposal job is complete” if that lowered prices, profits, and
employment?34 Clearly, the WAC’s Directors erred on the side of caution and
consciously colluded with business interests.
Another means of controlling the flow of goods into the marketplace was by
controlling prices. To do this meant eliminating all discounts to the end user and only
selling assets at or close to the going market rates. The WAC’s mandate contained
provisions that required it to abide by the WPTB’s price ceilings. Since second-hand
items were sold to end users at the highest levels possible, prices for new goods were
largely stabilized or trended upwards – rather than downwards – because of shortages.
This greatly limited any large-scale disruption to the national economy because it helped
control deflationary pressures, while also preventing speculators from pervasively
exploiting any wild fluctuation in prices (if or when they appeared). Prices were
determined through consultations with the WPTB and established businesses and by
calculating the asset’s depreciated value. Meetings with established businesses were
extremely important because they informed the WAC about all the added costs that
accumulated on every sale. Since surpluses were sold back through established trade and
distribution networks, the additional costs for repairing, refurbishing, and shipping items
had to be factored into the final price tag, while a modest sales commission for the
manufacturer and dealer was also added.35
Because of price ceilings the WAC had to calculate its selling price to established
businesses in light of these additional costs. It did this by calculating the asset’s
depreciated value in terms of its age, wartime usage, and market value (based on a
selected median year). The price was then adjusted to the WPTB’s ceilings and divided
up so manufacturers and dealers could cover all their costs. In the end, the final purchase
price paid by customers was a non-negotiable price-point that was fixed by the WAC’s
34
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Merchandising Department. The end user was never supposed to get a discount. Instead,
established businesses and corporate interests received the discounted price – or what
might be better explained as a dealer price or factory invoice determined by the
depreciation calculations – from the WAC. This was then added to the commission and
the costs of refurbishing, repairing, and shipping the asset.36
Unsurprisingly, the pricing of surplus assets and the lack of discounts for end users
was a very contentious issue. This tension about pricing stemmed from an ongoing
wartime debate over government largesse, wartime expansion, and the DMS’s massive
budget. The billions of dollars that had funded the production programs was in actuality
the public’s money raised through taxes, loans, and victory bonds. Therefore, recouping
as much of the original cost was essential, not only for political optics, but also in light of
the rising national debt and criticism from the Opposition in Parliament about
overproduction, excess, and wastage.37 Insiders in the DMS and DRS understood that
such enlarged expansion and investment had been the unavoidable cost of total war, but
tabulating where every dollar was spent in order to establish a price-point for surpluses
was nearly impossible and quite impractical for the WAC’s purposes.38 Simply put,
calculating the original cost was not going to be easy or have much bearing on postwar
appraisals and prices.
During the war emergency of 1940-1941, the financial costs of the war became
irrelevant as far as Howe was concerned. As he boldly told his staff in June 1940 while
instructing them to take whatever steps were necessary to increase production, “we have
no idea of the cost but before this war is over everything will be needed so let’s go ahead
anyway. If we lose the war nothing will matter...if we win the war the cost will still have
been of no consequence and will have been forgotten.”39 At the time, the production of
war materials mattered more than keeping detailed and centralized production records
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and receipts.40 Furthermore, as A. F. W. Plumptre explained, the DMS was “largely
staffed by persons unfamiliar with government regulations and government routine, most
of them business men and engineers” and as a result “there was a good deal of
misdirected effort.” 41 Overworked and compartmentalized, few people knew the whole
picture of where all the money was spent. Recouping the original cost of each article
would be difficult to calculate because the starting figures were unavailable or required
extensive research to tabulate or because the “dollar-a-year-men” who did know had
already left government service.
Moreover, the mandarins in the DMS and DRS were also well aware that the
original cost was drastically inflated. From its inception the DMS opted to use a form of
contract known as “cost-plus” over other contracting methods. The logic was simple
given Canada’s limited manufacturing capacity at the outbreak of hostilities: in order to
incentivize war production for private businesses, the DMS agreed to pay for or
guarantee bank loans to cover the cost of production plus a profit that came in the form of
a fixed fee, an award per item produced, or (more popularly) a percentage of the total. 42
However, the cost-plus system was open to abuse as contractors were liable to
dramatically inflate their start-up and production costs to turn a larger profit and double
up on other conversion incentives. In 1941, officials in the DMS came under fire when an
investigative report by the SCWEE concluded that cost-plus contracts were the worst and
most expensive form of contract. Despite this fact the DMS continued to use them as
Howe and his advisors saw little alternative but to sacrifice cost efficiency for the rapid
expansion required for increased production.43 Furthermore, in addition to the
construction and other capital costs associated with industrial expansion, the scarcity of
40
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sophisticated production equipment and the purchase and importation of machine tools
from the US substantially increased production costs beyond normal market values.44
The postwar market rates for assets acquired between 1940 and 1945 were
therefore drastically smaller than what was paid out during the war years. As a result, the
government could never expect to recoup the entirety of the original investment,
especially since these items naturally depreciated over time. In fact, it would only get
back a tiny fraction of the original price, though critics constantly assumed the
government could do better. However, these critical opinions often failed to differentiate
the total wartime expenditure by sub-dividing the costs recoverable in selling surpluses
from the sunk costs that had funded the expansion of industrial production early in the
war.45 Of course, the optics looked terrible, especially when aircraft or ships that had cost
millions to procure were sold for a fraction of the original investment. But there was little
that could be done. According to an unpublished history, the WAC’s gross sales total
from 12 July 1944 to 31 March 1948 amounted to $427,246,250.81 while a minimum of
$23,776,582.60 was recovered from sales in 1948-1949.46 These numbers represented
only a portion of the billions spent during the war, but the WAC considered this a solid
return for depreciating assets.

Dividend Denied
The WAC’s selling strategy was criticized by a disgruntled public that expected to
purchase goods at dealer prices. The public did not appreciate having to pay for an item
twice – first for its manufacture during the war and then at price ceilings after the war –
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all so that businesses could turn a profit. Yet the WAC’s selling strategy was precisely
designed to avoid the uncontrolled erosion of prices and limit the public’s ability to buy
direct. In fact, because the system was set up in opposition to the public’s expectations,
the frustration was actually a sign that the WAC was doing its job. However, with
corporations winning out, average consumers lost out and several groups contested this
disadvantaged position. Their efforts brought some relief, but the WAC refused to
overhaul the basic premise of its operations and preside over a fire-sale of crown assets.
Veterans pressured the government hardest as their associations mobilized quickly
to combat the WAC’s corporate favouritism. In the spring of 1945, the Second World
War Veterans organization wrote a resolution that the United Council of Veterans
approved and sent to several ministers including Howe. The resolution demanded
preferential treatment in buying surpluses, stating: “we urge that surplus war materials be
sold at a preferential price to returned ex-service personnel by Crown Assets Corporation
or by wholesalers on a cost-plus fee so that veterans could use such supplies to reestablish themselves.”47 These types of resolutions were common and a sign of things to
come, especially as more veterans returned home and encountered obstacles prohibiting
them from acquiring surplus things. In many cases, the items veterans wanted most were
the ones they had been using just days before their discharge. It seemed outrageous that
they could not buy them for their own re-establishment.
Throughout 1945 many veterans voiced their displeasure with the situation and the
Royal Canadian Legion started accumulating evidence. Since many veterans were
interested in acquiring trucks, their complaints tended to focus on the inability to buy
vehicles direct from the WAC and the sales commissions attached to the final price at car
dealerships. As one frustrated veteran told Captain E. M. Greaves, a Senior Army
Councillor stationed in Ottawa, “I understand these dealers get these cars for $125 and
sell at a ceiling of $375. Why can’t we buy direct? Surely after 5 years’ service I don’t
have to pay a dealer $250 for the privilege of buying a $375 truck.” 48 In Calgary where
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shortages of building materials, employment, and accommodation were especially acute
and disproportionately affecting veterans, the Army’s Rehabilitation Officer, Major E. A.
W. Miles, remarked that “feelings [were] beginning to run high” since “every troop train
adds more to the crowd, and it would take very little to start considerable
unpleasantness.”49 In the same report, Miles also summarized the general mood and
hostility brewing in Calgary. People believed that the government and big business were
colluding for profits, while willfully ignoring the scarcity of goods, accommodation
shortages, and rising unemployment levels:
Too soon it appears to have been forgotten that had it not been for the service
men there would have been no Canada, too often have these same servicemen
been told that ‘nothing is too good for them’, and now we find that very little
is being done that is ‘too good for them’ and actually it appears that most
consideration is given to manufacturers and dealers.50
During late 1945, the Legion made several attempts at pressuring the WAC into
providing veterans with favourable pricing and priority access to surplus goods. In
August and September several meetings between representatives of the Legion, WPTB,
DND, Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), and the WAC were convened to discuss
the issues and establish possible arrangements for a “veterans’ priority.” At meetings on 6
and 11 September, a potential set of arrangements were drawn up that included, among
other things, the creation of a list of items veterans needed most and the requirement that
the WAC keep those items on hand for thirty days so veterans could submit a claim,
inspect the goods, and then make a purchase at dealer prices (or so the Legion could buy
them on behalf of veterans). Summing up the meeting and the recommendations, J. W.
Johnson, a Veterans Welfare Office with the DVA stated, “I think the draft is excellent.
The suggestions we have put forward there in, I think are practical and if accepted should
go a long way towards solving a vexatious problem.”51
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Unfortunately, the key words in that sentence were “if accepted” and not “vexatious
problem.” On 6 December A. E. McMaster, the WAC’s General Manager, wrote to
Johnson with some bad news. Upon conferring with Berry and his staff, the WAC could
not accept a veterans’ priority because it was “administratively impossible” to
implement.52 While sympathetic to veterans’ issues, the WAC was having such a difficult
time with the priorities scheme they were considering abolishing them completely right
as the Legion was asking for an additional one.53 Other reasons for the refusal had to do
with holding the inventory for thirty days as this would slow sales and further stall an
already overburdened system. Additionally, the WAC could not guarantee a steady
stream of spare parts or customer services, so it was best to sell everything through
established dealers who could offer those things. Perhaps the most important reason why
the veteran priority was rejected was not even mentioned in McMaster’s letter. Instead, it
was hand-written in the margins by Berry on Johnson’s original memo: “this envisages
‘blind buying’ of course, which was what we are trying to avoid. Suppose the vet is
dissatisfied with the article when he sees it at the dealers? I fear I have no solution.”54 In
other words, holding items on the speculation that veterans would want them not only
delayed final disposal, but turned the veteran into an authorized speculator.
Thus, veterans were shut out of receiving any privileged access to the surplus assets
that many had used and gained great experience with during the war years. Instead, they
had to purchase them, like every other customer, through established businesses and at
the highest prices allowed under the WPTB’s ceilings. For veterans, hoping to acquire
items for their rehabilitation during a period of severe material shortages, this often meant
expending their entire gratuity payments or re-establishment credits on second-hand
materials that were sometimes inferior in quality or worn out. Moreover, an eager veteran
desperate to re-establish himself with home furnishings or tools was often susceptible to
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being victimized by fraudsters promising those things for cash but never delivering.55
Ultimately, by refusing to grant a veterans priority, the WAC placed veterans in direct
competition with civilians. This situation favoured the civilian who had earned higher
wages in Canada’s bustling wartime economy and had more savings to spend. Although
the situation was less than ideal, the WAC saw no advantages to altering its practices
though it did try pressuring dealers with patriotic and compassionate appeals.56
Despite their efforts, veterans could not unhinge the corporate favouritism. The
overriding concerns of WAC officials and businessmen were too entwined, as fears of
recreating another postwar depression clouded policymaking. Businessmen had the inside
track and the WAC depended on them regularly. For practically every major type of
commodity or industrial sector the WAC hired experts or associations closely affiliated
with the trade to act as agents for the Corporation. In regards to aircraft the WAC at first
relied on the Toronto-based engineering firm Armstrong, Wood, and Company but it later
settled on Federal Aircraft Limited, a crown company that helped the WAC on aircraft
sales and destruction policies.57 In September 1944 an agreement was struck with H.
Muehlstein & Company of Canada Limited (a subsidiary of the American conglomerate
H. Muehlstein Inc.) which made it the primary consultant and distributor for rubber
surpluses in Canada.58 The Canadian Electrical Manufacturers Association served as an
advisor for the disposal of electrical items and E. J. Longfellow was hired specifically as
a consultant.59 For ships and naval vessels, the WAC turned to David Reid, Chairman of
John Kilgour & Company, who acted as a broker for the sale of ships in the UK.
However, in January 1946, the WAC hired Park Steamship Company, the crown
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company that had managed Canada’s merchant marine during the war, to broker sales for
merchant and cargo vessels.60
Hiring agents was an effective strategy for the WAC since its large and diverse
inventory meant it had to engage in multiple merchandising fields simultaneously. Rather
than building new relationships with so many different businesses at once, it was easier
and more direct to hire someone that was already well-known and respected in the trade.
Thus, employing an “insider” to represent the WAC was the simplest and most direct
method for navigating the marketplace. Moreover, the WAC’s agents also took on some
other important tasks; they advised on disposal policies and procedures, informed their
networks of impending liquidations, facilitated introductions with potential clients, and
coordinated extensively with the industrial committees established by the WICB’s
Resource Controllers during the war.61
There is little doubt that agents helped the WAC, but they also profited
handsomely. Employing agents created an inner circle of clients who gained a significant
competitive advantage over “outsider” companies and the general public. After all, agents
were businessmen first and since profits mattered most, they used their positions
accordingly. The competitive advantage gained by agents can be demonstrated through
an analysis of those involved in the WAC’s destruction programs. In February 1944, the
WAC’s Board of Directors hired the President of the Canadian Secondary Materials
Association, Mr. Egmont Frankel, as its agent for scrap materials. Later in October an
agreement was reached with Atlas Steel Ltd. which acted as the WAC’s agent for steel
and metals disposal (or everything metallic but not labelled as scrap).62 In the following
years, both Atlas Steel and Frankel’s company, Frankel Brothers Ltd., benefitted
substantially from their transactions and association with the WAC because their
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companies gained the inside track on policy formulation and reconnaissance on available
inventories.
A clear pattern of corporate patronage emerges when all types of metal sales from
1944-1949 were plotted on Google Fusion tables. Although some large sales were made
to Anaconda American Brass Company, West Coast Shipbuilders Ltd., and Hayes Steel
Products Ltd., it was Atlas Steel that topped the network analysis charts in terms of
purchasing frequency, dollars spent, and total weight acquired. Although not every sale in
the WAC’s annual reports provided total weight, Atlas Steel surely made the single
heaviest purchase when it bought 1,708,745 net tons (or about 3,417,490,000 lbs.) of
shell steel billets from the WAC for the sum of $34,174.63 Although certainly not on par
with Atlas Steel, Frankel Brothers also made a variety of purchases from the WAC. From
1944 to 1949, it bought well over two million pounds of scrap metals (mainly brass,
nickel, and steel), in addition to 126,887 lbs. of copper wiring, $10,068 worth of Army
vehicle parts, thirteen naval vessels (five destroyers and eight corvettes) for $119,000,
and many other items listed as scrap.64 Clearly, as agents of the WAC, Atlas Steel and
Frankel Brothers benefitted from insider information about available inventories.
Agents also may have received some preferential treatment when bidding on
merchandise and real estate. In one instance, J. W. Horsey’s company, Dominion Stores
Ltd., got into a bidding war with Addison Ltd. for the York Arsenals building in Toronto.
From late 1945 through to early 1946 when the sale was finalized, the two companies bid
for the prized property. Originally, Addison offered $400,000 but quickly matched the
$475,000 counterbid from Dominion Stores. With both offers equal, the matter was
passed on to the Industrial Reconversion Branch (IRB) which determined that the sale to
Addison (a radio manufacturer) was the best choice since the Branch’s experts believed it
would generate more employment. However, before the WAC could act, Dominion
Stores submitted a $600,000 bid and the Corporation jumped at the offer. Although
Addison eventually settled on its second choice and purchased floor space at the John
Inglis plant extensions, it would appear that officials in the WAC favoured Horsey’s
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company by rejecting the IRB’s recommendations and completing the sale without giving
Addison much time to counterbid.65
However, despite enjoying a privileged position within the WAC’s disposal
strategy, agents and established businesses had some of their peace dividend denied as
well. Certainly businessmen gained competitive advantages, but their advice and opinions
were never binding. The fifth cardinal point mandated the WAC “to seek expert advice
from industry on price levels and marketing methods but not to act on such advice to the
expense of public interest.”66 This meant that the WAC reserved the right to refuse or
modify whatever information, opinions, or proposals it received from the business sector.
In effect, the WAC collaborated with business interests to create a disposal system that
benefited mutual economic imperatives. Yet the WAC also departed from the advice or
needs of businesses whenever they did not suit the political or social imperatives
structured into the WAC’s full mandate or the priorities system that allowed direct sales
to governments and public bodies before anything was sold to private interests.
One issue on which the WAC departed from the advice it received from business
interests was on the destruction of surpluses. Businesses were deathly afraid of their own
wartime productivity – particularly of assets easily reusable in the peacetime economy –
and openly advocated for complete destruction of surplus stocks. For instance, the Allied
Drug Council, an association representing the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals,
medicines, and medical supplies, echoed a common refrain when they pressured the
government to destroy all surpluses instead of redistributing or reusing them. While V. E.
Hessell, the Chairman of the Drug Council, acknowledged the wastefulness of such a
policy and the desperate need overseas, he explained in a letter to Ilsley, that “from a
purely selfish point of view, it would be best to destroy absolutely all surplus goods, as
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their appearance on the market is certain to lessen the demand for new manufactured
goods and consequently decrease employment.”67
The pressure that business interests brought to bear on the government worked on
some occasions, but the destruction of perfectly useable assets was not something that
interested the WAC. For the Corporation destroying surplus assets because they
threatened to flood markets and destroy prices was not sufficient grounds for initiating a
destruction program to eliminate the asset’s residual value, particularly given the postwar
shortages in supply. Instead, the destruction of a surplus asset was only considered as a
last resort or if no civilian uses were discovered. In other words, while businesses feared
the asset’s residual value and wanted it terminated to further stimulate demand for new
goods, the WAC considered it a quality worth preserving in some capacity. Moreover,
because its mission was to recoup as much money as possible, funding the costs of
destruction was not always advisable. While the WAC would do what it could to sustain
the normal economy and limit the disruptive influence of surpluses, it would not offer
business interests a blanket destruction policy or special treatment beyond using
established trade and distribution networks. All surplus assets that maintained residual
value in civilian life would be sold as quickly as possible so the WAC would recoup
more money while liquidating surpluses during a time of severe shortages. As Peterson
explained to the SCWEE, “now is the time, not only to get the best return for surpluses,
but also to relieve consumer needs. Every effort is being bent to accomplish this purpose.
No industry is receiving protection through the holding or export of surpluses, or the
suppression of offerings.”68

Munitions and Public Safety
There was one consideration that trumped selling an asset: public safety. Despite an
eager marketplace, if an item was designed purely to military specifications or possessed
no civilian applications or remained a danger to life, it was never offered for sale
domestically. If no international client could be found, than the WAC had no choice but
67
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to fund destruction. However, it is important to note the complexity in determining the
level of danger posed by an asset. At first glance blanket policies for destroying and
restricting the sale of dangerous materials are a very logical and vigilant course of action.
Hypothetically, if the government allowed a veteran to return home from Northwest
Europe and purchase a tank to drive on city streets, the rule of law and public safety
would be severely threatened. The unrestricted sale of tanks would not only upend the
basic tenets of all traffic laws (who stops at traffic signals when driving a tank?) but it
would also create a precedent for the availability of armoured vehicles to all segments of
the population that would be difficult to rescind, to say little about the lasting financial
burdens on customers (for tank maintenance) and municipalities (for road repair).
Clearly, establishing procedures that prevented the sale of “war-like material” that have
“no known peace-time uses” and destroying whatever remained a “danger to life” was a
prudent and reasonable course of action.69 Yet as the WAC discovered, blanket policies
designed to protect public safety were not always practical. Although they looked good
on paper, they created inflexible approaches to disposal that could hinder possible sales.
When an item was labelled dangerous by the CAAC or armed forces it fell to the
WAC to determine exactly what that meant and devise a strategy for selling or destroying
that category of item. As a result, in May 1944, when the issue of war-like materials was
first addressed by the CAAC, the WAC’s Board of Directors resolved to retain as much
technical expertise as necessary in order to “discover sound economic uses” for a variety
of military-patterned aircraft, vehicles, and even some types of ammunition, explosives,
and weaponry.70 The WAC’s Directors further resolved that war-like materials would
only be destroyed if no suitable peacetime applications were ever discovered. This was
one of the most important sets of policies ever developed by Canada’s disposal
administration since they were aimed at defining the practicality of military-patterned
objects in a non-military marketplace. The key dividing line between selling and
destroying assets was in determining their value to civilians. If the asset could not be
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easily converted to peaceful purposes or remained a danger to life, it was destroyed by
Clearance teams or contractors hired by the WAC or the armed forces in consultation
with the WAC. If some residual commercial value was found or if some potential market
existed (domestic or international) then the objects were not immediately consigned to
scrap heaps or thrown in the ocean.
However, simply identifying something as dangerous was not a straightforward
delineation between civilian and military practicality. In fact, the WAC discovered that
the line dividing civilian from military applications was so exceedingly thin that it was
difficult to justify the expense of complete destruction. Some lethal objects maintained
residual value to civilians without any adaptations or disassembly. Obviously, there were
many weapon systems that were never sold because they lacked any real civilian
applications that no amount of modifications could change. However, for every tank,
tactical aircraft, grenade, machine gun, or artillery piece there were other types of
weapons systems that retained some value and utility in peacetime. These latter types of
munitions straddled the line between civilian and military practicality so closely because
they were easily convertible for use in either context. In many instances, the armed forces
recognized the cross-over potential and, despite their exemptions for destroying surplus
ammunition and explosives, they declared lethal assets surplus to the CAAC and WAC
for disposal to civilian markets. For example, TNT and other types of explosives were
integral to the mining industry and infrastructure development, such as in highway and
railroad construction. Moreover, the logging industry had interest in acquiring Bren gun
carriers to pull logs in remote woodlands, while police forces were interested in machine
guns and tear gas.71 Some other niche markets included rifle clubs, educational
institutions, and flying schools. Of course, the supply far exceeded the demand, but these
customers provided the WAC with legitimate outlets for selling weaponry, ammunition,
and explosives so it could not ignore them for the sake of blanket destruction policies.
The policies and procedures involving the disposal of firearms exemplify how the
WAC navigated this thin line separating civilian and military practicality. To any
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reasonable person firearms are considered dangerous, so if public safety is paramount
then firearms should never be sold. However, since certain types of firearms maintain
residual value in peacetime, blanket sales restriction and destruction policies were not
always useful. For instance, in the hands of police forces or allied governments firearms
are an asset that can further the state’s interests, authority, and monopoly on violence.
Depending on the customer, selling arms might be worthwhile or even protect the
public’s safety. Furthermore, if a potential customer was a legitimate business or
association operating in Canada and specializing in hunting, sporting, youth education, or
something similar, then it made sense to sell certain types of weapons (like shot guns or
sporting rifles) to these reputable organizations. In these cases, restricting sales was not
ideal because the WAC and the Services would have to underwrite the expense of storing
and destroying the items, while forgoing any profits and the benefits of provisioning
material support to the civilian organizations involved.72
As a result, the WAC developed some flexible policies that allowed sales of lethal
assets on a case-by-case basis and policy bulletins about selling restrictions on firearms
were continuously redrafted between 1945 and 1947.73 In implementing these selling
restrictions, the WAC depended heavily on the RCMP for guidance, both in terms of
policy formation and also for conducting background checks on potential customers.
Throughout the immediate postwar period, WAC officials consulted frequently with the
RCMP and, depending on the assets involved, with other government agencies, such as
the Department of Transport when disposing of aircraft or the Department of External
Affairs when selling something internationally.74
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The incumbent issues involving firearms were so important that both Malley and
Berry corresponded directly with the long-time RCMP Commissioner, S. T. Wood. Their
correspondence in the late summer and early fall of 1947 reveals how dependent the
WAC was on the RCMP for guidance. In August 1947, Malley wrote Wood because he
saw an opportunity to unload the Corporation’s stock of surplus service rifles (mostly,
though not exclusively, the Lee Enfield Rifle No. 4 Mk. 1) because the American War
Assets Administration (WAA) was about to liquidate American service rifles. He
believed that since American weapons would “find their way into Canada to Sporting
Goods or Hardware Dealers,” it made sense to sell surplus Canadian rifles.75 Malley’s
primary concerns at the time were liquidating inventories, closing warehouses, and
slashing payroll, so he was desperate to unload the stocks of weaponry piled up at WAC
warehouses. On 13 September, Wood replied to Malley with an attached “Consolidated
Departmental Regulations Governing the Importation of Firearms and Dangerous and
Offensive Weapons” issued by the Department of National Revenue on 6 June 1946. He
informed Malley that firearms could only be imported under permits issued by National
Revenue and it was doubtful that any sporting or hardware store would receive approval
because it was not issuing “such permits and all requests therefor are presently being
refused.”76 There was no need to modify any procedures because of American actions.
On 27 September, Wood further clarified his reluctance for liberalizing sales of
firearms and lifting restrictions. Above all, he was preoccupied by the fallout from Igor
Gouzenko’s revelations about a Soviet spy-ring in Canada, the Red Scare, and the fears
of escalating gun violence. Although Wood acknowledged the “excellent background”
and “religious, educational or semi-military nature” of clientele referred to the RCMP for
investigation, he was concerned with other clubs and associations that “do not enjoy the
same reputation and which might well be interested in securing a stock of weapons for
improper purposes.”77 Wood then vaguely indicated that some of the organizations were
declared illegal during the war and “a few tend to be of a semi-military character and
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even favour the wearing of a type of uniform.”78 The Commissioner was concerned about
creating a precedent that might cause “a real problem for refusing similar demands from
other organizations which are not, at the present time, illegal but which are certainly not
dependable from a standpoint of loyalty to this country.”79 Wood saw no undue hardship
on the general public if weapons were not sold as he could not “visualize any actual need
for arming organizations which do not have the sanction and support of the Department
of National Defence.”80 A few days later Berry assured the Commissioner that “this
Corporation is in entire agreement with the policy which you suggest.” 81 He also told
Wood that the WAC would continue following existing policies so that the organizations
that Wood described as “questionable or disloyal” in character would not gain access to
surplus firearms through the WAC.
Since Malley’s attempt at liberalizing selling restrictions for service rifles failed
and no legitimate international clients were found, the WAC had no other choice except
to underwrite the cost of destruction. Whenever firearms were destroyed detailed
procedures were employed to ensure that the weapons were confined to specific
localities, sufficiently mutilated, and that the destruction process actually took place (so
no weapons mysteriously vanished). Surplus weapons in the hands of the WAC were all
destroyed in a similar fashion as the stock of 8,000 machine guns “of various types in
storage at Lauzon and St. Johns, Quebec” that Malley mentioned in his 30 August letter
to Wood.82 When Malley informed the RCMP Commissioner that the WAC still
possessed 8,000 machine guns, he asked if any police forces in Canada might want them.
Wood told Malley that he thought the Thompson sub-machine gun would be the only one
valuable to police forces, but that he saw no other potential clientele for which these
automatic weapons “might be disposed of legally.”83 Although Malley understood that
they could not be sold to the public under any circumstances, he needed to confirm that
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the WAC had no alternative except to “scrap these machine guns after they have been
sufficiently mutilated”84
All small arms declared surplus were mutilated under the supervision of a WAC
representative. If the armaments were located on a military base or port, service
personnel performed the job under the supervision of the WAC’s representative and an
officer or senior NCO who certified that mutilation took place. At WAC warehouses or
other locations, the WAC contracted out the job through “arrangements” with a local
“mechanic with portable acetylene cutter.”85 In these circumstances the destruction
process included a constable from the local RCMP Detachment who signed off on the
Certificate of Mutilation.
All mutilation was done
with an acetylene torch.
Usually one diagonal cut
near the magazine and
across the breech block,
firing pin, and piston post
was enough to mutilate
most

small

arms.

However, in some cases
Photo 9 Photo of a mutilated Bren gun, circa 1949. Source: LAC,
RG101, Vol. 2, File 9-2-1, Pt. 2 Disposal of Small Arms,
Ammunition & Explosives, photograph.

additional

cuts

were

necessary as seen in Photo
9 where a second cut

across the barrel at the gas port was necessary to completely wreck the venerable Bren
gun. Any components or spare parts were cut with the acetylene torch “in the most simple
and effective manner.”86 Once the cutting took place and the Certificate of Mutilation
was filled out and mailed to the WAC’s offices in Montreal, the small arms were usually
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sold as scrap to a local junk dealer who salvaged the metals after using a hydraulic press
to flatten the weapons.
Firearms were just one type of weaponry that the WAC dealt with, and even though
they closely straddled the line between civilian and military practicality, they may have
been one of the more clear-cut and easier delineations to manage. In effect, the line
dividing civilian and military applications got even murkier once larger weapon systems
were scrapped or broken down to basic materials. For example, if a bomber or fighter
(such as a Lancaster or Hurricane) was considered as a single object designed to military
specifications, few civilian uses were readily apparent and, in line with established
policies, these valiant fighting machines were scrapped. However, aircraft are really the
sum of several thousand component parts, some of which retain commercial value
individually but not collectively. Depending on the creativity of customers or the WAC’s
technical advisers and staff, many other potential improvisations or applications were
possible. Aside from providing spare parts for maintenance purposes, airplane parts could
double for many things. In one case, the WAC’s Consumer Goods Division found that
the “tough yet pliable” Plexiglas used for windows in cockpits and gun turrets could be
transformed into costume jewelry when diced and dyed different colours.87 In another
case, the WAC was alerted to one manufacturer’s discovery of the usefulness of surplus
airplane wheels and so the WAC sold the smaller tail wheels as replacements for
wheelbarrow wheels and the larger ones were marketed as something to improve the
mobility of trailers and machinery on farms or in factories.88 Thus, depending on one’s
creativity and imagination, when weapon systems were taken apart and broken down,
their components could be recycled into other productive civilian purposes.
Therefore, destruction was really a process of reduction that facilitated renewal,
reuse, recycling, and upcycling. A good disposal strategy had to accommodate and
nurture this process of material rehabilitation in light of the risks to public safety and
apprehensive businessmen. As a result, officials realized that they had to carefully
scrutinize and test every type of item and its components before, during, and after the
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asset entered their custody. The purpose was always to discover “sound economic uses”
for the tactical equipment built to military specifications.89 To illustrate this process
consider the Jeep and other motor transports, such at the 3-ton and 15-cwt Canadian
Military Pattern trucks. Throughout the war, the four-wheel drive ¼-ton truck, commonly
known as the Jeep, became an iconic symbol of the Allied war effort. As Howe remarked
in his radio speech in October 1944, the Jeep “has fired public imagination” and that
“everybody seems to want one.”90 Although the public was eager to buy jeeps, the reality
was that few were available. Quoting a WAC press release about the Jeep’s limited
availability, the Globe and Mail reported that the number “will fall far short of the
popular demand, judging by the thousands of inquiries that have poured in ever since
War Assets Corporation started operations.”91
Curiously, the public’s enthusiasm for the Jeep remained strong despite warnings
about the vehicle’s dubious suitability for “day to day civilian use.” 92 Although the Jeep
enjoyed incredible versatility on the frontlines as an all-purpose transport vehicle, its
postwar utility was questionable. In an article on the Jeep’s postwar rehabilitation,
Andrew Iarrocci explained that as early as August 1943 C. J. Mackenzie, the actingPresident of the National Research Council, sought advice about the Jeep’s postwar
utility to farmers. He contacted a professor at the University of Saskatchewan who was
involved in some extensive testing on the Jeep with the engineering department at
Massey-Harris Company in Toronto. The results of the tests, which found their way to
the members of the CAAC’s Sub-Committee on Automotive Equipment in mid-1944,
revealed that an unmodified Jeep built to military specifications would not enjoy a
productive civilian life. Among the Jeep’s chief failings was its lack of fuel efficiency,
tendency to roll over, insufficient loading capacity compared to larger farm trucks, and a
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transmission unsuitable for farm work.93 Those citizens looking to purchase a Jeep would
be sorely disappointed, at least until the new Jeep Station Wagon models started
appearing at car dealerships. These new Jeep models from Willy-Overland were
specifically built for civilian markets, though advertisements were quick to connect them
to their wartime brethren. One ad in Canadian Automotive Trade stated that “[the Jeep
Station Wagon] is a people’s car and a lineal descendent of the wartime and later the
Universal Jeep.”94
Furthermore, the Sub-Committee discovered that the limitations of the Jeep were
common to almost every military-patterned vehicle. As Brigadier Mavor explained in a
letter to the CAAC in February 1944, “the safety factor” was the biggest concern.95
Almost every type of military vehicle was right-hand drive, while civilian vehicles in
North America were left-hand drive. Moreover, military vehicles were designed to meet
military purposes and they lacked civilian-style comforts and features. They also needed
special parts that were not easily available in commercial markets, most models were
4X4 (thus they consumed more fuel) and the diameter of tires was larger than any civilian
model. Mavor believed that most military vehicles would require scrapping, despite the
fact that this “would perhaps arouse some adverse comments” from the public who were
not aware of the “peculiar” types or the long-term drag they would put on the market.96
Given the Sub-Committee’s composition, Mavor’s views found a receptive audience. Of
the ten men who populated the Sub-Committee, six were executives representing Ford,
GM, and Chrysler as well as the automotive parts industry, wholesale distributors, and
dealers. The other four came from the government or military: the WAC, the CAAC, the
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Automotive and Tank Production Branch in the DMS, and the Directorate of
Mechanization in the DND.97
It is fair to say that the final report submitted to Berry in late May 1945 reflected
both the interests of big business and the reality that few military vehicles would become
useful civilian assets without extensive modifications and refurbishing. The automotive
industry was vitally concerned by the disposal of vehicles and its representatives were
adamant that the disposal of surplus vehicles occur through regular distribution networks
so as not to create illegitimate supply channels dominated by speculators. For those
trucks, cars, and motorcycles deemed to have civilian potential, the Sub-Committee
recommended that manufacturers purchase all vehicles back from the government and
cover the financial and labour costs of reconversion, refurbishment and redistribution to
dealers for sale to the general public.98
Accordingly, the Sub-Committee also recommended that everything that could not
be salvaged in peacetime be disposed of as scrap and mutilated in such a way as to
prevent it from being used as a truck again. The only exception to this destruction policy
was for “new military types” that were still in their crates or already overseas. These
vehicles were to be disposed of outside the country wherever possible.99 This was a
cunning decision that benefited both the government and big business as it avoided
paying additional repatriation and reconversion costs while also providing a convenient
outlet to unload vehicles that would have further glutted the domestic market. Moreover,
finding overseas customers for those new vehicles still in crates had another, unspoken
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benefit for the car industry. Since every military-patterned vehicle manufactured during
the war came with one or two years of spare parts, car companies were anxious to limit
the domestic supply of spare parts, lest they allow a customer to repair and maintain their
military-patterned vehicle and further delay purchasing new civilian models.100
The key point in this vehicle example is that Canada’s disposal administration
actively sought the input of business interests and government expertise in order to amass
information about implementing sales policies and restrictions. Of course, the WAC
reserved the right to refuse the advice it received, and while this occurred in some
instances, the WAC largely accepted the automotive sector’s recommendations as
summarized in the Sub-Committee’s final report written by its chair, E. R. Birchard.
Surplus military vehicles that could be converted to civilian purposes were disposed of in
vast quantities through established dealers and manufacturers, while the remainder were
destroyed or sold overseas.101 The due diligence of policymakers was paramount. When
establishing and implementing policies and restrictions they sought to establish workable
arrangements that defined the contours of civilian and military in pragmatic ways,
protecting the public’s safety but still allowing the WAC to sell its inventories. These
decisions were not popular with the public, who perceived them as the indiscriminate
destruction of public property. However, war was extremely wasteful and, while there
was no shortage of items available to sell, there was also a tremendous amount of things
that could never be sold to civilians. Consequently, these items had to be destroyed.

Reduction to Destruction: Salvaging Value from Weapon Systems
Sometime in mid-1946 officials in the WAC came to grips with the reality that
more than just ammunition would require destruction. Aside from ocean dumping, there
were three other destruction methods available: incineration, scrapping, and mutilation.
According to the WAC’s own definitions, the destruction of surpluses implied their
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permanent elimination. This was only considered an option if the goods in question were
lethal or without any peacetime applications or items of a secret nature that could not be
sold because of national security concerns. The things that fell into these categories – the
bulk of which were most calibers of ammunition and artillery shells – were destroyed
using the safest and most efficient method possible: ocean dumping and to a lesser extent
incineration and burial.102 Although some ammunition and explosives were scrapped, the
incineration or dumping of stocks of dangerous goods permanently eliminated the threat
and saved the financial, storage, and security liabilities.
Scrapping and mutilation were commonly employed when dealing with weapon
systems, secret materials, or any other items whose only value to “the peacetime
economy [was] by melting [them] down, or by changing [their] form.”103 Scrapping or
the “reduction of surplus to produce” was defined by the process of breaking apart a
system of objects that formed a larger “apparatus” in order to salvage the components and
materials. This was the fate most often bestowed upon weapon systems from aircraft and
ships, to tanks and guns, and their “parts...which are not used in commercial life” but
could be further reduced until some civilian value was derived.104 Although it was closely
associated with scrapping and often done in tandem, mutilation had a separate meaning.
Mutilation implied “the marking or removal of material, or otherwise defacing any
particular surplus article so that it cannot be used for its original purpose.”105 In other
words, the intent of mutilation was not to change the object’s form, but merely modify its
intended function or identify a change in ownership. Mutilation could be done by
acetylene torch cuts or the use of official cancellation dye for government markings. It is
worth noting that objects were mutilated without being destroyed or scrapped. In fact,
most objects that entered the WAC’s custody were mutilated in some capacity so that
ownership could be established. Wherever possible – on the object or its components or
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its container – Clearance and Warehousing personnel branded surpluses with the WAC’s
logo or the words “War Assets Corporation.”106
The necessity of an expanded destruction program dawned on policymakers as they
faced two competing pressures. The first had to do with the quantity of surplus munitions,
the limited storage space, and the selling delays caused by restrictions, priorities, and the
testing for potential civilian applications. The other pressure was tied to the quality of
items in the WAC’s possession. When evaluating their inventories, the armed forces
adopted a stringent policy of keeping the best and most advanced equipment. Considering
that the Services returned large portions of their kit to the British and only repatriated
from Europe what they wanted to keep, this meant that the assets they declared surplus
were often the bottom-rung, obsolete equipment in deteriorating condition. In other
words, when the armed forces assessed their peacetime requirements they continued the
well-entrenched policy of cannibalizing kit for spare parts and declaring the remainder
surplus to the CAAC. This policy greatly affected the type and utility of munitions
entering the WAC’s custody since the Corporation received either the components of
weapon systems that the Services had already dismembered or the whole munition in its
obsolete and worn out state. Thus, in addition to the flood of items valuable to civilians or
in good condition, the WAC had to dispose of a wide selection of disparate things that
originated from a variety of munitions (and some supplies) that were chopped up,
disassembled, or technologically obsolescent.107
A robust destruction program became unavoidable as the inventories of worthless
kit and lethal objects without any civilian applications grew. Contrary to the public outcry
and reports of wanton destruction in the wake of incidents like those involving the RCAF
at Penhold, the WAC approached the destruction of surpluses in a methodical and
sensible way. Throughout the entire process attempts were made to sell assets before they
were further reduced. If sales were not possible, then the items were further scrapped so a
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new round of marketing and sales could take place. This process of reduction took place
until it was determined that no further value could be salvaged or if the storage and
labour costs exceeded potential profits. Moreover, as experience was gained with
particular categories of goods, the destruction process was streamlined so that these
objects were reduced to a particular configuration as quickly as possible or, if experience
indicated that nothing was salvageable, the entire thing might be destroyed right away
without any recovery efforts or testing.
It is worth noting that Canada’s destruction program mirrored those initiated in the
UK and US. However, a direct comparison is not wise since Canada’s program was less
extensive, especially by comparison to the US. Given the immense productivity of
America’s armaments industries, the US developed the largest and most comprehensive
disposal program of all the Allies. For example, when the United States Army Air Force
(USAAF) started declaring tactical aircraft surplus, a bewildering amount of planes
required disposal in practically every part of the world. When air bases closed down or
technological advances rendered older planes obsolete, fleets of tactical aircraft were
destroyed onsite or relocated to the US where they were stored at 60 special depots
administrated by America’s disposal agencies (first the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and then the WAA). It was at these “boneyards” where tactical aircraft were
concentrated for destruction or piecemeal sales.108
The largest boneyard was the sprawling desert facility at Kingman, Arizona, though
several permanent facilities were established across the US, such as at Davis-Monthan
Air Force Base in Tuscon, Arizona. In the war’s aftermath, aircraft boneyards gained
increasing notoriety and mystique in postwar American popular culture. In fact, the
Kingman boneyard was featured in an Academy Award-winning film The Best Years of
Our Lives (1946), in which actor Dana Andrews played a maladjusted Air Force veteran
named Fred Derry who found solace in smashing war planes in the fictionalized town of
Boone City.109 Today, surviving boneyards have become tourist attractions where the
public can view decades worth of obsolete planes in permanent storage. In some respects,
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aircraft boneyards represent a nexus point where the concepts of the “technological
sublime” and “deindustrial sublime” co-exist. At these sites, the general fascination with
and celebration of technological achievements (the technological sublime) and the
nostalgia for derelict things and abandonment (the deindustrial sublime) mix together as
the visitor walks through the open air museum observing both technological advancement
and obsolescence simultaneously.110
By contrast, Canada’s disposal administration never organized boneyards on such
an elaborate and permanent scale, so they never gained much popularity in postwar
Canadian society. In May 1944, the WAC’s Board of Directors determined that no
extensive network of government-run scrapyards was advisable since they expected to
utilize the armed forces’ storage facilities and vacant property wherever possible.
However, they also understood that when hostilities ended, a number of temporary yards
might be required to augment the existing infrastructure. The Board felt that if scrapyards
had to be set up they should be located in close proximity to major “centres of
production” and near RCAF bases where significant quantities of aluminum (used
extensively for constructing fuselages) would pile up.111 As a result, several temporary
yards were established, in Quebec (in Montreal and St. Johns), Ontario (Toronto and
Trenton), New Brunswick (Scoudouc), and in British Columbia (Vancouver). These
yards augmented whatever onsite scrapping operations were commenced by the military
and by private companies contracted by the WAC.112 After the reorganization, all scrap
was handled through the Supply Department’s Scrap Disposal Branch which worked
closely with the Corporation’s other Branches and Departments to collect, reduce, and
sell everything tagged as scrap. Since Clearance teams spearheaded all cleanup
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operations, its personnel were closely affiliated with the Scrap Disposal Branch and
carried out the bulk of scrapping requirements.113
If an article could not be sold in its primary form or to fulfill its intended function,
than it was reduced to its basic materials and components. Therefore, scrapping objects
was not the final stop in the transition from war to peace; rather it was just a means to
another end because the decision to progressively reduce weapon systems created new
potential uses and additional disposal requirements. The by-product of taking weapon
systems apart was the production of
numerous other components and
materials that formed them. These
newly separated assets could then
be sold to create another system or
fulfill another use. However, with
every reduction assets were broken
down

into

elements,

so

more

constituent

each

scrapping

operation yielded more items that
required storage, marketing, and
sales negotiations. This multiplied
the
Photo 10 Some of the parts and equipment stripped from
planes at St. Johns, Quebec. Source: LAC, RG101, Vol. 1,
File: R-1-1-9 History of War Assets Corporation Ltd. and
War Assets Corporation, Newspaper Clippings, The
Standard, 15 September 1945, 9.

workload

of

the

WAC’s

Warehousing and Merchandising
staff who had to store and sell more
(but smaller) objects and was
compounded by the amount of

obsolescent munitions declared to the CAAC.
To illustrate the various stages of the destruction process consider surplus aircraft.
When the RCAF started declaring them surplus, the WAC quickly came into possession
of approximately 5,388 aircraft by the end of November 1945 and another 1,402 by May
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1946. Officials immediately realized that “some [aircraft] were of a strictly military type,
unlicensable for commercial or for pleasure use in Canada, economically impractical for
export, or in a condition beyond economical repair.”114 In other words, most of these
aircraft could never be sold as aircraft and therefore had to be “reduced to produce” in
order to derive value from them.115 This was especially the case considering the selling
restrictions in place that forbid the sale of any tactical types and the certification
procedures administered by the Department of Transport that determined the
“airworthiness” of planes and the “pedigree” of the materials or parts. Stringent controls
were instituted over the sale of aircraft and their parts so as to protect the public from
mechanical errors, accidents, and unorthodox military modifications or designs. 116 These
restrictions not only determined who could purchase the planes and which ones were
flyable, but also monitored the sale of parts and components. After all, the WAC could
not scrap an obsolete plane and then resell the equally obsolete parts as replacements in
airworthy aircraft.
According to testimony before the SCWEE, of the 5,388 aircraft declared to the
WAC, 906 were sold as aircraft (or otherwise not in the custody of the WAC in
November 1945) and a further 1,430 planes (mostly obsolete trainer types such as, Anson
I and II, Oxford I and II, and Fairey Battle) were demolished. Of the remaining 3,052
aircraft “still in the Corporation’s hands” only 642 were “considered saleable as
aircraft.”117 This meant that a further 2,410 would require disposal in piecemeal fashion,
in addition to whatever else was declared later. Since scrapping aircraft meant taking
them apart to sell their components and materials these supplies accumulated
exponentially in warehouses before being sold or further reduced. This meant that the
WAC had to be methodical in what it recovered, lest its storage facilities be overwhelmed
with rivets or bolts instead of something more substantial. As a result, the WAC targeted
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its scrapping operations on the key parts deemed to have residual value in civilian
markets: engines, propellers, wheels, wireless equipment, instruments, Plexiglas, and
scrap metals.118 Removing anything else was not advisable or financially prudent because
the cost of removing and storing any other components far exceeded the potential profits
from their sale. Even if other items recovered from the planes were in good and saleable
condition, the WAC had no incentive to accommodate the marketplace if, for example, its
labour and storage costs totalled $1 but sales only remitted 75 cents.119 Simply put, it did
not matter if customers were lining up to purchase the recovered items if the salvaged
value was not worth the expense
of recovery.
Moreover, any assumption
about salvaging significant value
from

surplus

underestimates

aircraft
the

grossly
rate

of

technological change and usage
during the war years. In fact, the
WAC quickly discovered that
many items targeted for recovery
were worthless or in low demand.
Photo 11 Workers at St. Johns, Quebec scrap old damaged
aircraft that cannot be sold any other way. Source: LAC,
RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9 History of War Assets
Corporation Ltd. and War Assets Corporation, Newspaper
Clippings, The Standard, 15 September 1945, 8.

Thus, the unhappy by-product of
scrapping obsolete planes was the
accumulation of more obsolete
parts that no one wanted, even in

a materially-starved marketplace. As Berry explained to the SCWEE in reference to the
1,430 surplus aircraft demolished by the Corporation up to November 1945:
Practically all of the engines saved in demolition are still in our hands, along
with a large quantity of spare engines separately declared. These are either
obsolete for aircraft use or not eligible for Department of Transport
certificates. We have over 6,000. After National advertising we have
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succeeded in selling only 63. Further aircraft demolitions and possible further
declarations of engines will increase the supply to around 7,500…What shall
we do with the balance?120
Thus, in regards to surplus aircraft, scrapping constituted more of a control on quality
than a treasure hunt. Instead of finding hidden value, scrapping ensured that obsolete
aircraft or those without proper licensing would never fly again. Yet this was little
consolation to officials in the WAC’s Supply and Merchandising Departments tasked
with storing and selling a bewildering supply of objects that were rapidly deteriorating in
value and condition. Auctions sales, bulk transactions, indefinite loans to educational
institutions, and increased advertising helped liquidate a small fraction of the ballooning
inventory, but the fact still remained that parts and materials derived from scrapping were
not always that valuable and often remained the items of last resort for customers who
then complained that the items they wanted most were not available.
Although attempts were constantly made to sell items as they traversed every stage
of the destruction process, the WAC never panicked when unsaleable assets piled up or
commercial interest faded. Instead, the Corporation’s management adhered diligently to
its disposal procedures and only made modifications when necessary. The by-product of
this diligence was additional delays in final disposal. Before deciding on a course of
action the WAC had to collect information about the object’s condition and quantities,
collect and store it, test for civilian applications, process paperwork, and if no sales were
arranged proceed with the first wave of scrapping. This took time to complete and
accounts for some of the continuing delays in processing Surplus Declarations. By April
1946, the RCAF had submitted 6,018 Surplus Declarations to the CAAC, worth an
estimated original value of about $628,721,675 and consisting of thousands of different
items and property. However, only 2,181 of those declarations (a third of the total
number and worth about $133,893,000 originally) were collected, processed, and
disposed of by the WAC.121
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Adhering to its mandate with stubborn persistence demonstrates much about the
WAC’s raison d’être. The Corporation was methodical and calculating in protecting the
national economy and employment. It was not out to make a sale for the sake of selling,
but only if the sale was worth it. In fact, sometimes its mandate actually meant refusing a
sale and destroying the items instead. For example, consider the fleet of 203 Anson
training aircraft located in Brantford, Ontario. These obsolete aircraft were declared
surplus by the RCAF in mid-1945, but by March 1946 they were becoming an expensive
nuisance. Unable to sell the Ansons as airworthy planes, the WAC’s Clearance teams
scrapped them to recover their
major components and a new
advertising

campaign

got

underway to sell the parts and
airframes

separately.

The

campaign yielded just a single
$300 bid for the whole lot, but the
WAC rejected it on the basis that
it was too small and the scrap
dealer was unlikely to pay for the
removal

of

everything.122

Consequently, the materials went
Photo 12 An advertisement in the Winnipeg Free Press for
the sale of an Anson training aircraft. Source: Winnipeg
Free Press, 1 April 1946, 6.

back on the market and another
advertising campaign offered the
airframes for $10 per unit. This

brought in 37 purchases and $370, but only 19 frames were actually removed by
customers. Given the limited commercial interest in these derelict aircraft there were few
options left for the fleet of Anson airframes, so the WAC resorted to completing the
destruction process in order to save the labour and storage costs. The Ansons (or
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basically their leftover pieces) were destroyed by incineration in a “huge bonfire”
sometime in the spring of 1946.123
The Brantford bonfire was far from a unique occurrence, as the war’s end doomed
whole generations of aircraft models, including the famed Mosquito fighter-bomber.
Despite its best efforts, the WAC had trouble selling Mosquitos and their components.
Although some were eventually sold to Nationalist China, the market for the plane was
terribly small. According to an official with the WAC, who was interviewed by the Globe
and Mail’s Jack Hambleton, the Mosquito was “hardly a week-end plane” since it was
difficult to handle and required great skill to fly.124 They were also designed and built
under wartime conditions so there was little space inside the cockpit, their fuel efficiency
was terrible, and they were primarily constructed from plywood. Moreover, the pace of
technological change was also a factor in rendering the Mosquito obsolete and limiting
potential markets, as the anonymous official explained:
We have just been talking about wheeling the machines out onto the field and
leaving them there. It seems a terrible waste to see $30 million on wheels
sitting idle but what use are they now the war is over? The RCAF is going
into jet fighters and is not doing much flying other than transport work now.
They are getting Vampires – jet machines – and the Mosquito is an old
machine as a fighter now. 125
In early 1946, the WAC cannibalized fleets of Mosquitos. One group of 128
concentrated in Weston, Ontario was originally offered for sale but no scrap dealer or
educational institution was interested in acquiring these decaying relics. The Corporation
estimated that any further attempts to salvage materials from the aircraft were not
advisable since the recovery of $1 worth of saleable scrap metal would cost $30 per wing.
Therefore, sometime in the early spring the hulking wings (and probably many other
components) were piled together and burned in what had to be a “monster bonfire” since
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each wing was 52 feet long and weighed 2,300 lbs!126 A year later the sad saga of the
doomed Mosquitos continued. This time, as Hambleton reported, the WAC had a fleet of
100 Mosquitos that no one wanted. When the war ended they were cocooned and put into
storage at the DeHavilland Aircraft plant in Toronto. However, the storage contract with
DeHavilland expired in April 1947. Coupled with the prohibitive scrapping costs this
fleet of 100 Mosquitos was condemned to a similar fate as those in Weston.127 The
wartime investment literally went up in smoke!
As the destruction of the Ansons and Mosquitos demonstrates, where no
commercial interest existed or if the salvaged value was not worth the cost of recovery or
storage, the only responsible recourse was complete destruction. Much to the public’s
dissatisfaction, this happened frequently with obsolete aircraft. However, such actions
were necessary because they saved the Corporation from the cost of storing and handling
war junk. This in turn lowered operational costs and meant that the WAC remitted more
of its profits back to the government to help pay down the war debt. Therefore, contrary
to media reports about the wasteful and wanton destruction of public property, the
destruction process actually saved the taxpayer more money than if the WAC continued
to hold onto assets without any markets on which to sell them.128
As much as the WAC controlled and funded the destruction of surpluses through
the Scrap Disposal Branch, it also relied on businesses and commercial interests to assist
in destruction programs. In this regard the WAC did not have much choice. As surplus
items were restricted from sale or reduced to basic materials, commercial interests also
narrowed. Therefore, almost by default, the junk dealers and steel manufacturers (in
Ontario and Quebec especially) gained increasingly larger interest as surpluses moved
through the WAC’s reduction process. Not only did they already possess the expertise,
labour force, and equipment, but they maintained a vested interest in how the products
and materials were disposed of in the marketplace. As a result, junk dealers and metal
manufacturers were in a much better position to perform the destruction process and
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would step in to purchase items from the WAC before scrapping had even commenced.
This suited the WAC’s finances perfectly, since it did not have to fund the entire
destruction process. In fact, depending on the type of asset involved, the WAC would sell
whole items as scrap so that junk dealers or metal companies would cover the entire cost
of reduction instead of the taxpayer.
Scrap dealers had much to gain from these types of transactions since they received
a whole asset with potentially valuable components at scrap prices and often in bulk
purchases. Although a fair amount of the kit bought by dealers was derelict and unusable,
some real gems found their way into scrapyards. Despite explicit rules to the contrary,
upon discovering that something sold as scrap by the WAC was still valuable for a
primary or secondary use, junk dealers often refurbished the goods for use in their yards
or, more likely, for resale to interested customers. In one instance involving aircraft
components, the WAC was alerted to a scrap dealer’s scheme for reselling a small
inventory of obsolete engines procured from the WAC. Although the contractual
obligations forbade the engines from being resold for “air use” in Canada because of Air
Transport Regulations, the scrap dealer planned to sell the engines as replacements for
snowmobiles. The WAC “having already studied the possibility of their use in that way”
concluded they could not be adapted for snowmobiles and warned that “the final
purchaser would be gypped.”129 It is unclear if the WAC succeeded in stopping this sale,
but it is doubtful given how widespread the practice became.
Clearly there were loopholes that needed closing. Since items were usually sold as
scrap for a reason – because they were unsafe for civilians, unlicenseable, obsolete, or
threatening to the national economy, employment, or public safety – the WAC started
taking some additional precautions so that they did not reappear in the marketplace. To
help guard against the unlawful resale of items sold as scrap (but still in workable or
reusable condition) the Corporation started funding the cost of mutilation before the
dealer took possession or sent supervisors to the junk yard to observe the physical
destruction. Thus, from early 1946 onwards when, for example, obsolete engines,
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batteries, or their components were still in workable condition but sold as scrap,
Clearance or Warehousing staff (or Service Personnel where necessary) were obliged to
render the articles “useless” by “the simple expedient” of bashing “cylinder heads” (or
other vital components) with a sledge hammer.130
Combatting third-party resales with such countermeasures was not particularly
popular with customers, the media, or politicians, since perfectly usable goods were
destroyed rather than salvaged to fulfill other functions.131 Yet the WAC had its reasons
and if the junkman was not playing by the rules, then something had to be done to protect
the public regardless of the optics. Every step in the reduction process was accompanied
by attempts to sell the goods or their components, but if the Corporation could not find an
interested customer, than the goods had to be destroyed to save public money. That
perfectly useable goods were destroyed or sent to scrapyards during a time of severe
shortages and when demand was ferociously high appeared utterly wasteful and
incompetent. However, there were few available alternatives. It looked as if the WAC
was acting irresponsibly and unethically by destroying government assets, but in reality it
had already done what it could to sell them. The problem was in the eye of the beholder:
the public’s own expectations were not meshing with reality.132
The reselling of items sold as scrap was a problematic and persistent issue for the
Corporation, not only because mutilation by sledgehammer might be ineffective, but also
because it fashioned a public perception of the WAC as a neglectful and wasteful
enterprise. One vocal critic, Dr. J. J. Brown, an engineer who worked at Research
Enterprises during the war, believed that the WAC was badly run because it destroyed
perfectly good items or sold them to scrapyards for pennies on the dollar, rather than to a
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marketplace full of eager customers. In several articles condemning the WAC’s policies
and practices, Brown claimed to have purchased roughly $45,000 worth of items in good
condition from junk dealers for just $900.133 He was adamant that everything he collected
originated from the WAC and that scrap dealers were not always playing by the WAC’s
rules against reselling. As he stated in an article titled “Assets into Junk” published by
Maclean’s in August 1946, “some junk dealers, adhering strictly to their contracts with
the Corporation, have refused to sell me anything, but dozens of others have said, in
effect: ‘Make me an offer. If a machine is worth more to you as a machine than it’s worth
to me as scrap, we’ve got a right to do business.’”134
Although not completely impossible, attempts at tracking and enforcing the resale
restrictions on scrap were exceedingly hard once the objects left the WAC’s possession.
Brown’s critical reports in the Winnipeg Free Press, Maclean’s, and eventually his
testimony before the SCWEE targeted this situation with precision, as he divulged
numerous examples of blatant waste and bargain-hunting. In one telling example, Brown
claimed to have purchased two perfectly workable Jacobs-64 engines in good condition
and worth an estimated $8,000 for only $40 from Frankel Brothers Ltd.135 However,
Brown’s accusations should be taken with a grain of salt, as there were indications from
military officials testifying before the SCWEE that he inflated his estimates of the
original value and exaggerated the quantities available in scrapyards. For instance, Wing
Commander E. G. Mahoney stated that Brown’s estimates of how many aircraft batteries
(2,000) were scrapped at Solway & Sons were grossly exaggerated over what the RCAF
had actually declared (371) by the time of his visit to the junkyard in October 1945.136
Yet Brown’s accusations were not unfounded either. Good and workable surpluses
were being thrown onto scrapheaps instead of into a materially-starved marketplace and
public opinion was not favourable to such practices. However, there was method to the
WAC’s madness, although admittedly it was difficult for outsiders to support. At the
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heart of the issue were the WAC’s operational practices that favoured established
manufacturers and trade networks. The by-product of this preference was an extensive
reliance on business interests and the persecution of the second-hand market. By adhering
to its disposal philosophy, the WAC was condemning perfectly useable surpluses to the
scrapheap. If no middleman purchased the items in question than the WAC had no other
recourse but to either peddle the salvaged components or sell the items as scrap to
junkyards. Without a retail network, the WAC had no means to engage in retail sales to
interested customers like Brown. Instead, to the bafflement of potential clients, the WAC
redirected them to local dealers that had already made purchases from its inventories,
while it deliberately reduced any unsold remainder.
The blatant corporate favouritism in the WAC’s operational practices looked bad
and got even worse when surplus goods sold to established businesses started appearing
in stores. Corporations and dealers bought surplus goods at cheaper prices, while their
customers were not so lucky. Instead of getting cheap goods directly from the WAC,
customers had to pay the dealer’s commission and any logistical or refurbishing costs that
were always attached to the final price tag. As long as items were sold at price ceilings
the WAC was not concerned. Anything that established businesses did not buy was
labelled as scrap and reduced until destroyed. However, the system was not foolproof, as
the opportunity for reselling goods at prices above the WPTB’s ceilings or reselling items
labelled as scrap was often seized by businesses and junk dealers. Such actions could
undermine the whole system and the WAC had little control over these infractions. As a
result, a price variance resulted despite all attempts to control them. The variance affected
all types of surplus assets sold by the WAC – from scrap metals to aircraft, or vehicles to
radios – and it occurred right under the WAC’s nose.
The price variance resulted from several factors. In some cases, dealers and
companies reselling surplus assets were liable to gouge their customers with hidden fees
that were in excess of price ceilings and had to be paid up front in cash. In its quest to
create a veterans’ priority the Legion collected several examples of how this price
gouging was affecting veterans who wanted to purchase motor vehicles. One soldier told
Captain Greaves, “I have been to several dealers. They will not talk to me unless alone
and then persist in stating the necessity of extensive repairs on all vehicles taken over
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from the government. They refuse to consider a sale until I agree to pay the repair bill in
cash.”137 Another veteran, who encountered similar deviousness from a used-car
salesman but agreed to pay the bill, stated: “I bought [the taxi] at $690, the ceiling price
but had to pay a $210 repair bill on the quiet in order to get the car. I paid it to get in on
the taxi business while things are going well.”138
While used-car salesmen lived up to their somewhat slimy and nefarious
reputations, the WAC’s agents also gouged clients. Take the case of Charles Babb, a
well-connected American with extensive ties to the aviation industry. In early 1944, he
was hired by the WAC to be its agent for aircraft sales in the US and his company
Charles Babb Aviation Co. utilized this position to purchase aircraft and export them for
resale to third parties, particularly in Latin America. In one case, fifty-three Cornell
aircraft belonging to Canada’s Mutual Aid Program but located in Pennsylvania were
declared surplus. It appears that Babb’s company used his connections with the WAC and
“closed the deal before Canadians who had been trying to buy Cornells knew of those
particular planes’ existence.”139 Apparently Babb made a pretty penny on their resale, as
he purchased the Cornells for roughly $2,700 each, paid the export licences and taxes,
and pocketed the rest of the $4,500 purchase price.
In other cases, the price variance occurred because junk dealers would resell the
same objects as legitimate manufacturers. For example, if a manufacturer purchased back
most of its goods from the government, such as the Jacobs L4MB engine, and then
refurbished them for resale, they had to add their costs to the final price tag which,
depending on the scope of repairs, could vary from $750 to $1,500 per engine.140
However, companies did not always buy back all their products, so some inevitably
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wound up in scrapyards where an industrious customer might entice a junk dealer to sell
the engine for practically nothing and refurbished it on their own, as Brown had done
with his Jacobs engines as well as several other items, including an air compressor
contraption he used “for paint spraying, spraying vegetables, blowing up tires, [and]
cleaning off my work bench.”141 Clearly, some customers were getting shafted. As
Brown stated, “I believe that when the same basic article sells for nothing on one price
list, $250 on another, $750 to $1,000 on another and $1,500 on another, it’s not being
very intelligently merchandised.”142 To the WAC’s critics the problem was only
compounded by its corporate ties to manufacturing. Instead of bending to customer
satisfaction by keeping all prices stable, low, and selling direct, the WAC was trying to
eliminate – through resale restrictions, price controls, and destruction programs – the
second-hand market at the source. To frustrated customers, it was as if the WAC wanted
them to pay more for used goods.

Conclusion
In concluding his “Assets to Ashes” article in Maclean’s, Brown wrote a pointed
criticism of the WAC’s disposal strategy. While acknowledging the magnitude of the
task, he believed that the WAC’s “policies [were] based on a false and negative
philosophy, the philosophy of let’s get rid of it.”143 According to Brown, the strategy of
selling only to established businesses, destroying the unsold remainder, and refusing to
sell directly to the public were catastrophic mistakes. As Brown stated, “I simply claim
that War Assets has an insufficient respect for both commodities and clients and that on
those terms no merchant can succeed.”144 His claims certainly had merit. No disposal
strategy was perfect and there were clear winners and losers built into the system.
However, it is doubtful that any of the WAC’s senior directors or managers agreed with
him. From their perspective, the Corporation’s business philosophy was based on sound,
though unorthodox, principles that had been studied extensively. Succeeding as a
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merchant was not the goal. In fact, the difficulties that Brown faced in acquiring surplus
assets from the WAC were actually positive signs and evidence that operations were
functioning in accordance with how they were designed.
The WAC’s operational practices intentionally favoured established businesses and
did not prioritize the average customer. The countermeasures and selling restrictions were
aimed at limiting the development and expansion of an illegitimate second-hand market
that would threaten the normal flow of economic activity, the price of new goods, and
employment. In other words, the type of open-access retail network that Brown and many
others expected was precisely the type of system that the WAC wanted to avoid. The
Corporation tried limiting the market in which a speculator could purchase a whole
inventory and resell it without any concerns for long-term economic stability. The WAC
was not interested in making “fly-by-night” sales so it buttressed established businesses
across every merchandizing field its inventories flooded and destroyed whatever it could
not sell through legitimate trade networks. The end result was a system designed to meet
aggregate demand – and that it did. From 1945 to 1947, the WAC sold millions of
dollars’ worth of government property at a time of severe shortages. Thus, the WAC’s
inventories provisioned postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation with the assets and
materials needed during the transition from war to peace.
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Chapter 5
Tactical to Practical: Supporting Postwar Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation with Surplus Assets
Victorious day you’ve arrived at last!
Store away the guns they’re a thing of the past
Pray never again they’ll have to be used
But into tools of peace they will be fused.1
Anonymous, “Victory”

Introduction
When wars end the objects accumulated to fight are often the only things available
for reconstruction and rehabilitation. In the case of a total war this axiom is doubly
appropriate. Victory in the Second World War demanded substantial production feats in
every sector of the Canadian economy and monumental expenditures of public money
that far surpassed the precedent of 1914-1918. All out production for the war effort
subsumed practically every part of the Canadian economy and society by forcing civilian
goods and the free market economy to the sidelines. This resulted in a future commodity
crisis of epic proportions. With Canada’s shrinking military, postwar requirements for
munitions and supplies only constituted a fraction of wartime totals. The unneeded
materiel was plentiful and an overwhelmed WAC did its best to handle the situation. But
where did all the leftovers end up? What did the WAC sell? How useful were surplus
assets? This chapter addresses these questions by examining the types of things the WAC
sold, who purchased them, and where possible, what peacetime uses were derived from
surplus munitions and supplies.
As Magda Fahrni explained in her study, Household Politics, the transition from
war to peace was not completely centred on the federal government and its policies and
projects. While Mackenzie King’s government greatly shaped the debates and parameters
of postwar developments, preparations for peace happened across all social classes and
regions of the country. Individuals, families, and organizations all made their own plans
for their expected postwar activities, subsistence, and ambitions. In studying Montreal
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families and their responses to postwar reconstruction, Fahrni proved that the pursuit of a
stable home life and improved living standards were “scaffolded” onto the pillars of
“social and economic security” embedded into wider political agendas.2 In effect,
everyone had their own personal postwar plans and preconceived notions about the social
and spatial landscapes of their future lives, communities, and occupations. This “vision of
victory” constituted the sum of one’s personal hopes, dreams, fears, and goals – however
realistic – but was not always in line with government priorities or consensus opinions.3
However, the fulfillment of personal aspirations was conditioned by the hard reality
of competing interests groups and the limited availability of commodities and materials.
In many respects the attainment of higher living standards, employment, social security,
and rehabilitation were enabled by a materiality that supported all aspects of
reconstruction. Therefore, a material world underpinned everyone’s postwar plans. For
instance, building or buying a home for one’s family brought stability, but it could not
occur without supplies of wood, brick, wires, nails, and plumbing, to say little about
furnishing the abode with sinks, stoves, and other modern appliances. Employment,
education, and leisure pursuits were similarly affected by a material reality in which the
supply of objects greatly influenced the quality, scale, and degree of satisfaction with
each endeavour. Yet the acquisition of assets was never certain. Material shortages and
competing interests changed or thwarted the fulfillment of postwar ambitions and added
to wider political, economic, and social dislocation. Navigating the transition from war to
peace was no easy feat. As the White Paper stated, “our transition from peace to war was
not accomplished without dislocations, and the transition from war to peace cannot avoid
them entirely.”4
The key to mitigating “dislocations” was by facilitating the material conversion of
war assets and maintaining a steady supply of goods and resources throughout the
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economy. The quick and diligent liquidation of surplus munitions and supplies helped
stabilize the postwar economy in several key areas, mainly through the supply of metals
and building materials as well as the redistribution of industrial floor space. In many
ways surpluses greased the wheels of transition by buffering gaps in production and
shortages in supplies. This benefitted both end users making purchases from middlemen
and companies – large and small – preparing to produce future generations of new
products and designs.5 Although not always the perfect stop gap, surplus assets were vital
for meeting aggregate demand during a period of severe shortages by provisioning the
postwar economy with a steady stream of goods and resources. In doing so, this ensured
that second-hand goods and other government surpluses were consumed quickly and did
not compete with new merchandise slowly trickling into store shelves. Therefore, the
transition period offered the best opportunity to unload surpluses at a point in time where
they would do the most good and least harm.
The objects accumulated for war became the starting points of peace. Profuse in
quantity and diverse in quality, surplus munitions and supplies not only transferred to
new owners, but they also transitioned between old and new uses. This transition process
is sometimes referred to as material demobilization. Material demobilization took place
in two general ways roughly divided by the ease with which objects were converted from
wartime to peacetime purposes. In the first case, the convertibility of objects required
little effort or modifications since their utility and value remained relatively equal in war
or peace. Therefore, material demobilization involved the reuse and redeployment of
objects in order to fulfill their original functions, forms, and intentions. Items falling
under the label of “supplies” (such as typewriters, radios, desks, bedframes, and raw
resources) generally populated this category of material demobilization because their
convertibility from wartime usage remained high. However, in other cases such as those
involving military-patterned vehicles or aircraft, reuse was not as straightforward since
modifications and refurbishing were required in order to improve versatility, lifespans,
and meet civilian safety standards. Overall, the reuse of surplus assets provided many
advantages in peacetime. Corporations gained a valuable peace dividend since they
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stocked shelves with items purchased directly from the WAC or acquired the resources to
fuel future production. End users benefitted indirectly if they could purchase the assets
they needed through established businesses and trade networks. However, the peace
dividend was not always economic, since educational institutions, hospitals, and a whole
host of other organizations purchased surpluses for reuse in providing critical social
welfare services to communities and, especially, veterans.
The other half of material demobilization involved assets that were significantly
altered and adapted to fulfill completely new functions, forms, and intentions. Because
material shortages were rampant, people were lucky if they could obtain something new
or readily reusable. Inevitably some had to compromise on what they acquired and settle
for second-choice things that were designed for other purposes. Therefore, material
demobilization also entailed a process of recycling and upcycling in which purpose-built
items were reduced, refabricated, or reconfigured for new uses by new owners. In some
cases, recycling and upcycling operated in tandem with the reuse of surpluses, but this
did not always happen. There are subtle but not insignificant differences between all
these concepts. Upcycling is the act of repurposing objects by valuing the material from
which they are made and the form that they maintain. The recycling of something occurs
only when the asset is valued only for its components or materials.6 The objects that were
not easily reusable in peacetime had to be upcycled and recycled to create new utility.
Susan Strasser explained in her study, Waste and Want, recycling and upcycling are
fundamentally inventive processes that steer objects through many different forms,
functions, and intentions. Recycling and upcycling were common activities to nineteenthand twentieth-century societies as they privileged thrift and limited the amount of a trash
generated by social and economic developments.7 The recycling and upcycling of war
junk was an economic necessity. It took a certain level of ingenuity and originality to
imagine a possible adaptation for something that others might consider inert or worthless.
This was especially the case if the item was purpose-built for the military. After all, not
everyone could envision using steel helmets as chicken nests or the fuselages of derelict
6
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bombers as tourist cabins. Yet the repurposing of the war’s materiality was incredibly
important, not only did it make the most of depreciating assets, it also promoted an
entrepreneurial initiative that had been confined by years of wartime regulations and the
prewar economic malaise. By recycling and upcycling munitions and supplies, Canadians
fused new and old technologies, reformed and converted assets into new purposes, and
adapted their visions of victory to the availability and suitability of objects. In effect,
material demobilization was the peace dividend in practice.

The WAC and Economic Stability
The severe material shortages facing Canadian businesses and consumers after the
war were a product of many factors. As Joy Parr explained in her book Domestic Goods,
economic policies in the 1940s favoured export markets and what she termed the
“producer emphasis.”8 At the time, policymakers in the DRS and the authors of the White
Paper were most concerned with aggregate demand or the total demand for final goods
and services across the whole economy at a given time. In the “triage” of economic
priorities they considered consumer demand more pliable and better restrained than
unleashed with the support of fiscal policies. Instead of expanding aggregate demand and
better accommodating its regional disparities, public expenditure was better used as a
means of encouraging industrial expansion. In other words, the replacement of capital
goods and production machinery ranked higher than replacing household goods and the
“consumer emphasis.”9 Aggregate demand was kept to a basic minimum, while public
investment in accelerated depreciation favoured firms manufacturing industrial
equipment or processing raw materials. Policymakers relied on these industries to form a
stable base for postwar economic growth, particularly since the government was also
trying to secure more export markets for Canadian products and resources.10
Companies specializing in the “consumer emphasis” faced an uphill struggle to
retool and reconvert after years of wartime production and with limited access to special
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depreciation funds.11 Given the virtual elimination of civilian production from 1942
onwards and the heavy tax burdens on all corporate earnings, few durable goods were
available while companies lacked the necessary capital to reinvest in retooling,
expansion, and product innovation. The end result of this production shortage meant an
increased reliance on more expensive imports from the US and a persistent dearth of
durable and household goods in department stores, like washing machines, ranges, and
refrigerators.12 Furthermore, the return of another foreign exchange crisis in 1947
contributed to the shortages and undercut some of the government’s economic priorities.
The imbalance between American dollars and British sterling limited Canada’s capacity
for exporting and importing thereby forcing companies to manufacture import substitutes
to make up domestic shortages. As Parr explained, this situation “departed from the plan
for a strong postwar Canadian economy selling into international markets” and ensured
that aggregate demand fluctuated as companies retooled.13
Yet the fact that the manufacturing and resource extraction sectors were given more
favourable reconversion packages did not necessarily mean they had a smooth postwar
transition. Strikes throughout 1946 caused major disturbances across North America,
particularly in the steel, meatpacking, and automotive industries. As Peter McInnis
demonstrated, the postwar layoffs came swiftly and sharply. In October 1943, roughly 1.1
million Canadians were gainfully employed in war industries but by VE-Day that number
had dropped to 888,000 and by VJ-Day the total was 600,000 and it fell precipitously
thereafter.14 Starkly contrasting official proclamations promising high and stable
employment and income, job loss and unemployment spiked immediately following the
war. Net payments for unemployment insurance in Ontario and Quebec jumped by leaps
and bounds between 1945 and 1946. In Ontario payments went from $3.5 million to
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$16.3 million and in Quebec they went from $6.6 million to $18.9 million.15 Indeed, any
history of the industrial front that only focuses on how the war created jobs and full
employment completely obscures the fact that by 1945, job loss, labour disputes, and
decreasing production totals were the dominant economic trends.
Although the spike in unemployment was expected, workers and unions fought
back. On the heels of victory came waves of strikes that hit the resource and
manufacturing sectors especially hard. In 1946 and 1947, the number of strikes (225 and
236 respectively) never reached the wartime high of 401 in 1943, but the average
duration of each strike was three to four weeks, compared to five days in 1943. As
McInnis explained, postwar strikes translated to over 6.9 million lost worker days over
the course of those two calendar years combined.16 Thus, the combination of economic
policies, production shortfalls, currency exchanges, and labour disputes conspired to limit
Canada’s economic prosperity. Indeed, the Canadian economy stuttered into the postwar
period as the GDP, which soared over the Depression-era lows, remained stable between
1945 and 1946. The severe material shortages were therefore symptoms of wider social,
economic, and political dislocation caused by the transition from war to peace.
The WAC was well-positioned to help fill the vacuum in supply as it possessed
large caches of goods and resources leftover from the wartime production boom. From
cafeteria equipment and bedframes, to radios, furniture and large stocks of raw materials
(both new and recycled), the WAC took advantage of the situation and provided an
alternative source of supply to businesses and manufacturers, who reaped some
immediate rewards. As an article in the Globe and Mail stated “the fact that a number of
Canadian plants have not yet been forced to close their doors as a result of shortages
occasioned by the strike in steel and other basic industries is attributed largely to reserves
stockpiled during the war which are now surplus.”17 In combination with the winding
down of the WICB and its Resource Controls, the WAC aggressively liquidated stores of
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raw materials and finished goods to manufacturers and dealers whose regular suppliers
were unable to fill orders.18 This demonstrated how the WAC helped soften the burden of
reconversion on the manufacturing sector. On one hand it cleared plants of unneeded
things, and on the other it supplied the tools, machinery, and resources when they were
needed and at cheaper prices than the imported equivalents.
In doing so, however, the Corporation was working against organized labour since
its actions were aimed at minimizing the impact of the strikes and shortages. In being a
corporate life-preserver during the transition period, the WAC prevented a full-scale
shutdown in important industries. In one instance, at Mackinnon Industries, a parts
manufacturer for General Motors, a bitter dispute with employees was circumvented
when the company bought an “emergency shipment of scrap” that allowed replacement
workers to continue manufacturing. The shipment was directly responsible for “averting a
complete shutdown” of the factory in Oshawa and such shipments were probably not
isolated cases.19 However, while the substitute raw materials and second-hand goods
procured from the WAC acted as important stop gaps, they did not end the shortages and
an inevitable “slowdown in production” occurred because of the general supply situation,
inexperienced workers, and because the substitute materials were not always the perfect
fit and “often resulted in new processing problems.”20
The WAC did everything it could to maintain a flow of supplies to industries and
manufacturers. The sale of ferrous and non-ferrous metals can serve as a case study,
particularly given the widespread economic significance of steel. Notwithstanding
increased purchases from US steel mills (to offset wartime shortages), there was
significant wartime expansion at the seven largest steel foundries in Canada. The
country’s total steel production more than doubled during the war from 1,230,120 tons in
1939 to 2,860,000 tons in 1945, while the amount of steel consumed during the peak year

18

War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 5; War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report, 5.

19

CWM, Democracy at War, “War Surplus Metals Help Avert Shutdowns,” Globe and Mail, 13 September
1946; McInnis, Harnessing Labour Confrontation, 101.
20

CWM, Democracy at War, “War Surplus Metals Help Avert Shutdowns,” Globe and Mail, 13 September
1946.

245

of 1942 was 4,297,120 tons.21 Almost all of those totals were absorbed by munitions
production and a large (though unrecorded) measure was recycled into the postwar
economy, mainly through the WAC’s scrapping programs. This trend is shown in the
graph below which charts the number of transactions involving all types of metals
(ferrous, non-ferrous, scrap) from 1944-1949. According to the WAC’s annual reports,
the bulk of metal sales over $5,000 took place from April 1945 to March 1947, a timeline
that parallels the rapid expansion of all postwar destruction programs and clearance
operations. However, it must be noted that this chart only records metal sales as listed in
the annual reports. It does not include the sale of newly manufactured metals, nor does it
consistently include the sale of weapon systems for scrapping purposes. Therefore, some
tanks, ships and aircraft sold as scrap are not represented because they were listed under
different categories in the annual reports. No doubt their inclusion would significantly
increase both the total number of transactions as well as the total weight of metals sold to
private interests after the war, particularly in 1946 and 1947.22
Figure 2: Metal Sales by the War Assets Corporation,
1944-1949
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Tabulating the total weight of all surplus metals sold back to private interests by the
WAC is difficult. This is not only because metal could be recycled from many different
sources, but also because the annual reports did not always list the total weight for every
purchase. This discrepancy makes any sweeping conclusions about metals sales difficult,
but what numbers are available provide some indication about the general pattern of
metal supplies in postwar Canada. The graph below shows metal sales by weight, rather
than transaction frequency. According to available data, the WAC sold a total of roughly
4.1 billion pounds of metals (or about 1.83 million long tons) between 1944 and 1949.
However, over 3.7 billion pounds of that total (or about 1.65 million long tons) was sold
during the fiscal year of 1946-1947. The Atlas Steel mega-purchase of 3.4 billion pounds
of shell steel billets accounts for the bulk of metal sales that year and skews the graph
substantially. The key line to observe is the green one as it subtracts the largest-single
purchase from all years to show a more uniform pattern that peaks toward the end of
1945 and throughout 1946. Keep in mind that this chart does not account for all metals
available from the WAC so the actual totals and trends were much larger. A conservative
estimate might double the figures and place the peak over the same period though it
likely stretched into late 1947.23
Figure 3: Select Metal Sales by Weight, 1944-1949
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To maintain the supply of metals, the WAC also took some drastic actions. In one
notable case, the Corporation managed to recycle some batches of ammunition in order to
redistribute the metal components. The move followed the wartime practice of reselling
spent shell casings, but this time the WAC paid for the scrapping of live shells. Given
that there were few peacetime uses for volatile ordnance, ammunition was usually
dumped in the oceans if it could not be sold internationally. However, acting on advice
from the Steel Controller in early 1946, the WAC instructed the Navy not to dump a
batch of 74,799 7.2-inch shells. Instead the Corporation had the projectiles redirected to
CAL where the ammunition was decontaminated by boiling out the explosives and then
melting them down to recover the metals. This process, though more time consuming
than dumping, salvaged roughly 5,600 tons of scrap steel during a period of severe
shortages and according to the WAC’s Second Annual Report the whole procedure cost
only $72,315 or about half the “estimated dumping cost of $145,000” and with dumping
there was “no recovery of valuable scrap.”24
The recycling of surplus weapon systems and buildings without land greatly
augmented the amount of metals flowing into private hands. In fact, the quantities grew
so significant that the WAC started allowing companies to break resale restrictions on
surplus naval vessels sold as scrap. For example, consider the purchase of naval vessels
by the Frankel Brothers. Originally, it purchased five destroyers and eight corvettes in
order to reduce them to basic components and materials for resale in the peacetime
economy. The WAC gladly unloaded these ships onto a company willing to underwrite
the costs of scrapping and allowed Frankel Brothers to collect any profits from whatever
was salvaged. These profits could be substantial, as corvettes alone were said to have “a
thousand-odd” tons of salvageable steel (especially steel plates), excluding the engines,
wiring, and other fittings which were sold separately (if not removed by the WAC prior
to the sale). Indeed, the value of the steel and other salvageable components was certainly
in excess of the $10,000 purchase price.25 The only condition attached to the sale of ships
for scrap was that they could never be resold as a ship. In other words, any warship sold
24
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as scrap could not be resold to a third party in its primary form or to fulfill its intended
function without the WAC’s approval. On paper this policy made good sense and
prompted special procedures for the WAC’s Clearance teams (in coordination with the
Navy) to “demilitarize” (or remove all armaments and ammunition) every vessel before
being sent to one of the WAC’s ship graveyards.26
However, like with so many other things, this resale condition was incredibly
difficult to enforce. Inevitably some reckless companies resold surplus vessels despite the
restrictions, especially if the third party was willing to pay a premium, had the necessary
export permits, and the original purchaser was willing to risk being blacklisted by the
WAC for breaking its resale restrictions.27 In the case of the Frankel Brothers and their
corvettes, just a few months after finalizing their transactions with the WAC, a joint
opportunity arose with two other businesses (the International Iron and Metal Company
and Dominion Foundries) that had also purchased large numbers of corvettes for
scrapping purposes. The three companies were approached by a fourth, Victory Transport
and Metal, which had lost out on the original bidding process but still wanted to purchase
twenty corvettes to operate as cargo vessels. No doubt wishing to maintain his insider
privileges with the WAC, Egmont Frankel brought the opportunity to the attention of the
Corporation’s General Manager.
In yet another example of the type of corporate favouritism ingrained into the
WAC’s operations, the Board of Directors easily approved a renegotiated sales agreement
with all three companies that allowed them to pool the assets together for resale to
Victory Transport, while the WAC received a 30-percent commission on the total return
(or about $6,000).28 That three companies engaged in the scrap business and metal
26
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industry

parted

with

some

valuable

sources of metallic scrap (a key ingredient
in

steel

manufacturing)

is

not

an

insignificant event. It demonstrates that,
not only was there a strong postwar
demand for naval and cargo ships, but also
that a flood of recycled metals was
entering the postwar domestic economy.
In other words, these three companies
already had sufficient stocks that they
could spare several ships’ worth of metals.
The sale of ships for scrap was a
common method of disposal and very
profitable for shipyards and foundries.
While

several

classifications

of

decommissioned ships were better suited
for peacetime work – such as the Fort- and
Photo 13: An advertisement in the Globe and
Mail for the sale of surplus naval vessels for
scrapping
purposes.
These
types
of
advertisements were a common method for
attracting potential customers. Source: CWM,
Democracy at War, “For Sale” Globe and Mail,
12 October 1945.

Victory-class cargo ships – the RCN’s
surplus war ships often suffered a different
fate.

In

many

instances,

destroyers,

frigates, and corvettes were either sold to
foreign interests in a demilitarized state or

they were taken apart for their materials, as was the case with the destroyer and seven
frigates purchased by Halifax Shipyards Ltd. By late 1947, Halifax Shipyards had
purchased HMCS Chaudiere, Capilano, Springhill, Fort Wentworth, St. John, Kirkland
Lake, Port Colborne, and Montreal for scrapping purposes and an arrangement with the
Dominion Steel Corporation in Sydney gave that metal manufacturer a monopoly on all
the salvaged metals derived from the scrapping operations. Following a similar pattern as

250

the Frankel Brothers, sometime in 1948-1949 Halifax Shipyards paid the WAC a $5,000
“increase in selling price” so it could resell the HMCS Capilano “as a going ship.”29
The diligent disposal of materials and resources was a boon for businesses that used
them for manufacturing new things. In the case of metals, the WAC was able to provision
the economy with a solid supply that helped attenuate the severity of shortages in this
critical sector. However, the Corporation took action to alleviate the supply shortages in
other areas as well. Through an extensive and systematic demolition program of surplus
factories and military facilities, the WAC successfully recovered large caches of building
materials required in home and commercial construction. While it is important to
recognize that the Corporation never sought to remedy the whole supply situation on its
own, its actions did produce many beneficial results for corporations and, to a lesser
extent, their customers. In effect, the WAC’s actions took some of the edge off the supply
crisis because the shortages in building materials (like that of metals) would have been
worse had surpluses not been available. Therefore, the destruction of buildings was not
undertaken as a means of cutting storage or maintenance costs (like with aircraft); rather
demolition could be expensive and was done out of a desperate need for redistributing
parts and materials to new construction projects.
In January 1946, the WAC’s Supply Department established a Surplus Property
Branch to take “direct charge of the physical demolition” of surplus buildings or arrange
for contracts with private demolition firms.30 By March 1947, thirty-three sites had been
demolished and another twenty-five were completed a year later. At each location, a wide
assortment of barracks, guard towers, fences, bunkers, hangars, factory buildings,
warehouses, and administrative buildings were torn down for their components. In some
cases, the demolition could be extensive and expensive, especially if the WAC was
required to return the land back to its original state. For instance, one unnamed
demolition project required the Surplus Property Branch to demolish reinforced concrete
bunkers and turn the area into a baseball diamond. Although the costs of demolition were
29
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high and far exceeded potential profits, the value derived from them was “dynamic”
according to Berry, who had to justify continuing the expenses to his fellow Board
members in April 1947.31
The “dynamic” value to which Berry referred was tied to the purposes for which
the salvaged components were reused: the construction of homes. During the war, a
significant amount of internal and inter-provincial migration occurred when Canada’s
stagnant economy burst to life. Full employment meant that jobs were plentiful, but
usually located in urban centres or industrial areas, while wartime investments also
spurred growth in small towns or strategic areas all out of proportion to local
demographic and economic conditions. This resulted in a major accommodation crisis
whenever and wherever workers relocated for their new jobs. The influx of soldiers and
defence spending compounded the crisis in cities and places that were not prepared to
handle the population boom. As the war ended, veterans only accentuated the crisis.32
Although widespread complaints and frustration surfaced in every part of the
country, there was some cautious optimism in government circles near the end of 1945.
As Howe told Carmichael and J. G. Godsoe, the chairman of the WICB, in a memo about
improving the supply of building materials “I am satisfied that building will expand
rapidly,” but foreshadowing the future problem, he added that “it would be a pity if this
expansion were to be held back by a lack of certain lines of material. I do not think that
lumber will continue to be the bottleneck. It will probably be items such as roofing,
plumbing, wall board, etc.”33 A few months later, a survey of manufacturers in the
building materials trade found that companies producing materials for housing
construction were expecting to maintain 1945 levels or increase production in 1946, if
they could get sufficient labour. This would help alleviate some of the shortages running
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rampant in the last quarter of the year.34 The report, while not overly scientific, did
provide policymakers with some continuing assurances about their economic policies and
expenditures, but that optimism was soon exposed as complacency when labour strife
mixed with soaring demand and production delays. In effect, all estimates for 1946 were
thrown off and officials in the DRS were caught somewhat unprepared.
Shortages in building materials were so severe that they torpedoed construction
projects and a large portion of the CMHC’s plans. Both private enterprise and the two
crown companies established to build homes, Wartime Housing Ltd. and Housing
Enterprises Ltd., struggled to match their wartime achievements. The pressure to meet
demands for accommodation for veterans was overwhelming as the velocity of
demobilization picked up. In May 1945, the Services discharged 5,919 veterans and in
July they released another 15,393. By January 1946 they were expecting to discharge
30,000 veterans per month.35 According to Peter Neary a total of 395,013 veterans were
discharged in 1945 and another 381,031 in 1946. This amounted to more than 1,000
veterans returning to civilian life every day, each of whom had been clothed, fed, and
sheltered by the military during the war, but now ex-soldiers were searching for adequate
accommodations for themselves and their families.36 In some parts of the country, a
system of emergency shelters was used by the DND so that veterans had somewhere to
sleep. The DND often repurposed empty barracks or vacant buildings that were in the
process of being declared surplus, while local Rehabilitation Committees struggled to
find space for the surging influx of humans in their communities. However, these
arrangements were not very satisfactory for veterans in search of postwar stability, while
the continuing use of military facilities slowed the DND’s surplus declarations and
demobilization plans.37
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Emergency controls on materials and construction equipment were reinstituted by
the WICB so that Wartime Housing and Housing Enterprises received priority access to
the supplies they needed for building homes for veterans.38 However, the government’s
actions were not well received by the construction industry. Many complaints about
access and shortages reached the Building Materials Sub-Committee of the WICB
through its correspondence with construction companies and business associations.39
Perhaps Claude C. Chappell, President of the Nova Scotian construction company
Chappells Ltd., voiced the concerns of industry most succinctly when he wrote
government officials that “the policy of Wartime Housing Limited to bypass regular
dealers and commandeer the products of manufacturers of building supplies will
seriously cripple private enterprise and if carried out make it impossible for us to meet
the demands of our customers…or to meet our obligations to postwar rehabilitation.”40
Mayors, city clerks, and local rehabilitation committees joined business interests by
mailing dozens of letters to the government, most of which ended up at Godsoe’s office,
demanding action to relieve the shortages or remove controls.41 Reassuring responses
acknowledged the problem, but there was little that the WICB could do. Production had
dried up and new goods were in very short supply.
To do its part in offsetting the shortages and ameliorating the housing crisis, the
WAC did two dynamic things. First, its Surplus Property Branch and real estate
appraisers surveyed all buildings and real estate under its care. If the property or
buildings were deemed suitable for housing they were sold to municipalities and cities for
10 percent of the original value, and in August 1945 the Board of Directors approved this
momentous policy.42 Judging from surviving evidence this was the only occasion at
which the WAC formally departed from its well-entrenched “no discount” policy and
38
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offered surplus property at artificially depreciated values. For the WAC the peace
dividend was not always financial, as the housing crisis and material shortages were
forcing its hand. Almost immediately municipalities took advantage and a whole array of
buildings, huts, drill halls, armouries, camps, and hangers deemed suitable for housing
purposes were liquidated for pennies on the dollar.
There is no shortage of examples. The WAC’s annual reports note a minimum of
114 different sales of “real estate” or “buildings without land” to municipalities, cities, or
townships from 1945 to 1948. Many other sales took place but they went unrecorded in
the annual reports because the discounted selling price dropped the total below the $5,000
threshold needed for inclusion in the reports’ sales lists. For instance, in Calgary, the City
Commissioner, V. A. Newhall, negotiated with Berry to purchase several “hutments at #2
Wireless School for ex-service men’s accommodation.”43 The city agreed to purchase
two one-storey huts (#8 and #9) for $1,440 each and a single two-storey hut (#25) for
$3,520. The city then paid for the huts to be converted into eighty apartments. When the
renovations were finished, the city purchased two other two-storey huts (#26 and #30)
and renovated them into ninety-six “smaller suites.”44
Given the number of excess military bases and federal properties at war’s end, the
WAC became a preferred source of real estate for provincial and municipal governments,
especially if the army camps, barracks, hangers, and other facilities were cheap and easily
converted to apartment-style accommodations. Some of the larger sales recorded in the
annual reports included one for 264.52 acres of lands and buildings that formerly
comprised an “army brigade camp” at Port Alberni to the municipal government. The
City of Sherbrooke bought 60.5 acres and fifty buildings of the local army camp.45
Dozens of buildings were also sold at former BCATP aerodromes or other unneeded
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RCAF bases, including Oshawa, North Bay, Jarvis, Gananoque, Port Albert, and St.
Eugene – to name only those in Ontario.46
The WAC was being overly generous and recouped only a fraction of the original
value on these sales. For instance, the Port Alberni encampment returned only $70,000 to
the government, while the profits from the Sherbrooke sale amounted to $34,500. In
Saskatoon, the WAC sold to the provincial government “for housing purposes” a group
of army buildings originally valued at $405,129 for $32,500 or 8 percent of the original
value. In Calgary, some RCAF buildings were sold to the city “for housing purposes” for
$15,594, but the buildings had originally cost $195,558. In Vancouver, a group of army
huts were sold to the University of British Columbia “for housing purposes” at 10 percent
of the original value or $8,275.47 Of course the sale of buildings and real estate did not
provide an immediate relief to the crisis, as it usually took about eight weeks for cities to
find the necessary materials and a contractor to complete the renovations. Yet the WAC’s
discounted prices and sheer number of surplus facilities spread across the country
provided a frugal starting point to address postwar housing issues, particularly for
veterans.48 Thus, instead of recouping money, the WAC assisted in deriving other forms
of value from surplus facilities.49
The second dynamic thing the WAC did to address the housing crisis was to target
surplus buildings for salvage and demolition. According to the official policies of the
Lands and Buildings Department, surplus property was always disposed of to the “best
financial advantage consistent with the use to which they are put” and in the best interests
of supporting “employment, housing, education, vocational training, institutional
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purposes, and the reconstruction effort generally.”50 However, sometimes the “best
advantage” lay in the value of the parts and not the whole. In consultation with the
CMHC, the Lands and Buildings Department appraised every structure and then decided
whether or not to demolish it. If the site was tagged for demolition then all materials
(including, among other things, timber, electrical wiring, piping, plumbing fixtures,
window and door frames, and nails) recovered were sold first to Wartime Housing and
Housing Enterprises, and then to private contractors. Therefore, most salvaged materials
assisted in building houses.
Despite the fact that the totals returned to the economy were not substantial by
comparison to wartime production statistics, the recovery of nails was arguably one of the
most extensive, tedious, and necessary salvage efforts initiated by the Corporation. After
all, the construction of houses and buildings cannot occur without nails and strikes in the
steel industry greatly curtailed the production of all types, especially the 2½-, 3-, and 4inch types that were used in home construction. Canadian nail production in 1945
averaged about 117,000 kegs per month (or about 11.7 million lbs.) and there were
expectations of increasing this total in 1946 in order to supply the building program.
However, the “strike-vexed nail supply” imploded those projections and severely
truncated the 1946 building season.51 E. A. Taylor, the Field Executive Assistant to the
Steel Controller, wrote to Godsoe’s office to explain the situation “owing to a lack of
man-power in the steel mills and particularly at the nail machines, production of nails in
Canada, at present, is at the level of about 75% of the peak production attained in 1941.”
The difference, according to Taylor, amounted to “about 20,000 tons, or 400,000 kegs.”52
It would only decrease further.
Although the export of nails was severely truncated by the WICB, the strikes
exacerbated the situation throughout 1946. With hardware stores running out, desperate
builders and construction companies turned to the black market where nails sold for an
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outrageous $15, $18, or $20 a keg (the WPTB price ceiling was $4.37 per keg). 53 In order
to salvage nails and alleviate the situation as best it could, the WAC resorted to some
extra-ordinary measures. In the fall of 1946, as the WAC demolished buildings at the
RCAF’s No. 1 Equipment Depot in Toronto and the DIL cordite plant at Transcona in
Winnipeg, Clearance teams used mine detectors to discover nails and “a huge electromagnet” drawn by a tractor to collect them.54 Afterwards some unlucky employee was
tasked with working out the “kinks” in each used nail. In effect, the WAC employed an
“official nail-straightener” on all its reclamation projects. As one Globe and Mail reporter
jokingly explained to readers, “if you’ve banged your fingers recently trying to straighten
old nails you may be somewhat consoled to learn the Government is in the same
predicament.”55
Table 7: Materials Salvaged from the
Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 19461947
Total Amount
Kinds of Material
Salvaged
Lumber
17,019,824 fbm
Wall Board
4,188,203 sq. ft.
Electric cable (all kinds)
1,170,512 L. F.
Piping (all sizes)
203,669 L. F.
Conduit
40,713 L. F.
Windows - complete
7,269 units
Doors – complete
4,704 units
Nails
30 tons
Source: War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report,
(April 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947), 12.

Certainly the WAC could never
hope to reclaim enough nails to fill the
skyrocketing demand. In fact, the total
number of nails recouped was a drop
in the bucket compared to wartime
production statistics.56 According to
tabulations in the WAC’s annual
reports (as shown in Tables 7 and 8)
the

WAC’s

demolition

programs

yielded thirty tons in 1946-1947 and

422,655 lbs in 1947-1948, or about 672 and 4,226 kegs of nails respectively.57 However,
in a materially-starved marketplace every little bit helped, particularly since a substantial
amount of building supplies recovered were sold on priority claims to Wartime Housing
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and Housing Enterprises. Additionally, from 1944 to 1949 the WAC sold at least 384
complete buildings, houses, and hangars to these two crown companies thereby ensuring
that an even larger (though unrecorded) amount of materials and accommodations were
redistributed.58 In supplying what it could to the marketplace, the WAC was doing its part
in bridging the country between war and peace.
Nails were not the only things salvaged from dismantled buildings. Door and
window frames, plumbing supplies, and lumber were also recouped and, while the totals
barely matched wartime production, their timely redistribution when shortages reigned
helped prevent the supply situation from deteriorating further. The largest single
demolition project was at Debert, where 443 surplus buildings at the army base were
dismantled by the private contractor Brookfield Construction. The Debert demolition
project cost the WAC $451,019 in total, or a little less than the combined costs of the
second and third largest projects, Camp Borden ($287,060) and the DIL factory in Nobel
($216,977).59 It is estimated that the Debert camp alone provided 6 million feet of lumber
cut in various sizes and an unrecorded number of window and door frames, plumbing
fixtures, heating equipment, and electrical stores.60 In total, all the WAC’s demolition
programs from 1946-1948 recouped almost 44,000 windows and frames, over 17,400
doors and frames, over 630,000 feet of piping (all types), and thousands of other items in
short supply.
Although the demolition of military bases yielded significant supplies, the majority
of recycled building materials were derived from dismantling munitions factories. Since
private industry was not willing to invest heavily in the production of items without many
peacetime applications, the majority of Canada’s shell filling and explosives operations
were funded through the DMS and run by the crown company Allied War Supplies
Corporation (AWSC). Moreover, since the government knew it would not fund
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production indefinitely, the majority of these factories were built as temporary structures.
Once the PDC finished decontamination, some were dismantled. Some factories were
simply gigantic; the DIL factory in St. Paul l’Hermite (the Cherrier plant) outside
Montreal contained about 450 buildings and covered fifteen square kilometres, while the
DIL Bouchard plant in Ste. Therese had 466 buildings on 2,130 acres.61 In total, the
WAC demolished 3.767 million sq. ft. or about 13-percent of the total industrial floor
space constructed by the DMS (the largest sites were Ste. Therese, Villeray, Nobel, and
Transcona). Lumber was reclaimed
Table 8: Materials Salvaged from the
Demolition of Surplus Buildings, 1947-1948
Total Amount
Kinds of Material
Salvaged
Doors and frames
12,764 units
Windows and frames
36,530 units
Lumber
25,621,753 fbm
Composition wallboard
6,176,055 sq. ft.
Pipes (all types)
430,457 L. F.
Fittings (all types)
191,955 units
Plumbing fixtures
10,752 units
Tanks – H. W. – storage
298 units
Heater – jacket
145 units
Radiators
4,311 units
Wire – electrical
671,969 L. F.
Conduit – electrical
23,580 L. F.
Switches – panel circuit
12,168 units
transformers
Iron – corrugated sheets
42,796 sq. ft.
Nails - assorted
422,655 lbs.
Source: War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual Report,
(April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 9.

in

large

amounts

from

these

demolition projects, as Ste. Therese
yielded three million feet of wood
and Transcona another ten million
feet. Therefore, a significant portion
of the forty million feet of lumber
recouped by the WAC in 1946-1948
came from dismantling munitions
factories. The pamphlet Disposal
and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant
Buildings estimated that the lumber
alone was enough to construct 9,000
homes during a time of severe
housing

and

accommodation

shortages.62
While alleviating the housing

crisis was an important goal, demolition was not ideal. Instead, renovation was
sometimes the best course of action for the 33.5 million sq. ft. of industrial space
constructed by the government during the war. As Appendix 1 shows, a majority or 51
percent of all floor space was sold to private industries, while the government retained 37
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percent. Although across individual categories the amount sold to private interests was
considerably higher, some of the floor space retained by the crown ended up being used
by businesses anyway. Most of the floor space was purchased outright by big businesses
– usually the tenants that had occupied it during the war – so officials in the DRS
recognized that support for small and medium businesses had to be provided through
special arrangements. The WAC operated one set of these arrangements through its
multiple tenancy initiative that redeployed industrial floor space and equipment at several
former munitions plants in Toronto and Montreal. These sites were decontaminated,
cleared of unneeded tools and materials, sub-divided into smaller units, and favourably
leased to businesses. Overall, approximately ninety tenants benefitted from renting floor
space in former weapons factories and a host of new goods were produced.63
The multiple tenancy initiative owed its origins to the political pressure from
politicians, medium- and small-business owners, and “a number of ex-servicemen going
into business for the first time.”64 Over the summer of 1945 and in consultation with the
Industrial Reconversion Branch, G. H. S. Dinsmore, the WAC’s Director of Lands and
Buildings, became a de facto landlord who oversaw the clearance of facilities, the
division of floor space into smaller parcels, the provision of favourable six-year lease
agreements, and rent collection.65 In other words, the WAC converted industrial facilities
that had been some of the most productive munitions factories during the war into smaller
parcels so that small and medium businesses could afford the floor space to manufacture
their products in a period dominated by steep prices for industrial real estate. In fact, the
WAC bent over backwards to help these smaller companies; since the leases were so
favourable the WAC ran a deficit keeping the buildings in operation, as the revenue
barely covered operational expenses.66

63

Ibid, 20 and 25; LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, various minutes
1945-1946.
64

LAC, RG2, Vol. 79, File: C-85, Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant Buildings, 25.

65

Ibid, 20 and 25; LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, various minutes
1945-1946.
66

This was especially the case during the winter because the buildings were large and costly to heat. LAC,
RG101, Vol. 7, WAC – Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 11 July and 8 August 1946, 10 April 1947.

261

Three locations were chosen for conversion into multiple tenancies, two in
Montreal and one in Toronto. The Toronto facility, located at 37 Hanna Avenue and
renamed the Liberty Buildings, was used by the John Inglis Company during the war to
manufacture Bren guns. A portion of this large complex, totalling about 287,000 sq. ft.,
was cordoned off from the rest of the Inglis plant, which was converting its
manufacturing operations from Bren guns to fishing tackle, house trailers, home
appliances, domestic heaters, and many other items.67 The space was advertised by a
rental agency over the fall of 1945 and eventually it was split between eighteen clients
that employed about 1,700 workers that manufactured a wide range of goods including,
oil burners, decorative glassware,
electrical

instruments,

pens

and

pencils, and valves and fittings.
According to the pamphlet Disposal
and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant
Buildings,

three

manufacturing

clients

products

were

new

to

Canadian industry.68
The

two

multiple

tenancy

projects in Montreal were established
in former DIL factories that produced
Photo 14: Advertisement seeking tenants for the
Liberty Buildings, Toronto, Ontario. Source: Toronto
Star, 17 September 1945, 12.

vast

quantities

of

small

arms

ammunition for Brens and Lee Enfield

rifles: Montreal Works (renamed the Crown Industrial Building) located at 9600 St.
Lawrence Blvd. in the city’s north central Villeray district; and Verdun Works (renamed
the Verdun Industrial Building) located at 435 River St. on the southwestern coast of the
Island of Montreal. Just as in Toronto, the buildings were decontaminated, cleared,
converted, divided, and rented out to small- and medium-sized businesses. The Crown
67
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Industrial Building had thirty tenants, a cafeteria, a bank branch, and a WAC warehouse
located on site. It employed 2,200 people and manufactured a range of products, from
men’s and women’s clothing to electronic equipment. In Verdun there were thirty-five
tenants and 2,500 employees producing more than thirty kinds of goods, from
pharmaceuticals and processed foods, to clothing and electric razors. Apparently, sixteen
of these items were products new to Canadian manufacturing.69
Moreover, the WAC was not the only crown company to create multiple tenancy
projects. CAL occupied roughly five million sq. ft. of government-owned floor space
after the war, but most of it was left in “stand by” condition while its storage
requirements and future production needs were sorted out. In the intervening time, CAL
leased a number of buildings to private firms in Montreal and Toronto. One of the old
Small Arms Ltd. buildings, totalling 318,000 sq. ft., was sub-divided to accommodate
seventeen tenants producing many things, from men’s hats to photographic supplies.70
Although the WAC had little to do with what tenants produced, its multiple tenancy
projects demonstrate how the Corporation could facilitate the redeployment of surplus
buildings to bring a positive impact on postwar economic stability. These efforts fit into
the wider framework of government action plans since the Corporation was not the only
public organization supporting reconversion as many federal departments, agencies, and
the military actively supported reconstruction and rehabilitation through a variety of
different methods, such as the “rent to a vet” campaign or vocational training programs. 71

Starting Points for Peace: Reusing Surplus Assets
During the transition period between war and peace, munitions and supplies gained
new uses and meanings in civilian life. Yet objects cannot choose their forms, functions,
and intentions. Rather, those elements of their existence are imposed, colonized, or
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created by their human owners.72 If the objects of war were to transition into useful
peacetime purposes, their redeployment had to be controlled by human agency. Humans
chose what things remained useful and which ones required modifications or destruction.
Therefore, material demobilization was not a neutral process. Competing interests and
intentions shaped disposal since everyone wanted to acquire assets in order to fulfill
postwar ambitions. In effect, objects were essential to every postwar plan – whether those
of businesses or individual citizens or government departments – and everyone needed
things to improve living standards, attain goals, and profit. However, objects, or rather
the lack thereof, could also be a chief obstacle to fulfilling postwar plans and aspirations,
as their overall utility was curbed by the reality of finite supply, depreciating values, and
deteriorating conditions.
At the head of this process of material demobilization was the WAC. While it had
little control over the assets once they left its possession, the WAC maintained control
over their redeployment and redistribution through collection, storage, and sales. This
allowed the Corporation’s staff to determine which objects were suitable for peacetime
service, regulated who could acquire them, and to a lesser extent, help end users devise
new uses for the objects they purchased. Contrary to the public criticism from Brown and
other sources, the WAC did not just sell surpluses to big businesses or indiscriminately
destroy them. If someone could pass the WAC’s screening process, had a strong business
plan, could demonstrate some experience in the trade, and had the capital to cover down
payments, then the Corporation was more than happy to do business. In other words, the
overt corporate favouritism built into its mandate and operations did not preclude the
reuse of objects purchased directly from its inventories. Nor did it preclude the reuse of
objects resold by middlemen to end users. In fact, the WAC recognized and promoted the
residual value and versatility of some of its products in order to boost sales and provision
the postwar economy.
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Many different types of government surpluses maintained residual value without
major modifications. As we have seen, businesses were quite worried about these
particular assets being reused in the civilian economy since they had the potential to
scuttle markets for new goods. However, the government was not about to destroy these
valuable assets for the sake of corporate profits and it recirculated them through
established manufacturers and dealers. This gave businesses an opportunity to re-acquire
their wartime production, refurbish it (or recondition it to meet civilian standards), and
then resell it to end users. Motor vehicles, radio equipment, office furniture, electrical
equipment, textiles, and a whole host of other types of goods were disposed of in this
manner. Department stores and corporations specializing in consumer goods profited
substantially from the reuse of surplus items, particularly since they were not benefiting
from government economic priorities. In some respects, refurbished surpluses served as a
stop-gap measure while the production of new goods restarted.
Some department stores made an entire business out of the reusability of military
surpluses. From 1944 to 1948, the Army & Navy Department Stores Ltd. in Regina,
Edmonton, and Vancouver spent at least $259,521 acquiring thousands of different items.
In 1947-1948 alone, it bought 25,453 woollen blankets, 9,530 aviation suits, 4,495 pairs
of army boots, 5,150 pairs of trousers, 1,200 men’s serge blouses, 942,176 yards of nylon
braided cord, 70,359 lbs. of rope, and 50,253 bed springs.73 All these items stocked
shelves in stores during the immediate postwar period and sometimes customers were not
even aware they were purchasing repackaged surplus goods. As Howe explained during
his October 1944 radio broadcast “you may have bought some without knowing they
were war surplus materials because they are unused goods and the corporation has
disposed of them through the normal channels of trade.”74 It would seem that companies
like Army & Navy Stores outfitted an entire generation of camping equipment and
outdoor activities with new and old military gear that they acquired.
A particular pattern in the sales of consumable goods is plainly obvious when
examining the WAC’s sales data. Companies specializing in consumer products
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purchased them for resell during a time when many were struggling to retool their
factories or find new suppliers. For instance, General Steel Wares Ltd. bought back some
of its household goods and resources for future production. In 1945-1946 it acquired
70,000 enamel bowls, $6,379 worth of kitchen cutlery, $11,884 worth of machine tools
and equipment, and 2,557,858 lbs. of steel sheets in five separate transactions.75 Textiles
and clothing were purchased for resale in large amounts as well. The Canadian Overall
Company bought 12,555 pairs of khaki overalls and 10,740 pairs of gloves, while the
Canadian Hardware and Novelty Company purchased thousands of dollars’ worth of
textiles and clothing for its business, including 15,300 pairs of khaki dress trousers and
$39,670 worth of anti-gas equipment. Novack’s, a prominent company in London,
Ontario, specializing in uniforms and clothing, bought 2,425 pairs of men’s black ankle
boots in 1947-1948.76 The T. Eaton Company purchased a fair amount of surplus textiles,
clothing, footwear, cafeteria equipment, and even some automotive parts and equipment,
including 4,500 cardigans, 8,993 men’s combinations, 1,182 pairs of new winter boots,
364 Tarpaulin assemblies, and 1,155 rear curtains for vehicles.77 Thus, whole generations
of surplus items ended up on department store shelves either passed off as new items or
mixed in with the trickle of new goods.
Radio and electronics equipment were similarly scooped up by corporations
specializing in the trade. The WAC’s biggest customer in this field was Canadian General
Electric, which spent $3,168,038 from 1944 to 1948. Roughly half of that total was spent
on purchasing lands and buildings, including the Montreal Locomotive Works, a large
building in Peterborough, Ontario, another at 5400 Hochelaga St. in Montreal, and
several old RCAF hangers in Amherst and Pennfield Ridge, Nova Scotia. The rest of its
investment was spent on Mazda lamps, radio tubes, and vacuum tubes.78 Canadian
Westinghouse made similar transactions, though it spent only $1,269,892 on several
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purchases of machine tools, office equipment, typewriters, and furniture.79 Not only did
these types of purchases enable both companies to resell products for profit, they also
acquired important parts and electronic equipment, while better positioning themselves to
expand production once the floor space and machinery were up and running.

For

consumers and hobbyists, which included a fair number of veterans who had served as
radio operators during the war, the first generation of postwar radio sets and parts they
purchased from these companies were often old military models. As Kristen Haring
explained in Ham Radio’s Technical Culture, old military models dominated the North
American marketplace during the late 1940s. Moreover, surplus radio equipment was
particularly appealing to hobbyists since it required significant technical engagement to
tinker, repair, and modify. The postwar popularity of surplus radio equipment was
reflected in the frequency of instructional articles in hobby magazines: CQ alone
published ninety-nine articles on the subject between 1945 and 1955.

80

Public utilities and companies specializing in communications technologies
purchased surplus radios, electronics, and other equipment from the WAC. The largest
single purchase of electrical wiring was made by Universal Electric Company based in
Montreal. For $6,122 it purchased 1,195,759 feet of “electrical wire and cable on reels.”
Dominion Wire, Rope & Cable Company, the Hydro Electric Power Commission of
Ontario, Saskatchewan Power Commission, Bell Telephone Company, Rogers Majestic
Corporation, Wartime Housing Ltd., and an assortment of scrap metal dealers also
purchased a variety of other surplus electrical stores, equipment, telephone lines, wires,
transmission stations, and specialized factory floor space.81 Perhaps the single most
important utility to be sold by the WAC was the Pacific Communications System. This
network was built during the war to provide reliable communications within British
Columbia, particularly between the interior and coastal regions. The Pacific
Communications System was constructed as a joint effort by the government, all three
Services (the RCAF operated it during the war), and several companies including the B.
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C. Telephone Company. In mid-1946, the WAC decided “in the best interests of the
public and all concerned” to sell the grid to B. C. Telephone, Canadian National
Telegraphs, and Dominion Government Telegraphs so they could operate a reliable
communications system from Victoria and Vancouver, to Prince George and Prince
Rupert. Although it is difficult to calculate how much these companies paid for the
facilities, they acquired a vast network of teletype and telephone circuits supported by
16,500 miles of wire, 63,000 poles, and several power stations and switchboard sites.82
As might be expected, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, purchased large
amounts of motor vehicles, parts, equipment, production machinery, and some real estate.
These

big

three

car

companies purchased a
combined

$10,587,978

worth of surpluses from
the WAC. The most
common
were,
motor

purchases
unsurprisingly,

transport

spare

parts, engines, trucks,
and machine tools. Ford
Photo 15 View of rows of parts used to make army vehicles at the
Ford Motor Co. plant. Most of these vehicles were for British forces.
Photo was taken in March 1941. Source: LAC, National Film Board of
Canada, Copy Negative: PA-117534

and Chrysler purchased
the bulk of materials
during the 1946-1947

fiscal year and immediately put them into production lines or distributed them back
through their established supply networks.83 Smaller car manufacturers and dealers also
purchased from the WAC. For instance, Evans Motors Ltd. in Scarborough, Ontario
bought ten 1942-model Ford Lorries and fifteen 1942-model Ford 3-ton trucks. The

82

Quote from: LAC, MG27 IIIB20, C. D. Howe Fonds, Vol. 50, “Re: Pacific Communications System,”
W. M. Allen to J. H. Berry, 27 June 1946. See also: “Await Decision: Ground Lines to Coast May Aid
Central Interior,” Prince George Citizen, 21 March 1946, 1; Sales of $5,000 and Over” in War Assets
Corporation Annual Reports (1944-1949) compiled in author’s Sales Database.
83

“Sales of $5,000 and Over,” in War Assets Corporation Annual Reports (1944-1949) compiled in
author’s Sales Database.

268

Toronto Motor Car Ltd. and Victoria Motors Ltd., based in Niagara Falls, purchased
large amounts of spare parts as well as 1942- and 1943-model Ford trucks and fourteen
personnel carriers (seven each).84 Another company specializing in the manufacture of
automotive parts and accessories, Automotive Hardware Ltd., purchased $116,790 worth
of motor transport spare parts and 134.3 net tons of nuts and bolts.85 Much like the radio
manufacturers, these companies acquired assets to resell and parts to continue their
maintenance businesses well into the postwar period.
Practically every company involved in the aircraft industry purchased items from
the WAC. Canadair Ltd. and Trans-Canada Air Lines purchased large amounts of
equipment and real estate. Hangars and buildings at airports in Dorval, Moncton, and
Winnipeg account for most of Trans-Canada’s purchases. However, some anecdotal
evidence suggests that Trans-Canada was able to purchase thirty C-47 (DC3) twinengined Dakota transport aircraft stationed in Canada directly from the American firm
Douglas Aircraft Company. This purchase did not involve the WAC, but the planes
apparently remained in service until 1963.86 Canadair spent $4,152,852 on a variety of
parts, equipment, vehicles, and Pratt & Whitney engines. However, the bulk of its
expenditures ($3,886,821) were for the vaguely termed “Group Sales of Materials in
Several Classifications” in Cartierville, Quebec, and therefore it is unknown exactly what
was purchased.87 Several other smaller airlines availed themselves to the WAC’s
inventories. Maritime Central Airways bought most of its Lockheed fleet from the
Corporation, while MacKenzie Air Service Ltd., Hamiltair Ltd., Yukon Southern Air
Transport Ltd., Superior Airways Ltd., and Thunder Bay Air Lines Ltd. bought a variety
of Norseman, Lockheed, Cessna, and Gruman Goose aircraft.88
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Flying clubs benefitted from reusing surpluses, both in financial and leisure terms.
The Algoma Air Transport Company offers an interesting example. Based in South
Porcupine, Ontario, and owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ed Ahr, Algoma Air Transport operated
out of the local Porcupine Flying Club. The “luxurious flying club” was built around
1940 for $35,000 and contained a lounge, lecture room, a club room, a small dining
room, and seven bedrooms for visiting pilots.89 From 1944 to 1947, the Algoma Air
Transport and Porcupine Flying Club outfitted their operations with surplus planes. A
total of ten Anson Vs, six Harvards, three Lockheed aircraft, eight Cessna Cranes, one
Beechcraft, and four Oxford Vs were purchased.90 Flying clubs in particular were well
positioned to benefit from surplus aircraft. Early in the war the founding President of the
Royal Canadian Flying Clubs Association, Murton Adams Seymour, approached the
DND about using civilian flying clubs as training centres for air force pilots. The
Association helped to establish twenty-six clubs before 1939 and many started doubling
as Elementary Flying Training Schools in the BCATP.91 After the war, flying schools
expanded with the supply of surplus aircraft. For example, the Royal Canadian Flying
Clubs Association purchased eleven Cessna Crane and 150 Tiger Moth training aircraft
which it probably resold to member organizations.92
Perhaps the most lucrative product sold by the WAC was the fleet of surplus cargo
ships. In response to significant losses during the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, the
DMS formed the Park Steamship Company in April 1942 to construct, maintain, and
operate Canada’s rapidly expanding Merchant Marine and its growth paralleled the fiftyfold expansion of the RCN. Shipbuilding was contracted out to shipyards in the
Maritimes, St. Lawrence, Great Lakes, and West Coast regions which constructed a total
of over 9,000 different ships, including roughly 800 naval and cargo vessels, 3,300
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landing craft, and more than 5,000 other marine craft.93 Thus, the needs of the war effort
had forced the state to produce and maintain a large naval force out of all proportion to
Canada’s prewar maritime policies and, as Michael Hennessy pointed out, greatly
confounded officials preparing postwar priorities and plans.94
Policymakers and the shipping industry understood that the maintenance of a
postwar merchant marine would require government subsidies and supervision, but they
were leery of the accompanying economic and political baggage. Canadian exporters did
not support a government-run merchant marine, nor were they particularly thrilled at the
higher labour costs. Old ties to British flagged-vessels that shipped Canada’s exports
before the war and pressure from UK officials who wanted the British to control shipping
inside the Sterling area added more disincentives for sustaining a state-run merchant
marine.95 Furthermore, once hostilities ended and the Combined Shipping Adjustment
Board rescinded its controls over the allocation of cargo capacities, a shipping surplus
suddenly resulted as thousands of Liberty, Victory, North Sands, and Fort class vessels
were released from wartime service. The Americans voluntarily laid up 2,000 Liberty
ships or roughly 50 percent of the war-built Liberty fleet in an effort to prevent a collapse
caused by overcapacity. European Allies were not prepared to take similar actions, and
Denmark and Norway suggested that Canada follow the American example. As Hennessy
concluded, British actions, the industry’s preferences, and international pressures set the
stage for the “death” of Canada’s postwar merchant marine.96
By the spring of 1946, the political will to maintain a merchant marine had
evaporated and officials moved to divest Canada’s fleet of cargo vessels into private
hands. However, Cabinet decided that the liquidation of cargo vessels would occur,
wherever possible, to Canadian companies only. According to Hennessy about 140 ships
were retained on Canadian registry of which 110 were the large 10,000 dwt (dead-weight
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ton) class.97 However, as S. C. Heal explained, several companies were only nominally
Canadian, as Greek merchants were liable to form Canadian subsidiaries in order to
circumvent the restrictions and profit from the disposal of vessels.98 From 1945 to 1947,
the bulk of Canada’s merchant fleet was declared surplus and disposed of through the
WAC. In order to facilitate the sale of cargo ships, the WAC hired Park Steamship to
operate as its agent and an agreement was signed on 7 February 1946. Park Steamship
sold cargo vessels on fixed contracts that required a 20 percent down payment with the
balance owing over seven years at 3½-percent interest.99 There were allowances for
depreciation and war damage, but since many of the vessels were brand new these
allowances barely affected the final prices. In total, from 1944 to 1949, the WAC
recouped a minimum of $130,011,791 from the sale of all types of ships, ship
components, marine craft, and parts. Of that total, the sale of Park cargo vessels
accounted for $64,792,003 and the sale of Fort class ships brought in $28,251,406.100
The residual value of cargo vessels was extremely high since their wartime function
was identical to the one they performed in peacetime. Moreover, most of the Park and
Fort ships required few immediate repairs or renovations before entering peacetime
service. However, as Heal noted, many companies undertook some alterations to better
integrate their new vessels in existing fleets. In most cases, the modifications entailed the
improvement of crew quarters, galley accommodations, and the addition of cranes for
improved derrick capacity. Western Canada Steamships Ltd. purchased twenty-one Park
ships from the WAC, thirteen more than the second biggest customer, Saguenay
Terminals Ltd. Although it did not spend much money on modifications, Western Canada
Steamships did give each new vessel a fresh coat of paint and emblazoned its logo on the
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hull (Saguenay Terminals did the same thing).101 The reuse of these cargo ships was
further amplified by their relative youth and the potential for prolonged usage. Each
vessel was constructed at some point between 1940 and 1945 and therefore, barring war
damage or disaster, most cargo ships enjoyed a long postwar career until the late-1960s
when many were decommissioned and scrapped in Asian shipyards.102
Another commodity made valuable by its reusability was construction equipment.
The rapid expansion of industrial floor space and military facilities meant that the amount
of construction equipment owned by the Canadian government sky-rocketed. The
demands on all forms of building materials and machinery were substantial enough to
form a special Construction Control in the WICB. The Construction Controller ensured
that only the most necessary building projects received licensing and a bank of significant
construction projects was put on hold as a result.103 At the end of the war whatever
equipment was not needed by the crown was liquidated. Tractors, dump trucks, cranes,
Caterpillar Tractors, power shovels, road paving equipment, generators, drilling
machines, pumps, and hand tools were sold to a mix of priority holders and private
interests across the country.104
Although a large portion of the equipment went to construction and paving
companies, priority holders definitely used their privileges to secure tools and machinery.
The Provincial Governments were particularly eager to acquire construction equipment.
The Department of Highways and Public Works from Nova Scotia and Ontario purchased
asphalt distributors, Crawler cranes, excavators, trucks, and other equipment.105 The
Saskatchewan Reconstruction Corporation, PEI’s Department of Reconstruction, the
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Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario, and the cities of Port Arthur, Winnipeg,
Gloucester, and the village of Ormstown acquired construction equipment. The federal
departments of Labour, Mines and Resources, Public Works, Indian Affairs, and the
DVA also purchased construction equipment to fulfill postwar agendas. 106 A variety of
equipment was sold on public tenders to private contractors, equipment rental companies,
and construction companies, such as the Power Equipment Co. based in Port Arthur or
Western Construction Co. in Edmonton.107 These types of sales helped improve and
maintain the country’s infrastructure well into the postwar period. Sales to private firms
and government departments ensured that construction equipment was available for
housing, highway expansion, and urban development. If this equipment was not heavily
worn out, it was highly reusable and an essential starting point for the postwar
construction boom.108
Items acquired on priority requests were usually those most needed for supporting
local and provincial reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. These types of sales
demonstrate how surpluses were reused to expand social and welfare services.
Municipalities and provincial Civil Defence Committees received priority access to air
raid precaution equipment, warning sirens, uniforms, and personal equipment.109 Judging
by the timing of the sales, firefighting equipment was an urgent need for many
communities and provincial governments. The largest sales of surplus firefighting
equipment occurred in the fiscal year 1945-1946. The chair of Quebec City’s Civil
Defence Committee, J. J. Gagnon, purchased $18,108 worth of “miscellaneous
firefighting equipment.”110 Similar purchases were made by the City of Montreal, Nova
Scotia’s Department of Labour, and the Government of PEI. The New Brunswick
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Government bought $28,068 worth of “pumps with tools and accessories” while the City
of Toronto purchased a Bickle Seagrave Trailer fire pump and accessories. The
Laurentian Forest Protective Association Ltd., based in Quebec City, purchased six
Bickle Seagrave fire pumps and 20,000 feet of rubber-lined hose. Given that the
Laurentian Forest Protective Association paid $8,050 for six pumps while the City of
Toronto paid $7,099 for one, shows how the quality of surplus goods could vary
widely.111
Some of the most important items acquired on priority claims were the assets
reused in hospitals. In total the WAC sold a minimum of $3,665,532 worth of hospital
equipment to a variety of institutions and interest groups. By far the most frequent client
was the DVA, though it only purchased $242,240 worth of hospital equipment, medical
and dental supplies, bandages, pharmaceutical supplies, and some hospital buildings.112
The purchases were in line with the DVA’s expanding role in providing medical services
to veterans. As part of the Veterans’ Charter and its provisions for rehabilitating the
nation’s servicemen and women, the DVA had promised each veteran one year’s free
general medical service after discharge. A precursor to medicare, this program proved
wildly successful for all able-bodied veterans but it also required the DVA to improve its
medical facilities, construct new hospitals, and budget for medical insurance for both the
able-bodied and permanently disabled. Foreshadowing the war’s heavy casualty rates, the
number of hospitals operated by the DVA and by its predecessor the Department of
Pensions and National Health grew throughout the war. In September 1939 there were
2,720 beds available, but by April 1946, the DVA possessed 12,088 hospital beds with
plans to acquire another 8,590 and by the end of 1946 the DND had transferred two navy,
fourteen army, and four air force hospitals through the CAAC to the DVA. 113 Although a
small portion of the DVA’s medical services and expenses on rehabilitation, the reuse of
surplus medical supplies and facilities helped improve the quality of care for veterans
particularly during the 1946-1947 fiscal year when most of the supplies and equipment
was purchased.
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A large amount of medical supplies and hospital facilities were sold throughout
Canada. Notwithstanding the significant purchases of ambulances, trucks, and medical
supplies from by the Red Cross and the French and Dutch governments, the WAC sold
practically everything to priority holders and companies involved in the medical supply
or pharmaceutical industries. Canadian municipalities, provinces, hospitals, and medical
associations purchased all manner of items from beds and buildings, to consumable
supplies like bandages and drugs. However, some transactions were bizarre such as the
sale of seventy-five surplus South African frogs to the Ontario Department of Health in
December 1945 for medical experiments.114 Private companies purchased items vaguely
listed as “medical supplies & equipment” and a large amount of drugs. Three companies
and the DVA cleared out the entire inventory of sulphonamide, a family of powerful antibacterial drugs used extensively to treat wounds during the Second World War. The two
smallest purchases were made by Merck & Co. Ltd., which bought 12,512 oz. of quinine
sulphate, and Bell & Craig Ltd., which bought 4,399,000 tablets of sulphadiazine and
686,988 tablets of sulphaquanidine. The DVA and Mark Export & Import Ltd. made the
biggest purchases. In one $7,685 transaction – almost $2,000 less than Merck & Co.
Ltd.’s – the DVA bought 600,000 tablets of sulphadiazine, 50,000 of sulphaguanadine,
and 1,000,000 of sulphathiazole. Mark Export & Import Ltd. paid $53,109 for a
whopping 368,000 tablets of sulphathiazole, 2,000,000 of sulphaquanidine, 1,000,000 of
sulphonamide, 4,600,000 of sulphadiazine, and 2,000,000 tablets of the malaria
medication, Atabrine.115
Educational institutions also gained much from the reuse of surpluses. In general,
two types of educational institutions purchased from the WAC: universities and the
Department of Labour’s Canadian Vocational Training (CVT) program. The roots of
these purchases stemmed from the fact that both universities and the CVT were
completely overwhelmed with veterans after the war. As Peter Neary explained, by 31
March 1951, 53,788 and 80,110 veterans had received support to attend university or
vocational schools respectively. The legacies of such a program were fundamental to the
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Canada’s postwar political, economic, and social development. It trained a cadre of
returning service personnel, many of whom might never have attained post-secondary
education without the government’s assistance through the Veterans Rehabilitation Act.
This enabled them to pursue their studies and find meaningful and productive work in
civilian life. Thanks to the government’s assistance, many veterans who served as clerks,
mechanics, radio operators, pilots, or engineers were able to take that tactical training and
experience and reapply it to practical, civilian careers after the war. 116 The educational
entitlements offered under the Veterans Rehabilitation Act were the most important and
successful provisions of Canada’s original Veterans’ Charter.
Although the educational entitlements were successful overall, universities and
CVT schools faced some daunting challenges while in operation. In effect, the influx of
students was more rapid than the growth of facilities. For instance, in March 1945 there
were 3,607 veterans in the CVT program and a year later there were 36,341. Universities
were similarly blindsided. In 1939 there were a total of 35,164 students enrolled in
Canadian universities, but by 1946 there about 35,000 new students enrolled and
supported by the government. Class sizes grew in record numbers; some went from fifty
students in one year to well over 300 in the next.117 The numbers were overwhelming and
educational institutions faced serious challenges to expand facilities and procure
materials for classroom instruction. Moreover, the overcrowding in schools was
compounded by material shortages and production delays which meant that new goods
and building materials were not readily available. The universities and the CVT had little
choice but to turn to the WAC for help. Thus, educational institutions reused government
surpluses to fulfill their important function for veterans’ rehabilitation.
Universities scrambled to make purchases from the WAC. In Montreal, McGill
University spent at least $114,155 on acquiring scientific and professional equipment,
consumer goods, cafeteria equipment, barrack stores, and kitchenware. The Universities
of Ottawa, New Brunswick, Alberta, and Saskatchewan along with Laval University
purchased similar items. In fact, the sale of barrack stores, cafeteria equipment, and
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buildings was common to almost every university and provides some indication of the
most pressing issues facing schools: the space to both teach and house veterans.118 The
Universities of British Columbia and Toronto were the most active in utilizing the
WAC’s inventories. In order to meet the expanding demand for classroom space, the
University of Toronto’s Faculty of Applied Sciences occupied an 800,000 sq. ft. section
of the DIL plant established in Ajax, Ontario. Located twenty-five miles from campus,
the surplus buildings and worker huts were turned into makeshift dormitories and
classrooms. The University also purchased 2,623 tons of coal, 4,000 blankets, 500
mattresses, and 750 chairs to heat and outfit this significant amount of new real estate.119
The University of British Columbia was perhaps the most desperate institution. The
Great Depression had struck particularly hard and few new buildings were erected in the
decade before the war. Consequently, it was ill-prepared for the influx of studentveterans. In coordination with a $5 million construction program, UBC bought 112 army
huts for student housing. Other huts and buildings, which had just been evacuated by the
military, were purchased to provide thirty-seven classrooms that could seat 4,000
students, another thirty-six were used as laboratories for 900 students, and one threesection hut became the university’s new Faculty Club which opened on 5 January
1947.120 As the Maple Leaf newspaper reported to its readers, “built to take care of a
maximum of approximately 2,000 students, UBC solved the accommodation problem by
converting the facilities of war to the immediate needs of peace. Wooden huts from army
training camps, coastal defensive stations and aerodromes were brought to the campus to
be used for every conceivable purpose connected with the activities of a modern
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university.”121 There is no small irony that the veterans using the makeshift facilities as
students were also possibly the same people who had worked and lived in the huts during
the war.
In some respects, the CVT program was almost entirely dependent on the WAC for
its classroom materials. As R. F. Thompson, the Director of Training in the Department
of Labour, explained to the SCWEE, the CVT program only purchased items from
“outside” sources if it could not get them through the WAC.122 From the late 1930s and
throughout the war, the Department of Labour ran a series of vocational and
apprenticeship programs in cooperation with each province. These programs helped train
war workers and by the end of the war a new curriculum was formed to train droves of
discharged soldiers in a variety of skilled trades work, such as electrician, plumbing,
radio technicians, machinists, mechanics, and construction work.123 These trades were
critical to Canada’s future prosperity in the postwar period, as a generation of
vocationally-oriented professionals were trained to build and maintain the houses, roads,
cars, gadgets, and everything else ubiquitous to an expanding consumer society.
Yet the program would never have been successful had it not been for the
phenomenal amount of materials and facilities it acquired from the WAC. As Table 9
indicates, up to 31 March 1946, the WAC sold $2,005,538 to outfit the CVT with
thousands of machine tools, machinery, radio equipment, tools, saws, gauges, engines,
transmitters, air conditioners, scientific equipment, tractors, typewriters, desks, chairs,
adding machines, and thousands of dollars’ worth of other instructional equipment. The
CVT even purchased several bowling alleys from the WAC.124 The CVT also spent at
least $162,998 on bedframes, sheets, blankets, mattresses, pillows, benches, couches,
tables, chairs, kitchenware, and other miscellaneous cafeteria and barrack stores. These
items were in short supply and desperately needed to house veterans in residences,
especially considering that some veterans travelled great distances to attend vocational
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schools during the peak phases. Moreover, such purchases were doubly important given
that few soldiers had acquired many possessions or civilian-style comforts while enlisted.
Since the government had clothed, fed, and sheltered its service personnel during the war,
it was crucial to continue doing so until they found the means to support themselves as
veterans in civilian life.125
Table 9: Sales of Material For Educational Purposes, 12 July
1944 to 31 March 1946
Canadian
Educational
Vocational
Provinces
Total ($)
Institutions
Training
($)
Program ($)
British Columbia
110,357.24
88,371.84
22,015.40
Alberta
233,864.64
215,493.14
18,371.50
Saskatchewan
221,154.43
213,377.63
7,776.80
Manitoba
94,941.48
91,095.51
3,845.97
Ontario
1,062,203.56 899,056.22
163,147.34
Quebec
330,911.85
232,142.59
98,769.26
New Brunswick
177,943.15
167,852.41
10,090.74
Nova Scotia
91,801.18
74,729.99
17,071.19
Prince Edward Island
23,853.45
23,418.75
434.70
Totals
2,347,060.98 2,005,538.08 341,522.90
Source: SCWEE, 20 June 1946, (No. 24, Book 3), 785.

In some cases the CVT could not acquire the items it needed from the WAC. For
instance, sometimes the WAC did not possess the equipment in its inventory or it
prioritized the sale of some items to private interests (as was the case with certain
machine tools). In other cases, administrative delays with the WAC forced the CVT to
search for items elsewhere and it spent approximately $600,000 on material and
equipment from “outside” sources, particularly in the US.126 As Thompson explained:
I must say that what we got were obtained, for the most part, from very small
shops; say a man, probably an older man, had a small shop and wanted to sell
out. Our representatives were scouring the country for those things and they
would hear about it and they would take the opportunity to buy them…we
have had to set up a lot of shoe repair shops, barber schools, hair-dressing
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schools, and all items that we bought outside were, for the most part, items of
that kind that were not available from War Assets.127
Although veterans and their associations were denied priority access to the WAC’s
inventory, they were clearly benefiting indirectly from the sales of surpluses to
institutions and organizations set up to assist with rehabilitation.
Certainly educational institutions were deriving some benefits from the availability
of surpluses. Yet this did not always translate into a harmonious relationship nor did it
mean that educational institutions were satisfied with the arrangements. While Thompson
was sympathetic to the WAC’s difficulties and the logistics of disposal, he noted that
delays with the WAC forced the CVT to look elsewhere for the items it needed
immediately.128 Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the WAC’s support for educational
institutions was Charles E. Phillips, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Canada Newfoundland
Educational Association (CNEA). The CNEA was a non-profit educational association
formed by the provincial departments of education and the Newfoundland government to
act as a forum for cooperation and consultation. On behalf of educational institutions,
Phillips undertook a letter writing campaign in 1946 that attacked the WAC’s selling
policies. In letters to Mackenzie King, Howe, Berry, and several members of the
SCWEE, Phillips explained his concerns about the WAC’s unhelpful practices and
questioned the merits of making educational institutions pay market rates for surpluses
that were sometimes in deteriorating condition.129 Indeed, Phillips was angry about the
WAC’s “indefinite loan” policy in which the Corporation loaned items to educational
institutions indefinitely and at minimal cost (only the shipping and handling was
charged). However, items were only made available in this manner after the WAC
attempted to sell them commercially. If private interests or higher-level priority holders
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purchased the items than schools boards were out of luck, especially on items like
machine tools and other types of reusable equipment that everyone coveted.130

Assets to Ashes? Recycling and Upcycling Surplus Assets
Surplus supplies (and some munitions) were crucial to supporting economic and
social reconstruction. The reuse of surplus assets provided businesses with items to sell
during the postwar shortages and recirculated assets into the hands of organizations,
institutions, and individuals who used those things to fulfill their postwar plans, improve
living standards, and expand social services. Yet not everything was easily reusable in
civilian life. Many items were purpose-built for the military and required extensive
modifications to gain new forms, functions, and intentions. In other cases, pieces of
weapon systems or items derived from destruction programs were adapted into
improvised purposes. Thus, the reuse of surplus assets paralleled a pattern of recycling
and upcycling that refashioned utility and meaning. A key factor in the recycling and
upcycling of surplus assets was the ingenuity and creativity of the end user or the staff at
the WAC and established businesses reselling the items. Despite the public criticism, the
WAC did provision the second-hand economy while also promoting the recycling and
upcycling of surplus goods, materials, and war junk.
Creativity and ingenuity were essential to material demobilization because surplus
assets were not always the first choice or designed for their new-found purposes. This
was especially the case when upcycling things. Upcycling is the act of repurposing
objects by valuing the material from which they are made and the form that they
maintain. It differs from the concepts of reuse and recycling in subtle ways. The reuse of
an asset, as we have seen, involves repurposing it by valuing the materials composing it,
the form they are in, and seeks to maintain the intended function. The recycling of
something occurs only when the asset is valued for its component parts or materials. 131 It
requires a certain level of inventiveness and originality to imagine a possible use or
adaptation for something that others might consider inert or worthless. In effect, recycling
war junk into something new or upcycling surpluses into different uses helped
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reinvigorate private enterprise after years of heavy government regulation and scarcity.
Recycling and upcycling are innovative processes that privilege entrepreneurial genius by
forcing people to purchase second-choice materials and adapt them to their needs before
making a profit.132 Given the widespread shortages of new goods, people had to get
creative in order to fulfill their visions of victory. This was a healthy, though somewhat
inconvenient, by-product of reduction and destruction programs and helped transition the
economy out of a wartime mentality. In other words, wartime controls and propaganda
had preached all-out production, thereby privileging the consumption of goods and
resources, but now that hostilities were over it was time to refashion, reconfigured, and
conserve what had already been produced.
To assist with material conversion, trade publications started publishing advice on
how to recondition military surpluses and offered opinions about where future business
opportunities might prevail. In 1945-1946, the Canadian Automotive Trade ran a ninepart series entitled “Servicing Surplus Army Vehicles.” Written as instructional and
informational references, the articles pre-empted the flood of surplus vehicles by a few
months. The goal was to offer advice and information to “Garagemen and Dealers” about
the peculiarities of military-patterned vehicles and the special steps needed to recondition
or repair them. The first installment, “Is Servicing These a Military Secret?” instructed
readers that they “should have this information handy when surplus army vehicles come
in for service or reconditioning” because they had “a number of controls and other
features not ordinarily found on standard vehicles.”133 The article then went on to provide
short paragraphs of information on twenty-three different parts from light switches and
lubrication, to fuel gauges, wheel bearings, and ignition switches. Subsequent articles in
the series were focused more on specific aspects of military vehicles and trucks rather
than a general overview. The second article informed readers that the tires and wheels on
military-patterned vehicles were constructed differently and required an eighteen-step
procedure for removing and mounting.134 The other articles covered a range of important
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subjects: brakes, steering and axles servicing, steering repair, winches and special army
vehicles, brake adjustments, power tire pumps, and transmissions.135
The “Servicing Surplus Army Vehicles” series helped prepare the auto industry for
a future reality. Since surplus military vehicles were going to be sold to Canadians on the
domestic market, “garagemen and dealers” needed to familiarize themselves with these
assets in order to adjust to a new marketplace and serve their clientele, especially since
maintenance accounted for a large portion of profits in the automotive sector.136
However, other contributors to the Canadian Automotive Trade seized on this reality and
took things to another level by mixing fact and fantasy. In a somewhat overzealous article
about future “opportunities for Garagemen and Dealers” to develop their businesses in
the postwar period, Hiram McVicar wondered if the “corner garage” might not merge the
automobile industry with aircraft servicing.137 Swept up by the rapid wartime innovations
in aeronautics and aircraft manufacturing, McVicar believed that a future existed where
airplanes would be as commonly used as automobiles. On this point he was emphatic, as
the reliability of new aircraft models and the mass production of “light planes” would
open new and better travel methods – if only the government relaxed its restrictions on
airport construction, airworthiness certification, and pilot licensing.138
According to McVicar the automotive industry had to adapt to the changing times
by investing in aircraft servicing and the construction of small airports adjacent to their
garages. Quoting Russell Gibson, president of Cub Aircraft of Canada, whose company
planned to build 300 small-plane airfields across Canada, McVicar opined that any new
business venture would have to mimic some of the services already offered by the
automobile industry, such as “joy rides, flying instruction, charter flights, air taxi, and
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plane rental service.” He even added that “reconditioned used planes would be available
as the development went forward” and if airports were combined with used-car lots it
created a “drive-yourself” rental market for “visiting pilots.”139 Indeed, the automotive
industry had to get in on the action now because new technologies, like the flying car,
were on the horizon. McVicar professed that the “York Commuter” – a four-seat, high
winged, twin-engine “flying station wagon” designed by the York Manufacturing Co. of
New York – was the way forward.140 Although McVicar’s prophecies were flawed and
the flying car turned out to be nothing more than a pipe-dream, they were indicative of
how limitless imagination and creativity were in designing or improvising new
applications for technologies. Indeed, wartime technological advances had proven their
worth and reinvigorated further inventiveness, no matter how far-fetched or fanciful.
Although the technological sublime was exhilarating and inspired some new
innovations, there were many other entrepreneurs who took a less risky approach than
McVicar’s suggestions. Rather than banking on new technologies taking off (pun
intended), these entrepreneurs looked to the future by turning backwards, towards items
that were already manufactured. These individuals banked on their abilities to transform
or renovate old assets into new purposes rather invent something completely new, such as
the flying car. David Edgerton used the term “Creole technology” to describe this type of
technological adaptation. As Edgerton explained, “Creole” is most commonly used to
describe “local derivatives of something originally from elsewhere (typically the white
and black populations of the Americas).”141 However, instead of people, he applied the
concept to the history of technology as a means of demonstrating diffusion, usage, and
human agency. In other words, the term “Creole technology” implies that a hybrid exists
between the new and old designs, purposes, and compositions. Creole technology is
“derived, but different from, the originating case,” meaning that technology does not
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remain constant and can be adapted to suit local conditions and requirements whenever
and wherever it is used.142
Changing an asset’s form, function, and intention according to new potential uses
or local circumstances ensured the steady development of hybrid technologies in postwar
Canada. Consequently, surplus assets often underwent a process of upcycling that
physically altered usage, design, or composition. One of the most striking examples
involved some attempts at converting steel helmets. In late 1944, an enterprising
Scotsman, Alexander McPherson Wilson, was in negotiations with the WAC to purchase
30,000 surplus helmets specifically for resale to farmers as “hens’ nests.”143 The obvious
practicality of stripping out the helmets’ liners and flipping them upside down to make a
convenient bowl for the chicken and its eggs was a notable hybrid of an old form and
new function. Unfortunately, at the time, Wilson was not able to strike a deal with the
WAC. Although his idea was clearly derived and different from the originating case, it is
unclear if his “Creole” adaptation for steel helmets was ever attempted.
The recycling and upcycling of surplus ships and aircraft are probably the best
documented examples of Creole technologies derived from military surpluses. For
instance, in Brantford, where large numbers of surplus aircraft were being stored by the
WAC one interesting story emerged in October 1946. After being discharged from the
RCAF, two veterans, Henry Denbe and William Bickerdike, partnered in Montreal to
create a company they called Airplane Mechanical Salvage. The company specialized in
disassembling surplus aircraft and upcycling parts (and junk) to construct a variety of
new items. It also salvaged workable airplane components for resale in other industries.
Denbe, who served at the RCAF’s testing and development branch in Ottawa, and
Bikerdike, who was a pilot, had the requisite experience to make the most of the
opportunity and pass the WAC’s background checks.144
Airplane Mechanical Salvage also provided employment for many RCAF veterans
who picked apart “the planes like a chicken” to recover as much “meat” (workable parts)
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as possible.145 In 1946, the company purchased about 1,000 planes from the WAC: 500 in
Brantford, 300 in Mont Joli and 200 at St Johns, Quebec. From these derelict planes the
company developed “some of the finest car trailers, in more than one size, and
wheelbarrows, Canada has had.”146 The trailers and wheelbarrows were pneumatic, had
built in compressors, and cushioned wheels. Furthermore, the company recovered,
refurbished, and sold a whole slate of other items, including starters, generators, lights,
water-pressure tanks, gas tanks, batteries, hydraulic systems, “and a few other items” –
all largely recovered from the Anson aircraft and other types they dismantled. 147 In fact,
their business was so successful that the biggest challenge was disposing of the aircraft
frames once they were picked clean.
The recycling and upcycling of surplus aircraft occurred in other ways as well. In
one fascinating example, a veteran named John G. Lacourse purchased seven Ventura
bombers from the WAC and located at the RCAF station in Burford, Ontario. Lacourse
had the bombers shipped from Burford to the garage and service station he owned near
Hannon, Ontario. Originally he wanted to fly them over, but he was unable to find a
suitable landing site near his business. As a result, he rented several tow trucks to haul the
planes in “one of the strangest convoys ever seen on Ontario highways.”148 The convoy
was escorted by provincial police and when traversing Brantford, city police assisted in
redirecting traffic. Even with the wings removed the Ventura bombers were so large that
they took up the full width of the roads. As the Hamilton Spectator reported, “low
hanging branches were stripped from quite a few trees by the tails of the planes, and a
highway crew, following behind with a truck was kept busy removing them from the
roadway. In Brantford, a Hydro pole was broken off and service temporarily affected.”149
According to Lacourse, the efforts were worth it. Before moving the planes he stripped
them down and sold all their equipment, wheels, motors, wiring, instruments, tubing,
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toilets, chairs, scrap metal from the wings, and even some gasoline that was still in the
tanks at the time of his purchase. The sale of the equipment and parts more than covered
the planes’ selling price and his transportation costs to Hannon.150
For Lacourse, though, the real prize was the seven remaining fuselages. In fact,
Lacourse purchased the planes specifically to upcycle the fuselages into “family overnight cabins” at his service station. “When stripped of all the fittings,” he told the
Hamilton Spectator, “the body of the planes is large enough to permit room for a double
bed in the tail and two bunk beds in the nose. Tables, chairs, and other furniture will be
placed in the centre.”151 By purchasing surplus aircraft and renovating them so they could
be converted into tourist cabins at his service station, Lacourse was both recycling and
upcycling materiel into new and peaceful purposes. During a time of severe shortages in
building materials, Lacourse improvised a hybrid between new and old uses for
technology. In doing so, he was able to expand his business and build tourist cabins
cheaply. Instead of paying a premium to construct a normal set of cabins, he adapted his
plans to the availability of surplus aircraft and retrofitted them into his business
operations.
Canadian naval vessels underwent similar transformations. Although only ships
sold as scrap were barred from reuse, there were many other vessels that proved highly
adaptable to peacetime conditions. For instance, the tugboats, barges, patrol vessels, and
small boats that had serviced the RCN during the war were often purchased by private
interests and reused in similar capacities. In some cases, these ships required very little
alterations as was the case with the ex-naval tug HMCS North Shore purchased by the
Gilley Brothers Ltd. which operated out of New Westminster, British Columbia.152 Patrol
vessels were particularly coveted by fishing companies. In some cases, the Navy’s patrol
vessels were simply confiscated or loaned fishing vessels that were converted into
various wartime roles, as was the case with HMCS Crest, a seiner originally named May
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S and owned by Kunimatsu Saimoto, a Japanese Canadian living in Steveston, British
Columbia. The vessel was confiscated in 1942 and used as a Canadian Naval Patrol
Vessel until it was sold in 1945 to Gerrard Dal Secco who converted it back into a fishing
boat.153 Other naval patrol vessels had similar fates. HMCS Valdez, which was listed as
an “Ex Japanese Fishing Vessel” that was “requisitioned during the war,” was sold first
to a J. O. Horan in Vancouver and then found its way to Nelson Bros. Fisheries Ltd.154
Several other patrol boats, HMCS Standpoint, Skidegate, Moorlock, Merry Chase, Leelo,
Kuitan, and Smith Sound, also ended up in the West Coast fishing business as seiners,
trawlers, tug boats, or cargo haulers for the logging industry.155
Given how many corporations and individuals were interested in acquiring surplus
boats, many clients were not able to buy the ships they wanted and had to settle for
second choices. In these cases, the newly purchased ship had to be sufficiently renovated
and modified to perform its new tasks. According to a variety of sources and sales lists,
this was a common occurrence. In one case, HMCS La Valee, a minesweeper sold to
National Fisheries Ltd. in Vancouver, was converted over the summer of 1947 into a
transport vessel for fish meat.156 In another case, an ex-RCN Fairmile, Q070, was
purchased by the Radium Chemical Company in North Vancouver and subsequently
converted to transfer “men and supplies” between “the mills owned by this company on
the West Coast of Vancouver Island” and the home port of Port Alberni.157 Fairmiles
fulfilled a variety of other purposes including salvage rescue and pleasure craft. However,
sometimes the boats were not as useful as first envisioned. In one case, the Fairmile Q069
was purchased by Mr. Garfield Weston and donated to the Sea Scouts at Vancouver in
late 1945. But the vessel “proved unsuitable for the Sea Scouts” and they were looking to

153

According to the website http://www.nauticapedia.ca/ HMCS Crest was renamed May S in 1958 and the
registry closed in June 2002. The ship was originally built in 1927. “Ship Details: Crest (H. M. C. S.),”
(Accessed
24
October
2015)
http://www.nauticapedia.ca/dbase/Query/Shiplist4.php?&name=Crest%20(H.M.C.S.)&id=29753.
154

DHH, 81/520/8000-800 Box 242 – File 10, “Enclosure memo,” Staff Officer (Intelligence and Trade)
Esquimalt to Director Naval Plans and Development, 1 August 1947, 8-9.
155

Ibid, 8-9.

156

Ibid, 3.

157

Ibid, 5.

289

sell it over the summer of 1947.158 The boat was probably too expensive to keep in
operation.
Perhaps the most intriguing examples of upcycled naval vessels related to the fate
of Canada’s destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. These classes of ships were purpose-built
for war and, while large numbers were sold for scrapping, a fair number found useful
second lives. In some cases, that second-life could be in another country’s navy or it
could be quite inglorious, such as the sinking of the venerable HMCS Dunver and
Charlottetown to form breakwaters along the British Columbian coast.159 However, the
postwar utility of corvettes was slightly more flexible. Corvettes could be readily adapted
to a variety of purposes, though their conversions tended to require more financial
investments. On the West Coast, Union Steamship Ltd. bought three Castle-class
corvettes HMCS Leaside, St. Thomas, and Hespeler for $225,000 and four Bangor-class
minesweepers, HMCS Bellechasse, Chignecto, Courtenay, and Miramichi for $80,000.
According to the company’s Marine Superintendent, E. W. Suffield, Union Steamship
completely overhauled the corvettes and turned them into passenger ferries. In response
to an inquiry from the Navy about its former war ships, Suffield explained the
modifications: “the main deck accommodation is staterooms of standard class, officer’s
accommodation, saloon and galley. The foc’sale deck is deluxe cabin accommodation
with passenger lounge in after end. The boat deck has observation room accommodation
from the break of the bridge to the funnel.”160 The four minesweepers had yet to be
converted.
The key point here is that Union Steamship expanded its operations by turning
corvettes into passenger ferries. All three vessels were altered to carry 100 first class
passengers with twenty-five upper deck rooms and twenty-three standard deck rooms.
The company also outfitted HMCS Leaside, St. Thomas, and Hespeler (renamed
Coquitlam, Camosun, and Chilcotin respectively) with modern navigational aids and
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radar (perhaps also purchased from the WAC). The Coquitlam had the longest route,
ferrying passengers up the British Columbian coast from Vancouver to Prince Rupert,
Alert Bay, Port Hardy, and Alaska. The Camosun and Chilcotin both operated in the
vicinity of Vancouver and Vancouver Island.161
Union Steamship also had some competition
from Gulf Lines Ltd. which bought and
converted a minesweeper HMCS Truro, an exarmed yacht, and a fairmile into passenger
ferries. The Truro, renamed Gulf Mariner, was
brought over from the East Coast through the
Panama Canal and altered to service 500 daypassengers. The ex-armed yacht, renamed Gulf
Stream, had two 440 H. P. Vivian Diesel
motors installed to replace the original steam
engines and its passenger accommodations
were built from the bridge to vessel’s stern. The
new layout included five lounge cabins and a
coffee bar. However, the Gulf Stream sunk on
11 October 1947 and was “declared a total
loss.”162 The fairmile, renamed Gulf Wing,
underwent similar structural changes as the
Gulf Stream but its new Vivian Diesel engines
were only 320 H. P. and it was put into service
quite quickly after the war.
Photo 16 Brochure for the Union
Steamship’s S. S. “Chilcotin.” Source:
LAC, RG24, Vol. 3547, File: 8000-30 Vol.
4, “Disposal of H. M. C. Ships.”
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However, the profits derived from upcycled or recycled assets were not always financial,
nor did companies always do the transforming. Indeed, in many instances it was the end
users who gained the most from purchasing surpluses, though in these cases the profits
were more aesthetic, intrinsic, or leisure-related. Fashioning wedding dresses from the
silk, nylon, and cotton linings of parachutes is perhaps the most clichéd example.
However, parachute linings were quite versatile and could be adapted into other things. In
one case, several craftsmen and companies, including Bancroft Industries Ltd. and
Canadian Hardware & Novelty Co., purchased thousands of surplus parachutes and
altered the surfaces “free from threads” and reformed them “into smart ‘silk’ lamp
shades.”163 Other popular items included brass metals or shell casings, sold for art or
decorative purposes. This fuelled a new generation of “trench art” or items constructed by
soldiers (or forged by counterfeiters) from spent cartridge casings or other things found in
military environments. The most enduring of these “pieces” are the ashtrays designed
from spent artillery shells that were often fixtures in Legion halls.164
Other people purchased surpluses for purely leisure pursuits. For example,
sometime in 1946-1947, an American civilian living in Pasadena, California named Bearl
Sprott was able to acquire an ex-RCN armed yacht named HMCS Cougar. Sprott
purchased the Cougar from Jack Gilmour Ltd., a Vancouver-based company that had
originally bought the vessel from the WAC.165 He then proceeded to retrofit the Cougar
into the ultimate pleasure-craft. According to a confidential list of postwar ship sales,
Sprott added two new 300 horsepower diesel engines and closed the waists and
quarterdeck to accommodate the housing and handling facilities for “a small float plane
on the after deck.”166 A few months after purchasing the boat Sprott transferred it to a US
registry and changed the Cougar’s name back to its prewar moniker: Breezin’ Thru.
Indeed, Sprott’s renaming was remarkably appropriate and his yacht-plane contraption
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must have made him the envy of every other boater wherever his pleasure craft went!
However, in mid-1950, Sprott sold the boat to someone he called “the Duke” in
correspondence with the purchaser’s agent and while on route to its new home in Spain,
Breezin’ Thru was caught in Hurricane Charlie and sunk in the harbour at Kingston,
Jamaica.167

Conclusion
The disposal of munitions and supplies was an integral part of reconstruction and
rehabilitation. In selling its inventories, the WAC provisioned the postwar economy with
the tools, objects, materials, and assets that were needed to complete postwar plans and
objectives. Businesses, organizations, government agencies, and average citizens all
benefitted from material demobilization, as they were able to reuse, recycle, and upcycle
surplus munitions and supplies into productive peacetime purposes. Yet the ability to
acquire and use objects was limited by severe material shortages, government policies,
intense competition, and problems with industrial reconversion. This added greater
importance and urgency to obtaining surplus assets, the availability of which helped
mitigate the shortages by filling gaps in production or space in store shelves. Obviously,
second-hand assets could not completely resolve the dearth of goods in postwar Canada,
but they certainly took the edge off the crisis in several key areas. The WAC played an
important role in stabilizing some of the political, economic, and social dislocation
caused by the transition to peace. However, by the same token, the domestic marketplace
was not always an ideal location to sell everything. Canada’s population and economy
were too small relative to the vast quantities of unneeded government property, especially
considering the selling restrictions on lethal assets and the array of weaponry, explosives,
and ammunition accumulated by the military. International clients had to be found if the
WAC was going to recoup as much money as possible.
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Chapter 6
The Diplomacy of Disposal: Settling War Claims and Selling
Surpluses Overseas
We want to try to do justice to the Canadian taxpayer, and we are proceeding with this
disposal in close co-operation and collaboration with the British War Office and Ministry
of Supply, especially in relation to the disposal of actual war-like stores to constitute the
armies of Allied nations.1
G. K. Sheils, Deputy Minister, Department of Munitions and Supply, 30 July 1945

Introduction
The WAC effort to maintain economic stability and supply the objects required to
fulfill postwar plans was an important part of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The
Corporation certainly prioritized the domestic marketplace when liquidating its
inventories, resulting in an important peace dividend for the national economy and social
welfare programs immediately following the war. Yet sales to the domestic market and
Canadian customers were not the only outlets available, as foreign governments and
international clients showed interest in Canada’s surplus materiel. The export of surplus
assets to international clients and the disposal of Canadian-owned property located
overseas deserve further analysis particularly given the types of commodities sold and the
fact that Canadian citizens were not the only people to reuse, recycle, and upcycle
Canadian surpluses.
When hostilities ended, it was understood that the domestic economy and the
military’s postwar requirements could never fully absorb the vast inventories
accumulated during the war. Therefore, the large stockpiles of arsenals and equipment in
the UK and the Netherlands posed as significant challenge to both the WAC’s mandate
and the DND’s postwar planning. Returning assets to Canada was an expensive and
potentially redundant undertaking. In effect, the transportation and storage costs involved
in repatriating assets from Europe, just to declare them surplus in Canada, were not worth

1

CWM, Democracy at War, “Canada Selling Surplus Stores to Some Allies,” Globe and Mail, 30 July
1945.

294

it. This was especially the case if similar types and models were available in Canada in
sufficient numbers to fill postwar military requirements or aggregate demand.
The utility of international markets and alliances was obvious. Selling excess
military stores already located overseas saved repatriation costs, while exporting
surpluses from Canada ensured that the domestic economy would not get completely
overwhelmed. Therefore, international markets provided important outlets that limited
what items re-entered Canada’s domestic economy, while also helping with the
reconstruction of Europe or the reconstitution of friendly militaries in the years preceding
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, the disposal of surpluses
overseas also truncated the size and cost of Canada’s postwar destruction programs. This
fortunate development resulted from the fact that Canadian industries procured only part
of the munitions and supplies used by the country’s armed forces. Consequently,
Canadian military units had to draw heavily from British supply channels to offset
shortages. When hostilities ended, this created a situation in which Canadian soldiers
were in possession of kit that the military did not own and had to return.
The Canadian government also used the disposal of surplus munitions and supplies
overseas as a means of settling war debts with the UK and the Netherlands. Entwining
surplus military assets with war claims was mutually beneficial since Canadian assets
were already stockpiled in those countries and there was an acute demand for all manner
of weapons and equipment in a war-ravaged Europe. War debts were generally settled in
two ways: either through a lump sum payment issued to offset the difference between all
claims, or by transferring surplus munitions and supplies in lieu of money. This created a
flexible system for settling debts in which surplus property played a central role. In using
international sales as an outlet to protect the domestic economy, Canada dabbled in the
marketplace for military surpluses by selling large quantities of merchandise and, while
supplies lasted, enjoyed some prosperity.
Yet the disposal of munitions and supplies internationally had mixed success and
was far from straightforward. A large number of obstacles plagued the WAC’s efforts
overseas. In his dealings with the Canadian Military Headquarters in London (CMHQ)
and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Major-General D. E. Dewar, the
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WAC’s Overseas Sales Director, encountered a range of issues while stationed in
England from July 1945 to June 1946. Perhaps the biggest obstacles were created by the
Army’s slow and sometimes flawed procedures as well as its rapid demobilization plans.
Moreover, the postwar foreign exchange crisis meant that officials in the Department of
Finance only wanted Canadian or American dollars for surpluses, which prevented
Dewar from selling to clients who could only pay in their native currencies. DEA and
DRS officials also hindered Dewar’s efforts through formal and informal diplomatic
arrangements that closed off local British markets and required him to transfer any
Canadian surpluses destined for the UK to the Ministry of Supply. Competition with his
British and American counterparts also proved highly troublesome as the international
market for military surpluses was hotly contested and easily flooded.
During the war, the Canadian military had grown substantially in size and
capability, but this growth was disproportionate to the country’s junior rank in world
affairs. Therefore, when hostilities ended, Canada was primed to unload a large amount
of weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. This brought Canada into the shadowy world
of arms dealing. In fact, selling arms to reconstitute the armed forces of allied countries
was perhaps Canada’s most important postwar role in the establishment of collective
security arrangements.2 However, Canadian sales were often constrained by the interests
and foreign policies of the UK and US. To navigate around British or American
prohibitions, the DEA’s objections, and the questionable morality of selling arms, the
WAC “demilitarized” every ship and aircraft it sold by removing the armaments and
ammunition, while Cabinet stringently reviewed all trade proposals involving the export
of arms (both new and used). Canada’s international disposal policies were driven by
pragmatic necessities and were not overly concerned with how the asset was used after
payments were received.
In that sense, the WAC played a role in the diffusion of military technologies, with
both positive and negative consequences. The WAC sold systems without weapons,
which recouped some of their original value, but there was little stopping the customer
from finding armaments and ammunition elsewhere. The Corporation also sold surpluses
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to help in the reconstruction of postwar Europe and the associated humanitarian crisis,
but this always came as a secondary consideration since the Canadian government and
military had to satisfy postwar requirements before selling the remainder. The WAC also
played a role in the reconstitution of allied armies, but the quantity and quality of the
second-hand weaponry acquired was dubious and in all likelihood had a negative impact
on the combat effectiveness of Canada’s Allies.

The Disposal of Surpluses Located Overseas
Canada’s global footprint of surplus munitions and supplies was not as large as that
of the UK or US, but it still possessed some important transnational and international
dimensions. In fact, the country’s alliances and imperial connections were extremely
helpful in the disposal of assets used by its armed forces overseas. By using international
markets and relying on Allies, Canada was able to reduce or even eliminate many of its
liabilities for disposal. Just as it had during the war, Canada relied substantially on the
UK in this regard. Despite Canada’s remarkable wartime productivity, only about 30-40
percent of industrial output actually went to the country’s armed forces. Instead, the vast
majority of production went to the nation’s Allies through the Mutual Aid program.3 As a
result, when the war ended the ownership of all munitions and supplies in the hands of
the Canadian Army had to be ascertained before disposal took place. After all, an Army
using borrowed kit could not turn around and sell it for a profit without the original
owner’s consent.4
Over the summer of 1945 a special committee was established by the DND to vet
all stores located in England and Northwest Europe in order to determine what objects
were Canadian property. The committee, headed by an officer whose last name was
Morrison (his rank and first name are unknown), was similar to the AOSAC except that it
played a more direct role in examining property and accessing ownership. While the
cynic might liken the Morrison Committee’s work to a bunch of bureaucrats and army
officers counting their beans, the task of establishing ownership and tabulating stocks
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was an essential if tedious component of postwar planning. Only once quantities and
ownership were verified could surpluses be culled from available inventories for final
disposal. Therefore, the bean-counting allowed the military to figure out what nonCanadian property had to be returned to the British (or American) supply depots. In doing
so, this helped them establish the military’s postwar requirements.
Establishing the size of the postwar military was both a political and strategic
choice. Yet it also came with the pragmatic implications of calculating material needs,
projecting future consumption rates, and selecting kit from available stocks. In
determining postwar requirements each branch of the military forecasted the retention of
“sufficient consumable stores” on a range of “3 to 5 years based on the anticipated rate of
consumption” in peacetime.5 Given the extensive production and procurement programs,
the Services were in a privileged position of picking from pre-existing arsenals that had
already been paid for and declaring the remainder surplus. As Colonel W. G. Denney,
Director of Ordnance Services (Provision) in the MGO Branch, explained to the SCWEE,
“although there are many new developments which may, in the near future, change the
type of some weapons with which the Army fights, it is somewhat too early to assess all
these. Therefore, it has been decided that we will start with such battle proven equipment
as we have available, and that as new weapons and equipment are developed, the
Canadian Army will share in this development.”6
In addition to forecasting future material requirements and separating out Canadian
property from British- or American-owned assets, the establishment of postwar
requirements also had to be done in light of where Canadian assets were located. During
the war, Canada had effectively built up two separate militaries on either side of the
Atlantic. By the end of the war 1.1 million Canadians had donned a khaki uniform with a
little more than half serving overseas. When Germany was defeated, combat forces were
stationed primarily in the Netherlands and northern Germany, while the bulk of
remaining reserves and service personnel were stationed in Britain and in the coastal
areas of the continent along the First Canadian Army’s axis of advance. Major supply
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centres were located at Camp Bordon and Aldershot in the UK and Apeldoorn and
Deelen in the Netherlands.7 Back home in Canada, where the “other” half million served,
Canadian forces were spread across the country at various training and storage depots, air
bases, port cities and other strategic points. Major supply hubs were mainly located in
central Canada, near places like Montreal, Valcartier, and Valleyfield in Quebec and
Toronto, London, and Windsor in Ontario.8
In establishing postwar requirements each Service first had to tabulate what
Canadian property existed in their inventories both at home and overseas, and then it had
to figure out if the stores in Canada were sufficient to fill future needs. This calculation
was critical: if stocks in Canada were not sufficient to meet postwar requirements then
munitions and supplies located overseas had to be repatriated. Inversely, if postwar
requirements were satisfied by stores available in Canada then every corresponding
category of kit in Europe was surplus. There was simply no need to pay transportation
and storage costs just so items could be disposed of in Canada. Assets were only
repatriated if the stores available in Canada were insufficient. As one member of the
SCWEE remarked in response to his question about surplus declarations and repatriated
vehicles, “there would be no reason for returning these [vehicles] from overseas. If [the
Army] declared some surplus that were new here in Canada, then the Ordnance
Department has pulled a boner, I would say.”9
The military was intent on avoiding this “boner” and as a result everything that was
considered surplus and located overseas was disposed of there, either by returning them
to the original owner or through international sales. In doing so, Canada saved
substantially on disposal costs. In May 1946, Colonel Denney explained the value of this
strategy to the SCWEE. His testimony shows that almost every military asset brought
home from Europe was deemed necessary for postwar purposes. Thus, the expense of
returning (as of 2 May 1946) 8,312 military-patterned vehicles was justified since they
7
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were not available in Canada in sufficient quantities at the time.10 These vehicles
augmented forces already stationed at home, though he did admit that as postwar budgets
were confirmed several hundred of the returned vehicles unexpectedly became surplus.
However, the Army considered this number quite reasonable given that its original
estimates were made over the summer of 1945 and largely based on envisioned budgetary
allotments for the next fiscal year. As Denney stated, “I would like to point out…that an
estimate of the requirements for the post-war army immediately at the cessation of
hostilities takes considerable calculation and investigation…I think that to come within
500 of the requirements was a fairly good reckoning on the part of the General Staff, who
did the calculating practically ten months ago.”11
In making solid estimates about postwar requirements and separating out Canadianowned property so that everything else could be returned to the UK or US, the Army (in
particular) drastically cut back on what was dispose of at home and abroad. In effect,
Canada was able to pass off its liability for final disposal and avoid a sizable and
worldwide destruction program for military assets similar to those undertaken by the UK
and US. For instance, although Canada possessed large numbers of surplus aircraft, the
WAC never had to develop a large network of permanent boneyards around the world
where tactical aircraft were stored until reduced. Instead, they temporarily used former
RCAF air bases for storage space. Moreover, since large portions of Canada’s air fleet
were returned to the RAF or retained by the RCAF for future use, few intact tactical
aircraft were declared surplus. As a result, by May 1946, the WAC had received a total of
6,790 aircraft (split between forty-three different types) totalling $362,548,093 in original
value, but by the author’s count only 850 can be classified as tactical aircraft for a total
original value of $81,656,893.12 Although the numbers increased over the following years
(especially for Mosquito bombers), the remaining 5,940 aircraft were all obsolete models
with some civilian application such as, trainers, transport, and reconnaissance types.
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The British and Canadian militaries developed many informal arrangements for
exchanging assets free of charge and without declaring them surplus. This occurred
whenever both countries owned identical types of, for instance, vehicles or ammunition
located inside each other’s borders.13 The general parameters for informal disposal
arrangements were first studied over the summer and fall of 1944 and by February 1945
Berry finalized a comprehensive memorandum on the subject after circulating it to the
CAAC, the DEA, and the Privy Council. Although some corrections were made, the
basic logic and structure of his recommendations were accepted and served as a key
starting point for future war claims negotiations, particularly with the British.14 Berry’s
recommendations were largely based around the Canadian-American disposal agreements
outlined by the 33rd Recommendation of the PJBD. The key principle was the
maintenance of sovereignty over the assets and property located in another country.
Accordingly, each country involved retained the right to withdraw any property from the
other for disposal either in Canada or another country. Berry’s recommendations also
stipulated that disposal could only occur through established agencies. This meant that
Canadian surpluses could only be sold through the Ministry of Supply in the UK and
British surpluses in Canada could only be liquidated through the WAC. Other important
clauses included stipulations on acceptable currencies, that any sale of property within
the territorial limits of the other required approval from both governments or their
representatives, and that the British government was allowed to “pool any such surplus
property with similar items, held by them for disposal” and that a share of the net
proceeds would be credited to Canada.15
However, despite the thorough recommendations, an orderly liquidation of
surpluses located in foreign countries was not always the outcome. Over the summer of
13
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1945, the difficulty of implementing arrangements and procedures devised on paper and
coordinating them across multiple departments, governments, and militaries became quite
apparent to those tasked with overseas disposal. Although establishing ownership and
tabulating inventories eventually provided policymakers with an overall picture of what
assets were available for sale or postwar purposes, it did very little to speed up disposal
while the bean-counting and decision-making took place. In effect, while officials sorted
out the details, others saw new opportunities. Starting around April 1945 average
citizens, companies, organizations, and hospitals in the UK correctly predicted that
Canadian forces would soon be returning home and started contacting officers at CMHQ
about acquiring surplus equipment. Their appeals for help were met by a sympathetic
audience, but despite their best intentions, these soldiers were unable to help. The
Canadian Army was in the midst of its inventory appraisals for Pacific and postwar
requirements. Nothing was technically surplus yet, so nothing could be sold.
Yet the flood of requests and appeals for special consideration did not let up.
British hospitals and clinics were particularly persistent in their representations to MajorGeneral Robert Marsden Luton, the Director of Medical Services at CMHQ.
Impoverished, war-weary, and in some cases physically damaged, many British hospitals
and their patrons – particularly in the London area – were in dire need of more supplies
and improved facilities. In general, hospitals were searching for all manner of expendable
stores, from bedding, stirrups, syringes, bandages, or narcotics, to some of the more
specialized equipment like X-ray scanners, which was a recurring theme since X-ray
equipment was in short supply and very expensive.16 One of the first requests Luton
received was a 24 April 1945 letter from Colonel Kenneth Maitland, the Vice Chairman
and Treasurer of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital for Children. Maitland’s letter, written as
a follow-up to an earlier telephone conversation, explained that the hospital needed to
outfit a new branch opening at Banstead in Surrey and the hospital was hoping to acquire
equipment at a low cost or as a free gift. The hospital’s five-page wish list was combed
over the next month by Luton who figured that Canada could spare, among many other
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things, nine baby cots, twelve bed cradles, three blood pressure apparatuses, four X-Ray
viewing boxes, two Oxygen tents, and 100 rubber hot water bottles.17
On June 22nd, Luton sent the request and inventory up the chain of command to
Major-General E. G. Weeks, hoping that the supplies could be provided at “salvage price
or as a gift to the hospital” since Maitland had been especially helpful to Canadians
during the war.18 However, Luton’s request was at odds with official policy and
procedures. CMHQ was not in a position to help anyone – not even a children’s hospital
– because it did not know what was surplus yet.19 Moreover, through the on-going
diplomatic discussions about surplus disposal, Canadian officials in Ottawa became
aware that their British counterparts viewed these types of generous transactions very
apprehensively, especially for stores that were easily convertible to civilian uses. Just as
Canadian officials were concerned about the flood of American surpluses wreaking
havoc in domestic markets and destroying prices for new goods, the concerns of British
officials were magnified by the number of Allied armies stationed inside its borders and
the fact that most would leave behind large amounts of surplus kit. Without any formal
disposal agreements or settled war claims, these fears were prominent and concerning.
Canadian officials no doubt found the British fears familiar, but for Luton and other
CMHQ officers dealing with face-to-face requests, a different perspective developed.
Weeks’s refusal should not have surprised Luton. A month earlier, on 11 May
1945, Lieutenant-General P. J. Montague, the Chief of Staff at CMHQ, had relayed a
CMHQ recommendation to NDHQ about the possible uses of Canadian-owned surplus
medical and dental supplies. The recommendation (and correspondence), which crossed
Luton’s desk while he compiled an inventory for Maitland, called for giving the nearly
2,000 medical and dental officers stationed overseas priority access to purchase surplus
stores for their own rehabilitation since many had closed or sold their practices to enlist.
However, NDHQ refused the request because of severe shortages of medical supplies in
Canada, stating that medical and dental officers “who have not yet set up a practice face a
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difficult problem. Their plight however can only be considered as secondary to that in
which armed service casualties (present and future) would be placed were we unable
adequately to equip our own hospitals in Canada and overseas.”20
In the absence of any formal claims settlement between Canada and the UK or
much information on Berry’s February recommendations, it seems that Luton tried to
improvise his own informal disposal arrangements that took advantage of the prevailing
demand for surplus kit in Britain. Perhaps he hoped that common sense would prevail
when his superiors learned of his actions, but this was not the case. In fact, Luton was
working at odds with the policy parameters established in Ottawa. In the spring of 1945,
and on the basis of Berry’s recommendations for the disposal of surpluses in foreign
countries, an understanding was reached with the British when a Canadian delegation
arrived in May at Cambridge for some financial talks with John Maynard Keynes and
other British officials. The understanding was similar to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”
with the US, in that the Canadian and British governments agreed to let the British
Ministry of Supply handle the disposal of Canadian surpluses in the UK by taking
custody when necessary and by setting prices at or near market value. Whatever profits
were collected from the sales was put in a suspense account and settled at a later date
when the financial agreement and war claims settlements were finalized. Moreover, when
dealing with countries other than the UK, Canadian officials in Ottawa urged caution and
restraint in messages to their subordinates overseas.21 “To avoid embarrassment” and
prevent officials from working at cross-purposes, all enquiries about Canadian surpluses
were to be “directed through regular diplomatic channels in Ottawa by governments
concerned” and officials overseas were to forward their remarks and comments to
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contextualize the requests.22 Under no circumstances were officials in the Canadian Army
to negotiate or make promises to foreign dignitaries and officials.
However, the disposal arrangements devised in Ottawa and London remained
incompatible with some local conditions. Indeed, for the WAC’s Overseas Sales Director,
Major-General D. E. Dewar, using the proper channels became one of the biggest hurdles
of his job. When Dewar arrived in England in July 1945 the disposal of surplus Canadian
medical supplies immediately fell into his lap and became one of his first major tasks.23
Inundated with enquires and pressured by Luton, Dewar wanted to make some quick
sales, but instead faced bureaucratic delays and diplomatic hurdles, and until the CMHQ
finished its stock taking, he had little knowledge of what was available. For example, to
facilitate the sale of surplus medical supplies to British hospitals, Dewar convened a
meeting with Luton and British officials from the Ministries of Health and Supply on 4
September. At the time, it was unlikely that Dewar was fully briefed on the complete
parameters of the Anglo-Canadian “Gentlemen’s Agreement” since Howe informed him
of the arrangements in writing on 1 October. However, his dealings with British officials
certainly clarified the situation. At the September meeting, Luton stated his intentions:
there were currently 22,500 unused hospital beds in the UK, half of which would be
returned to Canada, but the other half would need new owners. Moreover, other valuable
equipment and supplies totalling about £400,000 were just sitting in storage. Luton was
worried that the “value to humanity” would be lost if this supply of equipment remained
unused and not maintained. He wanted to use Maitland’s hospital as a test case in which
medical supplies were turned over for a nominal fee of £1,000.24
Despite the need and cheaper prices, British officials resisted the overtures and
openly spoke about destroying these supplies rather than purchasing them. Although the
British officials did not object to the efforts to provide hospitals with supplies, they were
looking at the bigger picture and worried that Canadian surpluses sold for such small
22
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amounts would damage postwar prices for new goods, thus crippling the vital industries
that were manufacturing or expecting to produce them in the postwar economy.25 British
officials then referred to the parameters of Berry’s recommendations, citing the need to
dispose of everything through the Ministry of Supply. Both Luton and Dewar were taken
aback: it seemed as though Canadian and British officials had conspired to prevent any
attempts at filling the urgent need in the UK. In a moment of exasperation at the meeting
Dewar lamented the fact that “the Canadian Disposal Body did not visualize the
humanitarian aspect and that any action towards donations or sales at nominal prices
must be dealt with by the Canadian Authorities as a question of Government policy.”26
Everyone’s hands were tied for different reasons and it was clear that gifts were not
possible. However, Luton and Dewar were able to secure some discretion over where the
Ministry of Supply sold the equipment in that they could earmark items for delivery (with
a twenty percent discount) to those hospitals that had helped Canadians during the war.27
Throughout Dewar’s tenure as Overseas Sales Director, a constant series of
challenges and problems plagued his efforts. The sale of medical supplies in Britain was
just the beginning and his frequent correspondence with Howe revealed much about the
incumbent obstacles. It did not take long for Dewar’s frustration with the Canadian
Army’s procedures to grow, particularly given their inherent flaws. To put it mildly, the
Morrison Committee’s task was thankless and boring, the overseas equivalent of the
government-wide appraisals that preceded the flood of surplus declarations discussed in a
previous chapter. Like with bureaucrats in Ottawa, the monotony of paper-pushing
quickly wore out committee members who started taking advantage of whatever shortcuts
they could. According to Dewar, those shortcuts had serious consequences and greatly
complicated his work once the inventory lists arrived at his office in London. As he
explained to Howe, those in charge of making the inventories did so based solely on unit
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war establishments and not by counting all the items available in depots or unit areas. In
other words, committee members reasoned that if a unit was supposed to have X number
of soldiers than it should also have Y number of socks or Z number of weapons – so there
was no need to actually count everything. The reality, of course, was not so clear cut.
This shortcut allowed the committee to quickly tabulate a general inventory for their
superiors in Ottawa who were making the final decisions on all postwar requirements.
However, for Dewar it caused confusion and delay since he needed exact totals for the
purposes of marketing and sales negotiations.28
The time it took to compile the lists and communicate them back to Ottawa for final
approval also left Dewar without many goods to sell or indications of what might be
unneeded in the future. Obviously he expected a postwar rush at some point but, as the
summer turned to fall, Dewar grew exceedingly frustrated with the Army’s intransigence.
On 3 September 1945, he wrote to Howe explaining that “the army has been extremely
slow in getting forward to me their surplus lists. They have been handicapped by a lack
of knowledge of complete Canadian requirements as well as the complete requirements
of the Occupational Force” – all of which were being dictated to CMHQ from Ottawa.29
For Dewar the problem was getting out of hand. With each passing day he and other
Canadian officials were inundated with requests for all types of munitions and supplies
(such as vehicles, weapons, and medical supplies) from Allied governments, hospitals,
relief organizations, and individual citizens who all predicted an imminent Canadian
withdrawal from Europe.
However, Dewar had few items to offer and instead of consummating sales
immediately, he was forced to politely inform customers to check back later when
supplies might be available. Dewar felt as though he was missing a chance to take
advantage of a materially-starved marketplace. Moreover, as he saw it, the window of
opportunity was closing quickly, as rumours were rampant that other Allies were on the
verge of liquidating their surpluses and this added further urgency to Dewar’s complaints.
As he wrote Howe on 9 October, “I have been advised that the United States will put on
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the market approximately 40,000 vehicles in Belgium within the next two or three weeks.
For that reason I am continuing the pressure on the Army to release as many vehicles as
possible before the floods come.”30 Indeed, with so much Allied kit likely to become
available in Europe, getting a quick start on sales was essential. Prices and clients were
only going to decrease in the future.
Dewar’s pressure on CMHQ officers did result in some isolated successes. In
September 1945, he arranged one of the first major sales of Canadian assets overseas. In
exchanged for $5 million (USD) Canada sold about 3,600 trucks to Czechoslovakia and
Poland through UNRRA. Although CMHQ was originally unwilling to write off the
trucks as surplus, Dewar saved the transaction by prevailing “on CMHQ to give us a
partial list in order to facilitate the movement.”31 As a result, CMHQ released the trucks
from depots in the Netherlands and the whole transfer of assets was codenamed
Operation Canhar. Overall, Canhar proved quite successful. Dewar’s work ensured that
Canada found an early buyer for some of its surplus vehicles and the trucks arrived just in
time to help save the harvest in Poland and Czechoslovakia which was the operation’s
ultimate goal (note the merging of “CANada” and “HARvest”). Moreover, according to
Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray the sale also helped improve UNRRA’s public
image and offset some of the transportation issues that were plaguing the distribution of
aid.32 However, like most disposal operations it was far from perfectly executed.
Traversing the destroyed remnants of Germany to deliver the convoys of vehicles to the
two Eastern European nations was a complicated undertaking. The convoys got lost
multiple times when war damage caused detours and, inevitably, several accidents
occurred on the treacherous journey across Central Europe and through different Allied
occupation zones. The trip took several days to complete and accommodations (however
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rudimentary) had to be arranged. Moreover, since it was a two-way trip for all 3,600
drivers, a return trip had to be planned as well.33
Over the fall of 1945, and after the Pacific war ended, the armed forces finally
established their postwar requirements and the flood of surpluses that Dewar had
predicted commenced. Unlike at home where the WAC was reorganizing and expanding
its storage facilities to accommodate the surging inventories, Canada’s overseas disposal
administration was completely dependent on the Army’s and Air Force’s logistical
facilities. This proved to be quite a troublesome relationship given the amount of assets
requiring liquidation, the summer inventory tabulations, and a lack of coordination with
DND officials. In fact, it was only in early December that Howe and Berry found out that
“the army expects to be out of Holland by February 1st [1946]” and that this timetable
was arranged under the assumption that the WAC would somehow be in a position to
accept all remaining surpluses overseas.34 However, according to Berry it was not
possible or practical to build up a large staff of trustworthy and capable people to
maintain custody of surpluses overseas in the short time “prior to the Canadian Army
being sent home.”35 Perhaps Dewar summed up the situation best when he told Howe,
“the main idea in the minds of the Canadian Military Organization over here is to get the
troops back to Canada with all speed. This is perhaps very logical but it is certainly not
going to facilitate the work of disposal.”36
With all the Army’s facilities closing down and Canadian troops returning home,
no one would be left in Britain and Holland to guard or maintain Canada’s surplus
stockpiles. Although the new Minister of Defence, Douglas Abbott, assured Howe that
the Army would find volunteers, the numbers fell far short of requirements and there
were no guarantees that those with the necessary experience would agree to stay behind.37
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The WAC was left scrambling in front of an avalanche without the personnel,
administration, or supporting infrastructure. In an effort to help Dewar, Howe dispatched
Colonel T. F. Flahiff back overseas. Flahiff, who had just returned from his inspection
tour of Northwest Europe to start a new job as an assistant in the office of the Deputy
Minister of Reconstruction, was still in Halifax when he received his new and
inconvenient orders to cross the Atlantic again.38 In Britain, Dewar clambered to find the
necessary manpower to help him and often had to improvise solutions. For instance, since
the Army’s mechanics were being demobilized and sent home, the Army’s service and
repair facilities were rapidly closing down at Camp Bordon. As a result, Dewar had to
hire a local British company, Grantham Productions Ltd., to repair and retrofit surplus
vehicles so they could be readied for sale.39
Berry also tried getting Howe to pressure the Army to reconsider its timetable and
stay another six months to facilitate an orderly liquidation. However, Abbott, who was
brought in by Mackenzie King to expedite demobilization, politely declined. With the
timetable set, Berry and Howe saw no alternative but to give Dewar the go-ahead and
dispose of everything as quickly as possible. As Howe told Dewar in a Top Secret
telegram on 12 December 1945, “the disposal of surpluses in Northwest Europe must
now be shaped to coincide with availability of military personnel.” 40 By the end of 1945,
Dewar faced the reverse problem from the summer: he now had too many assets to sell in
a very short time period. The pressure to liquidate stores quickly was intense since his
mission was to recoup some of the original cost before the Army withdrew. Thankfully,
Dewar proved to be a highly capable salesman for the WAC, but the job was immensely
challenging as a never-ending series of obstacles complicated his efforts and limited his
freedom of action. In February 1946, after several stressful months of heavy work, Dewar
briefly considered resigning his post. Having served the DMS throughout the war as
Director-General of the Arsenals and Small Arms Production Branch, Dewar was burning
out. Adding to his burdens was the prolonged and unexpected separation from his wife,
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whose arrival in Britain was derailed because of bureaucratic regulations surrounding her
visa application.41 However, a cooler head prevailed, and Dewar continued as Overseas
Sales Director until the post was terminated in June 1946.
In late fall 1945, Dewar’s work started piling up as sales negotiations with the
Belgian and Dutch Governments commenced. Unfortunately, few documents outlining
the negotiations survived and no comprehensive list detailing everything purchased
exists. According to Berry’s report to the WAC’s Board of Directors in February 1946
roughly $2 million worth of surpluses were sold or in the process of being sold to those
countries and “negotiations were under way with the Belgian Government for additional
sales of tanks and armoured vehicles to perhaps $1,000,000.”42 Furthermore, from 19461948, the Dutch also made several purchases from the WAC that were labelled as “Group
Sales of Materials in Several Classifications” in the WAC’s annual reports. In total, these
sales amounted to over $3 million, but unfortunately it is unknown what materials or
classifications were exchanged. This suggests that these types of bulk purchases were one
way to camouflage the amount and diversity of military assets liquidated from storage
depots in the Netherlands.43
Suffice it to say, the Dutch and Belgians bought many different things in bulk. In
August 1945, the Dutch started negotiations for purchasing at least two divisions’ worth
of personal equipment that could outfit those citizens being called up for police duties,
and, eventually, for overseas service in the Pacific. These negotiations for the equipment
continued throughout the fall and sometime in the fiscal year of 1946-1947 dozens of
sales were finalized for a variety of other materials and equipment. For example, a total
of $3,531,911 was paid to the WAC (in thirty-five separate transactions) for clothing and
textiles by the Dutch government and the Canadian Red Cross for consignment to
Holland. Some of the items purchased included approximately 200,000 pairs of trousers,
150,000 blouses, 50,000 rifle slings, 35,000 blankets, 160,000 pairs of socks, and
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thousands of pairs of boots and shoes.44 These types of sales put surplus uniforms and
textiles to good use by providing many destitute Europeans with a change of clothes.
The sale of surplus assets for humanitarian purposes was an especially lucrative
business for the WAC. Not only did they provide a reliable outlet for unloading unneeded
materials and supplies, but sales to foreign governments, UNRRA, the Canadian Red
Cross, and several other charitable organizations helped attenuate a desperate postwar
humanitarian crisis. Crushed under the weight of heavy and prolonged fighting, much of
Europe and Asia lay in ruins. Allied militaries, local governments, and aid organizations
struggled to cope with the wretched and starving mass of humanity displaced by the war
and its aftermath.45 Although they certainly did not offset the entire crisis, surplus assets
filled a gigantic vacuum in the supply of basic commodities and services. Clothing and
textiles were some of the most coveted supplies and the Dutch were certainly not the only
people to benefit from Canadian stocks. The Red Cross and UNRRA made particular use
of old blouses, trousers, undergarments, coats, and boots. The Red Cross alone purchased
at least $3,804,911 worth of clothing and textiles, some motor transport spare parts, and
fifty-six ambulances. The items were shipped all over world: to China, Poland, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, Germany, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Holland.46
UNRRA and other relief organizations profited as well. One November 1945 shipment to
Athens, Greece totaled 140,000 lbs. of “mixed civilian clothing.”47
Against the back drop of a very cold winter and the war’s devastation, surplus
medical supplies were particularly coveted. The Belgians purchased long lists of
equipment and supplies from Canada, including aseptic furniture, sundry field medical
equipment, X-ray apparatuses and accessories, laboratory apparatuses, surgical
appliances, slings, assorted surgical dressings, and surgical instruments and appliances.
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The French Medical Mission purchased nearly half a million dollars’ worth of narcotics,
hospital equipment, and medical supplies, while the Dutch government purchased an
entire hospital (No. 1 General Hospital) and all the medical stores consolidated at
Nijmegen by 1st Canadian Army over the winter. Later in May 1946 (and as part of the
war claims settlement), the Dutch purchased all the remaining medical and dental
supplies situated in the Netherlands (mostly at Alverna), Canadian General Hospitals No.
2, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 21, and all the remaining armoured and unarmoured vehicles located
at the Deelen airfield.48
Despite these achievements, Dewar faced many obstacles along the way. Aside
from working with a timetable established that did not facilitate disposal, his problems
also stemmed from another government department based far away in Ottawa: the
Department of Finance. Despite the Hyde Park agreements and Canada’s best efforts to
balance its payments between Sterling pounds and American dollars, at the end of
hostilities Canada faced another foreign exchange crisis. As a result, Finance officials
were less willing to accept other currencies when selling surpluses, such as the Dutch
Guilder or Belgian Franc, and instead preferred to receive payments in Canadian or
American dollars. In August and September, various deals were worked out with the Low
Countries where local currencies were exchanged for surpluses under the conditions that
the money “remain available” to cover the costs of occupation.49 After subtracting those
costs, if sufficient credit remained in favour of Canada, both Belgium and Holland agreed
to pay the balance in American money. Such an agreement was important for all parties
concerned. It facilitated sales over the fall of 1945 and in the end served as the basis of
the war claims settlements that are discussed in the following section.50
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However, these currency agreements took several weeks to complete – and months
to finalize into the war claims settlements – and therefore complicated Dewar’s task in
the short-term. Would similar agreements need to be formulated with every nation
interested in Canada’s surpluses? If so, then how was Dewar supposed to sell anything
before February 1946? As the pressure for speedy sales mounted in December, Dewar’s
work was severely limited by these conflicting policies and priorities. He now had lots of
assets to liquidate but he could not sell to the highest bidder if payments were not in
Canadian or American funds. As a result, the currency preference prevented Dewar from
making several sales. For example, in April 1946 a potential deal with a Swedish
customer fell through because Canada would not accept Swedish currency and no
payments in Canadian or American dollars were possible.51 Dewar appears to have
circumvented some of these restrictions by selling $845,921 worth of typewriters, a
printing plant, paper, and office equipment to a British intermediary, R. A. Brand & Co.,
who tried reselling them to the Swedish buyers. Although the sale to R. A. Brand & Co.
went through on Dewar’s end, new currency and export restrictions enacted in September
1947 prevented Brand & Co. from selling to the Swedes. Consequently, they were unable
to make payments to the WAC and, eventually, lawyers got involved.52
In May 1946, Dewar requested additional time to complete potential sales with
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Russia. 53 His position as
Overseas Sales Director was ending in June, but with an extra few weeks he was
confident that several sales worth an extra few million American dollars could be
arranged. He also believed that if Canada accepted currencies other than American or
Canadian dollars, then even more sales would be possible. For instance, his contacts with
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the Portuguese government informed him that it would purchase more Canadian
surpluses, perhaps $5-6 million worth of remaining equipment, if it could use the
Portuguese escudo instead of the American dollar.54 Although Southern Rhodesia
purchased several types of vehicles and engineering equipment for just under a million
dollars, Dewar was not able to complete many of these potential transactions because he
was not granted an extension and Finance would not compromise on the currency issue.55
Another set of problems that caused headaches for Dewar was the brewing
competition between the Allies for a share in the marketplace. Every Allied country faced
the disposal problem and in other countries, like the UK and US, the problem was
exponentially larger and more complex than in Canada. The worldwide marketplace for
military surpluses was finite, easily flooded, and hotly contested. In January 1946, when
traveling in Holland to finalize the sale of clothing, medical supplies, vehicles, and
personal equipment, Dewar received his initiation into this competition when he was
confronted by suddenly cautious representatives of the Dutch Quartermaster General. In
conversations with the Dutch officers, Dewar learned that the Head of the British Military
Mission at The Hague had informed the Dutch Minister of War that the Canadians would
not be able to “deliver complete equipment for a division and that if the Minister of War
persisted in buying from [Canada], the [British] War Office would not be disposed to fill
in the gaps.”56 Flabbergasted by the story, Dewar prevailed upon the Dutch and
convinced them of the good faith of Canadians despite the “adverse reports” circulated by
representatives of the War Office.57
In retrospect the “adverse reports” emanating from the British Military Mission
were not totally inaccurate since the Canadian armed forces were returning significant
amounts of kit to British supply depots. To British officers it was clear that Canada could
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not sell everything required by a full-strength division, but whatever they did sell hurt
Britain’s share in the postwar marketplace for military surpluses. Something had to be
done to protect potential outlets for disposal and hinder Canadian activities in the interim.
Clearly, Canada’s speedy plans for demobilization were ruffling some feathers.
Moreover, the hostility of British officials was also, perhaps, linked to Canada’s
advantageous postwar position. As a medium-sized power with a sizeable army, but
without significant occupation duties or major global security interests, Canada got an
early jump on selling British-patterned kit. In doing so, Canadian sales were cutting into
potential export markets for British surpluses and such actions were making some
forward-thinking British officials anxious.

Settling Debts and Selling Arms
The sales arranged by Dewar over the fall and winter of 1945-1946 coincided with
the negotiations of numerous war claims settlements between Canada and several
countries including the UK, US, and Netherlands. Agreements with the British and Dutch
followed a parallel timeline to the Canadian-American disposal agreements and, in
general, a similar vein. However, there were some distinctive elements to the British and
Dutch war claims settlements that deserve further attention, particularly in reference to
the precarious postwar positions of these two European powers. The Dutch settlement
also highlights the international significance of Canada’s postwar disposal program
through which it sold surplus arms and equipment to help reconstitute the armed forces of
future NATO allies.
In general, the war claims settlements are overshadowed by the Anglo-American
and Anglo-Canadian financial agreements negotiated throughout the fall of 1945 and
winter of 1946 respectively.58 Although these two financial agreements were significant
achievements, they differed from the claims settlements in their intent and scope. For the
most part, the financial treaties were future-oriented agreements that sought to maintain
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postwar prosperity in trans-Atlantic trade by propping up the British economy with loans.
The Anglo-American financial agreement provided the British with a five-year, $3.75
billion loan with a two percent interest rate and it stipulated that Britain had to open up
the Sterling area by converting more currency earnings into American dollars. The US
and UK also negotiated a separate claims settlement to resolve the outstanding debts for
Lend-Lease supplies and the sale of remaining American surplus property in the UK.
Once completed in March 1946, it was appended to the financial treaty.59 The AngloCanadian financial agreement furnished the UK with a 1oan of $1.25 billion over five
years with a two percent interest rate. The loan’s purposes were threefold: it allowed the
British to make their balance of payments between dollars and sterling, it helped maintain
adequate gold and dollar reserves in London, and it required Britain to maintain certain
obligations for multilateral trade with Canada. Although the financial agreement
cancelled the outstanding $425 million owed Canada for the BCATP, the agreement was
negotiated separately from the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement, though both
treaties were signed the same day in Ottawa, 6 March 1946.60
By contrast, the war claims settlements were completed as a means of resolving any
outstanding debts accumulated during the war. Rather than accommodating future
economic stability, the claims settlements were more backwards focused and sought to
wipe the slate clean by putting the signatories on an even financial footing. War debts
were accrued in many ways – through credits and loans, lending or leasing military
equipment and facilities, billeting troops, and damages attributable to service personnel
after liberation. Luckily for Dewar, the settlement of war claims coincided with the
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accelerated demobilization timetables and helped ease some of the pressure since assets
were written off at the bargaining table and, in the case of the Dutch settlement,
negotiations were handled personally by the DND’s Deputy Minister (Army) Alexander
Ross while he was assigned to CMHQ.61
The war claims settlements should not be confused with Canada’s billion-dollar gift
or the larger American loan. In fact, the two types of treaties were kept intentionally
separate in order to fulfill vastly different purposes. In Canada’s case, the extension of
loans to Britain and several other nations (including the Netherlands) was intended to
secure foreign markets for Canadian exports. The logic was simple: extending Canadian
credits to other countries would secure foreign purchases of new products being
manufactured by Canadian industries. It also fit with prevailing economic priorities
favouring exports and the producer emphasis but, unfortunately, the loans never managed
to stimulate economic growth in the way that policymakers hoped. Instead they
precipitated another balance of payments problem in 1947 when Britain drew heavily
from its loan in the early stages.62 However, since the loans were designed to stimulate
new production in Canada, they could not be used to sop up the residues of old, wartime
production. As a result, the loans could not be used to purchase Canadian surpluses
unless special adjustments were granted, such as in the case of Nationalist China and the
$25 million credit specifically set aside to cover weapon sales.63
Apart from establishing financial solvency amongst Allied nations, there were four
important hallmarks to Canada’s war claims settlements. The first, and perhaps most
basic, was the bilateral nature of each agreement. There were very few – if any –
multilateral war claims settlements between Allies. When first discussing international
arrangements for the disposal of Canadian surpluses, Berry had originally proposed a
series of multilateral agreements between all Allied nations, the creation of an
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international committee to handle the disposition of surpluses, and the division of the
world into zones through which the transfer of surplus would be intentionally blocked.
These ideas were later amended in September 1944 and very few survived in the final
version circulated in February 1945.64 In fact, the multilateral approach was largely
dismissed as too impractical and eventually it was superseded by a series of bilateral
agreements that were determined based upon the scope of wartime developments, debts,
and the physical locations of surpluses at the end of the war.
The second hallmark was the lump sum payment in exchange for title to the assets.
This was the simplest method for settling claims as it established an approximate value
for surpluses located in foreign countries and transferred ownership accordingly. Surplus
assets became the pawns of peacemaking – something akin to reparations-in-kind –
exchanged between allies to settle debts. The key negotiating challenge was in
determining which country had to pay the lump sum, determining what properties were
covered (and not covered) by the payment, and establishing a dollar figure acceptable to
all parties concerned. In the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement the British paid
Canada $150 million in order to cancel all outstanding debts between the two countries.
In the case of the Dutch-Canadian claims settlement, the Canadian Army paid the Dutch
government $33 million to settle all outstanding claims, though most of that total was
paid through the transfer of Canada’s formidable stocks of military hardware located in
the Netherlands.
Although the lump sum payment was not the only method available for enticing
sales of leftover war junk or settling claims, Canada never really deviated from this type
of arrangement.65 The lump sum payment worked for Canada given the narrow
geographic dispersion of its surpluses (predominately Northwest Europe and the UK) and
the fact that quantities were not sufficient to necessitate any special measures. As a result
of these circumstances, Canada’s war claims settlements had to possess a repatriation
clause, the third hallmark of claims settlements. The repatriation clause allowed either
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country to remove or withdraw from the other whatever property it desired to keep. For
instance, in the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement, Article 3e cancelled all claims
incurred by either Government in the disposal of surplus assets by combining Britain’s
lump sum payment (Article 1) with the clearly stated caveat of Article 3e: “this
Agreement shall not prejudice the right of either Government to remove any of its surplus
war assets from the country of the other, either for its own use or for transfer to others.”66
This qualifying statement provided the legal basis for both countries to repatriate
whatever munitions or supplies were needed for postwar requirements, thereby ensuring
that the high demand and ready market in Europe would not always take precedence over
Canadian needs at home. The military was free to repatriate what it wanted, while the
WAC also retained some flexibility to find other international customers. Largely based
on the precedent of Berry’s February recommendations, this type of clause was used in
all disposal agreements – informal or formal – and also legitimized any sales that were
made by Dewar before the settlement came into effect.
The fourth hallmark had to do with the origins of the claims settlements. Usually
preceded by informal arrangements, the formal claims settlements were always a
reflection of wartime developments and necessities. The main claims of the UK against
Canada arose from the supplies and services it provided for all Canadian Army and Air
Force personnel while stationed in the British Isles or in operations in Europe. This was
known as “capitation rates” (or payments to the British for supplies, arms, munitions, and
services overseas) and the DND had been unable to reach an agreement with the War
Office to resolve the capitation rates for 1944 and 1945.67 For Canada, the main claims
stemmed from several contracts completed after the Mutual Aid Board ceased
functioning in September 1945. These contracts were for the production of several cargo
vessels for the British Admiralty (the cost of which was born by the WAC) and the
manufacture of new rolling stock for India since its existing railcars and transport
infrastructure were badly worn out by the war. There were also several other claims
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originating from munitions production or jointly-owned facilities, such as those of the
Inspection Board or the BCATP.68
The negotiations for the Anglo-Canadian war claims settlement happened
concurrently with those for the loan agreement. However, they were much shorter in
duration and occurred only at the end of February 1946, just before the loan agreement
was finalized. R. B. Bryce, Canada’s main negotiator for the claims settlement, received a
formal proposal on 25 February 1946 in which the British offered to pay Canada $150
million in exchange for cancelling all claims. That Britain paid Canada (and not vice
versa) to settle claims not only demonstrated the value of some of the post-Mutual Aid
contracts for ships and rolling stock, but also the recognition that certain properties and
assets in Canada equaled the balance owing for capitation rates. After reviewing the
proposal, Bryce charted the mixture of claims and estimated costs in a memo to Ilsley and
Clark. Although far from detailed, his calculations showed that “there was a rough
balance between British and Canadian claims when the $150 million cash payment was
taken into account.”69 As a result, the agreement was drawn up by 2 March with “very
sweeping” and “general terms” in order to account for both “known and unknown
claims.”70 The settlement also stipulated that any Canadian property left over in the UK
or not slated for sale to another country would be turned over to the British Ministry of
Supply by 15 May 1946.
Following the settlement’s conclusion, some issues emerged when implementing its
conditions in Britain. Although the sweeping terms covering “known and unknown
claims” would greatly assist British officials in solving the dilemmas, the settlement was
implemented while Dewar busily attempted to sell as much as possible. This created
certain legal technicalities if sales were not completed before 15 May or if negotiations
were ongoing at the time. While there was some leeway at first, by July 1946 British
officials started flexing their muscles. Apparently, in an effort to make as many sales as
possible, Dewar sold surplus assets to as many different business interests as possible.
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Some companies were less than desirable and British officials took advantage of the 15
May cut-off to prevent them from occurring. In one case, the Ministry of Supply and the
Treasury impeded the sale of 120 Canadian Chevrolet lorries to the London & Suburban
Commercial Vehicles (Brixton) Ltd. The deal was brokered by Grantham Traders Ltd.
(the sister company of Grantham Productions hired by Dewar to repair Canadian vehicles
at Camp Bordon), but the three companies were tarnished by their suspicious
“commercial morality” and association with a controversial Member of Parliament for
Grantham, Denis Kendall.71 Kendall, who was suspected of espionage and heavily
involved in the black market according to MI5 and MI6 security files, was also closely
associated with right-wing extremists during his time as MP.72 As a result, the sale was
blocked but in September 1946 Grantham Productions suddenly retaliated by claiming
that the Canadians owed them a startling £19,000 for repair work at Camp Bordon. The
claim was quietly dismissed after consultations with Dewar.73
Throughout his time in Britain, Dewar’s freedom of action was greatly limited by
the British insistence on remitting all Canadian surpluses destined for British markets to
the Ministry of Supply. This closed off the local marketplace and forced Dewar to broker
sales with British merchants under export-only restrictions. In other words, the informal
and formal arrangements between Canada and the UK disproportionately affected the
terms and conditions under which Dewar worked. However, the situation was quite
different in the Netherlands where the war’s devastation left so many people deprived
and destitute. Consequently, Dutch officials were less scrupulous about eroding prices
and controlling sales through government ministries. In fact, the need for equipment and
supplies was so high that the Dutch were most interested in preventing assets from
leaving their borders. This gave Dewar and Flahiff, who was stationed on the continent,
wide latitude in Holland where the First Canadian Army was quickly demobilizing. By
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March 1946 Dewar had sold $7,068,047 worth of materials to France, Belgium, UNRRA,
and the Red Cross. In the following year he sold $7,665,550, of which $2,503,750 was
from UNRRA for motor transport and the Dutch government spent $566,241 on spare
parts and tools for Browning machine guns, motorcycles, ammunition, dental equipment,
workshop equipment, and motor transport.74
These sales to the Dutch government were over and above the large amount of
munitions and supplies it acquired from First Army as part of the war claims settlement.
Piggy-backing on the currency arrangements negotiated over the fall of 1945, the war
claims settlement with the Netherlands was finalized on 22 May 1946. Under its terms all
remaining Canadian military equipment on the continent (apart from the kit used by the
occupation forces) was transferred to the Dutch military. In the claims settlement, the
Canadian Army and Dutch Government agreed that the Army owed $33 million for the
costs of occupation. In order to cover the payment the Army agreed to turn over $25
million worth of surplus munitions and supplies to the Dutch while $8 million in Dutch
payments on orders placed with Canadian industries were cancelled.75 In addition to the
settlement of claims, Canada also negotiated a separate financial treaty with the
Netherlands, signed earlier on 5 February 1946, in which the Canadian government
agreed to loan the Dutch $25 million in credits for purchasing exports from Canadian
industries and extended another $15 million for the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia).76
Unfortunately, documentation on the Dutch claims settlement did not definitely
identify what munitions and supplies constituted the $25 million total or how they were
appraised. However, what is certain is that a substantial amount of munitions and
supplies changed hands within a year following VE-Day. Even when accounting for the
return of assets to the UK and Canada, the First Canadian Army was the largest military
force ever fielded by the country, consisting of five fighting divisions (three infantry and
two armoured) and many other auxiliary and supporting units. Given that the postwar
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Army would never approach a similar size and considering its shrinking budget, the
expense of repatriation, and its rapid demobilization, the Army was primed to unload
surplus kit and needed an outlet quickly. The Dutch, by contrast, were in desperate need
of everything and faced a growing colonial war in Indonesia. With First Canadian Army
stationed in Holland and Northwestern Germany, it must have been a rather fortuitous
moment when officials from both countries realized how closely their priorities aligned.
The prized set of First Army assets was its formidable array of motor transport and
armoured vehicles. Over the summer and fall, the bulk of First Army’s “A” (armoured)
and “B” (unarmoured) vehicles were concentrated at the Deelen airfield, located between
Arnhem and Apeldoorn, which became a glorified parking lot for Canadian vehicles.
After conquering the Netherlands in May 1940, the Germans undertook an extensive
construction program to build airfields for fighters. The facility was large and extensive,
as its buildings, hangars, runways, and roads eventually covered an area larger than
60,000 acres. The Canadians captured the shattered remnants of the airfield in April 1945
and together with local authorities set about repairing and redeveloping the site.77 By the
late fall, First Army designated Deelen airfield as “No. 1 Demob Vehicle Park” and every
conceivable type of vehicle was sent there for storage and disposal. The “Deelen dump”
was sub-divided into two areas, Deelen I where all the workable vehicles in good
condition were stored and Deelen II was the junkyard where the derelict machines and
broken vehicles were left.78 Amongst published accounts there is no consensus on how
many vehicles ended up in Deelen, but the number is probably about 30,000. The Deelen
Airbase Museum’s website states that Canadians left over 37,000 there in “rows and rows
of vehicles, as far as the eye could see.”79 However, a 16 May 1946 inventory (probably
of Deelen I only) taken just before the facility was transferred to Dutch control, counted
27,931 vehicles (3,261 motorcycles, 3,163 cars and utilities, 13,310 trucks and tractors,
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4,970 trailers 10-cwt to 40-ton, and 3,227 armoured vehicles).80 Whatever the total, a
significant amount of vehicles exchanged hands.
Although further research into Dutch records is needed, it is quite obvious that
Canada directly equipped part of the Royal Netherlands Army immediately following the
war. Moreover, it is also apparent that a sizeable amount of what the Dutch purchased
from Canada ended up being redeployed to the Netherlands East Indies to fight against
Indonesian revolutionaries. Indeed, it was no coincidence that the Dutch were scrambling
to acquire “personal equipment for 50,000 men to be called up in the Netherlands” at the
beginning of August, as Indonesian leaders declared independence shortly thereafter on
17 August 1945.81 Thus, immediately following the war Canada turned into a quasi-arms
dealer; as Christopher Kilford explained, outfitting its allies with military paraphernalia
was one of Canada’s key contributions to the early history of NATO.82 The large
Canadian military was rapidly transforming through substantial reductions, but its
munitions would not easily disperse into civilian life at a similar pace as returning
veterans. Therefore, Canadian munitions were not only demobilized, they were also
remobilized by the Dutch.
The colonial emergency was also one of the reasons why the Dutch government
started objecting to the destruction of kit and captured German weaponry. On 19 July
1945, the Dutch government officially protested the practice in a letter to the DEA,
explaining that “the Netherlands Government…is encountering the greatest difficulties in
its endeavour to equip her police and special security troops with the necessary weapons,
and therefore if the arming of these units cannot be efficiently carried out the
maintenance of peace and order is seriously threatened.” The letter also stated that at
different salvage dumps in the Netherlands “goods which are not appropriate for use by
the Allied troops are burned” and that the “bicycles, shoes, clothing, revolvers, carbines
etc. etc.” that were still useable but nonetheless destroyed “[were] creating an
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unfavourable impression on the population who are at present suffering from every form
of shortage.”83
The need to re-integrate the Resistance movement into the regular armed forces and
undertake more training operations was a central preoccupation for the Dutch. As a
result, the use of Canadian or German equipment for training and police purposes was
stressed in official communications between Prince Bernard, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Royal Netherlands Army, and Pierre Dupuy, the Canadian Ambassador to the
Netherlands. On 2 August 1945, Dupuy relayed the substance of his encounters with
Bernard to his superiors and attempted to impress the urgency upon them by pointing out
that “the longer a decision [on surplus sales] was delayed the more difficult it would be to
discipline [the Resistance fighters] and keep them well under control.” 84 However, the
sub-context to these protests was difficult to miss. Given the timing and continued
correspondence on the issue throughout early August, some ideological and imperial
motivations were likely at work. As Jennifer Foray and Kirk Goodlet point out, the
“Indies Question” and the revival of the Dutch Empire through the re-conquest of its
prized colony, Indonesia, was seen by Dutch leaders as a prerequisite for recovery and
rehabilitation. Wider cultural and psychological factors pointed them towards the use of
military forces to re-establish Dutch legitimacy by bringing “order” and “stability” to its
Empire.85 In light of the ideological and imperial aspirations of Dutch leaders, statements
to Canadian diplomats about the equipment’s usage in Holland were probably a
smokescreen designed to obscure their intended destination and hide the precarious
position facing the Dutch Empire fighting a revolution in its Pacific colonies with
second-hand munitions and supplies.
In a shadowy story with few supporting documents, surplus Canadian tanks,
firearms, artillery, and ammunition ended up in Indonesia when the Dutch ramped up
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their military presence in 1946 and 1947. The war continued until December 1949,
though by that time Canadian surplus munitions and supplies were long used up.
According to secondary sources, of the three Dutch divisions sent to Indonesia from
Holland, one was completely outfitted with Canadian surplus weapons and equipment
while the other two used kit procured from British sources.86 However, there are three
additional layers of complexity that cloud a straightforward connection between the
purchase, redeployment, and utility of Canada’s military hardware. In the first case, there
was a constant drain on the sources of supply. Dutch scavengers or desperate civilians
often raided the Deelen dump to steal equipment or items they required. Additionally,
numerous vehicles and equipment acquired from Canada were refurbished or adapted to
meet urgent civilian needs in Holland. Therefore, the mobilization of units for service in
the East Indies was done in competition with a steady drain on parts and equipment along
with the intrepid work of those engaged in material rehabilitation.87
Second, by the time all the sales were finalized in May 1946, the Canadian Army
had already picked through its inventories, returned the assets it did not own, and
repatriated those it wanted to keep. Since militaries have an insatiable appetite for the
most advanced and newest technologies, the Canadian Army kept the best materiel for
itself, especially since the Army was preparing to redeploy an expeditionary force to the
Pacific and postwar budgets had yet to be finalized at the time. 88 Even when accounting
for the Pacific Expeditionary Force’s planned reliance on American supply channels and
the deceitful practice of categorizing whole tanks or armoured vehicles as “steel” or
“chassis” in order to camouflage the size of weapons sales, the Dutch still received a lot
of worthless junk. No doubt, they received substantial amounts of pristine and useable
military gear, but it was always mixed in with the derelict leftovers Canada did not want
to repatriate.
Third, regardless of the quality and quantity of assets exchanged by the war claims
settlement, their deteriorating condition throughout 1945-1946 is the most complicating
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layer shrouding the diffusion of Canadian munitions. Much of Canada’s materiel in
Northwest Europe went unused over the summer and since personnel were rapidly
demobilized there were fewer mechanics around to maintain them. Canada’s weaponry
was left “lying in open air depots in the Netherlands” and was “likely to be damaged by
the heavy rains [that began] in September.”89 Under the circumstances of demobilization,
it is highly probable that whatever was purchased by May 1946 had deteriorated (to
varying extents) in storage and without proper maintenance. Thus, the materiel acquired
by the Dutch was probably only really suitable for training and police purposes in the
Netherlands – if at all – and may not have survived long when deployed on the frontlines
in Indonesia. Although there is no doubt that some of the materiel the Dutch purchased
was first-rate and battle-tested, it is equally obvious that a large portion of the kit
outfitting the Dutch army had limited lifespans and was liable to deteriorate or
breakdown rapidly especially in the challenging environment and climate of Indonesia.
Without question the Army’s $33 million settlement with the Dutch was the single
largest arms transaction, but it was an exception to the norm of international sales. The
general pattern of Canada’s overseas disposal operations – which included either the sale
of Canadian-owned property already located in foreign countries or exported from
Canada to foreign buyers – followed a slightly different path. Usually the WAC’s
representative was the main point of contact, though the Corporation always consulted
with Howe’s office and the relevant officials in the DEA and DRS before making a sale.
After all, this was Dewar’s main role as Overseas Sales Director. As we have seen, he
arranged sales of Canadian property located in Europe, but strangely, he was not involved
in the Dutch transaction. Furthermore, the sale of surpluses internationally was almost
always done in smaller quantities and spread across many different customers. This
meant that when the WAC sold its stockpiles internationally it did so in piecemeal
fashion and not in bulk quantities. The Corporation certainly had preferential clients,
especially American brokers who resold Canadian surpluses to foreign buyers, but even
then a single broker or end user rarely cornered the entire stock. The general pattern of
international sales never approached the scale or scope of the Dutch claims settlement.
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Perhaps the most striking departure from the general pattern of international sales
was the near unanimity that greeted the Dutch purchases in Ottawa. The sale of surplus
arms and ammunition was a delicate business. Internally, Canadian officials disagreed on
how best to approach weapon sales and, externally, Canada had to navigate around the
confines of American and British interests which often limited options. Some officials in
the DEA expressed misgivings about the final destination of Canadian weaponry and
worried that arms sales would enable the violent repression of “colonial peoples” in
Indonesia and other places.90 The DEA also worried that arms sales might disturb the
regional balance of power and contradict policies or embargoes set up by Canada’s allies.
Moreover, it was also difficult to determine local allegiances or how far the communist
influence had spread.91 Thus, making international sales was an uncertain and risky
business, as no one wanted to sell arms to the wrong people.
Most of the DEA’s concerns were summarized by Norman Robertson, the UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, in a memorandum submitted to Cabinet in May
1946. Robertson outlined three potential courses of action. The first was one where
Canada refused arms sales to all countries except “those such as the United Kingdom and
the United States with which we have exceptionally close political relations and a clearly
established community of defence interests.”92 Second, Canada could “parallel” the
policies of the US and UK, thereby permitting expanded sales to some additional
countries, such as Brazil or Mexico. Third, Canada could institute no restrictions and
“sell freely to all countries.”93 Robertson believed that option one was the best course of
action as it supported Canada’s historic alliance systems but allowed some flexibility for
Cabinet to review potential sales on a case-by-case basis. Option two left Canada in a
discriminatory position of refusing some sales but favouring others, while option three
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would elicit strong protests from the UK and US.94 On 24 May 1946, Cabinet adopted
option one as its preferred policy. Although Robertson’s memo greatly influenced
Cabinet’s future decisions on arms sales, the timing of this decision was not insignificant.
By May 1946, Canada had already sold, exchanged, repatriated, or consigned most of its
weaponry, ammunition, and supplies in Europe. In other words, during that critical
interval between May 1945 and May 1946 the bulk of surplus lethal assets were divested.
Up to May 1946, policies about the sale of weapon systems were generally guided
by the necessity of disposal. It made pragmatic, fiscal, political, and economic sense to
sell munitions to the Dutch and other close Allies. However, as the balance of payments
crisis resurfaced and the range of clientele dried up, the stocks of surplus munitions and
supplies continued to piling up. After all, surplus declarations only peaked in March and
April 1946, and the largest volume of sales occurred throughout the whole calendar year
of 1946. Thus, while nearly all of the military’s surpluses located in Europe were dealt
with by May 1946, there still remained large quantities at home. Canada’s economy and
military could never possibly absorb everything, so inevitably the WAC had to sell its
commodities to international customers. International sales became a key outlet for
unloading unwanted materiel, thereby saving Canadian taxpayers from funding larger
destruction programs or, inversely, saving the domestic economy from absorbing the
complete flood of assets. This situation became a source of tension and conflict in
Cabinet, as Howe sought permission to sell both new and used weaponry to Nationalist
China and several Latin American countries, while the new Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, pushed back.95 Howe’s logic was pragmatic as
Canada had assets to dispose of as quickly as possible, but his position did not always
conform to the local and international conditions that concerned the DEA.
Canada could not barge ahead with sales, as external pressures from the UK and US
limited the range of available options. The pressures came in two general forms. First, as
already noted, the international market for military surpluses was hotly contested and
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easily flooded. As a result, the Allies competed with each other for a share of the
marketplace. Just as the British had reacted unfavourably to Canadian sales, the
Americans were similarly displeased when Canada started infringing on potential
markets. During the war’s latter stages, Canada sold some production surpluses,
including weapons and vehicles, to Nationalist China. However, the Americans were
hostile to these developments as they viewed Canada’s efforts as an encroachment into an
American theatre of operations where the deployment and sale of American materiel was
used to influence Nationalist strategy and tactics. Moreover, there were suspicions that
the Americans were also trying to guard the Chinese marketplace for the disposal of their
own surpluses.96
The second external pressure was related to the first. Canadian arms sales were not
only constrained by a competitive marketplace; they were also affected by British and
American interests and foreign policies. Canada had little choice but to follow its more
powerful Allies and keep its foreign policies in line with their objectives, which could
preclude sales. For instance, the UK and US upheld an unofficial arms embargo during
the first half of the Chinese civil war and therefore Canada could not sell weapons to the
Nationalists until mid-1947. However, the embargo was never publicly announced, which
allowed Cabinet to follow a dichotomous policy that both upheld and undermined the
clandestine sanctions. Until the Americans lifted the unofficial ban, Cabinet denied all
requests for munitions (for both surplus and new production) from Chinese
representatives unless the request was made before the Mutual Aid program was
terminated in September 1945. Throughout late 1945 and 1946 Cabinet approved several
sales from the Mutual Aid backlog, but they were negotiated under new payment terms
outlined by the Sino-Canadian financial treaty.97
In the case of Latin American countries, Canada had little choice but to defer to
American interests and decisions. American policy was decidedly against arming any
Latin American state, though it was willing to grant export permits for Mexico and Brazil
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possibly because both countries had fought during the war.98 Apparently, a major concern
of the American State Department was to “discourage expenditures on military
equipment which would seriously strain the economy of the purchasing country.” 99 The
US was insisting on cash payments for weapons since most Latin American republics
were not “in a position to pay cash on a substantial scale. Peru and Chile [were] virtually
bankrupt.”100 Moreover, the State Department was particularly hostile to Argentina and
its leader Juan Peron. At American insistence, the sale of a single corvette, HMCS
Barrie, to the Argentinian Navy was held up for two years, even though dozens of other
Canadian ships were sold in Latin America through American brokers.101
In order to navigate these international pressures and successfully dispose of
surpluses to Canada’s best advantage, officials in the DEA and the DRS had to get
creative. In the end, they came to an ingenious – if devious – set of compromises and
initiatives that helped them bypass most reservations about dealing arms and avoid
clashing with British or American interests. For those countries outside Canada’s
traditional alliance systems, the government implemented a policy of selling only
demilitarized assets. This meant that every ship or aircraft sold by the WAC was stripped
of all armaments and ammunition before the sale was made. This effectively rendered
munitions harmless and allowed Canadians to sell them without being considered
weapons. In other words, demilitarized corvettes, frigates, and destroyers were no longer
warships and could be sold as boats. As a result, every vessel entering the WAC’s
custody had its armaments removed so as to facilitate its potential sale and conversion.102
In the case of HMCS Barrie, when skeptical American officials finally relented and
allowed the transaction to take place, the demilitarized corvette was renamed Capitan
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Canepa by the Argentinian navy and turned into an oceanographic vessel with “five labs”
that “probe[d] [Argentina’s] coastal waters.”103
According to some newspaper accounts roughly 75 percent of all surpluses sold by
the WAC went to Canadian businesses and citizens.104 However, this was actually an
inflated and misleading statistic. In fact, when accounting for resales to third parties, a
large portion of sales – certainly more than 25 percent – were made to foreign interests
and companies. This discrepancy between policy, propaganda, and outcome was a
product of the WAC’s reliance on brokers and established businesses. As we have seen
with the sale of cargo ships, some brokers and foreign companies formed subsidiary
corporations in Canada so they could tacitly fulfill the sale provisions and gain access to
the WAC’s inventories. These corporate entities were only Canadian on paper, as there
was never any intention of using the assets in Canada. People like Charles Babb, who
was hired as an agent by the WAC, profited substantially from his dealings in surplus
aircraft and by forming a Canadian subsidiary. The airplanes he purchased all went to
third parties, many from Latin America.105 A similar trend existed with naval vessels. For
instance, in September 1945, the New York based United Ship Corporation bought
twenty-four corvettes from the WAC for $570,000 and at least twelve were resold to
three Latin American countries. Chile bought HMCS Strathroy, Stellarton, and Thorlock,
while Panama received HMCS Norsyd, Guelph, and St. Lambert. United Ship
Corporation also resold HMCS Rivère du Loup, Lachute, Peterborough, Louisburg (II),
Belleville, and Asbestos to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican government also
acquired the frigate HMCS Carlplace for $140,000 in a direct sale from the WAC.106
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The case of Aristotle Onassis, a Greek shipping magnate, exemplifies the point
further. Sometime between April 1946 and March 1947, he purchased the demilitarized
frigate HMCS Stormont for $70,000 through Constantino Konialdis, a broker based in
Montevideo, Uruguay. The Stormont never returned to Canada, as Onassis brought it to
Naples, Italy, and renamed it Christina (after his daughter) just before investing $4
million converting it into a “floating palace” with ten guest apartments.107 Within a
decade the Christina became synonymous with conspicuous wealth as Onassis had a fullsized swimming pool installed and many other attractions. Perhaps, the strangest addition
to this luxury yacht were the bar stools. Onassis had them covered in minke whale
foreskin and reportedly loved to tell his female guests – who included Marilyn Monroe
and Elizabeth Taylor – “Madame, you are sitting on the largest penis in the world.”108
Onassis hosted many distinguished guests on his boat, including Winston Churchill, John
F. Kennedy, and in 1956 Monaco’s Prince Rainier and Grace Kelly were married on
board. In 1999, the ship was relaunched by new owners as the Christina O, a pleasure
craft for the extremely wealthy (rental rates were reportedly $60,000 per day between
2006 and 2009). According to The National Post, in 2013 the Christina O was moored in
a shipyard outside London awaiting new owners. The reported asking price was $34
million which makes HMCS Stormont, perhaps, the only surplus asset to substantially
appreciate in value after the war.109
Canadian officials and politicians were not overly concerned about where
demilitarized assets ended up after the broker purchased them. Their complacency
originated from the removal of weapons and the WAC’s reliance on American brokers.
These conditions obviated any Canadian liability, as the export permits and conditions of
any subsequent sale would happen under American laws. Once the WAC made the sale,
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it was no longer considered a Canadian matter and this probably accounts for the fact that
the Corporation rarely tracked assets after leaving its possession. Instead, transactions
like the one with United Ship Corporation were listed as sales to American companies or
American interests and the paper trail petered out.110 To be sure, the WAC entertained
many offers for purchasing surplus munitions and supplies and it made a fair share of
direct sales to foreign governments as a result. For instance, sales to the Venezuelan
government recouped $3,312,166 in eleven transactions from 1945 to 1947. The
Venezuelans purchased seven corvettes and at least 1,499 Dodge 3-ton trucks and 100
Chevrolet 3-ton “tilting trucks.”111 Additionally, the Government of Jamaica spent
$34,000 on “trucks and various spare parts” in 1946-1947, the Chilean Government
bought three frigates, HMCS Joliette, Seacliffe, and Glace Bay, for $390,000, and Peru
bought HMCS Poundmaker and St. Pierre in late 1947.112 Yet it is obvious that these
direct sales were not the norm and that large numbers of surplus ended up with foreign
interests through intermediaries.
It would be easy to deride the WAC’s international sales and disposal policies,
labelling it as an arms dealer. After all, Canada supplied a variety of new and used assets
to its allies.113 Yet the arms dealer characterization might not be completely accurate.
Canada’s postwar disposal policies and international sales walked a thin line between the
two extremes of peacekeeper and arms dealer. In effect, Canada was both and neither at
the same time. There is little question Canada sold arms to allies, but these sales usually
had rational purposes that furthered Canadian interests, such as when the weapons were
used to reconstitute an ally’s armed forces or settle debts incurred by the war. When
dealing with non-traditional allies or trading partners, WAC officials restricted the types
of assets it sold. Demilitarizing warships and aircraft, for instance, ensured that Canada
was not selling any functional weapon systems thereby allowing officials to dispose of
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surpluses while navigating around American and British embargoes or conflicting
interests. In Canada’s case, the diplomacy of disposal was formed by a pragmatic
compromise between ideals and intentions.
However, once a demilitarized asset was sold, there was little stopping the
purchaser from acquiring the armaments elsewhere. Therefore, Canada was also
inadvertently selling arms, or perhaps more accurately, it was selling systems without
weapons. Canada’s international disposal policies lived in the “grey zone.” 114 Canadian
officials in the DEA and DRS were satisfied with selling ships to American brokers even
if they ended up outfitting the navies of dictators like Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo,
President of the Dominican Republic. Yet when Trujillo later tried to acquire armaments
for the ships from Canada, he was firmly rebuffed and a similar request from the Chileans
was also refused.115 After May 1946, Canada also started refusing new Dutch requests for
armaments. Sometime in late 1946 or early 1947, the Netherlands Purchasing
Commission wanted to order one million rounds of .303-inch rifle ammunition and an
earlier request for “10,000 Sten machine guns and ammunition to be used in policing
Indonesia” was made. However, Cabinet refused the sales “on the ground[s] that these
would be used to pacify the native populations [in Indonesia]” and that “a million rounds
of rifle ammunition [was] an excessive issue for normal police purposes.”116
The sale of Mosquito bombers also followed a similar trajectory, though several
contradictions emerged when Cabinet approved sales to some countries and not others.
Since the RCAF expected to maintain some of its fighter squadrons with Mosquitos large
batches were not declared surplus right after the war. However, once the RCAF settled on
a postwar procurement strategy involving Vampire jets, the need for Mosquitos dropped
substantially throughout 1946 and 1947. Consequently, Mosquitos started forming an
increasingly large part of the WAC’s inventories. In early 1947, Argentina submitted a
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request to purchase 100 Mosquitos from the WAC. However, the “grey zone” of these
aircraft hardly existed, as few civilian uses were possible for the Mosquito. The twinengined bomber could carry a payload of 4,000 lbs. and was heavily armed with at least
four 20mm cannons or four .303 Browning machine guns. In early April, when DEA
officials broached the Argentinean proposal with the State Department, their American
counterparts used the loaded terms “dismayed” and “disappointed” to describe their
attitude if the transaction went ahead. Given American attitudes, Cabinet deferred to
American opinions and refused the sale.117
However, just a few months later, Cabinet jumped at the opportunity to sell 174
Mosquitos to Nationalist China. On 25 August 1947, Cabinet formally approved the sale
in light of several factors that signaled a slight deviation from policies and patterns
established after May 1946. In this case, American policy towards arms sales in China
had changed. Up to late 1946, the US and UK upheld their unofficial embargo, but with
the Nationalist fairing so poorly, the Americans lifted it completely by May 1947 and an
export permit for 131,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition was quickly granted.118
Now the Americans were looking more favourably upon weapon sales to the Nationalists,
but Canada had already been selling China munitions and supplies as part of its credit
agreement.119 Despite serious reservations from the DEA and St. Laurent, Howe
prevailed in Cabinet and gained approval for the Mosquito sale. The Chinese agreed to
use $2.5 million of their Canadian credit for the purchase and separately pay $3.5 million
for armaments and ammunition in American dollars. As Kim Richard Nossal pointed out,
the 1947 exchange crisis made Cabinet especially eager for American dollars.
Unfortunately, Cabinet never received the American money it was promised. As soon as
the sale was approved, the Nationalist government reneged and wanted the whole sale
applied to the military credit and Howe, “happy at the prospect of clearing the obsolete
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Mosquitos from War Assets Corporation warehouses, pressured St. Laurent into agreeing
to the Chinese request.”120
Although sales to China fulfilled pragmatic purposes for Canada, the diffusion of
military technologies was not necessarily productive for end users. As Victor Shiu
Chiang Cheng explained, the battlefields of the Chinese Civil War were decidedly “low
tech environments” and the Nationalists (as well as the Communists) had trouble
incorporating modern technologies and weapon systems into their strategies and
tactics.121 For example, the Americans supplied the Nationalists with a phenomenal
amount of materiel. By late 1945, thirty-nine divisions in Chiang Kai-shek’s army were
completely outfitted with standard American weaponry and the US also sold $900 million
worth of war surpluses for $175 million.122 However, a variety of cultural, environmental,
and logistical factors conspired to limit their effectiveness on the battlefield. For instance,
surplus American uniforms and boots did not fit the “shorter and slighter Chinese
soldiers” while many Chinese commanders had little experience with mechanized
warfare and consequently did not deploy their tanks or mobile forces in accordance with
the principles of modern warfare.123 Eventually, both sides developed an aversion to
military technologies that Chiang Cheng described as “technophobic misperceptions.”124
Canada’s sale of 174 Mosquito bombers fit into this problematic pattern. Like with
the Dutch arms sales, the utility of these assets was dubious. Even for the most
experienced pilots, the Mosquito bomber was a difficult plane to fly, so Chinese pilots
faced a steep learning curve. However, reports from the Canadian Military Attaché in
Nanking explained that this curve was likely insurmountable. Summarizing the situation,
he stated “that the [Chinese pilots] were the best pilots according to Chinese
standards…and [they] should not have had too much difficulty flying the aircraft,” but
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while training in Canada “they were quite unused to aircraft of such speed and power.”125
There were also concerns about reaction times which were “reported as being in some
cases five seconds slower than the averagely good British or Canadian pilot.”
Consequently, a higher number of crashes took place and a “small number of aircraft
were written off in this training.”126
There were serious problems with the logistical and maintenance services. After
purchasing the Mosquitos the Chinese paid De Havilland to train pilots, ship the aircraft
overseas, and provide in theatre technical support. However, De Havilland failed to meet
its contractual obligations since the planes were not packaged correctly and many arrived
damaged, while the seven or eight technicians sent to China were “unpunctual” and
lacked “the requisite engineering knowledge” to perform their jobs. 127 Moreover, aircraft
assembly was behind schedule and the conduct of the Chinese officers did nothing to
maintain control over the workers. According to the Attaché, “Chinese parties”
responsible for the assembly work changed so frequently that, “it [was] not unusual to
find scores of additional personnel gazing entranced at the entire proceedings.”128
Perhaps, T. C. Davis, the Canadian Ambassador to China, summed up the situation best
in his remarks appended as a covering letter to the Attaché’s report:
I am afraid that this transaction is not going to be a very satisfactory one from
the standpoint of the Government of China…In the first place, I do not know
where they are going to effectively use these machines and, secondly, I think
that a lot of Chinese crews are going to be killed in the attempted use thereof
as it would seem that very few Chinese pilots are capable of safely operating
this type of bomber.129
Clearly, the utility of Mosquitos was suspect. The diffusion of military technologies was
complicated by many factors that ultimately affected the types and utility of arms sales.
In the end, it would seem that Canadian surplus weaponry might have done more harm
than good for its Allies on battlefields in China and Indonesia.
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Conclusion
The disposal of Canada’s munitions and supplies had international significance and
provided Canada with some advantages. Since the cost of repatriating assets just to
declare them surplus was prohibitive, surplus stockpiles accumulated in Europe posed a
special challenge. Over the summer of 1945, the military took stock of its inventories
both at home and overseas to determine ownership and postwar requirements. If Canada
did not own the kit then it had to be returned to British or Americans depots. Moreover, if
stocks of munitions and supplies in Canada were sufficient for postwar requirements then
every corresponding type of Canadian-owned materiel overseas was surplus and had to
be sold there. This saved logistical expenses and reduced disposal liabilities. Coupled
with its junior status in world affairs, Canada was able to embark on a rapid overseas
demobilization program and quickly entered the market for surplus materiel, much to the
dissatisfaction of the British and Americans. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the
international disposal of surpluses, a series of informal and formal diplomatic
arrangements were negotiated to regulate sales and, whenever possible, help settle
outstanding war debts. International sales also offered Canada another outlet to alleviate
the flood of assets in domestic markets, while also allowing the Department of Finance to
accrue additional American or Canadian dollars off sales.
However, international sales also came with some serious complications and
consequences. For Dewar, the workload was intense as he lacked the necessary staff and
organization overseas. Additionally, he was forced to operate under timelines and
restrictions that did not accommodate the disposal process and sometimes scuttled his
efforts. Sales of surplus supplies to UNRRA and the Red Cross went a long way in
relieving strife, while sales of weaponry and ammunition helped reconstitute the armed
forces of Allied governments. The WAC was not an arms dealer as it only sold weapons
and ammunition to close Allied partners and demilitarized whatever else it sold to foreign
interests. Although surpluses were highly coveted, their quality and durability was
suspect. Therefore, it is doubtful that end users derived many advantages from the bulk of
surpluses they purchased, as the eclectic collection of second-hand items deteriorated
rapidly and the diffusion of Canadian materiel hindered combat effectiveness.
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Chapter 7
Drowned at Sea: Ammunition Destruction and Ocean
Dumping
The sea washes away all the ills of men.1
Euripides

Introduction
From 1940 to 1945, Canada’s wartime economy produced 4.4 billion rounds of
small arms ammunition and 72 million artillery shells. Although these production totals
were vastly eclipsed by Canada’s major Allies, it still ranked as a substantial wartime
achievement for a country of 11 million people. However, by 1945, these tools of death
and destruction posed a serious dilemma for policymakers and military authorities. After
years of conflict that wrought devastation across every corner of the globe, there were no
illusions about how destabilizing and dangerous these items were to public safety and the
rule of law. During the war, a large fraction of all manufactured explosives and
ammunition was expended by Allied soldiers, while the ample leftovers far exceeded
postwar requirements. Without a proper disposal strategy the dangers posed by these
deadly assets were magnified by the mountains of ordnance piling up everywhere after
hostilities ended. What would happen to all the surplus ammunition and explosives?
Where would all this destructive potential end up?
The government and military understood that all the munitions accumulated to fight
the war would not simply dematerialize once victory was declared. The dangers would
persist for as long as the objects maintained their primary forms and remained capable of
fulfilling their intended functions. In the case of ammunition and artillery shells, that
form and function was to kill and maim, so they would carry little value into peacetime
and portend future disasters wherever they were stored. Therefore, victory in the Second
World War precipitated a serious crisis in logistics and storage that became a major
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headache for the WAC and the military. The quantities of ammunition and shells were
especially problematic and they required a special set of policies and practices.
This chapter begins with an examination of how destruction policies and practices
for lethal assets evolved over time. Immediately following the war, a serious storage
crisis developed as huge quantities of munitions piled up at factories, depots, and
warehouses across the country. The storage crisis was exacerbated by three factors. The
first was the inability of the WAC and the military to coordinate an ammunition disposal
program that satisfied everyone’s needs. When combined with a second factor, political
interference – in the form of adverse media reports about wanton destruction, prying
questions from politicians, and bureaucratic procedures that prioritized making sales
before destroying weaponry – a volatile situation developed and threatened to escalate
once the flood of surpluses commenced and as the WAC started monopolizing
destruction programs after its reorganization. The third factor was the limited amount of
stowage space specially designed to house ammunition and explosives. After the war,
bunkers and magazines were rapidly filled when military units demobilized and returned
their armaments to storage.
Few contemporaries appear to have recognized the full scope and danger of the
storage crisis until July 1945 when the confluence of sales restrictions, storage
requirements, departmental jurisdictions, stalled destruction programs, and the profuse
quantities of weaponry, ammunition, and explosives piling up across the country resulted
in the “other” Halifax Explosion. The fallout from the Bedford Magazine Explosion, as it
was called later to distinguish it from the Halifax Explosion of 1917, served as a catalyst
for policy changes and the acceleration of destruction programs throughout 1946-1947.
The explosion pushed policymakers to consider public safety as the paramount issue and
merged with growing fears about rising crime rates and gun violence that seemed to be
sweeping across the country. When it came to the destruction of ammunition and
explosives, the main concerns of policymakers were pragmatic and related directly to the
profuse existence of dangerous assets, the technical aspects of the destruction process, the
inconvenience of storage, and the continuing threat they posed to public safety.
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The destruction method that best mitigated these concerns was ocean dumping,
which became the primary method for disarmament used by all belligerent powers. In
fact, the practice became so common it gained a colloquial moniker: “drowned at sea.”
The long-term environmental and ecological consequences of throwing ammunition in
the oceans were not considered a priority as a complex web of scientific and international
precedents guided decision-makers away from such considerations and back to the reality
of the moment: munitions accumulated to fight do not simply dematerialize when peace
is declared. Instead, they require a location of deposit and diligent disposal methods in
order to attenuate their potentially devastating impact on public safety. Rather than worry
about the future effects of saltwater corrosion and the eventual release of all the
carcinogens, chemicals, acids, and metals that formed each projectile tossed overboard,
policymakers were more perturbed by the Bedford disaster. This time, unlike in 1917, the
explosion was not caused by a chance collision of two ships in the harbour but by
overcrowded magazines and a strained relationship between the armed forces and the
government’s disposal administration. Under such circumstances it was imperative to
destroy the dangerous assets as quickly as possible. In the wake of the Bedford disaster
Canada’s ocean dumping program commenced with vigour. The military and the WAC
worked out the issues that confounded their relationship in regards to ammunition and
explosive disposal, as policies and procedures were adapted to limit delays in final
disposition and the two organizations started working in tandem to alleviate the storage
crisis. As a result, all types of surplus ordnance ended up on the ocean floor.

Storage Wars: The Evolution of Destruction Policies and Practices
Almost immediately after the CAAC and WAC were established in November
1943, the three Services started declaring surplus small amounts of obsolete kit
categorized as “war-like material which is a danger to life” and assets of a purely military
design with “no known peace-time uses.”2 From January to May 1944, these declarations
included, among other things, approximately 12,000 magazines of ammunition, and at
least 797 cases of dynamite and 20,000 blasting caps left over in Newfoundland from
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building the Gander-Lewisporte-Bishop’s Falls highway.3 As a result, in May the CAAC
approved a special exemption to the DND that authorized its trained experts and weapons
specialists to destroy all unneeded small arms, ammunition, and explosives without
formally declaring them surplus through the CAAC.4 This exemption, renewed in
September, mirrored the other exemptions issued by the CAAC and greatly cut down on
the amount of munitions entering the WAC’s custody, while also saving the Corporation
the cost of hiring weapon experts and building specialized storage facilities. To that end,
the CAAC formulated two general policies related to weapons, ammunition, and items of
a purely military design or lethal nature:
(i) that where it was represented to the Committee that live ammunition was
of no further use in the prosecution of the war or for any other purpose, and
the cost and/or the hazard of unloading the same was such as to render
unloading unadvisable, such live ammunition should be disposed of by a
suitable method of elimination, such as dumping into the sea;
(ii) that no general policy be recommended at the present time in respect of
other items of purely military equipment declared surplus but the same be
dealt with from time to time as they come before the Committee.5
The first clause of this general policy was profoundly influential because it allowed
the Services to destroy unneeded or deteriorating ammunition and explosives by dumping
them in the ocean. Given its gravity, the CAAC sent the order to Cabinet for
consideration. This resulted in PC6099 issued on 4 August 1944 that approved the
disposal procedures for dangerous objects. PC6099 stated that if weapons, ammunition,
or explosives were declared surplus, priority went to the DMS for war purposes and if no
purchaser was found then the WAC could dispose of these items by “suitable method of
elimination, such as dumping into the sea, reducing to basic materials should such
reduction be considered economical and the hazard involved therein be considered not
excessive”6 The second clause stopped short of enshrining ocean dumping as the only
standard procedure for destroying war-like stores with no known peacetime uses. Instead,
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the Committee reserved some flexibility by allowing for the development of ad hoc
disposal policies for specific types of weapon systems. To policymakers this seemed like
a prudent course of action; even if the weaponry and ammunition were labelled
dangerous, some attempt at salvaging value was preferable to paying the costs of
destruction. This way the CAAC and WAC maintained a free hand to explore other
disposal options as lethal assets became available and PC6099 tacitly approved these
arrangements by structuring the priority for selling ahead of destruction. However, this
selling imperative would later become a major source of problems and precipitated a
storage crisis within the military’s logistical infrastructure.
Originally, the CAAC’s exemption served a very important function for both the
military and the WAC. Prior to the end of the war it made perfect sense to authorize the
Services to dispose of their surplus weapons and ammunition in accordance with their
wartime objectives, strategies, and deployments. Therefore, disposal procedures were
grafted into the armed forces’ pre-existing operational priorities that favoured the
deployment of the newest and most advanced weapon systems. In other words, the
CAAC’s exemption provided the Army, Navy, and Air Force with a free hand to
cannibalize unneeded weapon systems and utilize surpluses as sources of spare parts for
repair and maintenance purposes. The only types of tactical assets that were declared
surplus before hostilities ended were obsolete weaponry that was badly worn out or
completely unneeded.7 Thus, during the war the disposal of all weaponry and ammunition
was mostly kept in-house and overseen through the DND’s disposal agencies connected
to the AOSAC and the units in actual possession of the items.
While the CAAC’s exemption allowed the armed forces to dispose of weapons and
ammunition as needed, it also accommodated the WAC’s lack of storage space. Before
the WAC’s reorganization and expansion, the Corporation operated few warehouses and
relied heavily on custodial arrangements with the DND. Indeed, most of the items
declared surplus – lethal or otherwise – by the Services between January 1944 and
August 1945 never actually left the custody of the military until the WAC found a buyer
or approved their destruction. Without any storage capacity of its own, the WAC was
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completely dependent on the Services and had to relinquish a certain level of control over
the fate and treatment of surpluses. In effect, the armed force’s exemption for disposing
of weapons and ammunition was essential for creating workable custodial arrangements
with the DND. It made practical and economic sense to enable the military to free up
storage space by either breaking down items into smaller pieces or completely destroying
the unneeded assets in its custody.
However, these arrangements came with some inconvenient baggage which
influenced the trajectory of disposal operations and led to the modification of the armed
forces’ exemption in August 1945. As Chapter 2 explained, a number of problems
plagued the custodial arrangements and cooperation between the Services and the WAC.
These issues came to a head in mid-1945 when the WAC and armed forces first came
under attack from politicians and public accusations about the wanton destruction of
government property dutifully paid for by public money. Under the political and public
fallout from the Penhold incident in February 1945, the WAC revised the CAAC’s
exemption to the armed forces. In August 1945, the Corporation ordered the armed forces
to stop all destruction programs involving weapon systems and equipment unless
otherwise instructed by the Corporation.
The only exception to the WAC’s new order was ammunition: the Services were
allowed to continue destroying all types of ammunition and explosives without declaring
them to the CAAC.8 This caveat was maintained because bombs and bullets lacked any
obvious or widespread civilian applications but still occupied valuable storage space.
Moreover, they also posed a serious danger to public safety if stockpiled in large amounts
while awaiting orders for destruction from the WAC after it had explored all possible
avenues for selling them. Furthermore, the policy change coincided with the WAC’s
expansion and reorganization to better accommodate its increased custodial
responsibilities through material clearance and warehousing operations. As a result, the
newly created Supply Department gained two additional elements, the Scrap Disposal
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Section and the Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board, which took over most
destruction programs involving surplus declarations of weapon systems, tactical
equipment, and even ammunition (if the Services elected to declare it surplus through
regular channels).9
For a time, the Services gladly obliged the WAC and refrained from destroying
weapon systems, while continuing to dump increasingly larger quantities of ammunition.
Over the summer and fall of 1945 there were simply few surplus weapon systems
available to declare. Canada’s participation in the Pacific war remained on the horizon
until Japan’s surrender and each Service was in the midst of tabulating its inventories,
budgets, and postwar requirements. However, once the flood of surpluses commenced,
the WAC’s order to halt destruction efforts came back to bite everyone. With the
curtailment of the DND’s special exemption for destroying all war-like stores, the WAC
assimilated these new functions into its already overwhelmed operations. Coupled with
the selling imperative built into PC6099 (and the requisite pre-sale storage requirements),
the available space to physically store things was quickly consumed at supply depots and
warehouses where munitions of all types started piling up next to radios, bedframes, and
everything else from Canada’s wartime arsenal.10
The space to physically locate assets was the critical postwar issue. This was
especially the case since the Services had relied on the availability of storage space from
civilian sources during the war but with hostilities over and budget cuts looming the high
rental prices were one expense that was quickly targeted for cutting. For example, the
Navy had 7.96 acres of leased or rented space from civilian sources on the books at the
time of VE-Day, but by June 1946 that total had dropped to 1.09 acres.11 When the rental
contracts expired, the surpluses inside those facilities had to be removed to the WAC’s
warehouses, thus providing the armed forces with alternative storage space for their
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unneeded things. However, unlike with non-lethal surpluses, the WAC was not prepared
to or capable of providing the necessary facilities for all the surplus weaponry,
ammunition, and explosives. While the WAC’s reorganization and expansion created
fifty-one warehouses across the country, it had to rely on the military’s purpose-built
magazines and ammunition bunkers. This meant that at ammunition depots and other
bases where weaponry was stored, surplus and non-surplus munitions had to be stored
together. This strategy saved the WAC from paying for transportation, maintenance,
construction, and security, but it did very little to help the Services actively engaged in
demobilizing personnel, slashing budgets, and consolidating inventories of munitions
they wished to keep. In fact, when combined with the high rate of personnel turnover at
ammunition depots and the relaxation of storage procedures to accommodate
overcrowding, the possibility of disaster grew with each incoming shipment.12
In hindsight, the looming crisis and subsequent disaster was fairly obvious. Both
the military and the WAC were burning the candle at both ends. On the one end were the
armed forces sifting through inventories to determine postwar requirements while a
seemingly endless array of new and used equipment continued piling up at bases and
depots. Like a speeding train, loaded down with many carloads of heavy materials,
Canada’s war machine took time to slow down and come to a complete stop. War
production had hit its peak in late 1943 and consumption rates spiked in 1944 and 1945,
so the logistics of moving munitions overseas had also ramped up over that time. After
VE- and VJ-Day, munitions shipments overseas tailed off while the residues of
production programs continued to arrive from war factories, and shortly thereafter,
repatriated units were demobilized and disarmed. This compounded the storage crisis that
was already hitting acute levels in Halifax and Montreal. The key to avoiding disaster
was in providing the necessary space and braking power for the train to stop. However,
this proved difficult to do within the context of decreasing total storage capacities and
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logistical arrangements designed to move products to the war fronts quickly, not hold
them in prolonged stasis.13
The military was expecting the WAC to be proactive and help absorb this abrupt
reverse in its supply chain management, but at the candle’s other end, the WAC remained
largely reactive. Overwhelmed with the flood of surpluses and stacks of paperwork the
WAC hastily expanded and reorganized to better handle its increasing responsibilities.
Delays in the destruction or sale of all types of assets developed and, in the case of
weapons and ammunition, the time lags were compounded by selling restrictions and the
necessity of testing for civilian applications. Throughout the immediate postwar period,
the WAC was playing catch up and, in doing so, it was hindering the military’s
demobilization plans. Where the Services thought they could count on the WAC to
remove and relocate all types of surpluses, the WAC wanted the weapons and
ammunition to stay put. In other words, the WAC sought to control large portions of
lethal assets from within the military’s purpose-built facilities, rather than hastily fund the
construction and management of new magazines nearby.14
A further issue affecting the WAC were both the informal and formal disposal
arrangements with Britain that took place over a parallel time frame. The agreements
with Britain greatly affected the WAC’s operations because it created another source of
surplus weapons (and supplies). Since the arrangements all stipulated that the WAC was
the only organization designated to handle the disposal of all surplus foreign property in
Canada, it came into possession of any surplus British (or American) ammunition and
weaponry located in Canada. For instance, during the war the Royal Navy built up large
stockpiles of naval weapons and ordnance in Halifax, but by May 1946 the British
Admiralty had returned most of what it needed from Canadian ports “for present or
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possible future reserve.”15 What remained required storage and was usually transferred,
through informal arrangements, directly to the RCN “free of charge” and if the British
munitions were not required by the RCN then the “remaining surplus Imperial stocks”
were immediately reported to the CAAC “in accordance with usual procedure.” 16 Given
that the surplus ammunition was not owned by Canada, the RCN felt it was important to
involve the CAAC/WAC because anything left behind “might be construed as being
involved in the UK Settlement Account.”17
The WAC also acquired lethal assets from other British sources in Canada, such as
the British Admiralty Technical Mission (BATM) and the Joint Inspection Board of the
United Kingdom and Canada. Since the BATM and Inspection Board were closely
affiliated with the DMS, it made sense that their termination, decontamination, and
disposal fell under its jurisdiction. As a result the British Admiralty’s magazines at St.
Polycarpe and St. Lazare in Quebec were transferred directly to the WAC for disposal.
Although all the arsenals at St. Polycarpe and St. Lazare (as well as other types of
ammunition at Valcartier) were offered to the Services through the CAAC, only a small
portion was claimed.18 The rest was tagged for destruction through late 1946 or early
1947. Thus, despite the CAAC’s exemptions and the WAC’s attempts at saving the
financial costs of ammunition and explosive disposal, the Corporation was nonetheless
forced to fund its own destruction programs overseen by the Scrap Disposal Branch, the
Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board, and the PDC (which was transferred into the
WAC’s organization in August 1946). Of course, before destruction or sale took place,

15

LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-2, “Memorandum for the CNAS,” E.H. Russell to M.A. Medland, 4
May 1946; TNA, ADM 1/17547, “Re: Shipment of Imperial Ammunition Stores to A.S. C. United
Kingdom,” 8 August 1946, 1-2.
16

Ibid, “Memorandum for Deputy Minister,” H.T.W. Grant, 21 June 1946. See also: TNA, ADM 1/17547,
“Clearance of Surplus Ammunition Held in America and Canada,” various correspondence and briefing
notes, December 1945 January 1947.
17

LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-2, “Memorandum for Deputy Minister,” H.T.W. Grant, 21 June
1946.
18

See the CAAC’s transfer notices for the St. Lazare Magazine. LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-2,
“Notice of Allocation,” (and cover letter), 12 September 1946. Ibid, “Memorandum for the CNAS,” E.H.
Russell to M.A. Medland, 4 May 1946; Ibid, “Memorandum for Deputy Minister,” H.T.W. Grant, 21 June
1946.

350

the items had to be stored somewhere safe, which usually meant cramming more lethal
assets into already overcrowded depots.
The WAC’s destruction program for ammunition paralleled the Navy’s dumping
program and piggy-backed on the armed forces’ storage facilities and expertise, thus
adding more burdens to an already strained relationship. Financial data indicates that over
the fiscal year of 1946-1947 the WAC’s destruction program commenced when
$472,903.19 was spent on ammunition disposal, including $182,056.82 on the demolition
of “miscellaneous ammunition & explosives,” depth charges, and mustard gas. 19 During
the next fiscal year the Corporation spent another $456,925.47 on “ammunition disposal
expenses,” including $243,394.00 from June to September 1947.20 However, because the
Corporation lacked the space and expertise for handling these dangerous things, it paid
the DND for these services. As a result, the Army received $775,285.83 in 1946-1947 to
store ammunition for the WAC, but the following year this expense dropped substantially
as only $21,887.92 was paid for the use of ammunition depots.21 This significant drop in
storage costs demonstrates the rapid timeline for ammunition destruction. However, such
diligent efforts, commencing around the midpoint of 1946, came too late to relieve the
postwar congestion that developed in the military’s logistical infrastructure. In fact, the
velocity of destruction programs in 1946-1947 was a direct result of events immediately
following VE-Day when munitions and supplies were piling up and confounding the
coordination between the WAC and armed forces.
It did not take long for a disaster to strike in Halifax. On the evening of 18 July
1945, a fire broke out around 6:30PM on the south jetty of the Bedford Magazine,
Canada’s largest ammunition depot. The fire quickly spread to a nearby ammunition
barge (or “floating magazine”) that exploded and ignited the surrounding piles of
ammunition temporarily stored outside because of overcrowding inside the stowage
bunkers. The chain reaction of explosions that resulted continued for more than twentyfour hours, completely destroying the Bedford Magazine and terrorizing Haligonians who
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had lived through a similar disaster twenty-eight years earlier. However, an orderly
evacuation plan limited casualties to one fatality and several dozen injuries. Luckily, the
1945 explosion was nowhere near as large or devastating as the earlier blast that levelled
large parts of the city and killed almost 2,000 people.22
The Bedford Magazine Explosion was a turning point in Canada’s postwar
disarmament. In late July a committee, chaired by Lt-Col. Ogilvie, was established to
investigate the explosion. The Ogilvie committee published two reports on the incident,
the first in August (on the causes of and responses to the explosion) and the second in
October

(making

recommendations
reconstructing

for

the

facility).23

Despite extensive research and
interviews with witnesses and
first

responders,

Ogilvie’s

committee could not definitively
prove what started the fire, but
concluded

that

the

probable

cause was careless smoking in
combination with overcrowded
Photo 17 Picture showing some of the devastation from the
Bedford Magazine Explosion. Source: LAC, RG24, Vol.
8070, File: 1270-41 Ammunition Disposal Committee,
Bedford Basin, Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports, Copy Negative
HS 1509-71.

storage

facilities,

a

large

personnel turnover, and a laxity
in the enforcement of safety

regulations.24 However, the fact that a fire originally started on a dock where an
ammunition barge exploded into a chain reaction that engulfed an overcrowded
magazine, indicates that Canada’s fledgling ammunition dumping program was at fault
or, at least, indirectly responsible. Indeed, the Bedford disaster exposed the serious
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storage problems plaguing the system of custodial arrangements for lethal assets and
demonstrated the need for adapting existing procedures to better handle the disposal of
ammunition and explosives.
According to correspondence in August, November, and December 1945 between
Berry, Howe, and several officials in the DND and DMS, the explosion threw off
dumping timetables and inventory tabulations, and greatly affected the scope and nature
of future destruction programs. In fact, the correspondence revealed that most of the
ordnance that exploded was surplus ammunition awaiting destruction and a large portion
appears to have been British in
origin – thus putting the WAC’s
role in the accident into clearer
focus.25 However, in the immediate
aftermath, the origin, ownership,
and

quantities

involved

were

unknown to contemporaries since
no one knew exactly what had
exploded. As Captain R. W. Wood,
the RCN’s Director of Naval
Photo 18 Picture showing one of the two major craters
caused by the Bedford Magazine Explosion. This crater
was made by ordnance improperly stored outside of the
ammunition bunkers. LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 127041 Ammunition Disposal Committee, Bedford Basin,
Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports, Copy Negative HS 1509-64

Ordnance, explained in a letter to
an

official

in

the

DMS’s

Ammunition Filling Division, the
lists of surplus ammunition that
Berry had submitted to Shiels (on

the Navy’s behalf) were now outdated and had to be cancelled “due to the explosion in
Halifax where most of the surplus ammunition was held.”26 He continued, “in view of the
above it is requested that the disposal of the ammunition as previously submitted be held
in abeyance until a firm stock report is received from our Halifax depot at which time a
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new list will be forwarded.”27 Thus, a new inventory list had to be compiled while
facilities and storage sites were repaired before any more surplus ammunition could be
sent to Halifax and dumped. However, this was not possible until sometime in the spring
of 1947, so in the meantime Canada’s dumping program shifted north to Sydney (where
most ships were being decommissioned and de-ammunitioned) and south to Shelburne
(where the WAC had established a temporary ship graveyard).28
For Berry it seems that the Bedford Magazine Explosion served as a catalyst for
change and in its aftermath he moved aggressively to address the situation. At the heart of
his concerns was public safety which was now under threat from stocks of surplus
ordnance accidently exploding. In the hands of trained specialists and purpose-built
facilities, accidents of this nature were not supposed to happen, especially since none had
taken place in Canada during the war. Berry’s concerns mirrored a growing alarm from
politicians about the “flood of weapons going about the country” at the close of
hostilities.29 In the fall of 1945, gun crime and weapon ownership became an increasingly
larger political and social issue as the media and politicians worried about illegal gun
sales and a purported increase in gun violence. As Blake Brown explained, by 1945 the
RCMP had compiled a temporary wartime gun registry that had a total of 1,949,921
registered rifles, shotguns, and pistols.30 Of course that total excluded the roughly 1.5
million rifles, pistols, and machine guns manufactured for the war effort, as well as the
rising number of unregistered firearms – especially those smuggled home as souvenirs by
returning soldiers – which some conservatively estimated to constitute another 500,000
weapons.31
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A social catastrophe seemed imminent. Through the DMS and DND, the federal
government had nurtured the expansion of an industrial war machine, purchased its
death-dealing commodities in vast numbers, trained 1.1 million citizens in their use, and
another 1.1 million in their manufacture. What would result from this wartime marriage
of materiel and everyday life? Worst-case scenarios seemed to pop up everywhere, as
several gun-related incidents in 1945 added fuel to the fire. In one poignant accident, an
Ottawa boy was shot and killed by his friend showing off his father’s souvenir revolver.
In another incident in late-October 1945, three thieves broke into the Canadian War
Museum and stole weapons from several display cases, one of which was used in the
shooting death of an Ottawa police officer, Detective Thomas Stoneman.32
Perhaps the most notorious string of gun-related crimes in postwar Canada
happened over the late summer and fall of 1945 in Southwestern Ontario. Armed to the
teeth with handguns, four Sten sub-machine guns, and polka dot handkerchiefs covering
their faces, the five-member Polka Dot Gang embarked on a spree of robberies that
turned them into the “leading figures” of “a crime wave” that swept through Ontario.33
On 18 October the Toronto Daily Star reported that “gangs” and criminals had netted
close to $500,000 in stolen cash and bonds, though the Polka Dot Gang was only thought
responsible for stealing a portion of that alarming total. 34 From August to October, the
Polka Dot Gang struck with impunity. Their largest single haul was $10,000 taken from a
safe in Hamilton, but they also hit several creameries, dairies, packing plants, and a flour
mill in Parkhill, Stratford, London, Guelph, York, and Port Dalhousie. On several other
occasions they were thwarted from carrying out their heists, but they were never afraid to
use force when necessary: the Toronto Daily Star reported that the gang had assaulted
uncooperative employees, nearly killed a night watchman, and shot at pursing police
officers in York Township.35 The Polka Dot Gang was eventually arrested after a 15
in Montreal. By 1946, the War Diary repeatedly noted how many firearms were taken out of kit bags. LAC,
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October heist during which they forced their way into the home of a St. Catharines
businessman named Thomas Heit, but left witnesses who gave police the license plate
number of their getaway car.36 These events, and others like them, came on the heels of
other wartime incidents that conditioned fears of rising rates in juvenile delinquency and
violent crime, despite the fact that Canada’s actual crime rate in 1945 had dropped from
its peak in the 1930s.37
It was in this apprehensive climate that Berry started pressing Howe to modify
PC6099 and approve a new disposal policy in November 1945. In light of “recent events”
and the termination of hostilities, Berry was concerned about the length of time that the
WAC and armed forces were required to store surplus weapons and ammunition while an
attempt was made to find customers and make a sale.38 This meant that a lengthy and
costly delay was built into the disposal process that obstructed the start of any destruction
program. Moreover, with the damaged storage facilities in Halifax and the delays caused
after the explosion, ammunition destruction (which had heretofore been in continuous
operation) was now running behind schedule. Berry wanted Howe to decide whether
surplus weapons and ammunition would be kept for a “prescribed period” to await
potential sales or if they should be destroyed immediately, “if no known sale for this type
of surplus at the time it becomes available” was possible.39 Given the situation, it is clear
that Berry preferred the second option.
Howe wrote Berry back on 5 December and agreed with him. “The matter is so
important,” he wrote in his short cryptic reply, a Council decision was required and it was
brought up at the 12 December meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction.40
At the meeting Howe explained that “in view of the lack of market, inadvisability in
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certain instances of general sale, and substantial costs of storage, it appeared desirable to
destroy the goods in question rather than retain them in storage.”41 The Committee
concurred and approved a vaguely worded order to direct the WAC that “where no
known sale for surplus small arms and ammunition existed, to proceed with mutilation
and sale as scrap of the arms and ammunition involved.”42 Because Berry’s original
concern was about storing lethal assets in expectation of a sale, ocean dumping was never
expressly mentioned in this exchange since there was never any intention to sell the
surplus ordnance already slated for dumping.
However,

the

new

orders drastically increased
and accelerated the scope
of all destruction programs
since the armed forces and
the

WAC

were

now

relieved of the necessity of
stockpiling

surplus

munitions while attempting
to sell them. At all times
the
Photo 19 Picture showing the devastation of the Bedford Magazine
Explosion. Note the unexploded ordnance scattered throughout.
Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41 Ammunition
Disposal Committee, Bedford Basin, Colonel Ogilvie’s Reports,
Copy Negative HS 1509-108.

considerations

over-riding
for

the

destruction of lethal assets
were speed and efficiency,
the public’s safety and

security, the safety of the specialists and technicians tasked with destruction, the financial
costs, and, perhaps most pressing of all, freeing storage space at ammunition depots. As
one official from the DND wrote to M. A. Medland, Wood’s successor as Director of
Naval Ordnance, in May 1946, “it is intended to dump all surplus imperial stocks of
ammunition and explosives stores held at [Royal Canadian Naval Armaments Depot]’s so
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that further stowage space which is urgently required may be made available at an early
date.”43
In the aftermath of the Bedford Explosion, concerns were coalescing in the minds
of military officers and government officials. Naval officers, who were still debating
postwar requirements and tabulating inventories over the summer, swiftly decided on the
fate of all remaining ordnance in Bedford. Instead of inspecting all the ammunition still
littering the blast area or consigned to “floating magazines,” the Director of Naval
Ordnance was instructed “to proceed from the standpoint of clearance rather than of
future use” and write off all stocks of ammunition and explosives in Bedford in order to
commence “dumping at once.”44 Not only were these assets replaceable from other
sources should the Navy require them in the future, but what had not detonated was
probably damaged in some capacity, so there was little use in trying to sell them.45
Indeed, at every step of the demobilization and disposal process, the concerns of
policymakers were shaped by the immediacy and proximity of dangerous munitions as
well as the technical feats required for purging them from their spheres of responsibility.

Davey’s Storage Locker: Canada’s Ammunition Dumping Program
When hostilities ended, the standard procedures for the disposal of all war-like
stores were well-established on paper and tested with the limited amounts of tactical
equipment declared surplus by the DND. The Services cannibalized what they needed
and declared the remainder surplus. Any lethal assets entering the WAC’s possession
were frozen from general sale and usually held by the armed forces (at depots or
magazines or air bases) pending the Merchandising Department’s ability to sell to a select
clientele that included foreign governments, allied armies, police forces, and dealers who
acquired the requisite permits and passed the RCMP’s background checks. If the “single
purpose implements of war” could not be sold and no possible civilian applications were
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discovered by the WAC then the items were referred to either the Scrap Disposal Branch
or the Ammunition and Chemical Disposal Board for final disposition.46 At that point the
assets were usually tagged for destruction either by scrapping, mutilation, incineration, or
ocean dumping.
The fact that there were four available options for destroying surplus weapons and
ammunition demonstrates that drowning was not a forgone conclusion once surplus
ordnance became available, nor was ocean dumping the sole method utilized by the WAC
or the armed forces. However, given the numbers requiring disposal, the concerns for
public safety, the desired speed and efficiency, and the international precedents
established by Canada’s closest Allies, ocean dumping became the favoured destruction
method for ammunition and explosives. The long-term environmental and ecological
consequences of ammunition dumping were hardly considered relevant and largely
ignored or misunderstood by the scientific community, military officials, and government
bureaucrats making disposal policies.
At first glance, scrapping and mutilation were obvious starting points and, as
Chapter 4 explained, the favoured destruction method for all types of weapon systems
since their materials and components were salvaged. However, scrapping and mutilation
came with some baggage that made them less practical to implement with ammunition.
To correctly scrap and mutilate ordnance, suitable amounts of time and care were needed,
particularly given the technical nature of the task. A continuous supply of expertise was
essential for ensuring quality control and efficiency, while storage facilities and extensive
security precautions were required to guard against reassembly or thefts from storage
areas.47 Overcoming these challenges meant forestalling the demobilization of trained
weapons specialists and the acquisition of larger facilities where the objects could be
securely stored before processing. In Europe and Asia, storage and manpower
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arrangements were further complicated by the devastation wrought by Allied victory as
well as the significant quantities of ammunition located there. At home, the rapid
demobilization of Canadian personnel coupled with the fact that most munitions factories
were quickly dismantled or reconverted to civilian needs meant that both the expertise
and locations for scrapping ammunition shrank drastically after May 1945. Indeed, the
amount of ordnance requiring destruction across the world was so large that scrapping
and mutilation alone could not possibly finish the job within the context of
demobilization and reconstruction timetables.
A further challenge to mutilation and scraping was the explosive compounds and
chemicals inside the war’s deadliest ammunition: artillery shells. Although some isolated
successes demonstrated that scrapping shells could be done efficiently in order to recycle
the metals in the casings, the time, effort, and numbers conspired to negate its widespread
feasibility. How could every single shell be taken apart safely and in line with rapid
demobilization schedules? And how would the millions of tons of chemical weapons
produced but never used in combat be destroyed? In these cases, it was best to destroy
these chemicals and impregnated materials rather than risk the death or injury of
inspectors and specialists tasked with taking them apart and appraising what could be
salvaged. Thus, it was clear that mutilation and scrapping were best for weapons systems
(such as aircraft, ships, tanks, and firearms) that were composed of many reusable parts
and materials, but they were not that useful for destroying the highly contaminated
materials or small arms ammunition, artillery shells, and chemical weapons.
Incineration and controlled explosions were the other available alternatives, and
while utilized wherever feasible, they faced similar obstacles as scrapping and mutilation.
Using explosions to destroy munitions had to happen in a place that was both safely and
securely distant from any population centre but still within proximity of good and
operational transit networks that could be devoted only to the movement of munitions
rather than, for example, displaced persons or food or commercial goods. Finding
suitable locations and facilities after the war was limited by the quantities requiring
destruction, their proximity to military installations, industrial production, and, in Europe
and Asia, the devastated nature of the transportation networks. Aside from storage and
security concerns prior to detonation, another major obstacle was simply keeping pace
360

with cleanup operations. This was exceedingly difficult once landscapes were remediated
and destroyed cities rebuilt. In this case, controlled explosions would need to move
further away from rebounding population centres and storage sites, while any salvageable
materials inside the munitions would literally go up in smoke. Indeed, reconstruction and
rebuilding efforts seriously limited the space and time in which large explosions and fires
could take place.
The numbers were just too large to make controlled explosions and burns practical
as the singular method of destruction, especially for TNT. To understand their
impracticality, consider the total blast yields involved in comparison to the atomic bombs
used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The blast yield from Little Boy, the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima, registered between 12 and 18 kilotons or the equivalent of 12,000
to 18,000 tons of TNT exploding at one time. Such a large explosion is estimated to have
killed in the vicinity of 70,000 people – many vaporized instantly or killed by flying
debris – and at least another 20,000 over the following days from severe radiation
poisoning.
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Yet, hypothetically, if the quantities of conventional explosives requiring

disposal were concentrated in one location and detonated together, the resulting explosion
would have made Hiroshima look like a gentle gust of wind. According to Terrence
Long, Chairman of the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (IDUM), there is
a minimum of 80,000 tons of conventional ammunition on the seafloor around Cape
Breton alone.49 Even if only a quarter of that conservative estimate is actually TNT, its
blast yield – if it had been centralized and detonated in a single location rather than
dumped at sea – would be 20 kilotons or the equivalent yield of Fat Man the atomic
weapon that obliterated most of Nagasaki.
Obviously, controlled explosions of such magnitude were not advisable. Yet if
numerous smaller explosions and fires were organized another serious problem surfaces:
longevity. Consider that France’s demineurs – the army unit created to collect and
destroy unexploded ordnance in France predominantly from the Great War – utilize
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explosive detonations along the Channel coast at Le Crotoy as their primary method of
disposal. In performing this highly dangerous and deadly job, they collect and destroy
roughly 300 tons of unexploded ordnance annually. Although this is a substantial total,
the cleanup will likely continue for centuries!50 Because of better blasting caps and fuses,
the Second World War yielded significantly less unexploded ordnance, but in 1945 it was
the stockpiles awaiting future use that were most troubling.51 The numbers are simply
mind-boggling: the Americans produced about 41 billion rounds of ammunition (all
calibers, including artillery shells) and the Germans built 3.35 million tons of ordnance in
1944 alone (and despite the intensity of bombing raids).52 Of course not all of these
arsenals were tagged for destruction and large portions were already fired, but the
leftovers may have taken centuries to destroy solely by fire and combustion.
Thus, to destroy large stocks of ammunition and shells properly, a storage site and
efficient destruction method were essential. The site had to be located somewhere
inaccessible so that nobody could easily steal the items and the destruction method had to
ensure that reassembly was not possible. The site and method had to accommodate the
devastated nature of local conditions and take advantage of the available expertise,
equipment, and transportation of the Allied armies. Above all, the site had to be large
enough to store all the lethal assets, either as a whole or in parts, so that they would never
again be used for their intended function. Finally, the destruction method had to be
relatively quick and efficient so that it could keep pace with rebuilding efforts and
demobilization, thereby adding even greater importance to the location’s indefinite size
and proximity.
In fact, the ideal option would combine the location and method together, meaning
that the site where the lethal assets were placed was their destruction. As things turned
out, a solution was close at hand, and it was also one that the Western Allies knew all too
well. Wherever their armies had fought, the tyranny of distance was conquered before the
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enemy was defeated. The vast bodies of water separating the war front from the industrial
front posed the greatest geographic and logistical obstacles to victory. 53 However, in
peace, they became the ideal places for discarding the detritus of war. Not only did the
Allies possess the available shipping capacity, but ground transportation networks would
only need to ship munitions one way (to the ports). The water and seafloor provided the
location and perimeter security thus rendering the assets completely inaccessible and
unusable. Moreover, the objects could be dumped as a whole or in parts which limited
handling and negated the need for extensive mutilation. At the time, the long-term
corrosive powers of saltwater and the profuse amount of chemicals inside each shell were
hardly considered relevant. Instead, the water’s colder temperatures were seen as ideal for
insulating the bombs so they were less likely to ignite or explode accidently in the short
term. Finally, as long as rough seas and bad weather were minimal, ocean dumping could
continue without disruptions, far away from prying eyes, and in controlled locations so as
not to disturb shipping or the fishing industries.
In many respects the dumping of munitions in the oceans might appear today like
some immoral transgression and that the Allies consciously perpetrated an environmental
disaster in disarming themselves and their enemies. No doubt there is some truth to that
assertion, particularly in reference to the dumping of chemical weapons, and later
radioactive waste, but the objective here is not to debate the morality of dumping within
the context of today’s growing environmental concerns.54 Instead, the objective is to
understand why and how ocean dumping became a viable and widely-used option for the
destruction of ammunition and some types of weapon systems. At the heart of the matter
was the contemporary attitude towards the environmental impact of munitions dumping.
There were simply few concerns about the effects of saltwater corrosion or the ecological
consequences of introducing large quantities of chemicals, acids, metals, and carcinogens
into marine environments. Instead concerns were focused on the pragmatic aspects of
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disposal, the quantities involved, speed, and the public’s general safety if these items
remained in storage facilities on land.
Some discussion of the broader historical and international context helps clarify
contemporary attitudes about the marine environment and the permissibility of dumping
munitions. The precedents that guided policymakers to their decisions came in many
forms. In fact, for both practical and symbolic reasons, humans have had a long history of
dumping weapons and military accoutrements in water. For instance, in 1950 Danish
workers digging a drainage pipe at Illerup near Skanderborg on the Jutland Peninsula
discovered a major weapons deposit in what is now a dry lake bed. Archeological
excavations and scientific testing found that most of the objects dated from 200 A. D.
and, to the great surprise of all concerned, were identified as Roman in origin. Far from
any Roman frontier, the items were dumped there by early Germanic peoples who were
actively resisting Roman conquest at the time. The act of dumping was obviously
significant to the dumpers since the objects were first captured in battle and then
transported many miles before ending up under water. The fact that the lake at Illerup
was chosen over some other bodies of water closer to the battlefield has led experts to
conclude that the primary motivation for dumping was symbolic and religious. The
thousands of objects at Illerup were thrown into the lake as a sacrifice to the gods for
helping defeat the enemy.55
Obviously, the actions of ancient cultures were far removed from those of modern
societies and the choices of political and military leaders after the Second World War.
Yet they demonstrate the Longue durée of human interaction with bodies of water. As
Philip Steinberg explained in his book The Social Construction of the Ocean, throughout
recorded history humans have used the world’s oceans and waterways for a variety of
economic, political, and social practices. Societies, corporations, and governments have
continuously consumed and regulated ocean space for their own advantages by
controlling access, usage, transportation, resource exploitation, sovereignty, and
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defence.56 However, Steinberg’s theoretical approach and political-economic focus
ignored another critical aspect of how humans have historically interacted with and
envisioned the oceans: as a place and means for discarding waste. 57 For centuries,
humans have used oceans, rivers, and lakes to “store” unwanted items or dispose of
garbage, sewage, and more recently, munitions and atomic waste. As Joel Tarr explained
in The Search for the Ultimate Sink, every process “be it natural, consumer, or
production…requires location of a place of deposit, or a ‘sink.’”58 Most relevant for our
purposes is Tarr’s contention that in the search for the “ultimate sink” for industrial
wastes and urban pollution, the preferred option was the “cheapest and most convenient
manner possible.”59 Unfortunately, this often meant pumping and dumping waste into the
closest waterway or the ocean.
The industrial revolution and rise of mass consumerism throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries resulted in a dramatic increase of marine pollution and ocean
dumping that has left a frightening legacy for the twenty-first century. Some experts and
environmentalists now believe that the oceans are on the brink of dying and that humans
have “killed” their ecosystems with plastic, garbage, industrial wastes, radioactive
materials, and discarded munitions.60 One recent study found that between 4 and 12
million tons of plastic are dumped in the oceans every year, a shocking revelation
connected to other pressing environmental concerns such as ocean acidification, global
warming, over-consumption, and the birth of the plastic industry in the 1930s and
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1940s.61 A contributing factor to creating this environmental catastrophe was the
contemporary attitudes of government officials and scientists in the mid-twentieth
century. As Jacob Hamblin explained, these attitudes centred on the phenomenon of
“acceptable thresholds” or the idea that somehow water could repeatedly absorb a dose of
pollution without affecting humans, marine life, or the ocean’s chemistry. 62 In other
words, the cumulative measurement did not matter as much as the individual dosage so
the pollution of waterways and oceans could continue as long as it did not harm public
health immediately following the act. There was little concern for the ocean itself or any
consideration for the long-term effects that dumping could have on the marine
environment. Somehow the water would recover and the pollutants would disappear.63
Building on contemporary attitudes toward marine pollution, it is not difficult to
understand how the ocean dumping of munitions entered the equation in the 1940s,
especially since the precedent was already well established after the Great War. Because
the First World War ended so unexpectedly in November 1918, and during a series of
crushing Allied offensives in its last hundred days, a profuse amount of munitions were
stockpiled across Western Europe, especially at the front and along the Channel Coast.
As a result, the French and British organized various dumping operations along the coast
at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk under the auspices of the Ministry of Munitions and
Ministère de la Guerre. In practice, however, the job was contracted out to several private
contractors that purchased the munitions. These companies, such as F. N. Pickett et Fils
and George Cohen & Co., bought the weapons for scrap resources and were obligated to
destroy the unwanted remainder or unsalvageable items usually by dumping or
incineration.64 The records of the British Disposal and Liquidation Commission provide
some indication about their scope after the Great War. Despite the protests of British
oyster merchants, who saw their stocks drop precipitously in the 1920s, several thousand
tons of conventional weapons were dumped in the English Channel along with over
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12,000 tons of mustard gas. However, the numbers were probably much larger than what
was documented in this set of records.65
When Canadians started dumping ammunition in the ocean in 1945, they were not
trailblazers. In fact, the Canadian government and military were following the precedents
set by their larger Allies, particularly in reference to the disarmament of Germany and
Japan. When the Allies occupied the shattered remnants of Germany and Japan they
immediately initiated a process of demilitarization and disarmament, while formal
agreements were negotiated by subcommittees of the Allied Control Council.66 This was
realpolitik in practice. Disarming the enemy was a central duty of the occupation forces,
as it eliminated any challenge to Allied supremacy. Right as humanitarian aid trickled
into devastated areas, the Allies undertook extensive surveys and inspections to facilitate
an exodus of weapons, ammunition, scientific equipment, and production machinery.
This process of demilitarization and disarmament is often discussed by historians in the
context of rising tensions between the superpowers, the plundering of German scientific
and industrial resources (both human and material), the removal of factories by the
Soviets, or the improvement of future weapon designs and procurement programs in the
early stages of the Cold War.67 Yet disarmament and demilitarization created a major
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pragmatic dilemma: the Allies collected a massive array of munitions and supplies in
Europe and Asia, but not every weapon or gadget was desired for postwar purposes. In
fact, only a small fraction of what was confiscated had any residual scientific or military
value, while the remainder was a serious security liability.
The situation was further compounded by the demobilization of Allied armies and
the downsizing of manpower and materiel requirements which produced a large amount
of surplus Allied weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. Indeed, the British Army – just
one branch of one country’s armed forces – estimated that it possessed 1.2 million tons of
surplus ammunition in the UK alone.68 Thus, the amount of assets requiring disposal was
even larger than captured weapons and leftover ammunition in Germany and Japan. It
included all types of Allied weapon systems and ammunition spread across thousands of
places, from small islands in the Pacific to storage magazines on the home front and
everywhere in between. Since ocean dumping was seen as the most efficient and safest
method of disposal for lethal assets, the bulk of unneeded Second World War-era
ammunition wound up on the ocean floor. All types of ammunition were dumped along
with many different types of weapons, from small caliber bullets to the largest artillery
shells; from damaged aircraft to obsolete ships; from firearms to chemical weapons.
There were few restrictions and no international oversight controlling the practice until
1972.69
It was within this wider international context that Canada’s dumping program took
shape, both at home and overseas. As an important but middle-ranked power, Canada had
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no formal occupation zone in Germany, but the Army still participated in Allied
occupation duties in support of the British. Canadian soldiers actively collected and
destroyed large amounts of enemy weaponry and ammunition. Over the summer of 1945,
Canadian forces dumped into the Baltic and North Seas a minimum of six million tons of
captured ammunition that had been collected from parts of the Netherlands and the
Emden-Wilhelmshaven area in Northwest Germany. Major Frank Swanson, a
correspondent for the Hamilton Spectator, reported in late July that “the last and biggest
ammunition dumping program of the Canadian army is underway…It will see six million
tons of enemy ammunition consigned to the depths of the North Sea under fathoms of salt
water.”70 In reality though, Canada’s contributions to German disarmament were just a
drop in the bucket as the Americans, British, and Russians dumped tremendous amounts
in the Baltic. In fact, scientists now estimate that a combination of years of saltwater
corrosion and water currents have spread rusting bombs over about one-third of the
Baltic’s seabed.71 Today, munitions (both conventional and chemical) and their byproducts wash up on beaches regularly, while fishermen accidentally catch about 3 tons a
year. In 2007, one expert told an audience in Berlin at an international conference on
munitions in the Baltic, underwater explosions are now large enough that seismic
instruments frequently detect them.72
The main element of Canada’s dumping program was focused closer to home, on
the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts. It was here that thousands of tons of weapons
and ammunition were dumped with the approval of the Canadian government. Over the
summer, Canadian military authorities started defining potential locations for dumping
sites. In making these arrangements, however, they had to coordinate with provincial
governments, companies operating undersea cables, and the shipping industry. In late
June and early July, naval authorities in Ottawa and Halifax circulated a set of potential
70
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locations with coordinates to several companies and the provincial departments of
fisheries that bordered the St. Lawrence. Most replies were generally favourable. Some
companies, such as the Halifax and Bermuda Cable Company Ltd., did not foresee any
problems associated with dumping explosives, as the company viewed the proposed
locations “as being normally safe as far as our cables are concerned” and its officials had
“no reason to anticipate any break in communication from such activity.” 73 A few
changes were suggested by other companies, such as Western Union Wharf, because the
proposed dumping sites were too close to their cables and secondary locations were
devised.74 Although one might expect a vocal input and response from the provincial
governments, both the fisheries departments in Quebec and Nova Scotia quickly remitted
their approvals.75
Ammunition dumping received approval, in one form or another, from a powerful
consortium of provincial and federal officials, military authorities, and corporations.
Remarkably, it appears that few military officials thought to contact leaders from the
fishing industry or local communities and there was no concern about the long-term
environmental impact of corroded shells on the ocean floor. In fact, the only
environmental concerns appearing in this correspondence were preoccupied with the
short-term risk of accidental explosions and the danger this posed to the supply of salmon
in the area. As one undated message from the Naval Officer In-Charge (NOIC) of
Quebec explained to his counterpart in Cape Breton: “Provincial Deputy Minister of
Fisheries concurs in proposed area for dumping ammunition provided there will be no
explosions during dumping as for next 6 weeks to 2 months salmon run from Gaspe
Peninsula to North Shore will be on.”76
On 14 September 1945 – just twelve days after the Japanese surrender at Tokyo
Bay – a confidential memorandum to the Secretary of the Naval Board defined in broad
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detail the scope of future dumping operations. The Director of Naval Ordnance ordered
“that the following Naval Order…be promulgated” and he continued by outlining three
areas approved for ammunition dumping on the country’s Atlantic coast:
1)

Off Halifax, NS

Within a radius of (5) nautical miles from a position bearing 116° and distant
forty (40) nautical miles from Chebucto Head Lighthouse. (Approximate
location Latitude 44° 12’ N, Longitude 62° 42’ W)
2)

Off Sydney, NS

Within a radius of five (5) nautical miles from Latitude 46° 19’ N, Longitude
58° 39’ W.
3)

St. Lawrence

Within an area bounded as follows: Southern Limit, Latitude 49° 30’N.
Western and Northern Limit, the 100 fathom contour line bordering the North
Shore of the St. Lawrence. Eastern Limit: Longitude 65° 30’W.77
With these orders and approval from Canada’s government through PC6099 and
Ogilvie’s report, dumping operations commenced with additional vigour particularly at
Emerald Basin, the first location identified in Wood’s Naval Order. From the summer of
1945 onwards, the Navy undertook the majority of dumping operations on behalf of all
three Services and with increasing assistance from the WAC. Over this time, the bulk of
unneeded Second World War-era ammunition disappeared from storage magazines and
weapons’ lockers and – most likely – wound up in the ocean.
It is difficult to quantify exactly what and how much was dumped into the oceans at
this time. However, a comprehensive list remitted to the RCN’s Commanding Officer for
the Atlantic Coast in Halifax provides some indications about the nature of Canada’s
dumping operations. The list “of explosive stores jettisoned by H. M. C. Ships
subsequent to ‘V-E’ Day” detailed all items dumped from May until September 1945
localized to one port in the Maritimes: Sydney.78 According to the list 522,972 individual
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objects were tossed into the ocean. This included 252,658 cartridges of .303-inch small
arms ammunition, 101,729 cartridges of 20-mm Oerlikon ammunition, 19,992 cartridges
of 2-pounder quick firing artillery shells, 2,305 depth charges, and thousands of other
projectiles divided into 53 different categories of types and calibers. 79 The intensity of
dumping operations is quite striking considering that these items were dumped from only
one port over the summer when postwar requirements were still in flux and war with
Japan loomed ahead. Therefore, this inventory list constituted only a starting point, as
dumping
Table 10: Disposal of Ammunition, Report
for Week Ending 29 September 1945
Type of Ammunition Dumped
Quantity
Depth Charges, Mk. VII
1,050
Cartridges, Q. F. 4” Mk. XIX
517
Cartridges, 20 MM Oerlikon
49,000
Cartridges, B.L. 4”
1,456
Full and Reduced Charges
Cartridges, Q. F. 3” 20 Cwt.
896
Cartridges, Q. F. 2 Pdr. H.E./H.V.
71,512
Cartridges, S. A. 9MM
58,880
Cartridges, .303”
4,000
Shell Q.F. 4.7”
93
Shell, Q. F. 4”
714
Shell, Q. F. 12 pdr. 12 Cwt.
91
Projectiles, 1¾ Hedgehog
1,929
Fuzes, Time No. 198
525
Primers, D/C Mk. VII
170
Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1
Disposal on Demobilization Ammunition and
Explosives, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for week
ending 29 September 1945,” Superintendent (Naval
Armament Depot, Dartmouth NS) to Commanding
Officer Atlantic Coast, 3 October 1945.

operations

exponentially

increased

after

Japan

surrendered and postwar budgets
were confirmed.
A

short

Britain’s

comparison

postwar

with

ammunition

dumping program might further
illuminate the smaller scope and
scale

of

Canadian

dumping

operations. Two undated reports
published on Britain’s ammunition
dumping

program,

which

was

mainly based at Beaufort’s Dyke in
the Irish Sea and operated out of the
military port of Cairnryan, estimated
that

at

least

180,000

tons

of

ammunition was disposed of in
Beaufort’s Dyke by the end of 1946. These reports suggested that .303-inch small arms
ammunition, 20mm and 40mm Anti-Aircraft shells, mortar bombs, 500 lbs. High
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Explosive (HE) bombs, hand grenades, and anti-aircraft rockets were the most common
items tossed overboard.80
In terms of types, Canada’s dumping program certainly mirrored Britain’s, though
it was much smaller. Although documentation is hard to find, two weekly summaries for
the weeks ending 29 September 1945 and 6 October 1945 suggest a general pattern.
According to these summaries dumping was a daily occurrence, unless adverse weather
kept ships in port. Over the course of the week ending on 29 September “an estimated
550 tons of ammunition” was dumped (by comparison the RAF was dumping 500 tons a
day in Beaufort’s Dyke by November
Table 11: Disposal of Ammunition,
Report for Week Ending 6 October 1945
Type of Ammunition Dumped
Quantity
Depth Charges, Mk. VII
100
O. Q. F. 2 pdr. H.E./H.V.
89,956
Mine Charge Cases
23
Cartridges, U.S., 3” 50 Cal.
236
Cartridges, S. A., 5” Vickers
196,140
Cartridges, S. A., .30 Cal.
256,139
Shell, Q. F. 4” Mixed
249
Warheads 21” Mk. IV-VB
8
Warheads 21” Mk. II
4
Fuzes, Time No. 198
100

1945)

Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1
Disposal on Demobilization Ammunition and
Explosives, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for
week ending 6 October 1945,” Superintendent
(Naval Armament Depot, Dartmouth NS) to
Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 12 October
1945.

was dumped per day. On average the

and

the

following

week

inclement weather limited operations to
just 350 tons.81 Tables 10 and 11 list
the types and quantities dumped off the
Atlantic coast over this two-week
period.

Furthermore,

one

weekly

summary that divided the total tonnage
dumped by ship from 9-13 October
gives some indication about how much

three vessels engaged in dumping that
week carried about 30-35 tons daily.
However, each ship did have one day
that departed from this average: HMCS

Poundmaker dumped 44 tons on 10 October, while HMCS Buckingham and Victoriaville
dumped 55 tons on 19 tons respectively on 13 October.82
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While dumping became a standard practice, it was far from an exact science and
was replete with some serious challenges and obstacles. Perhaps the biggest was correctly
navigating to the designated coordinates and remaining there for hours while the cargo
was offloaded by hand. Since the ship could not anchor and was constantly in motion
while dumping took place, the five-nautical-mile radius defined by the Director of Naval
Ordnance was easily traversed and the cargo dispersed unevenly over a wide area, to say
little about all the dumping that took place before the areas were defined. Dumping was
also labour-intensive. Loose munitions were always dumped one at a time, by hand in
order to limit bumping, sparks, midair

collisions,

and

accidental

explosions. Other common methods
were to lower a ramp and either roll or
shove the ammunition overboard or to
use “special gravity rollers where
smaller types of ammunition were
concerned.”83

Dumping

was

also

limited by the amount each vessel
could carry safely to the designated
site. Multiple trips were needed which
Photo 20 On arrival at the ammunition dumping
ground off Cairnryan, members of the Royal Army
Ordnance Corps (RAOC) place shells on gravity rollers
that take the ammunition over the side of the ship and
into the sea. Note the man in the background who is
simply throwing ammunition overboard. © IWM (H
42208)

increased the chances of navigational
errors and delays because of bad
weather or rough seas.84 The travel
times and dumping techniques greatly
limited

how

much

was

tossed

overboard in a single day, so dumping one stockpile could drag on for days and often
take place in areas that were never officially recorded. Finally, to limit the handling of
both deteriorated ammunition and chemical weapons, these objects were loaded onto
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surplus landingcraft in port and then towed out to designated coordinates and scuttled.85
Of course, loading all these eggs in one basket created the potential for an unmitigated
disaster, especially if handling procedures were not strictly followed in port (to say
nothing about relieving the WAC of storing and maintaining surplus naval vessels sunk
with the deadly cargo onboard).
These challenges were perhaps best illustrated by one dumping operation that took
place in February 1946 near Sable Island. The debacle, recounted in DND records and by
John Bryden in his book Deadly Allies, developed into a comedy of errors since nothing
went to plan and make-shift solutions were adapted to finish the job.86 On 18 February,
LST No. 209 was loaded with its cargo of about 2,000 tons of mustard gas and towed out
to sea by two tug boats hired from a private firm, Foundation Maritime Ltd. in Halifax.
The two tugs and LST 209 were accompanied by a naval escort, the minesweeper HMCS
Middlesex, and an old army supply ship, HMCS General Drury, carrying members of the
local press, the Army’s disposal officer, and the WAC supervisor. However, while on
route, the convoy hit a winter gale that threw them off course and prevented a scuttling
party (provided by a Montreal-based private contractor Hayes, Stuart, and Coy Ltd.) from
boarding the ship.87 An attempt was made to sink the LST with depth charges, but when
it was discovered that 100 drums of mustard gas were stowed on the deck and not in the
cargo hold, the use of depth charges was not advisable. At dusk when the weather
cleared, the scuttling party boarded the LST but they botched the job when they
“neglected to open the after sea cocks” and as a result the “hulk settled very slowly and
was only half submerged at daylight the following day.”88 At this point the Middlesex
was requested to “holed the after end (of the LST) with Oerlikon fire” and after 400
rounds were expended the LST finally sank, roughly 200 miles from the designated
position. Several of the drums were observed floating around the dump site afterwards
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and rifle fire from 50 to 70 yards was used to sink them.89 Indeed, dumping could be
dangerous, improvised, and occur far away from sanctioned locations.
Although some relatively detailed records were kept by the DND, there was little
incentive to do so. This was not only because of the frequency and routine nature of
dumping operations, but also because there was little civilian oversight. PC6099 and the
CAAC’s exemption for the armed forces effectively limited the required documentation
and the involvement of Canada’s disposal administration in overseeing this aspect of
disarmament.90 As the handwritten marginalia of the Chief of Naval Administration and
Supply (CNAS) explained in a 4 May 1946 memo, “there is little use in declaring
explosives stores to Crown Assets as we have authority to dump all surplus stores of this
nature and which we report periodically in accordance with CAAC letter 4th Sept.
1945.”91 The Army, Navy and Air Force had a free hand when it came to dumping
ammunition and they used it often, although they did periodically inform the Committee
and Corporation about their activities. The WAC kept tabs on the situation, usually
through regional supervisors and by covering some of the costs of dumping. In the wake
of the Bedford Magazine Explosion it would appear that all parties involved in the
destruction of ammunition achieved a satisfactory arrangement and procedure to carry it
out, though preserving detailed records was not a priority.
Although the Navy did the lion’s share of dumping, it did not handle every aspect.
In many instances, dumping was a joint operation between the three Services. Canada’s
dumping program for mustard gas exemplifies this cooperation. By contrast, to the US
and UK, the dumping of Canada’s chemical weapons arsenals were much smaller in
89
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terms of tonnage and took less time to carry out, but they were nonetheless important to
the country’s efforts at demobilization. At least two specific dumping operations were
carried out by a joint Army-Navy task force (though there were probably more), first in
February 1946 and then again in late September or early October 1947.92 In the two
operations a total of about 3,000 tons of mustard gas was shipped by train from the
Stormont Chemicals Ltd. plant in Cornwall, Ontario, to Halifax (1946) and Esquimalt
(1947) for disposal. In both operations, the Army was responsible for the shipping and
handling, while the Navy provided the vessels, navigation, and “other marine aspects.”93
Despite the comedy of errors that befell the Halifax expedition, the lethal cargo was sunk
in water 1,000 fathoms deep
and “200 miles from Halifax
and 60 miles South and South
East of Sable Island.”94 In
Esquimalt, the dumping took
place over ten days, 100 miles
out from the harbour at a site
approved by the Ministry of
Fisheries that was “well clear of
the continental shelf.”95
Photo 21 Drums of mustard gas awaiting disposal, 30 January
1946. Each container was likely dumped in the ocean. Source:
LAC, Series: Army, Z-4407-8, MIKAN no. 4462568.

The Army also proceeded
unilaterally

and

dumped

ammunition in the Great Lakes.
Although not substantiated in archival records, it appears that the Army used the Great
Lakes as an emergency measure to maintain its own demobilization schedule while the
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Navy got its affairs back in order after the Bedford Magazine Explosion. Reporting for
the Globe and Mail on 20 November 1945, James Vipond told readers about the Army’s
test dump of 150 tons of obsolete ammunition jettisoned into seventy-eight fathoms of
fresh water at Dyer Bay on Lake Huron, two miles from the Bruce Peninsula and several
miles north of Owen Sound. The test, performed by the Great Lakes tugboat Northern,
took several trips to complete and the twelve soldiers accompanying Captain J. M.
Seldon, an ordnance expert in the Canadian Army, threw the ammunition and explosives
overboard by hand. Seldon later explained to Vipond in an interview that it was not
possible to salvage any materials from the shells and that the ammunition was obsolete
since Dunkirk in 1940.96 However, this was just the tip of the iceberg. This successful test
dump paved the way for future operations in Dyer Bay as the Army shipped at least
another 1,000 tons of ammunition from Petawawa to Owen Sound. Adding to the
operation’s success was the fact that the WAC sold the wooden boxes and metal
containers used for storing the ordnance as 10,000 wooden tool boxes and 5,000 boxes
for packing fish.97 One hopes that each container was decontaminated beforehand.

Conclusion
After the Second World War, the ocean dumping of ammunition, explosives, and
weaponry was the primary method used by the Allies to disarm Germany and Japan as
well as their own armed forces. This was a gigantic and global undertaking that put
hundreds of millions of tons of conventional and chemical weapons at the bottom of Old
Davey’s Locker. As a junior ally Canada played only a small role. Its armed forces and
government officials were neither trailblazers nor pioneers, but the country still dumped
hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A
powerful consortium of government officials, ordnance experts, military authorities,
scientists, oceanographers, and corporations approved of the practice. During this time,
the main concerns that guided policy formation and implementation were: public safety,
the quantities requiring destruction, the financial costs, storage requirements, and the
technical nature of the task. Ocean dumping appeared to be the miracle cure that
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alleviated most problems. Moreover, it was a relatively quick, efficient, and pragmatic
solution that was adaptable to almost all local conditions across the world.
Once underwater, munitions quickly fade from memory but their toxic legacies
persist. Contemporaries were not concerned by the effects of saltwater corrosion or the
future dangers posed by all the chemicals, acids, metals, and carcinogens that formed the
munitions. Over time, saltwater corrodes through each casing which releases the
poisonous contents into marine environments. This threatens water quality, fish stocks,
and the food chain, and complicates cleanup operations (since SONAR cannot distinguish
between a clump of TNT and the ocean floor). Presently, the dangers of underwater
munitions have never been higher. Anecdotal evidence suggests that cancer rates are
more common in communities that depend on the fish harvested from dump sites, while
chemical and conventional munitions frequently wash up on shores, killing or injuring
people every year around the world. Moreover, oil and gas companies have constructed
offshore drilling rigs and underwater pipelines in known dumping grounds where
spontaneous explosions are common, such as in the Gulf of Mexico, the Irish Sea, and off
the Atlantic coast of Canada.98 The environmental and ecological costs of ammunition
dumping are one of the Second World War’s most pervasive but underappreciated
legacies.
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Conclusion
Prologue to Peace, Epilogue to War
We may be winning the war abroad but we have still to win peace at
home…The disassembly job facing War Assets is in some respects even more
difficult than the assembly job which has been done by other government
departments. But its importance is paramount.1
Editorial, 9 September 1944
No matter the duration, distance, or devastation when conflicts end the implements
of war require disposal. This dissertation explored how the Canadian government planned
and implemented its disposal strategy following the Second World War, but its subject
matter and conclusions are widely applicable to other conflicts and postwar experiences.
For instance, when Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan ended in 2012,
policymakers were beset with another disposal problem. Although it was not as large as
the one facing their predecessors, it shared some striking similarities and challenges. In
light of the global financial instability and the reduced spending priorities of Stephen
Harper’s Conservative government, steep budget cuts forced federal departments to
rapidly downsize and dispose of surplus inventories. Just like in the 1940s, the media
coverage and public opinion were not always favourable to the changes particularly when
the DND was forced to close military bases across the country, discard expensive
armaments that it had recently acquired, and cannibalize old weapon systems for
serviceable parts and equipment.2 As a result of this postwar transition, the federal
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government’s current disposal agency, GC Surplus, was overwhelmed with a whole
range of surplus assets produced by a shrinking bureaucracy and military.3
Media reports also revealed other challenges facing the DND that were similar to
those in 1945. One of the more pressing was the repatriation of weaponry and equipment
from Afghanistan. In 2012 and 2013, The Star and CBC News reported on the logistical
difficulties facing the military in Kandahar months after Canada’s combat mission ended.
The high costs of repatriating munitions and supplies from the war front had necessitated
some careful planning. It is unclear how much kit was sold to the Afghan military and
government, but the Canadian military decided to return its high-valued equipment
through an expensive air and sea operation. The “low priority” equipment was supposed
to be loaded onto trucks and shipped over land from the Kandahar airfield to the port at
Karachi, Pakistan. However, after an American airstrike killed twenty-four Pakistani
soldiers by accident, the Afghan-Pakistan border was closed until the Americans
apologized some seven months later. The roughly 375 shipping containers full of tires,
spare parts, and other types of equipment were “stranded” at the airfield, which resulted
in a logistical “nightmare” that steadily grew more expensive since the containers had to
be guarded and a special team sent to appraise their deteriorating conditions.4
Just as in the 1940s, the destruction of perfectly useable munitions and supplies
became a politically sensitive topic in the 2010s. In July 2015, the Ottawa Citizen
reported that millions’ worth of military gear was being scrapped instead of sold to
Ukraine. The optics did not look favourable, but the decision was reasonable given the
circumstances. The issue at stake was not a government ignoring potential markets for
surplus kit or unwilling to aid a beleaguered ally, but the incompatibility of Canada’s
weapon systems with Ukrainian variants. The diffusion of military technology was not
3

Laura Payton, “Government Surplus Auction Site Sells Cars, Jewelry, Office Furniture,” CBC News, 29
May 2014, (Accessed 22 November 2014) http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/government-surplus-auctionsite-sells-cars-jewelry-office-furniture-1.2649860; “Wacky Items for Sale By Federal Government,” CBC
News, no date, (Accessed 10 December 2015) http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wacky-items-for-sale-byfederal-government-1.2652043. To bid on surplus property, go to: www.GCsurplus.ca.
4

Colin Perkel, “Canadian Military Gear Still Stuck in Afghanistan,” The Star, 5 July 2012, (Accessed 31
July
2015)
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/07/05/canadian_military_gear_still_stuck_in_afghanistan.html; “Canadian Military Gear Stranded in Afghanistan, The Canadian Press, 19 May 2013
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possible because the Ukrainian forces used different types of systems and technologies.
Any acquisition of Canadian assets by Ukraine required months of training and the
creation of new logistical and maintenance procedures. Without any prospective buyers,
there were few alternatives except to scrap the ten Husky and Buffalo armoured vehicles,
194 LAV-2s, four specialized landmine detector vehicles, and 5,400 Eryx anti-tank
missiles.5 The decision to destroy these surpluses was expensive since the vehicles alone
had cost Canadian taxpayers $30 million in 2007. A further incentive for scrapping was
the rising cost of maintenance and storage which would easily surpass any profits accrued
from sales. Naturally, such actions were not popular with critics who were not aware of
all the factors at play or whether components were salvaged from scrap heaps.6
The disposal of munitions and supplies is an important but underappreciated
element of military history. All too often scholarly inquiry is squarely focused on the
mobilization, procurement, and deployment of new weapon systems; while little is said
about how those objects were demobilized and disposed of when they were no longer
required. This observation about a general historiographical trend in military history
should not be taken lightly. It not only highlights the “boys and their toys” stereotypes
about military historians, it also points to a set of challenging questions that need some
consideration. When new kit is acquired by the military it replaces something else, so
why are military historians not more interested in the disposal of old things? Why do
military historians write studies focused only on the acquisition of new weapon systems
and technologies? It is unfortunate that scholars are not more curious about how
militaries discard their obsolete weaponry and clean up their battlefields after the fighting
ends. Understanding why and how things are thrown away can illuminate a great deal
about the past; perhaps even more than what gets kept and preserved over time.
These questions also hint at a larger issue that contextualizes some of this current
fascination with procurement. Since the Second World War ended, consumers (and
military historians alike) have been inundated by a diverse material opulence grounded in

5

David Pugliese, “Millions in military gear goes to scrap heap instead of Ukraine,” Ottawa Citizen, 3 July
2015 (Accessed 31 July 2015) http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/millions-in-military-gear-goes-toscrap-heap-instead-of-ukraine.
6
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vast inventories of cheap and disposal products. The prevalence of disposability is
everywhere and it is reaching alarming rates. Today, every North American is on pace to
generate 102 tons of garbage over their lifetimes – that amounts of 7.1 lbs. of trash
created every day, from birth to death.7 Living in a world dominated by garbage and
planned obsolescence has created a cultural emphasis that privileges the acquisition of
new things and new technologies. It is small wonder that military historians have shown
little interest in derelict things, thrift, or the longevity of product lifecycles when the
preponderance of disposability has simplified and minimized their complexity. As a
result, the types of questions military historians ask about the past are conditioned away
from understanding the mutability of objects or the political, economic, social, and
environment significance of disposal operations. In effect, planned obsolescence has
dulled the curiosity for how disposal works and affects lifestyles.
This dissertation has shown that today’s extreme wastefulness was a luxury that
few Canadians could afford in the 1940s. At that time, Depression-era thrift still
influenced people’s instincts to conserve and derive as much value from junk as possible.
Moreover, Canadians accurately predicted that the government and military would shrink
in size once the war ended, thereby releasing surplus inventories into the economy and,
with any luck, their personal possession. Everyone envisioned a postwar plan that was
underpinned by a material world. After years of scarcity, Canadians wanted access to
cheaper goods and higher living standards, but their ambitions and expectations were
often trumped by the cold realities of supply shortages, unemployment, and the other
transitional “shocks” prevalent after the war.8 This dissertation has also shown that the
government and military anticipated the needs of peace and developed their own visions
of victory. As early as May 1943, bureaucrats and military officers realized that they
needed to develop a comprehensive disposal strategy for surplus munitions and supplies
or else they risked serious political, economic, and social dislocation. However, despite
their best intentions for creating an efficient disposal strategy, as operations unfolded

7

Humes, Garbology 1-38, especially 1-6.

8

LAC, RG101, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Newspaper Clippings, “Move to Cushion the Shocks,” Montreal
Gazette, 3 December 1943.
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officials discovered their efforts were not always productive especially once the flood of
surplus assets peaked in 1946.
Contemporaries clearly understood that military assets do not simply disappear
when they are no longer needed. Rather, objects require a concerted set of programs and
policies to control their collection, storage, and final disposition. This dissertation
documented the origins of Canada’s postwar disposal administration, its objectives and
policies, and how it functioned. It showed that the disposal process was not neutral and
nor was it perfectly implemented. The establishment of the CAAC and WAC was the
product of political, economic, and social pressures that forced the government into
action. However, policies and procedures did not always conform to the expectations of
some interest groups, while they deliberately favoured others. This provoked an evolving
array of criticism that continually dogged the best efforts of the CAAC and WAC
throughout their existence. Disposal operations unfolded through a process of trial and
error and were constantly plagued by the battle against diminishing returns. Each policy
and procedure enabled both positive and negative results, but they also required constant
attention and careful adjustments that were not always possible at any given moment.
The objects of war were accumulated on such a massive scale that large surpluses
inevitability resulted. Some of these surpluses were in peak condition when the war
ended, but they were also liable to rapidly depreciate in value given their condition, war
damage, technological advances, or dubious civilian applications. The Second World
War was incredibly wasteful and the CAAC and WAC faced the daunting task of
minimizing the war’s waste through the reuse, reduction, recycling, and upcycling of
munitions and supplies. Besides the vast quantities of leftover war junk, the war’s
wastefulness manifested itself in other areas as well. The tens of millions of people who
died worldwide between 1939 and 1945 stand as a stark reminder of the human tragedy,
but the colossal expenditure of material resources should not be discounted. The
“abnormal wartime depletion” of minerals, timber, coal, water, food, and other essential
resources posed some serious dilemmas for policymakers who expected consumption
rates to grow in peacetime even if soil nutrients were depleted, forests clear cut, and ore
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deposits exhausted by wartime extraction.9 The Second World War also produced some
dangerous environmental legacies, as its hazardous remnants are worldwide and range
from abandoned kit in remote places to crumbling fortifications at tourist sites and from
unexploded ordnance to polluted landscapes. However, the most serious environmental
legacy stems from the ocean dumping of munitions, years of saltwater corrosion, and the
leaching of carcinogenic chemicals into marine environments and the food chain. In the
final reckoning, one could argue that the greatest single victim of the war was the planet
Earth. Unfortunately, the wider community of military historians – especially in Canada –
have been slow to address the study of warfare and its impact on the environment, which
makes this field a unique and compelling addition to current paradigms and debates about
the Second World War.
This dissertation has also demonstrated how the disposal of munitions and supplies
supported postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation to produce some positive and
productive outcomes. Disarming and disbanding military forces might remove
opportunities for utilizing the weapon systems for their intended purposes, but that alone
will not eliminate or change their forms, functions, and intentions. Instead, these
implements of war traversed a disposal process that reshaped and reconfigured them into
peaceful purposes. The reduction, recycling, and upcycling of surplus war assets not only
converted munitions and supplies to fulfill civilian needs, they also recovered resources
and parts that supplied economic activity in the early postwar period. Although the
convertibility of surplus assets provided a significant benefit, reusing munitions and
supplies for their primary functions was still the most valuable and desired alternative.
The sale of reusable items to corporations and foreign, provincial, and municipal
governments were the most profitable transactions and allowed the CAAC and WAC to
recoup as much money as possible. Through these efforts, the Canadian government
operated a disposal strategy that implemented one of the first government-run initiatives
designed to redistribute industrial production by managing a system that reversed
wartime logistics to support peacetime consumption.
9

LAC, RG28, Vol. 859, File: “Minutes of Staff Meetings in Minister’s Office, 1944-1945, “Re:
Investigation of Mineral Economics,” A. A. MacKay to R. A. C. Henry, 3 May 1945. A. A. MacKay was
the DRS’s Co-ordinator of Resources Development and he was writing to inform Henry that more funding
was urgently needed so that exploration and development work could take place in the mining industry.
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The history of the disposal of munitions and supplies after the Second World War
is more than just a study of disarmament and demobilization; it is also a study of how
munitions and supplies were transformed, reused, recycled, and upcycled into new or
different purposes in peacetime. When the objects of war are repurposed or completely
discarded to support postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation, they have fundamental
consequences for postwar political, economic, and social developments. They shape the
contours of the material environment that structures human experiences and become
active legacies that participate in social, spatial, and human relationships in uneven
patterns of utility and meaning. For those Canadians living in the 1940s, the disposal of
munitions and supplies underpinned the transition from war to peace and provisioned
postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation in ways that historians are only starting to
understand.
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Appendix 1

Disposal of Crown Plants, by Wartime Use of Plants, as at June 1, 1948
Proportion of Floor Space
Total
Made
Retained
Floor
available
For
by the
Dismantled
Space
Wartime Use of Plants
to private disposal
Crown
industry
000’s
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
sq. ft.
Shipbuilding
1,958
4
77
4
15
Aircraft
7,411
28
70
2
Automotive
616
10
90
Guns and Small Arms
3,498
19
81
Small Arms Ammunition
3,519
30
68
2
Ammunition Components
678
11
89
Ammunition Filling
7,804
80
1
2
17
Chemicals and Explosives
4,594
25
30
45
Instruments and
872
17
83
Communications
Miscellaneous Stores
67
100
Industrial Equipment
216
60
40
Basic Materials
2,267
28
71
1
Totals
33,500
37
51
1
11
Source: LAC, RG2, Vol. 79, File: C-85, Disposal and Peacetime Use of Crown Plant Buildings, 18, Table
5.
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Appendix 2
Standard
Procedure
CAAC 1
CAAC 2

CAAC 3

CAAC 4

CAAC 5
CAAC 6
CAAC 7
CAAC 8
CAAC 9
CAAC 10

CAAC 101

CAAC 103
CAAC 102

CAAC 201
US
CAAC 202
US

CAAC Standard Procedures, 1-10
Date of
Revision
Title/Purpose
Issue
1 Apr 44
Issuance of Standard Procedures
16 Apr 44
Report of Surplus
A
8 July 44
B
4 Jan 45
Reporting of Surplus
C
30 Dec 48
16 Apr 44
Surplus Crown Property – Schedule of Types
A
6 July 44
Transfers, Allocations, or Sales of Surplus
28 Apr 44
Assets
Transfers, Allocations, Priority, or Sales of
A
6 July 44
Surplus Crown Assets
Transfers, Priority and Sales of Surplus
B
3 Apr 46
Crown Assets to Federal Government
Departments or Agencies
28 Apr 44
Requests for Allocation of Crown Surplus
Demands for Material or Equipment in the
29 May 44
Possession of War Assets Corporation Ltd.
27 Sept 44
Disposal of Ships
Charges Involved in the Custody and
24 Apr 45
Maintenance of Surplus Crown Real Property
Disposal of Surplus Real Property Either
1 May 45
Leased or Crown-owned (see Order in
Council PC6204, 11 Aug 44)
19 Jun 46
Notice of Allocation
Issuance of Standard Procedures Covering the
Reporting and Disposition of Surplus In
1 Mar 45
Canada Which is the Property of
Governments other than the Canadian
Government
1 Mar 45
War Surplus - Schedule of Types
15 May 45 Reporting of Surplus (in Canada) which is the
property of governments other than the
Canadian Government
Disposal of United States of America
15 May 45
Government-owned Immovables in Canada
15 May 45
Disposal of United States of America
Government-owned Moveables in Canada
Revised
1 Nov 45
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